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Preface
With this fourth edition, the time is right to separate out the different forms 
of electronic signature, giving each a separate chapter. I anticipate that this approach will enable the reader to have a better understanding of the different 
forms in which an electronic signature can be manifest.The case law on the topic has increased – in fact it has increased to such an extent that I have not been able to incorporate as many cases in this text as I have 
discovered after cursory searches in electronic search engines. If I have missed a 
particularly important case, please let me know. I have begun to prefer citing case 
law from appellate courts. I have also removed the extensive list of legislation on the basis that I maintain a table of world legislation that is updated and published in the Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review occasionally. This list in turn now relies on lawyers and legal scholars from across the world to help 
keep it up-to-date.
This leads me on to consider the purpose and structure of this book. A number of issues arise, such as whether the book should be as comprehensive as possible, or a more selective approach might be considered; whether to include examples 
from as many jurisdictions as possible, or to restrict the citing of examples. In addition, the question also arises as to how individual chapters for each type of electronic signature is structured – that is, whether a country by country analysis is appropriate, or if the analysis by legal topic is more helpful, together with a 
breakdown by jurisdiction.Another concern for this edition are the suggestions by my good friend Timothy 
S. Reiniger in his review of the third edition.1 Tim, who is a principal author of the Electronic Identity Management Act of Virginia,2 suggested:In a future edition, the reviewer hopes that Mason will add discussion and analysis of cybernetics, information theory, and entropy in the context of various proposed forms of electronic 
signature and identity credential strategies. This would be a great addition to policy discussions around federated identity management, access control, trustworthy computing, and identity 
theft.
We have discussed these issues on occasion. One consideration will be to extend 
the book to include identity and authentication. Unfortunately, the timetable 
1 The Journal of Law, Science and Technology, 53 (2013), pp. 239-47.
2 Chapter 483 An Act to amend the Code of Virginia by adding in Title 2.2 a chapter 
numbered 4.3, consisting of sections numbered 2.2-436 and 2.2-437, and by adding in 
Title 59.1 a chapter numbered 50, consisting of sections numbered 59.1-550 through 59.1-
555, relating to electronic identity management; standards; liability. [S 814]. Approved 23 
March 2015.
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leading up to the preparation of the fourth edition did not permit such an 
extension. Perhaps readers will kindly offer their opinions on this suggested 
change.I agreed with the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies to host the Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review online under open source, and I have now decided that this book is better available online under a Creative Commons 
licence as well. I am delighted to take part in this project with the School of Advanced Study, University of London and the Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies. I sincerely hope that by putting the book online and making it available as open source, it will become more widely available – and in turn, I hope to 
encourage others to take part in the next edition – for which see the manifesto.Finally, I have an observation regarding the types of electronic signature that are 
listed in this book as ‘electronic signatures’. For many jurists across the world, the act of ticking an icon in the shape of a box to accept the terms of a contract 
can hardly count as a form of signature. In the physical world, that must be right. 
Similarly, it might be questioned that a personal identity number (PIN) can also 
be considered to be an electronic signature. Here is the analysis I offer in my book When Bank Systems Fail: Debit cards, credit cards, ATMs, mobile and online 
banking: your rights and what to do when things go wrong (2nd edn., St Albans: 
PP Publishing, 2014), pp. 50–1:
Arguably, the PIN combines two functions. Before considering the 
two functions, consider the requirements of the bank. The bank needs to satisfy itself that:
1. The card is legitimate (this is difficult to achieve, as the 
reports about fraud demonstrate), and
2. The card is in the possession of the customer to whom it was issued, or a person authorised by the customer to use 
the card.
If the bank satisfies itself that its computer systems are interacting 
with the card issued to the customer (which is not always the case), then the computer system requests the purported customer to 
undertake one further act to confirm they (or a person authorised 
by them) have physically inserted the card into the ATM or the 
point of sale terminal, by keying in the correct PIN. Generally, if the computer systems receive positive results from both interactions, then the bank will permit the person at the ATM or the point of sale terminal to undertake whatever activity they are permitted to do 
within the terms of the mandate.
The first function of a PIN
The first function of the PIN acts as a means of authentication. The PIN purports to demonstrate that the person that keyed in the 
PIN knew the correct PIN (there are some forms of attack that do 
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not need the correct PIN – any combination of numbers will act 
to deceive the card issuer that the correct PIN has been keyed in).
The second function of a PIN
Once the computer systems of the bank are satisfied that the card is legitimate and the PIN is the correct PIN of the customer, then the person at the ATM or the point of sale terminal can undertake any activity on the account that is permitted within the mandate 
and within the limitations of the technology.The PIN, even though it is offered to the machine before a transaction is effected, acts as a signature to verify a payment or 
other form of transaction. This means that the presentation of a card to an ATM, and the input of a PIN, is similar to a cheque that is written out by the account holder, signed, and then presented to the 
cashier at the bank. The customer completes the action necessary to request a payment in advance of the payment being made by the cashier, and then signs the cheque in the presence of the cashier – all before receiving acknowledgment that a transaction has been 
authorised. This means the PIN is a form of electronic signature.
It might be considered that the action of clicking the ‘I accept’ icon or box, or typing in a PIN are merely a means by which the person agrees to conclude the 
contract, but the act is not that of appending their electronic signature.This analysis might be right, but we must recall that the digital world is different 
to the physical world. Conceptually, some of the forms of electronic signature 
may not strictly be considered ‘signatures’ in the physical world. Nevertheless, it is a convenient shorthand to refer to some forms of agreeing to enter a contract 
as an ‘electronic signature’ – at least we can all understand the meaning behind 
these words, even if the form is not quite what we expect. Stephen Mason
stephenmason@stephenmason.euLangford, BedfordshireSeptember 2016
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1The signature
1.1 The purpose of this chapter is to put the concept of the signature into a broad legal context; to set out the purposes that can be attributed to a signature 
and to explain the functions a signature is capable of performing. In order to appreciate what constitutes an electronic signature, it is helpful to understand the function a signature performs and how judges have responded to changes 
in technology over the generations. It is for this reason that this chapter sets out a brief history of how judges have responded to changes in technology and the different methods that have been used to indicate how a signature can be made 
manifest. The function a signature performs remains as valid in the electronic age as when the use of an impression of a seal was considered to be the best means of authentication before the advent of widespread literacy, although seals, 
as with all other forms of evidence, were forged.1
1.2 It should be acknowledged that many of the cases referred to in this 
chapter refer to statutes that may well have been amended or appealed. However, this does not detract from the problems that lawyers and judges faced when 
applying legal principles to new forms of technology. As most of these cases illustrate, judges applied the underlying legal principles to the facts of the case, leaving the technology to one side, because the technology does not affect the 
legal principles. That judges and lawyers have had to deal with new technologies is hardly unique, and to suggest that judges are dealing with technological change 
for the first time in history is erroneous. Judges have always been required to apply the law, regardless of the technology used, and the development of the 
networked world is no different.
The purpose of a signature
1.3 Legislation providing for electronic signatures has, essentially, been directed to provide for the authenticity of the person using the signature, although various statutes provide for additional uses, such as providing for 
the integrity of a message or document. Authentication can be the process by which a person or legal entity seeks to verify the validity or genuineness of a 
particular piece of information. Alternatively, it can mean the formal assertion 
of validity, such as the signing of a certificate: we authenticate what it certifies. In certain circumstances, there may also be a need to verify the identity of an 
individual or legal entity, although what is meant by ‘identity’ will also depend 
1 R. G. Johnston, D. D. Martinez and A. R. E. Garcia, ‘Were ancient seals secure?’, Antiquity, 75 
(2001), pp. 299–305.
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on the reason for ascertaining the identity.2 With a cheque, the signature serves to link the name of the person printed on the cheque with the person that claims 
to have the authority to draw money from the account indicated on the cheque. The existence of the cheque guarantee card with a manuscript signature on the reverse serves to reinforce the link between the card and the cheque, although the signature, even if the signature on the reverse of the cheque guarantee card matches the signature on the cheque, does not necessarily identify the 
person signing the cheque.3 In cheque cases, the printed name on a cheque is not necessarily accepted as a form of signature, although it can contribute 
to authenticity. For instance, Lawton LJ considered the issue of authenticity in 
relation to a cheque with a name printed on it, and suggested that ‘A printed name accompanied by a written signature was prima facie evidence that the 
cheque was being drawn on the account it purported to be drawn on’,4 although in the South African case of Akasia Finance v. Da Souza,5 Leveson J indicated 
why, at 338 G-H, he did not consider the name printed on the cheque could be a signature:At the foot of each cheque, where the signature of the drawer is 
normally to be found, appear the words, ‘Domestic Homes (Pty) 
Ltd, Registration No 73/0541’. The words are printed and are 
plainly printed by machine.It is well known that for several years past banks have been 
issuing cheque books to their customers with the customer’s name machine-printed thereon in the same space as the cheques in the 
present case. The printing is usually computer-controlled. This is 
done as part of a design to facilitate the modern banking system. Of 
importance is the fact that the printing is not done by the customer. 
It is therefore not the company’s signature in the sense that, if put there by a person authorised by a corporate customer, it would 
constitute the company’s signature or seal under the provisions of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
2 N. Bohm and S. Mason, ‘Identity and its verification’, Computer Law & Security Review, 26 
(2001), pp. 43–51; for a technical response, see R. E. Smith, Authentication: from password 
to public keys (Boston, Mass., 2002).
3 A website cited in previous editions of this text (http://www.zug.com/pranks/credit_
card/) illustrated how little people relied on a manuscript signature for the many millions 
of transactions conducted every day. The illustrations included the use of variations of 
their signature with a number of transactions, including evidence of the transaction slips. 
Alas, this website is no longer available.4 Ringham v. Hackett (1980) 124 SJ 201 at 202(a). In Central Motors (Birmingham) Ltd v. P 
A & S N P Wadsworth [1982] CAT 231, 28 May 1982; (1983) 133 NLJ 555 Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division), a second account holder was held jointly liable for a cheque that he did not 
sign under the provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.
5 1993 (2) SA 337 (W).
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1.4 The function of a signature is generally determined by the nature and 
content of the document to which it is affixed.
1.5 It is thought that the act of a person fixing their name to a document is 
well understood by lawyers and non-lawyers alike. However, a consideration of the case law demonstrates the range of issues that have arisen in relation to what 
seems, at first glance, a relatively simple concept. The means by which judges have 
tested the validity of a signature has altered over time. From concentrating on the form a signature takes, judges went on to question its validity by considering the 
function the signature performs.6 The analysis in the move from form to function 
applies equally to the analysis of electronic signatures. The perceptive comments from the sound dissenting judgment of Bell J in 1855 in the South African case of Van Vuuren v. Van Vuuren,7 at 121 provides a useful summary with which to begin:
… the expression ‘to sign’ a document has no strict legal or 
technical meaning different from the popular meaning, viz., to authenticate by that which stands for or is intended to represent 
the name of the person who is to authenticate. If you say to the 
most illiterate person ‘Sign this paper,’ if he cannot write, he will put a cross to it, and if he do not know how to do this the most 
experienced man of business cannot tell him to do more. If the party have learned a little writing, or if rheumatism of hard labour have cramped the nerves of his hand, and you ask him to sign a document, he will put the initial capital letters of his Christian and surname, while he will not venture upon writing the other 
more minute and therefore more difficult to be executed letters 
of these names, and he will feel satisfied that he has ‘signed’. If the man of business doubt this, and, seeing he can write so far as to 
be able to make the capital letters, think it will not be sufficient without the smaller letters, and insist upon his making them, 
should the party say he cannot, the lawyer will be content. On the other hand, should the party make the attempt and produce a scrawl more or less legible, so again the man of business will be content – whether the scrawl be legible or illegible, he will 
be satisfied that the man has ‘signed’. Such is the popular and professional practice, and the decision of the Courts had been 
conformably to it.
6 C. Reed, ‘What is a signature?’, Journal of Information, Law and Technology, 3 (2000), 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/reed/.
7 2 Searle 116.
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Dictionary definitions
1.6 The Oxford English Dictionary offers a number of definitions of the word 
‘signature’ as a noun and a verb.8 The earliest references relate to signatures of 
a public nature that are intended to have legal effect. The first definition of a 
signature as a noun is that of ‘A writing prepared and presented to the Baron of Exchequer by a writer to the signet, as the ground of a royal grant to the person 
in whose name it is presented’. An illustration for 1534 refers to ‘To pass with 
writings and signaturis to be subscrivit be the Kingis grace’. The remaining 
references for this entry also relate to royal signatures in the public domain. 
The second and third definitions continue with the same meaning. Item 2(a) is 
defined as ‘The name (or special mark) of a person written with his or her own 
hand as an authentication of some document or writing’, and is illustrated from 
Hollyband of 1580, referring to ‘the signature or marke of a Notaries’, with the 
next illustration from Coke dated 1633 referring to ‘A bill superscribed with the 
signature or signe manuall, or royall hand of the King’. The third reference, item 
2(b), ‘The action of signing one’s name, or of authenticating a document by doing 
so’, is also illustrated by an early reference to Lord Keeper Williams from 1621: 
‘Some things wee must offer to the kings signature when the clarkes are not to 
bee found’.
1.7 The law dictionaries vary in their treatment of the definition of ‘signature’. 
Some provide a definition that is similar to that offered by the Oxford English 
Dictionary, such as:
Signature. A sign or mark impressed upon anything; a stamp, a mark; the name of a person written by himself either in full or by initials as regards his Christian name or names, and in full as regards his surname, or by initials only … or by a mark only, though 
he can write … or by rubber stamp … or by proxy.A person signs a document when he writes or marks something 
on it in token of his intention to be bound by its contents. In the case of an ordinary person, signature is commonly performed by 
his subscribing his name to the document, and hence ‘signature’ 
is frequently used as equivalent to ‘subscription’; but any mark is 
sufficient if it shows an intention to be bound by the document; 
illiterate people commonly sign by making a cross.9
1. A person’s name or mark written by that person or at that 
person’s direction. 2. Commercial law. Any name, mark, or writing 
used with the intention of authenticating a document.10
8 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd edn. on CD-ROM, version 4.0, 2009).9 Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (4th edn., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015).10 Black’s Law Dictionary (10th edn., n.p., West Group, 2014).
1. The signature 5
1.8 Other legal dictionaries provide judicial examples of the meaning to be 
attributed to a signature, with case examples.11
The manuscript signature
1.9 The epitome of a signature is the act of an individual writing their name in their own hand on a document, usually in the form of a manuscript 
signature.12 More widely, it is the action of a person affixing a permanent 
imprint upon a document. In the world before the invention of electricity and computers, an imprint was required to have the characteristic of permanency 
because it was necessary to retain tangible evidence of intention. In addition, the parties to the document may consider it necessary to retain the evidence 
for a sufficient length of time in order to enforce any rights or obligations 
evidenced in the record. Before the development of the telegraph, a document 
would normally be considered something written onto a material, mainly paper. Although a number of people may be involved with the framing of a document 
and its subsequent manifestation in its final physical form, the document will 
have been created physically. Thus if an instruction was passed from one party to another by means of the operators of a semaphore, the sending operator could give evidence of the instructions received from the instructing party and the signals they used to transmit the message, and the receiving operator 
could give evidence of the signals they observed and noted down on paper. With the development of communications over the electric telegraph, the same principles would apply as with the semaphore, but the electronic pulses would be interpreted in the light of the code used by the sending and receiving 
operators. The use of the telegraph meant that the message was encoded 
into electronic pulses, but the pulses were not stored. The receiving operator 
transferred the evidence of the message to a carrier. In contrast, software code transmits and stores the data in digital format, but the data are not visible 
to the human eye. It requires a combination of the interpretation and use of 
hardware and software to make the data visible to the human. In a world that relied on physical and permanent evidence of proof of intent, the requirement 
for an enduring record is understandable. While the legal consequences of a 
signature will differ when fixed to artefacts, such as items of pottery, paintings, sculpture and carvings on surfaces such as stone, marble, glass and wooden furniture, nevertheless a signature is capable of establishing the identity of the 
11 Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (8th edn., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2015). The entry in this dictionary is of useful length, separating out different areas of 
law with good discussion. Words and Phrases legally defined (4th edn., London: LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2007; supplement 2010).12 Although the tuğra (a cipher or imperial monogram) of the Ottoman sultans that served 
as the signature of the sultan was drawn up by a court official and affixed to official 
documents. Over time, it was also carved on seals and stamped on coins, and artists illuminated later tuğra.
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creator of the article and is also capable of authenticating the provenance of 
the object.13
1.10 A document usually exists on a carrier, typically paper. The carrier is marked permanently with content, usually with ink, either in the form of 
handwriting or by means of a printing press. This process alters the carrier 
physically. The content imprinted on the carrier may include a range of information, depending on the nature of the document, including information 
about the person that created, issued or initiated the content. Over time, the carrier will include additional information as it is handled, including coffee or 
tea stains, scratches, additional content, fingerprints and DNA. Finally, a person 
or legal entity might sign the carrier with a signature. The reason for signing the document will depend on the nature of the document and the purpose for which 
the person is signing. When brought together, these components comprise the 
document in its entirety.14
Writing
1.11 In England and Wales, writing is defined in s5, Schedule 1 of the 
Interpretation Act 1978, and ‘includes typing, printing, lithography, photography and other modes of representing or reproducing words in visible form, and 
expressions referring to writing are construed accordingly’. This definition emphasizes the need for the writing to be in visible form, which excludes 
information in a digital format. This means that information in digital format 
will only come within this definition if it comes within the method set out in 
the definition, ‘and other modes of representing or reproducing words’.15 In his conclusion of whether information in digital format will amount to writing, Professor Reed suggested there were two possible approaches to this problem:
The distinction is not between information affixed to a carrier or not, but between informal speech and formally recorded information, in the same way that the content of a message was recorded by means of telegraph, although the problem with this analysis is that there is no distinction between the use of the 
technology in a formal or informal capacity.
The second possibility is to suggest that the requirement of ‘writing’ is merely evidential in nature, although the courts continue to 
13 The copy of a painting with a false signature painted on it with the intention of passing off the painting as by the genuine painter was determined to be a cheat at common law by Cockburn LCJ and his fellow judges in Regina v. Thomas Closs (1858) Crown Cases 
Reserved 460, Dears & Bell 460.14 For the meaning of a ‘document’ in a digital context, see S. Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence 
(3nd edn, London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), ch. 10.15 C. Reed, Digital Information Law: Electronic Documents and Requirements of Form 
(London: Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 1996), 83–4 for other statutory definitions 
and further comments.
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maintain the position that tendering oral evidence cannot rectify 
the lack of formality.16
1.12 It is useful to note the range of functions that writing performs in relation to a physical carrier, as considered in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce:17the following non-exhaustive list indicates reasons why national 
laws require the use of ‘writings’: (1) to ensure that there would be tangible evidence of the existence and nature of the intent of the 
parties to bind themselves; (2) to help the parties be aware of the 
consequences of their entering into a contract; (3) to provide that 
a document would be legible by all; (4) to provide that a document would remain unaltered over time and provide a permanent record 
of a transaction; (5) to allow for the reproduction of a document so 
that each party would hold a copy of the same data; (6) to allow for 
the authentication of data by means of a signature; (7) to provide that a document would be in a form acceptable to public authorities 
and courts; (8) to finalize the intent of the author of the ‘writing’ 
and provide a record of that intent; (9) to allow for the easy storage 
of data in a tangible form; (10) to facilitate control and subsequent 
audit for accounting, tax or regulatory purposes; and (11) to bring legal rights and obligations into existence in those cases where a 
‘writing’ was required for validity purposes.18
1.13 For the position in Scotland, the reader is referred to the Requirements of 
Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.
Statutory definition of signature
1.14 There does not appear to be a statutory definition of the term ‘signature’, and Ashman J commented in 1892 in a case regarding probate that there was no judicial formula either:19Exactly what constitutes a signature has never been reduced to a judicial formula … The principle upon which these cases proceeded was that whatever the testator of grantor was shown to 
16 Reed, Digital Information Law, 94–102.17 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was adopted by the Commission on 12 June 
1996, following its 605th meeting, which in turn was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 51/162 at its 85th plenary meeting on 16 December 1996, and includes an additional article 5 bis as adopted by the Commission at its 31st meeting in June 1998.18 Guide to Enactment paragraph 48.19 Mitchell J quoted these comments of Ashman J (whose decision was reversed) in In re 
Plate’s Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 23 A. 1038.
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have intended as his signature was a valid signing, no matter how 
imperfect or unfinished or fantastical or illegible, or even false, the separate characters or symbols he used might be, when critically 
judged.
1.15 The Interpretation Act 1978 does not provide a definition, although 
Professor Reed noted there were fifteen statutory definitions of ‘signature’ 
or ‘signing’ in force in 1996, eleven of which adopted an identical or similar 
variation to the following: ‘“signature” includes a facsimile of a signature by 
whatever process reproduced’.20 This particular definition is sufficiently general 
to include a representation of a signature in electronic format. The most obvious example is that of a manuscript signature that is scanned and converted into 
digital form. Such a representation can be attached to a document produced on a computer, or it could be the image of the signature as sent and received 
by a facsimile machine. It is estimated that there are in the region of 40,000 
references to the requirement for a manuscript signature.21 However, whether a personal signature is required depends upon the wording of the statute or 
from the context of the requirement.22 With respect to legislation, Professor Reed notes that the statutory provisions relating to the provision of a signature fall into three broad categories:23Where documents that have been signed are admissible in evidence, 
or create evidential presumptions. The evidential presumptions are either that the document is conclusive proof of its contents, or 
it is clear evidence of the facts set out in the document.Where documents have to be signed for the purpose of authentication, either expressly or from the context of the 
requirement.
Where a signature is required to exercise a statutory power.
The functions of a signature
1.16 In summary, a signature can serve a number of functions, each of which 
can have varying degrees of importance.24
20 Water Resources Act 1991 (c 57) Schedule 4, Part II, Proceedings of Flood Defence Committees, quoted in Reed, Digital Information Law, p. 225; Table 5.1, pp. 262–3 for the full list.21 HC Official Report (6th series) col 41, 29 November 1999; note also Reed, Digital 
Information Law, p. 239 and n. 41; Reed, ‘What is a signature?’, 3.1.2 and n. 68.22 Reed, Digital Information Law, pp. 233–4 and nn. 23 and 24.23 Reed, Digital Information Law, pp. 240–1. Professor Reed provides examples in nn. 42–52.24 L. L. Fuller, ‘Consideration and form’, Columbia Law Review, 41 (1941), pp. 799–824 
refers to the evidentiary, cautionary function and channelling functions; M. Sneddon, 
‘Legislating to facilitate electronic signatures and records: exceptions, standards and the 
impact on the statute book’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 21 (1998), part 
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The primary evidential function
1.17 It is suggested that the primary purpose of a signature serves to provide admissible and reliable evidence that comprises the following elements:
(i) To provide tangible evidence that the signatory approves and 
adopts the contents of the document.
(ii) In so doing, the signatory agrees that the content of the 
document is binding upon them and will have legal effect.
(iii) Further, the signatory is reminded of the significance of the act 
and the need to act within the provisions of the document.
1.18 The nature of the act of signing differs between the application of a 
manuscript signature and the use of an electronic signature. This is because a 
manuscript signature, if authentic, is biologically linked to a specific individual, but cryptographic authentication systems bind signatures to individuals by way 
of software code and procedural mechanisms.
1.19 With electronic signatures, the person does not physically sign anything, but causes software to sign electronically using an untrustworthy machine for knowing what document has been signed25 – even when using a biodynamic 
version of a manuscript signature. This is significant, because the act of signing using an electronic signature has a different symbolic meaning to that of a manuscript signature, and suggests a weaker sense of the involvement of the 
person in the process of signing, as noted by Professor Chou.26
2 II A (i)–(iv), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/1998/59.html; ‘Digital 
signature guidelines’ (Judicial Studies Board, 2000), p. 3; J. Dumortier, P. Van Eecke 
and I. Anné, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures (Leuven: Interdisciplinary Centre 
for Law and Information Technology, 1998), Report 1, Part III, p. 50; ISTEV, ‘Legal and Regulatory Issues for the European Trusted Services Infrastructure – European Trusted 
Services’ (2007), para 3; Digital Signature Guidelines (n.p.: American Bar Association, 
1996), pp. 4–9; A. McCullagh, P. Little and W. Caelli, ‘Electronic signatures: understand 
the past to develop the future’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, 21 (1998), p. 
56; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 with additional article 5 bis as adopted in 1998 (New York: United Nations, 1999) paras 48 and 
53; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures with Guide to Enactment 2001 (United 
Nations, New York 2002) para 29; ‘Protections of the acknowledgment’ in ‘A Position on 
Digital Signature Laws and Notarization’, a position statement from the National Notary Association, September 2000, 3 – 5; Promoting confidence in electronic commerce: legal 
issues on international use of electronic authentication and signature methods (Vienna: 
United Nations, 2009), pp. 1–8; for a similar overview of the same topic and discussion of 
the development of signatures, see L. Brazell, Electronic Signatures and Identities: Law and 
Regulation (2nd edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 2–001–2–043.25 S. Mason and T. S. Reiniger, ‘“Trust” between machines? Establishing identity between 
humans and software code, or whether you know it is a dog, and if so, which dog?’, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 21 (2015), pp. 135–48.26 E. Y. Chou, ‘Paperless and soulless: e-signatures diminish the signer’s presence and 
decrease acceptance’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6 (2015), pp. 343–51. 
Professor Chou also provides further citations.
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Secondary evidential functions
1.20 A signature can also provide evidence of identification and proof of the following:
(i) The signature can authenticate the identity of the person signing 
the document. One example would be to reinforce the causal link between the signature and a name printed on a document, such as 
a name printed on a chequebook or credit card.
(ii) The identity of a particular characteristic, or attribute, or status 
of the person such as a government minister or company director.
(iii) Where a person signing acknowledges, verifies or witnesses the record, but does not necessarily agree to be bound by the 
content of the document.
(iv)The existence of the document provides a record of the intent of the signatory, and, in turn, physical evidence of the originality and completeness of the document itself, including the time, date 
and place of the act of the affixing of the signature to the document.
(v) Where a person is a witness to the signing of a document, the signature of the witness can provide for the authenticity and the 
voluntary nature of the signature of a third party.
(vi) It can demonstrate that the content of the document has not 
been altered subsequently to the affixing of the signature.
(vii) A signature can provide evidence that the record is a true 
copy of another record.
Cautionary function
1.21 This function acts to reinforce the legal nature of the document, thereby 
encouraging the person affixing their signature that they should take care before 
committing themselves to the contents of the document.
Protective function
1.22 As a corollary to the cautionary function, the party receiving the document 
containing a manuscript signature recognizes that the other party affirms the content of the document and they have given their full attention to the content of 
the document. They can also be assured of the identity of the signatory, and are 
consequently in receipt of the proof of the source and contents of the document. 
This function is linked to the evidentiary function.27
27 Sneddon, ‘Legislating to facilitate electronic signatures and records’, Part 2 II A (ii).
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Channelling function
1.23 The formality of a manuscript signature helps to clarify the point at which 
a person recognizes the act has become legally significant. Also, the content of the document, by being recorded on a durable form, serves to concentrate the mind on the legally binding nature of the document, thus reducing the risks associated 
with oral recollections. This function is also linked to the evidentiary function.
Record keeping function
1.24 Closely related to the evidentiary function, a document contained on a carrier manifest in physical format serves as a durable record of the terms of 
the agreement. It also enables governments to impose taxes on documents and 
permit audits based on the existence of documents having a physical existence.
Disputing a manuscript signature
Defences
1.25 A manuscript signature cannot be disputed unless the following defences can be established: the signature is a forgery;28 the signature was conditional; the signature was obtained as a result of misrepresentation; the signature was 
obtained in such circumstance that it was not the act of the person signing (non 
est factum); mental incapacity; mistake; where one party unilaterally added 
material terms to the writing after the other’s signature; where the person signing the document did not realize the document they signed was a contractual 
document; by statute as being unreasonable or unfair. These defences are not dealt with in this text, other than a brief consideration of the disputes where a 
manuscript signature has been at issue. The reader is referred to the standard 
textbooks on the subject. It is well known that manuscript signatures are forged. To prevent this problem, and to test both the validity and the effectiveness of a 
manuscript signature, some documents require the signature to be affixed in the 
presence of a witness or an authorized official, such as a notary.
Evidence of the manuscript signature
1.26 Where a manuscript signature is challenged on a document, evidence 
28 In the case of Brown v. National Westminster Bank Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyds Rep 187 QBD Commercial Court, the bank paid sums of money on 329 cheques that were alleged to have 
forged Mrs Brown’s signature. The bank admitted to paying out on 100 cheques that were 
forged, but put Mrs Brown to proof that the remaining cheques were forged. This was because the bank took measures, through the branch managers, to question Mrs Brown 
on a number of cheques that passed through her account. Mrs Brown failed to prove that 
she did not sign the remaining cheques. For similar facts in Australia, see Tina Motors Pty. 
Ltd. v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. [1977] VR 205.
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will need to demonstrate the issues discussed below. It should be noted that the 
evidentiary burden is a factor in considering the precise nature of the signature. In the Canadian case of Regina v. Blumes,29 the signature on a vehicle registration document, issued by the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, was 
challenged. It was alleged that the document was not admissible because it was not clear whether the signature was a manuscript signature, a rubber stamp or a 
facsimile signature. This document was afforded the presumption of regularity, 
which meant that a mere challenge was not sufficient to avoid the operation of 
regularity.
The identity of the person affixing the manuscript signature
1.27 Evidence will have to be adduced to show the signature affixed to the 
document is that of the signatory. In such cases, the signature in question will 
have to be compared to samples of the same signature. A signature may be forged or the signature could be that of the signatory, but they may have attempted to 
disguise their handwriting. Thus a handwriting analyst30 will need to have two 
kinds of samples: ‘request samples’ which are produced for the examination and duplicate the material in question, and naturally occurring samples, made by the 
signatory without realizing the example will be examined. Two main factors can then be examined, that of pictorial impression, which includes matters such as 
slope, size, margins, spacing and the position of the writing in relation to lines. Second, the construction of the letters can be examined, such as the direction 
the letter ‘o’ is formed, the way the letter ‘t’ is crossed, and the way in which 
the person has written letters that require more than one movement. Forgers tend to concentrate on the pictorial impression and fail to copy details of the way 
letters are constructed. Likewise, people trying to disguise their handwriting also concentrate on the pictorial impression, rather than changing the formation 
of their letters. Further analysis can be undertaken by considering the relative 
proportions of letters, the spaces between letters, pressure variations. Also, the 
attributes of the instrument used to affix the signature to the document can be considered, such as how smooth the signature has been signed, whether it is 
jagged or confident, whether there is a pause and where the instrument lifts off 
the surface. Further, the carrier itself can be examined, from the type of material 
used (physical properties, optical properties), any security features (watermarks), 
29 2002 BCPC 0045.30 Recent research has demonstrated that the findings of experts across all forensic disciplines can be subject to bias as the result of cognitive factors, such that the same 
expert has reached the opposite conclusion with the same evidence, for which see I. D. 
Dror, C. Champod, G. Langenburg, D. Charlton, H. Hunt and R. Rosenthal, ‘Cognitive issues 
of fingerprint analysis: inter- and intra-expert consistency and the effect of a ‘target’ 
comparison’, Forensic Science International, 208 (2011), pp. 10–17 and the references 
cited therein. Apparently the US Secret Service uses a software program called Forensic 
Information System for Handwriting (FISH) that enables document examiners to scan and 
digitize text writings such as threatening correspondence.
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the printing process used (the use and identification of a photocopier, computer 
or printer) and other evidence such as perforations and microscopic analysis 
that might reveal imperfections that may link the carrier to the person. Further examination can include the comparison of typescript; impressions by means of Electrostatic Detection Apparatus; whether more than one type of material 
was used to affix information on the carrier; whether any alterations were made or entries obliterated, and the sequence in which intersecting lines have been 
written.
1.28 Where the party relying on the authenticity of the manuscript signature successfully demonstrates the similarity of the manuscript signature to the sample signatures, the evidential burden will then fall upon the alleged signatory 
to prove the signature was forged. Although this point was made in Saunders 
v. Anglia Building Society31 in relation to the defence where the signature was obtained in such circumstance that it was not the act of the person signing, the 
principle applies to a forged signature.
Intention to authenticate and adopt the document
1.29 Where a person affixes their manuscript signature to a document, it must 
be shown that they intended to sign the document. The case of L’Estrange v. F 
Graucob Limited,32 which pre-dates the modern legislation, serves to illustrate 
the point. In this case, Miss L’Estrange carried on the business of a café. The 
defendants manufactured and sold automatic slot machines. In early 1933, Miss 
L’Estrange agreed to buy an automatic slot machine for cigarettes for a total of £81 5s 6d, payable over 18 months. She signed a form, printed on brown paper 
headed ‘Sales Agreement’. This document included a number of contract terms 
written in very small print, one of which included ‘This agreement contains all 
the terms and conditions under which I agree to purchase the machine specified above, and any express or implied condition, statement, or warranty, statutory 
or otherwise not stated herein is hereby excluded’. The machine was installed on 
29 March 1933. However, it failed to work, and she eventually initiated an action 
in the county court to recover the payments she had made. Judgment was made 
in her favour. The decision was reversed in the Divisional Court because Miss 
L’Estrange had signed the written contract, and in doing so acknowledged that 
she was bound by the terms. There was no misrepresentation that induced her 
to sign. It was irrelevant that she did not read the contract or know its contents.33
31 [1971] AC 1004.32 [1934] 2 KB 394 Divisional Court; J. R. Spencer, ‘Signature, consent, and the rule in 
L’Estrange v. Graucob’, CLJ, pp. 104–22, notes at p. 104 that this was not the first case in which the rule was laid down, although it was the case that made the rule famous; see 
Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Company (1877) 2 CPD 416, The Luna [1920] P 22 and 
Blay v. Pollard and Morris [1930] 1 KB 628.33 This decision, and the discussion of a fourth defence, that the signatory did not agree to 
the term, is discussed in Spencer, ‘Signature, consent, and the rule in L’Estrange v. Graucob’.
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1.30 This was not the case in Pryor v. Pryor.34 Anthony Pryor made a will on 5 
November 1859. One of the attesting witnesses was his daughter. The testator 
wanted his daughter’s husband to sign the will as a witness, but because it was 
not known when he would return, he asked his daughter to sign her husband’s 
name instead of her own. She did so. Sir C Creswell refused to admit the will to 
probate because the subscription was not intended to represent her signature.
1.31 Although a manuscript signature on a document may not be in dispute, the person signing the document may wish the other party to infer they had the authority to sign the document, as in the case of Ringham v. Hackett.35 The presumption may 
be rebutted by evidence. In this case, the name printed on the cheque in Ringham was that of a partnership, and the signature by one of the partners on the cheque 
was deemed to be sufficient evidence to intend the recipient to infer the cheque 
was drawn on the partnership. In the case of Central Motors (Birmingham) Ltd v. PA 
& SNP Wadsworth,36 Central Motors required a cheque for the payment of a motor 
car in the name of the firm. In accordance with this request, Mr Wadsworth gave 
Central Motors a cheque with his signature beneath the name of the firm, which 
was printed on the cheque, below that of the names of the defendants. It was held 
that by handing over a cheque signed in this way, Mr Wadsworth provided sufficient evidence from the circumstances to personally authenticate the document as being 
a cheque of the firm. By signing the cheque, Mr Wadsworth had the requisite intent 
to adopt the cheque as that of the firm.
Methods of authentication before manuscript 
signatures
Objects as a means of authentication
1.32 Before the use of written charters became common, objects would be used to preserve memory and provide evidence of an act, especially when obtaining title 
to a property. The object served to act as a symbol of the conveyance. For instance, Earl Warenne gave a gift to Lewes Priory in 1147, and both he and his brother had hair from their head cut off by Henry of Blois, bishop of Winchester before the altar for retention by the Priory as evidence of the gift,37 although by the reign of Henry II, judges began to refuse to take cognizance of symbolic objects, other than sealed 
writings. However, the production of an object could still be adduced as evidence, 
and knives were used for this purpose, especially for a conveyance.38
34 (1860) LJR 29 NS P, M & A 114.35 (1980) 124 SJ 201.36 [1982] CAT 231, May 28, 1982; (1983) 133 NLJ 555 Court of Appeal (Civil Division).37 M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307 (2nd edn., London: 
Blackwell, 1993), p. 38, where further examples are given.38 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, pp. 39, 257–9 indicating knives were often used 
to convey land, and the blade had to be broken in the process.
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The sign of the cross
1.33 The presumption about what constitutes a signature is predicated 
on the concept of literacy. Evidence from anthropological studies of non-literate societies and sociological studies of people living in deprived areas of the industrialized world suggest that literacy itself is primarily a form of 
technology.39 This is reflected in the history of literacy, because in medieval 
society, it was rare for the most educated people to write. There was no value 
placed on a personal signature. Documents were ratified with a cross, because 
the cross was a solemn symbol of Christian truth. This method of authentication was retained after the conquest by the Normans,40 and is illustrated in a grant 
dated 1068–76 by Waleran, of property at Bures St Mary, Suffolk, to St Stephen’s 
Abbey, Caen, attested by William I, Queen Matilda, John of Bayeaux, bishop of Rouen, and Roger and Robert Beaumont, with their names added by the scribe 
next to each cross.41
The seal and chirograph
1.34 There was a time when a personal signature was not accepted as a lawful mark of authentication on a document unless the person signing the document 
was a Jew. A Christian was required to sign with a cross, or their signum was 
affixed to the document in the form of an impression of a seal.42 Seal impressions were made in malleable metals, such as gold or silver, while the papacy used 
lead. The use of metals prevents the impression from being attached directly to the document, which means the seal must be attached to the document in some 
other way, such as a piece of string. Sealing wax began to be used, which is an 
amalgam of beeswax and resin. The beeswax becomes malleable when gently 
heated, and the resin acts as an adhesive. In the sixteenth century, shellac was 
introduced as a material, and remains popular today. By 1300 in England, the use 
39 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, p. 7.40 W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, III (3rd edn., London: Methuen), 231.41 P. D. A. Harvey and A. McGuinness, A guide to British medieval seals (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996), figure 1. Museums across the world display early documents, and it is fun to seek such documents out to note the various designs of a cross that people 
adopted. Two documents from the state archive of Dubrovnik are in display in the Dubrovnik maritime museum with a variety of crosses: a contract between Dubrovnik and Termoli from 1203, signed in Termoli on the mutual exemption from port duties and taxes; an agreement on the renewal of friendship between Dubrovnik and Molfetta from 
1208, confirming mutual exemption from port duties and taxes as stated in the previous 
contract from 1148.42 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, p. 233; Harvey and McGuinness, Guide to British 
Medieval Seals, p. 1; P. M. Barnes and L. C. Hector, A Guide to Seals in the Public Record Office 
(2nd edn., London: HMSO, 1968) illustrate, on p. 3, that the meaning of ‘seal’ is the actual 
impression that was attached to a document, and the ‘matrix’ or ‘die’ is the implement 
which makes the impression. However, in this text, the word ‘matrix’ and ‘die’ will not be 
used for fear of making the subject far too technical.
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of seals had permeated society to such an extent that serfs and villeins were using 
documents, especially to convey property. The use of seals have a long history in 
China, Japan and Korea, and continue to be used daily in these countries.
1.35 Sometimes two copies of a document, whatever the subject, would be 
produced. This form of document was known as a chirograph, dating from the 
ninth century or earlier. A chirograph might record an agreement between two parties, including a marriage settlement, conveyance of land or repayment of a 
loan. The text is written twice, usually on two sides of the same parchment. When written on the same parchment, the two halves were separated by being torn or cut into two pieces, usually with a wavy line or a zigzag as a precaution against 
forgery or alteration.43 In addition, the scribe would add text across the division, 
such as the word CHIROGRAPHUM.44 Each party would be given one of the halves of the parchment, duly authenticated by the impression of the seal of the other 
party, and each piece served to authenticate the other. This practice was so 
popular that chirographs became known as indentures. Tripartite chirographs were also widely used in England for drawing up wills in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries.45
Witnesses and scribes
1.36 Clanchy has observed that there would be occasions when the addition of the sign of the cross or the impression of a seal on a charter was not considered 
a sufficient means of authentication. Hence documents would include a list of 
witnesses attending the event in which the promise was made. In such cases, the emphasis would have been on the public ceremonial attendant upon the 
transaction.46 It was also possible that parties would rely on the particular 
handwriting of a scribe to establish the authenticity of a document. The test of distinctive handwriting was acknowledged in the Statute of Merchants of 1285, requiring all merchants to have their debts recorded before the mayor of London, 
or before similar authorities in other cities and towns, as designated. Each bond 
43 In a similar fashion, after being notched with the amount received, tally sticks were 
cracked open lengthways by splitting the stick vertically into two. The tally-writer then inscribed the smooth sides with the details of the person to whom the tally was given, and 
the reason for the payment. As a record, they were light, small and virtually impossible to 
forge. To make space in the rambling buildings making up the Palace of Westminster, the 
Treasury ordered the tally sticks, no longer used as records, to be destroyed. In burning the tally sticks in the furnaces that heated the House of Lords, the heat generated was so 
great as to cause the House of Lords and House of Commons to burn to the ground (C. Shenton, The Day Parliament Burned Down (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 
14–15; 50–3, 240).44 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, p. 87; for an example of an agreement between Colchester Abbey and the burgesses dating from 1254, see plate VII, in the Harvard Law 
Library MS 87, 2.254.45 P. Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages (London: Hambledon and 
London, 2003), pp. 40–41.46 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, p. 295.
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was to be written by a nominated clerk, and the bond had to be enrolled in the 
hand of the clerk who was known.47
The format of the signature
1.37 In England, an early record of a manuscript signature is that of Edward 
III of 1362, who signed a document with his name. It is suggested it was already the custom to do this in Castile, and because he was writing to the king of Castile, 
he also appended his manuscript signature. The manuscript signature acted 
to confirm his recognition of the contents of the document, but not to replace 
the seal.48 Although politicians enact statutes with a view to regulating human affairs, human ingenuity always manages to circumvent procedures and rules 
laid down in an attempt to provide for certainty. As a result, judges have been 
required to exercise their powers to test the definition of a signature, and what 
is acceptable in the legal context. The case law illustrates that in general, judges 
assessed the validity in relation to the functions a signature performed. Different factual problems required a broader understanding of the function a signature 
performed. Whatever the form a signature took, judges looked to the intent 
behind the use of the signature. Thus the range of forms a signature can take is 
wide, as demonstrated by the following discussion.
Manuscript
A mark
1.38 A mark can be in the form of any shape, including the sign of the cross, 
an ‘x’, a shape or a number of lines that intersect. An example is the mark on a memorandum dated 16 October 1666 of words spoken by Elizabeth Daniel of 
Eyam in the County of Derby as her last will and testament. Rebecca Hawksworth appended her mark on the memorandum as a witness to what was spoken and 
written down. Probate was granted on 24 April 1667. Her mark consisted of an incomplete line that is roughly in the shape of a heart, intersected with a further 
horizontal line.49
1.39 Bills of exchange A case dating from 1798 is that of Adam v. Kerr,50 where a mark on a bill of exchange included an argument over whether the particular mark used by custom in Jamaica was acceptable as a valid signature, and in 1830, 
George v. Surrey51 dealt with the validity of a bill of exchange in which Tindal 
47 Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, p. 307.48 Harvey and McGuinness, Guide to British Medieval Seals, p. 2 and n. 2.49 A copy of this document is on display in the museum at Eyam, together with another 
document with the marks of three men; each of these marks is different in shape.50 1 B & P 360; 126 ER 952.51 1 M. & M. 516, 173 ER 1243.
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CJ accepted a bill with a mark which included the endorsement ‘Ann Moore her 
mark’.52
1.40 An interest in real property In respect of the transfer of property, a 
general warranty deed conveying property and signed with affixing a mark to 
the document before a notary public and witnesses was a sufficient signature,53 as was the sale of an erf in South Africa, where the mark was considered an act of 
the signer, and signified assent to the content of the document.54
1.41 Wills Before the majority of people could read and write, the provisions of some statutes meant that where a person could not write their name, they were still required to provide a mark on a will,55 even when the will was signed with a signature, but the codicil was signed by a mark;56 and where the will is 
signed by a mark where the testator was able to write.57 This also applies to a witness,58 and where a witness signs a will by marking the document with a 
cross.59 Where an interested person adds a mark to a will, the presumption is 
52 In the South African case of Hanse v. Jordan & Fuchs 1909 19 CTR 530, the sum of £21 4s 
was due on a promissory note. The defendant claimed not to have added his mark. The 
magistrate at first instance, having heard the case, believed the plaintiff ’s account of the 
facts. On appeal, Buchanan J commented, at 530, ‘The defendant denied this [adding his 
mark to the note], but the mere fact that he can write, and only signed by his mark, is not 
sufficient ground upon which the Court can upset the finding of the Magistrate upon the 
fact’.53 Mitchell v. Mills, 264 S.E.2d 749.54 Chisnall and Chisnall v. Sturgeon and Sturgeon 1993 (2) SA 642 (W). For Scotland, see M. 
C. Meston and D. J. Cusine, ‘Execution of deeds by a mark’, Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland (1993), pp. 270–2.55 Although in the case of Crosbie v. Wilson (1865) 3 M. 870 in Scotland, a will which was 
attested, but only had the testator’s name at the end in words only, with the statement ‘her 
mark’. This was held to be ineffective as a signature.56 Baker v. Dening (1838) 8 AD & E 94; 112 ER 771; Patterson J indicated that when a document is signed by a mark, an enquiry may be undertaken as to the circumstances 
of the signing to ensure a will was properly attested. See also Re Field’s Goods (1843) 3 Curt 752; 163 ER 890, although note Hindmarch v. Charlton (1861) 8 HL Cas 160 and Re 
Holtam, Gillett v. Rogers (1913) 108 LT 732.57 Taylor v. Denning, 3 Nev. & P. 228, where the illness of the testator made it difficult to write. 
In the 1929 New York case of In the Matter of the Estate of Stegman, 133 Misc. 745, 234 
N.Y.S. 239, probate was denied where a testator, who was able to write, subscribed a third 
will with a mark. The proponent failed to prove the third and final will was valid. Evans 
S indicated, at 747 ‘This manner of execution is not rare but it is unusual, for a person to 
sign by a mark that is able to write. This fact in itself does not invalidate a will but it is 
obvious that it calls for greater scrutiny on the part of the court’. For a contrary decision in Wisconsin in 1925, see In re Mueller’s Will, 188 Wis. 183, 205 N.W. 814, 42 A.L.R. 951, where the testator made her mark, even though she could write, and where a witness 
added the words ‘her’ above, and ‘mark’ below the cross.58 Harrison v. Harrison (1803) 8 Ves Jun 185; 32 ER 324.59 A will was held to be sufficiently signed where a testatrix signed with a mark without her name appearing on the document in Re Bryce’s Goods (1839) 2 Curt 325; 163 ER 427.
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that the will is not valid.60 The act itself is not invalid, but strict proof is required, as noted by Lord Watson in the case of Donnelly v. Broughton61 where he pointed 
out, at 442, that ‘the onus of proof may be increased by circumstances, such as 
unbounded confidence in the drawer of the will, extreme debility in the testator, clandestinely, and other circumstances which may increase the presumption 
even so much as to be conclusive against the instrument’.
1.42 United States of America In the United States of America, the case law has covered a wider range of examples where judges have been required to determine the legal implications of various forms of mark and other signs, 
including fingerprints and an account number. A mark on a bill has been 
held sufficient as a means of authentication,62 as on deeds,63 fingerprints,64 on insurance documents,65 notices of appeal,66 under the relevant Statute of 
60 Paske v. Ollat 2 Phill 323.61 [1891] AC 435 PC.62 Federal: Zacharie v. Franklin, 37 U.S. 151, 12 Pet. 151, 1838 WL 3945 (U.S.La.), 9 L.Ed. 1035 
(the mark of Joseph Milah in a bill of sale comprising slaves, their children, and stock and 
household furniture had the same effect as a signature) (1838).
Indiana (1867): Shank v. Butsch, 28 Ind. 19, 1867 WL 2925 (Ind.).New Hampshire: Willoughby v. Moulton, 47 N.H. 205, 1866 WL 1982 (N.H.) (a promissory note signed by a mark may be valid against the person signing, even though 
there was no subscribing witness).
New York: Brown v. The Butchers & Drovers’ Bank, 6 Hill 443, 41 Am.Dec. 755 (a person 
writing ‘1. 2. 8.’ on the back of a bill of exchange as a substitute for his name served to 
endorse the bill) (1844).Tennessee: Brown v. McClanahan, 68 Tenn. 347, 1878 WL 4292 (Tenn.), 9 Baxt. 347, 
2 Leg.Rep. 59.South Carolina: Zimmerman v. Sale, 37 S.C.L. 76, 3 Rich. 76, 1846 WL 2269 (S.C.App.L.) 
(a mark that is not accompanied by the name of the person making the mark remains a 
signature) (1864).63 Carolina (1891): Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N.C. 134, 12 S.E. 902, 12 L.R.A. 205.Kentucky: Blair v. Campbell, 45 S.W. 93, 19 Ky.L.Rptr. 2012 (a deed signed with a mark 
and acknowledged before the county clerk was held to be sufficient as a signature) (1898); 
Stephens v. Perkins, 273 S.W. 545 (in the conveyance of property, the marks of nine heirs 
was sufficient signature on the conveyance) (1925).
Georgia: Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72, 43 S.E. 786 (A deed signed ‘I, J. R., sign my hand 
to it X here’ is sufficiently signed) (1903).64 Illinois: Matter of the Estate of Deskovic, 21 Ill.App.2d 209, 157 N.E.2d 769, 72 A.L.R.2d 
1261 (1st Dist. 1959).
New York (1937): In the Matter of the Estate of Romaniw, 163 Misc. 481, 296 N.Y.S. 925.65 Georgia: Thurmond v. Spoon, 125 Ga.App. 811, 189 S.E.2d 92 (a mark affixed to a beneficiary 
card is a sufficient signature) (1972). Dissenting, Evans J articulated the view that the 
name of the person must be affixed to the document as well as a mark.Pennsylvania: Tomilio v. Pisco, 123 Pa. Super. 423, 187 A. 86 (it is a signature where the person signing is too weak to sign their name, but makes an undecipherable series of 
curves and strokes) (1936).66 North Carolina: State v. Byrd, 93 N.C. 624, 1885 WL 1753 (N.C.).Wisconsin: Finley v. Prescott, 47 L.R.A. 695, 104 Wis. 614, 80 N.W. 930 (appeal papers 
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Frauds (including a trade mark),67 with respect to trover and conversion68 and 
wills.69
Illegible writing
1.43 It is rare for illegible writing to be the subject of legal proceedings, although in 1862 the surname on a notice of objection was disputed because it 
was not legible.70 The appeal court reversed the decision of the revising barrister, 
and held the notice of objection was sufficient. Earle CJ observed, at 39:
may be signed by a mark, and there is no statutory requirement to have the signature of a 
person in the form of a mark witnessed) (1899).67 Federal: Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 13 S.Ct. 950, 37 L.Ed. 819, 50 L.R.A. 240 (telegrams 
containing orders in the form of Shepperton’s Code, and directed the sales delivery for 
account of designated names, such as ‘Albert,’ ‘Alfred,’ ‘Alexander,’ ‘Amanda,’ ‘Andrew,’ 
‘Winston,’ were intended and understood to represent the firm name of B. S. Bibb & Co., 
held to be sufficient as a signature) (1893); Federal 4th circuit: Barber & Ross Co., v. Lifetime 
Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1987), 3 U.C.C. Rep.Serv.2d (CBC) 41 (trademark printed on a written sales brochure met the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and signature 
requirement).Missouri: Defur v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 677 F.Supp. 622 (E.D.Mo. 1988) 
(writings with the defendant’s trademark printed on them constituted signed writings).68 Massachusetts: Foye v. Patch, 132 Mass. 105, 1882 WL 10891 (Mass.) (adding a mark to a 
written agreement is a satisfactory signature).69 Illinois: Cunningham v. Hallyburton, 342 Ill. 442, 174 N.E. 420 (1930); In re Westerman’s 
Will, 401 Ill. 489, 82 N.E.2d 474 (1948) (the will of Minnie Westerman (her maiden name) dated 13 April 1942 revoked an earlier will dated 9 April 1942 and executed under her married name of Wilhelmina Frederichs, when both wills were signed with her mark, notwithstanding she was not authorized to resume her maiden name in her second 
divorce proceedings).
New York: 1809 case of Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns 144; 1847 case of Butler v. 
Benson, 1 Barb. 533; Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N.Y. 153, 12 Tiffany 153, 1868 WL 6249 (N.Y.) 
(after trying for some time to apply the pen to the paper to sign his name, the hand of the 
deceased trembled so much that he made a cross on his will); In the Matter of the Estate of 
Galvin, 78 Misc.2d 22, 355 N.Y.2d 751 (a mark added to a will by the daughter and at the 
request of the deceased was a valid signature of the deceased) (1974).Pennsylvania: Main v. Ryder, 84 Pa. 217, 4 W.N.C. 173, 1877 WL 13243 (Pa.) (signing a will with a mark while touching the writing instrument held and controlled by another 
person) (1877). Note: in Pennsylvania, a new Act was enacted in 1833, requiring the manuscript signature of a testator, and a mark was no longer permitted, for which see 
Assay v. Hoover, 5 Pa. St. 21 (1846); Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. 441, 5 Barr. 441, 1846 WL 5049 
(Pa.), 47 Am.Dec. 418; but see Long v. Zook, 13 Pa. 400, 1850 WL 5764 (Pa.), 1 Harris 
400 where Gibson CJ, in applying the revised Act of 1848, commented that the 1833 Act 
probably defeated more true wills than false ones; also note the comments of Gibson CJ in the earlier case of Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa.St. 497, 1849 WL 5732 (Pa.).Texas: 1934 case of Short v. Short, 67 S.W.2d 425; 1937 case of Mortgage Bond 
Corporation v. Haney, 105 S.W.2d 488.Wisconsin: Will of Susan Jenkins, 43 Wis. 610, 1878 WL 3217 (Wis.).70 Trotter v. Walker 13 C.B. (N.S.) 29; 143 ER 12.
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Lastly, it is one thing to say that the statute enjoins a legible signature, and another thing to say that such legibility is a condition 
precedent to the validity of the notice. Were we to hold this notice bad, questions would arise on the notice or claim of every man who 
might have written his name very badly or spelt it incorrectly. The object of the act of parliament, which calls to its aid persons of very imperfect education, might be defeated by adopting a rigorous 
construction, and furthered by a more benignant one.
1.44 In Scotland, an illegible signature by the testator on a codicil was accepted as a signature in Stirling Stuart v. Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees.71 In this case, Mr Crawfurd was not able write, even his own name, without becoming affected 
with a tremor, which meant that his writing was shaky and irregular. The Lord President made an interesting observation at 625 and 626 on the issue of illegible writing:… it is said that if you examine this particular signature without reference to any other signature of the testator, it is utterly illegible, and that the Court is not entitled to give effect to an illegible 
signature. That proposition is stated a great deal too broadly. Illegible signatures are not uncommon even when the writer is not 
suffering from the infirmity under which Mr Crawfurd suffered, 
but from other infirmities altogether. The infirmity of affectation 
is perhaps, of all others, most productive of illegible signatures. Many persons of the highest ability and skill in penmanship sign in such a manner that it is impossible for anyone seeing their 
signatures for the first time to say what is meant by them. Now, are 
all those illegible signatures to be disregarded? I think that a very 
dangerous doctrine, and I am not prepared to accede to it. Does it 
then make any difference if the illegibility arises from an infirmity 
such as Mr Crawfurd suffered from? I think not. If it is clear that this is written by him, and if it is made out that that is the kind of writing by which he was in the habit of representing his name in deeds, how does the case differ from illegibility arising from other 
causes? You require evidence in both instances to enable you to say what the writing is; here you require someone to tell you that what 
is written stands for “William Stuart Stirling Crawfurd,” while in the other cases I have referred to you require to be instructed that 
that is the ordinary way in which the writer signs his name.
1.45 In Ireland, two scrawls that were undecipherable but intended to be initials were accepted as a mark under the Wills Act 1837,72 and in Canada, it was held that a manuscript signature of a Justice of the Peace does not render the 
71 (1885) 12 R. 610.72 In the Goods of Kieran, deceased [1933] IR 222.
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information invalid if it is not legible, because of the presumption of regularity.73 In the United States, judges have also been required to consider illegible scrawl,74 and the 1890 Pennsylvanian case of Appeal of Knox,75 it was held that a note 
written by the deceased and signed with her first name ‘Harriet’ was a signature. 
Mitchell J remarked, at 1023, that ‘Custom controls the rule of names, and so 
it does the rule of signature’. He went on to note, in relation to the difficulty in reading a signature:So the form which a man customarily uses to identify and bind himself in writing is his signature, whatever shape he may choose 
to give it. There is no requirement that it shall be legible, though 
legibility is one of the prime objects of writing. It is sufficient if it be such as he usually signs, and the signatures of neither Rufus Choate 
nor General Spinner could be rejected, though no man, unaided, could discover what the ragged marks made by either of those 
two eminent personages were intended to represent. Nor is there 
any fixed requirement how much of the full name shall be written. Custom varies with time and place, and habit with the whim of 
the individual. Sovereigns write only their first names, and the 
sovereign of Spain, more royally still, signs his decrees only, ‘I, the 
King,’ (Yo el Rey). English peers now sign their titles only, though they be geographical names, like Devon or Stafford, as broad as 
a county. The great Bacon wrote his name ‘Fr. Verulam,’ and the 
ordinary signature of the poet-philosopher of fishermen was ‘Iz: 
Wa’. In the fifty-six signatures to the most solemn instrument of 
modern times, the Declaration of Independence, we find every 
variety from Th. Jefferson to the unmistakably identified Charles 
Carroll, of Carrollton. In the present day it is not uncommon for business men to have a signature for checks and banking purposes somewhat different from that used in their ordinary business, and, in familiar correspondence, signature by initials or nickname or 
diminutive is probably the general practice.76
1.46 In South Africa, Murray J concluded in the case of Van Niekerk v. Smit77 
that a letter on headed notepaper with the name and address of the firm was 
73 R v. Kapoor 52 C.C.C. (3d) 41.74 Alabama: Dew v. Garner, 7 Port. 503, 1838 WL 1335 (Ala.); Mississippi (1896): Sheehan v. 
Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 35 L.R.A. 102; Pennsylvania (1936): Tomilio v. Pisco, 123 
Pa. Super. 423, 187 A. 86; Wyoming (1929): In re Iverson’s Estate, 39 Wyo. 482, 273 P. 684, 
64 A.L.R. 203.75 131 P. 220, 18 A. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am.St.Rep. 798.76 Note his comments at 1022 about Vernon v. Kirk, 30 Pa.St. 222; Assay v. Hoover, 5 Pa. St. 21 and Grabill v. Barr, 5 Pa. 441, 5 Barr. 441, 1846 WL 5049 (Pa.), 47 Am.Dec. 418 and the 
subsequent change of the law.77 1952 (3) SA 17 (T).
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properly signed, even though indecipherable marks were made with a lead 
pencil, perhaps representing initials, over the concluding words in type ‘Ferreira 
en van Zyl’. In SAI Investments v. Vander Schyff NO78 it was held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to indicate the identity of an illegible signature on the agreement where the signature of the person signing as purchaser on the last page was indecipherable, as were the names of the two witnesses who attested 
to the signature. A similar finding was made on appeal in the case of Van der 
Merwe v. Kenkes (Edms) BPK,79 where the appellant was clearly identified in an agreement as the purchaser, but the signatures of both the purchaser and the 
seller were illegible. Extrinsic evidence to indicate that the illegible signature 
was that of the appellant or her husband was admissible.
Assisted signature or mark 
1.47 The problems associated with people that are too ill or too weak to sign a document are well illustrated in the South African case of Matanda v. Rex,80 
where a boy of thirteen could not write. He made a statement to a magistrate, described at 436:My practice, which we adopted in this case, is for the witness to come up to me, I hand the pen to him, he touches the pen and then 
I make the mark for him. I hold one end of the pen and he holds 
the other, after he is told to what he is deposing. He is not actually 
holding the pen at one end while I am making the mark. I hand him 
the pen, holding it myself. He fingers it. Then I take it and I make 
the mark. That is what happened in this case.
1.48 A similar point was discussed in Fulton v. Kee,81 where the members of the court of appeal distinguished between a will signed by the testator with 
assistance or by direction. In the 1975 New York case of In re Estate of McCready82 and the 1927 Pennsylvania case of Brehony v. Brehony,83 the mark of a person who was blind that was made with the assistance of another was considered a 
signature.
1.49 Wills Where a person is too ill to sign a document, one question might 
be whether there is any evidence to demonstrate the person intended to sign. In the case of Wilson v. Beddard,84 the testator made a will dated 7 September 1826 
78 1999 (3) SA 340 (N).79 1983 (3) SA 909 (T).80 1923 AD 435 (B).81 [1961] NI 1, CA (NI).82 369 N.Y.S.2d 325, 82 Misc.2d 531.83 289 Pa. 267, 137 A. 260.84 (1841) 12 Sim 28; 59 ER 1041.
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and died the following day. The will was signed by the testator’s mark, his hand 
being guided by another person. Before making the mark, the testator made faint 
strokes on each of the sheets containing the will. On the motion for a new trial, 
the Vice-Chancellor, Sir L. Shadwell, agreed with the trial judge, Parke B, that the 
will was signed by the testator. It was decided that the act of making the faint strokes provided evidence that the testator intended to sign the will, and the fact that he was helped by another person to place his mark on the document did not 
make the mark any less of a signature.
A name without a signature
1.50 There are occasions when a person makes a promise that they later 
refuse to fulfil for some reason. Such was the case in Knight v. Crockford,85 where 
Crockford agreed to sell a public house to one Knight. Given the evidence in this 
case, Eyre CJ determined that the draft agreement was a sufficient agreement, 
and although only Knight had affixed his signature to the document, the words 
‘I, James Crockford, agree to sell, &c’ written by Crockford were considered a 
signature within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds 1677.
Mistake as to the name
1.51 Wills Sometime humans make mistakes, and in circumstances where the better response is to render an equitable result, judges have, on occasion, 
disregarded minor issues in respect to wills. For instance, in Re Clarke’s Goods86 
the testatrix was described as ‘Susannah Clarke’, and executed the will with a 
mark, against which was written ‘Susannah Barrell, her mark’, Barrell having 
been her maiden name. Sir C. Cresswell was satisfied that the mark was that of Susannah Clarke, and thought the additional words next to the mark did not 
matter.87
Variations of a name
1.52 Voting Administrative mistakes tend not to be considered an adequate 
reason for preventing people from casting their vote. In R v. Thwaites88 the names 
of a number of men entitled to vote were listed on the burgess roll incorrectly. 
When they voted, they signed the voting papers with their correct names. It was held that the men had a right to vote, and although they voted with different 
85 1 Esp 190; 170 ER 324; the insertion of names into a document that the parties intend to sign is not signed: Hubert v. Treherne 3 Man. & G. 743, 133 ER 1338.86 (1858) LJR 27 NS P & M 18; 1 Sw & Tr 22; 164 ER 611.87 Re Douce’s Goods (1862) 2 Sw & Tr 592; 164 ER 1127 where the deceased was mistakenly 
described as John Douce, but his name was actually Thomas Douce.88 22 LJQB 238.
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names in comparison to the names listed on roll, they were the men mentioned in the burgess roll and this was a mere case of misnomer within the provisions of 
s142 of the Municipal Corporation Act of 5 & 6 Will. 4 c76 1853.
1.53 Wills There are times when some people will adopt alternative names for 
a variety of reasons. For instance, they may forget to write their present name, as in the case of In the Goods of Glover,89 where a woman signed her will with 
the name of her first husband, ‘Susan Reeve’ and then placed the will into an 
envelope marked by her ‘The will of Susan Glover’. Alternatively, a person might 
use a substitute name.90 In Scotland, a letter written and sent from one sister to another was capable of constituting a holographic will, and the subscription of 
her Christian name ‘Connie’ was also a sufficient authentication.91
1.54 United States of America A range of variations of a name have been 
tested in the US courts, including the use of a fictitious name on deeds,92 and 
using the name of another without permission on a promissory note.93 More commonly, mistaken or partial names have appeared in matters relating to a lien,94 the Statute of Frauds,95 mortgages,96 the name of a partnership on an 
89 11 Jur. 1022, 5 Notes of Cases 553.90 Re Reddings Goods (1850) 14 Jur 1052; 2 Rob Ecc 338; 163 ER 1338. The two law reports 
differ whether the testatrix signed her first name with the initial ‘C’ or ‘Charlotte’.91 Draper v. Thomason 1954 SC 136, 1954 SLT 222.92 Arkansas (1947): Walker v. Emrich, 212 Ark. 598, 206 S.W.2d 769.
New York: David v. Williamsburgh City Fire Insurance Company, 83 N.Y. 265, 38 Sickels 
265, 1880 WL 12653 (N.Y.), 38 Am.Rep. 418 (where a person adopts a fictitious name with intent to covey title, he is bound by the name he adopts when executing a conveyance of 
the property).93 New Hampshire: Grafton Bank v. Flanders, 4 N.H. 239, 1827 WL 744 (N.H.) (a person putting the name of another on a promissory note without authority from any person of 
that name is liable for the note).94 Federal 2nd circuit: In the Matter of Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (1965) (the name ‘Excel 
Department Stores’ instead of the correct name ‘Excel Stores, Inc’ was a minor error and 
not seriously misleading when the contract was properly signed by an appropriate officer 
of the company).95 Massachusetts: Fessenden v. Mussey, 65 Mass. 127, 1853 WL 4969 (Mass.) (the name 
‘Benj. Mussey’ as recorded at the time of the auction held to be a signature, even though 
it omitted the middle letter of the defendant’s name); Walker v. Walker, 175 Mass. 349, 56 
N.E. 601 (a marriage contract was deemed to be signed where the defendant signed the 
document with her first name only) (1900).Missouri: Great Western Printing Co. v. Belcher, 127 Mo.App. 133, 104 S.W. 894 (the 
words ‘Guaranteed. Belcher’ written in lead pencil across the face of the original account 
is a signature, even though the signature did not include the first name) (1907).96 California: Middleton v. Findla, 25 Cal. 76, 1864 WL 629 (Cal.) (a grantor that signs a deed 
by a wrong name (Edmund Jones) with his correct name in the body of the deed (Edward 
Jones) does not invalidate the conveyance).Indiana: Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind. 136, 1880 WL 6236 (Ind.), 23 Am.Rep. 193 (a woman 
signing a mortgage deed with her first name only, accepted as a signature).
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arbitration bond97 and on a writ,98 and it is not surprising that the range of 
human behaviour is more widely reflected in the cases of wills,99 although the liberal approach in extending the meaning of a signature was not extended to the 1914 Pennsylvanian case of In re Brennan’s Estate,100 where a testamentary 
paper ending with ‘your miserable father’ was held not to have been executed 
correctly.
The use of initials
1.55 Statute of Frauds The use of initials has been held sufficient to be a mark or signature to indicate the intent of a party under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, as in the case of Phillimore v. Barry.101 Messrs Fector and Minet of Dover stored a quantity of rum, the cargo of a Danish prize, which was to be 
sold by auction in various lots on 28 April 1808. Before the day of the sale, the 
defendants wrote to Fector and Minet to buy thirteen puncheons of the rum. 
As a result, Mr John Minet Fector of the firm bid for several lots, which were 
duly knocked down to him. The auctioneer wrote down in the printed catalogue 
the initials ‘I.M.F.’ opposite each lot sold to the defendant. On 11 May 1808, the defendants subsequently wrote a letter to Fector and Minet, recognising and 
approving the purchase. The warehouse accidentally caught fire on 18 May 
1808, and a quantity of gunpowder stored in the building exploded (that is, it 
burnt rapidly at a subsonic speed), destroying the rum. There was no evidence 
that the deposit was paid. The defendants claimed the contract was void under 
the Statute of Frauds on the basis that there was no memorandum in writing. It was also submitted that the auctioneer was not the authorized agent of the defendants, and even if he were, the inclusion of the initials against each lot could 
not be considered a memorandum of agreement. It was also contended that the rum remained at the risk of the sellers for thirty days, and the property did not 
vest with the defendant. Lord Ellenborough held that Mr Minet was the agent to the defendants, and that his initials as written by the auctioneer in the catalogue, 
together with the defendant’s letter confirming the sale, constituted a sufficient 
memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. He also held that the property vested absolutely in the purchasers from the moment of sale, and the provision of storage for thirty days was part of the consideration for which the 
purchase money was to be paid. While the finding by Lord Ellenborough was not 
97 New York: Mackay v. J. and L. Bloodgood, 9 Johns. 285 (the affixing of the name and seal of 
a firm by one partner binds the other partner) (1812).98 Maine: Sawtelle v. Wardwell, 56 Me. 146, 1868 WL 1770 (Me.) (the surname of attorney on 
the back of a writ of endorsement is a sufficient signature), although note the dissenting 
judgment of Kent J.99 Kentucky: Wells v. Lewis, 190 Ky. 626, 228 S.W. 3 (the signature ‘Ant Nanie’ appended to a 
letter as a testamentary writing is a sufficient signature) (1921).100 91 A. 220, 244 Pa. 574.101 1 Camp 512; 170 ER 1040.
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relevant to whether the initials represented a signature, nevertheless they were considered part of the evidence to demonstrate a contract existed between the 
parties.
1.56 In Chichester v. Cobb,102 the defendant wrote a letter to Mary Ann Williams, as follows: Kensington, 21st July 1865
My dear M. A. – So soon as all pecuniary and necessary arrangements are made to constitute an unquestionable legal marriage as proposed, I will be prepared to pay over for your behalf 300l., and concur in every practicable measure by which an equitable share, 
or its equivalent, in the settled property can be assured to you. I shall expect to see Edward here this evening, as requested in my 
note to him of last evening. – Yours ever affectionately, E.C.
1.57 After the marriage, the defendant refused to pay the £300. Blackburn 
and Shee JJ in the Queen’s Bench agreed that the initials constituted a sufficient 
signing of the contract or memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
1.58 Judicial use There is a case where a judge in England and Wales signed 
a bill of indictment with his initials. In R v. Morais,103 a bill of indictment was 
signed in manuscript ‘Cor. The Honourable Mr. Justice Roch’ and underneath, in 
the judge’s handwriting, the words ‘Leave to prefer’ and his initials, ‘J. R.’, with the 
date ‘23.9.87’ and the words ‘A Justice of the High Court’. This form of signature 
was held not to be a signature by Lord Lane, CJ in the Court of Appeal. A new 
trial was ordered.104 Judicial officers in the United States have used initials, although the decisions do not always indicate approval of the use of initials in the 
absence of a full signature.105 In the 1933 Federal case of George A. Ohl & Co., v. A. 
L. Smith Iron Works,106 the use of a judge’s initials followed by ‘D. J.’ was held as a 
signature authenticating a bill of exceptions, and the initials ‘D. J.’ were added for 
the purpose of indicating his judicial office. Hughes CJ commented on the use of initials at 176–77:
102 (1866) 14 L.T.N.S. 433.103 [1988] 3 All ER 161, CA.104 Surprisingly, no case law on signatures appeared to have been cited or referred to in the appeal, which is particularly interesting, bearing in mind the comments by Buxton and Brooke LJJ in Copeland v. Smith [2000] 1 WLR 1371.105 Federal: Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed. 743 (the initials ‘A.B.’ 
held not to be a signature of the judge, nor sufficient authentication of a bill of exceptions) 
(1888); Kinney v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 222 U.S. 283, 32 S.Ct. 101, 56 
L.Ed. 200 (a paper in the record styled ‘Exceptions to the Charge to the Jury’ upon which 
the initials ‘J. P. McP., Trial Judge’ are placed is not a bill of exceptions) (1911).Kentucky: Wurts v. Newsome, 253 Ky. 38, 68 S.W.2d 448 (there was no signature where 
a judge signed a ballot with his surname and initial, or with his initials) (1934).106 288 U.S. 170, 53 S.Ct. 340, 77 L.Ed. 681.
Electronic signatures in law28
Signature by initials has been held to be sufficient under the Statute 
of Frauds and the Statute of Wills, and in other transactions. It has been held in some states that a different rule obtains in the case of 
the official signature of certain judicial officers, but the Congress 
has not established such a rule for the judges of the federal courts. Nor, in the absence of special statutory requirement, is there a 
uniform custom in relation to official signatures. It may be assumed 
that a requirement of the officer’s signature, without more, means that he shall write his name or his distinctive appellation; but the question remains as to what writing of that character is to be 
deemed sufficient for the purpose of authenticating his official 
act. There is no rule that he shall adhere to the precise form of his 
name as it appears in his commission. The full name of the officer 
may or may not be used. Not infrequently Christian names are omitted, in part or altogether, or are abbreviated or indicated by 
initials. In some of the most important communications on behalf 
of the federal government, only the surname of the officer is used. 
When an officer authenticates his official act by affixing his initials he does not entirely omit to use his name; he simply abbreviates it; 
he uses a combination of letters which are part of it. Undoubtedly that method is informal, but we think that it is clearly a method of 
‘signing’. It cannot be said in such a case that he has utterly failed to 
‘sign,’ so that his authentication of his official act, in the absence of 
further statutory requirement, is to be regarded as absolutely void.
1.59 The cases of Origet v. United States107 and Kinney v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Company108 were neither cited nor referred to as being overruled, although the comments by Hughes CJ appear to indicate that initials are 
acceptable. The initials of a judge on a judgment were held to be sufficient in the Illinois case of Robertson v. Robertson,109 and in the 1905 Nebraska case of 
Griffith v. Bonawitz,110 the initials of two judges, written on the back of a number 
of ballots, were also held to be signatures.
1.60 Wills Initials have been used in wills, as in the case of Re Savory’s Goods,111 where the testatrix executed the will by writing her initials in the presence of two 
witnesses who duly attested. See also In the Goods of Clark112 where the deceased, who was too ill to sign his will, requested his wife to sign for him, which she 
107 125 U.S. 240, 8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed. 743.108 222 U.S. 283, 32 S.Ct. 101, 56 L.Ed. 200.109 462 N.E.2d 712 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1984).110 73 Neb. 622, 103 N.W. 327.111 15 Jur 1042.112 2 Curt. 329, 163 ER 428.
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did, with her mark. This was a sufficient compliance with the Act, although the 
executrix lost a legacy that was granted to her under the terms of the will. In the case of In the Goods of Christian,113 H. H. Christian, a rear admiral in the Royal Navy, left a will that included the signature of a witness in the form of initials, which 
was also a sufficient subscription. For a line of cases in England with respect to wills, see Re Blewitt’s Goods,114 and in Scotland, initials were considered a form of signature in Speirs v. Speirs or Home Speirs.115
1.61 In South Africa, a will signed with initials was signed in the case of In re 
Trollip,116 in which the decision in Van Vuuren v. Van Vuuren117 was overruled, and the decision in the case of In re Ebden’s Will118 approved. De Villiers CJ observed, 
at 245, that ‘If a mark is a sufficient signature, a fortiori initials must be sufficient’. 
A modern example of a will in which initials were accepted as sufficient evidence of a signature is that of the Canadian case of Re Schultz.119
1.62 Rights in property In respect of rights in property, the initials of a landlord in a rent book served to renew a lease and enable an option to buy to be exercised,120 and directors adding their initials to a clause providing a guarantee in a contract were bound by the guarantee under the provisions of s2 of the 
Contracts Enforcement Act 1956 in the New Zealand case of Doughty-Pratt Group 
Limited v. Perry Castle.121 Although it was accepted that initials can be considered a signature in Newell v. Tarrant,122 in the particular circumstances of the case, the initials in question did not amount to an execution and authentication to create an equitable charge over Chase Farm, and the initials also failed to comply 
with the strict requirements of s2(3) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1989.
1.63 Voting In the 19th century voting papers had to be signed with the name of the burgess voting under the provisions of s32 of the Municipal Corporation 
Act of 5 & 6 Will. 4 c76. In 1852, in the case of R v. Avery,123 it was held that a person can sign as they ordinarily write their signature, such as, in this instance, 
the surname and initial of the Christian name.
113 2 Rob. Ecc. 110, 163 ER 1260.114 (1879–81) 5 PD 116.115 (1879) 6 R. 1359.116 1895 12 SC 243.117 2 Searle 116.118 4 Juta 495.119 (1984) 8 DLR (4th) 147.120 Hill v. Hill [1947] 1 Ch 231.121 [1995] 2 NZLR 398 (CA).122 [2004] EWHC 772 (Ch), 2004 WL 741782.123 21 LJQB 430.
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1.64 United States of America In the United States of America, decisions relating to the use of initials covers a range of situations, including bills,124 
cheques (checks),125 the Statute of Frauds,126 trusts127 and wills,128 although the evidence does not always indicate the initials served as a means of authentication, as in the 1945 Wisconsin case of North American Seed Co., v. Cedarburg Supply 
Co.,129 where the initials ‘H. Z.’ for Harvey Zirtzlaff were placed in such an odd position, that it was determined they did not serve as a signature in accordance 
with s207 of the Restatement of Contracts. Attempts are made on occasions to retrieve a small scintilla of hope from an otherwise impossible position, which is what was attempted in the federal eighth circuit case of Vess Beverages, Inc., v. 
124 New York (1845): Palmer v. Stevens, 1 Denio 471.125 New York: The Merchants’ Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443 (the initials of the defendant on a 
check held to be a sufficient endorsement) (1831).126 Federal: The Salmon Falls Manufacturing Company v. Goddard, 55 U.S. 446, 14 How. 446, 
1852 WL 6760 (U.S.Mass.), 14 L.Ed. 493 (the initials ‘R.M.M.’ and ‘W.W.G.’ were sufficient to 
be signatures) (1852); Federal 5th Circuit: Jones v. Fox Film Corporation, 68 F.2d 116 (the 
initials ‘J.T.J.’ for John T. Jones held to be a signature) (1934); Federal 7th Circuit: Monetti, 
S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corporation, 931 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1991) (the initials ‘SS/mh’ typed by a secretary held to be the signature of Steve Schneider, who dictated the letter to 
the secretary).Iowa: Burns v. Burrows, 196 N.W. 62 (the initials ‘R.A.S.’ held to be a signature of R. A. 
Santee) (1923).Massachusetts: Irving v. Goodimate, Co., 320 Mass. 454, 70 N.E.2d 414, 171 A.L.R. 326 
(the initials ‘RL/s’ of the president of the company were typed at the bottom of a letter); 
Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen 474, 91 Mass. 474, 1864 WL 3510 (Mass.) (initials of both 
parties, ‘J.H.F.’ and ‘J.B.R.’ were signatures) (1946).Michigan: Archbold v. Industrial Land Co., 264 Mich. 289, 249 N.W. 858 (an instrument 
signed ‘Approved: J.S.L’. and ‘O.K. with me: O.T.B.’ and ‘O.K. with me: O.T.M.’ held to be signed 
by O. G. Bowker and J. S. Lille, respectively president and vice-president of the Industrial 
Land company, and O. T. Morse, vice-president of the American Blower Corporation) 
(1933); Borkowski v. Kolodziejski, 332 Mich. 589, 52 N.W.2d 348 (defendant signed his 
name with the initials ‘L.S.’ after it) (1952).Missouri: Kamada, M.D. v. RX Group Limited, 639 S.W.2d 146, (Mo.App. 1982) (initials 
on a lease sufficient).New Jersey: Smith v. Howell, 11 N.J.Eq. 349, 1857 WL 4462 (N.J.Ch.), 3 Stockt. 349 (the 
initials of Walter Kirkpatrick used by him as his signature to form a trust) (1857); Crabtree 
v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation, 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E.2d 551 (the initials of Robert 
P. Johns, executive vice-president and general manger subscribed to a payroll card, is a 
signature for the purposes of establishing an employment contract) (1953).Washington: Degginger v. Martin, 48 Wash. 1, 92 P. 674 (the initials of an agent added 
by him in his own hand underneath his typewritten name, contract held to be sufficiently 
executed) (1907).127 California: Weiner v. Mullaney, 59 Cal.App.2d 620, 140 P.2d 704 (the initials of George J 
Mullaney typed at the end of several letters to his sister comprised a signature sufficiently 
signed in the formation of a trust) (1943).128 Virginia: Pilcher v. Pilcher, 117 Va. 356, 84 S.E. 667, L.R.A. 1915D 902 (a will written by 
the testator ‘I give to my wife, Alice McCabe Pilcher, all of my property, real and personal. 
E.M.P.’ held to be sufficiently signed) (1915).129 247 Wis. 31, 18 N.W.2d 466, 159 A.L.R. 250.
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The Paddington Corporation,130 where the initials of those attending a meeting that were added by the person who took a note of the meeting did not constitute 
individual signatures, and thus did not qualify as a means of authentication.
The use of a surname
1.65 Statute of Frauds People use many variations of their name when 
signing a document, and the use of first name or family name is not unusual. In the context of the Statute of Frauds, the question about what could be construed as a signature was argued before Lord Denham CJ and Patteson, Coleridge and Wrightman JJ in the case of Lobb and Knight v. Stanley in 1844.131 Interestingly, the comments made both by counsel and Patteson J in this case seem to imply that contemporaries would have preferred to reverse the liberal approach relating to 
the meaning of a signature. However, the authorities were too well established to 
be reviewed or ignored. In this instance, one Stanley, a certified bankrupt, gave a 
written promise signed by him after his bankruptcy. Three undated letters were produced, one of which read:Mr Stanley begs to inform Mr Lobb that he will be glad to give him 
a promissory note or bill for the amount of Mr Stanley’s account, payable at three months, as Mr Stanley has of late been put to heavy expenses, and hopes this arrangement will be satisfactory 
to Mr Lobb. 3 Crescent. Thursday morning.
1.66 At the trial before Lord Denman CJ, a verdict was found for Lobb, and 
leave was given to appeal. Whately, counsel for Stanley, submitted that all the 
previous decisions relating to what was meant to be a signature were not correct. 
He argued: ‘Those decisions, however, are scarcely to be defended on principle; 
and, if the question were new, probably a different doctrine would be adopted’.132 This view was noted and commented upon by Patteson J:
It is true that the word ‘signed’ occurs in the statute: and, if this had 
been the first time that we were called upon to put a construction on that word, and if the decisions on the Statute of Frauds had not occurred, I should perhaps be slow to say that this was a 
signature.133
1.67 Lord Denham CJ agreed, that in one sense the letters were not signed. However, he then considered the intrinsic evidence of the documents, and pointed out that
130 941 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1991).131 (1844) 5 QB 574; 114 ER 1366; Law Times, 2 (1843–4), p. 366.132 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 579.133 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 582.
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… it is a signature of the party when he authenticates the instrument 
by writing his name in the body. Here, it is true, the whole name is 
not written, but only ‘Mr Stanley’. I think more is not necessary.134
1.68 Coleridge J reinforced the significance of the mechanism by which the document was authenticated, when he pointed out that:Is it not enough if a party, at the beginning of a document, writes 
his name so as to govern what follows? Does he not then use his 
name as a signature?135
1.69 It was unanimously agreed that Stanley signed the documents. Stanley 
wrote the letters himself. He identified himself by surname in the body of the 
letters. By identifying himself in this way, he demonstrated his intention that the 
recipient should rely on the promise contained in the letter. The signature was, in effect, his assertion, by writing his surname within the text of the message, that 
the contents of the letters are to be acted upon by the recipient.
1.70 A note written in the third person was accepted as a signature in the 1811 case of Morrison v. Turnour,136 as was an unsigned statement that began ‘Mr 
Wilmot Parker has agreed,’ in an action for specific performance in respect of a 
contract for the purchase of a leasehold house.137
1.71 Deeds In Scotland, Lord Dervaird held that a deed executed by the 
subscription of the granter’s surname alone is not of itself improbative or invalid in the case of American Express Europe Ltd v. Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc,138 following the decision in Gordon v. Murray,139 where it was upheld that the 
subscription to an assignation, being ‘Fullerton of that Ilk’ without a Christian 
name, was valid. The case of Traquair (Earl of) v. Janet Gibson140 in which the use 
of initials was used, was also canvassed. For the modern position in Scotland, see 
s7(2) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.
The use of a trade name
1.72 The use of a trade name by a party may be sufficient to indicate an intention to enter into a contract, as in the case of Johnson v. Dogson,141 where an agent for the plaintiff signed a memorandum retained by the defendant 
134 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 581.135 (1844) 5 QB 574 at 582.136 18 Ves. 175, 34 ER 1204; 18 Ves. Jun. 175, 34 ER 284.137 Propert v. Parker [1830] 1 Russ & M 625; 39 ER 240.138 1989 SCLR 333, 1989 SLT 650, OH.139 (1765) Mor. 16818.140 (1724) Mor. 16809.141 (1837) 6 LJ Ex 185; 1 Jur 739; 2 M & W 653; Murp & H 271, 150 ER 918.
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‘for’ Johnson, Johnson & Co. In Cohen v. Roche,142 the printed name of the firm on the front page of the auction catalogue was held to constitute a signature by 
Mr Roche. In reaching his judgment in this case, McCardie J considered that the insertion of the name in the catalogue served to authenticate the catalogue, and 
this authentication was reinforced ‘in that the defendant himself wrote down in 
his auctioneer’s book the price realized by lot 145, and also entered the names 
of the purchasers’.143 However, the mere insertion of the name of the seller in a memorandum where the sale of the property was subject to the approval of the seller, even where the buyer signed the document with his mark, does not indicate the authentication of the document, and the inclusion of the name of the auctioneer on the particulars of sale only acted to announce that he would 
sell the premises.144 In the 1842 New York case of Miller v. Pelletier,145 the clerk to the auctioneer wrote down the name of the highest bidder for 7 Barclay Street, 
New York, in the sales book. The successful bidder subsequently took action to recover the deposit, because the seller claimed they had not subscribed to the 
contract. The Vice-Chancellor concluded that the purchaser was bound by the addition of his name to the sales book by the clerk to the auctioneer, but in the 
absence of the seller’s name or subscription in the sales book, the contract was 
void, and the deposit returned to the buyer.
A partial signature 
1.73 Wills Sudden changes in life expectancy can cause a person, as they near the end of their life, to review the arrangements for the disposal of their 
worldly goods. On such occasions, ensuring the disposition is made in the proper 
form can be overtaken by the imminent demise of the testatrix. In Re Chalcraft’s 
Goods,146 as Mrs Chalcraft’s life ebbed away, her doctor administered greater 
doses of morphia to alleviate the pain she was experiencing. She wanted to sign a 
codicil to her will, and took hold of a pen and wrote ‘E. Chal’, but never completed 
her name, because she died, and the signature came to an abrupt end. One of the issues before the court was whether what the deceased wrote was intended to be 
her signature. Willmer J found that making a decision as to whether the partial signature could be considered to be her signature within the provisions of the 
Wills Act 1837 to be a ‘very difficult point to decide’.147 He suggested that there must be a question of degree involved in any decision, and he interpreted the words used by the Lord Chancellor in Hindmarch v. Charlton148 broadly. Taking 
142 [1927] 1 KB 169.143 [1927] 1 KB 169 at 175 and 176.144 Dyas v. Stafford [1882] 9 LR Ir 520.145 4 Edw. Ch. 102.146 [1948] P 222, [1948] 1 All ER 700.147 [1948] P 222 at 232.148 (1861) 8 HL Cas 160 at 167 ‘I will lay down this as my notion of the law: that to make a 
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into account the circumstances the deceased found herself in at the end of her 
life, he decided that the mark she made did amount to a signature.
1.74 In comparison, in 1892, Mitchell J concluded that there is no signature where a testator began to sign a codicil, but stopped after making a stroke 
of the pen resembling the first part of the first letter of his name, and said to 
those present ‘I can’t sign it now’. Given the nature of the evidence, the judge concluded that the testator did not intend the scrawl on the document to be a 
signature.149 The Outer House in Scotland reached the same decision in the case of Donald v. M’Gregor,150 where the matron of the hospital, at the request 
of the deceased, wrote a codicil on a post card. The deceased tried to sign it, but 
desisted after writing ‘Mary T. M’Gr’, adding a cross as her mark. Two witnesses 
appended their signatures. Lord Ashmore noted, at 105, that ‘the deceased did not herself subscribe the codicil; for although she began to write her name she did not complete it, probably because she was too weak and too ill to write more 
than she did, and no one executed the writing for her’ and went on to indicate 
that in Scotland, ‘as regards the cross which she added – signing by a mark is 
not sufficient in law’. Thus neither her partial signature nor the cross acted as a 
signature.
Words other than a name
1.75 Wills Occasionally, people will not refer to each other by name, but by reference to their relationship with each other, such as between parents and 
children, where a child may call their parents ‘mum’ and ‘dad’, ‘mater’ or ‘pater’ 
or some other form of address. Equally, parents may well do the same with their 
children, especially when writing to them. They may not sign a letter or card 
with their name, but with the words ‘mother’ or ‘father’. In the case of Re Cook’s 
Estate Murison v. Cook,151 the testatrix drew up a holograph will on two sheets of 
notepaper, which was duly properly attested by two competent witnesses. The 
document ended ‘Please Leslie be kind to Dot. Your loving mother’. Leslie was her 
son and Dot referred to one of her daughters. The question was whether the words 
‘Your loving mother’ constituted a signature within the meaning of the Wills Act 
1837. Collingwood J, having cited various authorities, came to the conclusion 
that the testatrix intended the words ‘Your loving mother’ to identify herself 
as the person attesting.152 This case illustrates the concern that judges have in establishing whether the person signing the document intended the words they used to apply to the terms of the document they signed, and in the United States, 
valid subscription of a witness, there must be the name or some mark which is intended 
to represent the name’.149 In re Plate’s Estate, 148 Pa. 55, 23 A. 1038.150 1926 S.L.T. 103.151 [1960] 1 All ER 689.152 The most persuasive comment to support his decision in this context was the opinion of Lord Campbell LC in Hindmarch v. Charlton (1861) 8 HL Cas 160 at 167.
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there is a line of case law to illustrate the use of similar words and phrases,153 although the 1940 Californian case of Berdan v. Berdan154 demonstrated this 
liberal approach can only be taken so far. In this instance, a father wrote a letter to his son on a typewriter, and his wife added further handwritten script on the 
reverse of the letter: ‘Dad signed this with his signature and also “Dad” below. The 
signature in case you might want to use it. Lawfully. Mother’. The word ‘Mother’ was capable of being a legally binding signature, but taken not to be because it was assumed, in the absence of any evidence, that the language illustrated that 
she did not believe the word ‘Dad’ was a legally binding signature.
An identifying phrase
1.76 In contrast to the previous examples above, the use of the phrase ‘mother’ was not held to be a signature in an earlier case of Selby v. Selby155 where a letter 
addressed to the son, beginning ‘My Dear Robert’ and ending in the words ‘Do me 
the justice to believe me the most affectionate of mothers’, was not sufficiently 
signed within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds 1677. The Master of the Rolls 
held that it was not sufficient that a party to a document can be identified in 
such a way, because the Statute required the document to be signed. He rejected 
the proposition that where the writer of the document has been identified, it could therefore be construed that there was a signature within the meaning of 
153 Arkansas (1906): Arendt v. Arendt, 80 Ark. 204, 96 S.W. 982 (after William Arendt shot 
himself, a letter addressed to his wife was discovered, including the statement ‘Whatever I 
have in worldly goods, it is my wish that you should possess them’. At the end of the letter, 
he signed with a shortened version of his first name, ‘Will’. Held to be a signature by the 
members of the jury and affirmed on appeal); Boone v. Boone, 114 Ark. 69, 169 S.W. 779 
(testator omitted the letter ‘n’ in his signature in writing his first name, Emanuel, on one 
of the sheets of the will; this does not affect the validity) (1914); Cartwright v. Cartwright, 
158 Ark. 278, 250 S.W. 11 (a letter sent by an American soldier killed in action on 14 October 1918 to his wife, part of which was testamentary in its effect, and signed with the 
abbreviation of his first name ‘Lus’, held to be a sufficient signature) (1923).California: In re Henderson’s Estate, 196 Cal. 623, 239 P. 938 (‘From A Loving Mother’ 
a sufficient signature) (1923); In re Button’s Estate, 277 P. 758 reversed 287 P. 964 (‘Love 
from Muddy’ a valid signature) (1930).Kentucky: Word v. Whipps, 28 S.W. 151, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 403 (in the absence of fraud or suspicious circumstances, the misspelling of a name does not affect the validity of a 
signature, ‘A. J. Whpps’ written instead of ‘A. J. Whipps’) (1894); Wells v. Lewis, 190 Ky. 
626, 228 S.W. 3 (‘Ant Nanie’ appended to a letter as a testamentary writing is a sufficient 
signature) (1921).
Pennsylvania (1890): Appeal of Knox, 131 P. 220, 18 A. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am.St.
Rep. 798; In re Kimmel’s Estate, 278 P. 435, 123 A. 405, 31 A.L.R. 678 (a testamentary letter 
ending with ‘Father’ held to be signed) (1924).Texas: Barnes v. Horne, 233 S.W. 859 (a letter by the deceased to his brother considered 
a will, and signed at the end with the shortened version of his name ‘Ed’ accepted as a 
signature) (1921).154 103 P.2d 622.155 (1817) 3 Mer 2; 36 ER 1.
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the Statute. Lord Skerrington also concluded, in Pentland v. Pentland’s Trustees,156 
that a holograph codicil signed ‘Yr Loving Mother,’ was not signed. The basis of the objections to accepting such terms as a form of signature were set out by Interim Sheriff-Substitute Kermack in Allan and Crichton, Petitioners,157 where a 
witness had subscribed as ‘Mrs Bernard’ without adhibiting her Christian name 
or initial, was not considered to form a signature.
1.77 It is instructive to compare the decision of the Master of the Rolls in Selby 
v. Selby to that of the comment made by Maule J in Morton v. Copeland, that a 
‘Signature does not necessarily mean writing a person’s Christian and surname, 
but any mark which indicates it as the act of the party’158 and the decision by Lord Hunter in Rhodes v. Peterson159 from Scotland. In this case, Mrs Dorothy Macandrew wrote a letter to her daughter in her own handwriting, and signed 
it ‘Lots of Love. Mum’. Lord Hunter was required to determine whether the word 
‘Mum’ was sufficient to establish the holograph will was duly signed. He noted some latitude in the law of Scotland towards the meaning of what is meant by a 
signature, and went on to observe, at 100(a):It clearly is not essential that the subscription should consist of a surname preceded by either an initial or initials or a Christian name or names, nor is it essential that the surname should appear at all or, indeed, that there should be comprised in the subscription or signature any of the Christian names or surnames written in 
full.
1.78 Lord Hunter also indicated that the use of a familiar or pet name could be a valid signature provided it was proved that the writer signed their name 
usually in such a way. He went on to suggest, at 100(b), that the use of such a 
form of signature was ‘as apt to signify that the writing is the completed and 
concluded expression of the writer’s intention as a signature by initials or by 
abbreviated Christian name’. In particular, he considered it settled authority, that where a holograph writing consisted of a name other than the Christian name or names or initials followed by the surname of the writer, that there must be 
sufficient evidence to identify whatever name was used by the writer (in this case, 
‘Mum’), was used regularly. The form by which a person identify themselves does not necessarily affect the validity of the document, especially where a person writes a document with their own handwriting and uses a phrase as a means 
of identification. The facts of these cases do not appear to offer any features to 
distinguish them.
156 (1908) 16 S.L.T. 480.157 1933 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 2.158 (1855) 16 C B 516 at 535. A footnote was added to this comment: ‘Provided it be proved 
or admitted to be genuine, and be the accustomed mode of signature of the party’, 139 ER 
861.159 (1972) SLT 98.
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Abbreviation of a name
Solicitors Act 1974 Professional firms tend to accumulate long names over 
time, although the present fashion is to adopt a shortened version. Long names 
can be tedious, and one partner in the firm of Bartlett Gluckstein Crawley & de 
Reya sought to reduce the requirement of signing the firm’s name in full, and 
a client decided to challenge this practice.160 Mr Byrne was sent a bill of costs. The bill had a printed heading with the full name of the partnership, its address 
and the names of the partners. The bill was signed ‘Bartletts’ by a partner. The 
full name was printed below the signature, but not immediately beneath it. The 
bill was sent with a letter headed with the firm’s full name, which was also 
signed in the same abbreviated name. Mr Byrne refused to pay because the 
signature on the bill did not comply with the requirements of s69(2) of the 
Solicitors Act 1974. The firm brought an action to recover the costs. McDonnell 
J gave judgment for Mr Byrne. He accepted the sum was owed, but agreed that 
the bill was not signed in accordance with the required form. On appeal, Fox LJ determined that the bill was properly signed, and offered the following comments:
There had been legislation relating to solicitors’ bills of costs 
over several centuries. The question was whether as a matter of 
construction it could be said that the bill was signed ‘in the name 
of the firm’.
Those words could not require that the whole name of the firm, 
which in the present case was a long one, had to be set out in full. If a solicitor was required to sign in his own name he did not have to 
sign all his names in full nor write all his initials.
If the name of the firm had been printed immediately below the 
signature ‘Bartletts’ it could hardly have been doubted that the bill 
was signed in the name of the firm.There was a signature on the bill of costs by a solicitor of the 
Supreme Court. That signature was intended to authenticate the bill and the defendant treated it as a bill issued with the authority 
of the firm itself….The signature could only be regarded as a signature in the name 
of the firm, and anyone reading it would take it to be a convenient 
and obvious contraction of the full name of the firm.161
1.79 Bush J agreed with this analysis and the appeal was allowed. Interestingly, between the trial and the appeal, a fresh bill of costs was prepared and delivered 
160 Bartletts de Reya v. Byrne (1983) The Times 14 January; (1983) 127 SJ 69, Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division).161 (1983) The Times 14 January.
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to Mr Byrne, signed with the full name of the firm. It was paid before the hearing 
in the Court of Appeal.
Impression of a mark
A seal imprint
1.80 Wills The impression of a seal on documents has a long history, especially 
on wills, and their use continues today. An early case after the passing of the Statute of Frauds where a seal was the subject of a decision is that of Lemayne 
v. Stanley,162 where the devisor wrote his will in his own hand, and added his 
seal to the will, but did not sign it. It was unanimously held that this was a 
good will, because he had written it himself and identified himself in the will by 
name. However, there was disagreement as to whether the imprint of the seal 
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a signature. Three members of the court, North, Wyndham and Charlton JJ, considered signing was no more than 
a mark, and sealing was a sufficient mark. However, the report is ambiguous, 
and states the majority held the mark was sufficient because ‘for signum is no more than a mark, and sealing is a sufficient mark that this is his will’ (italics in 
the original). The second part of this sentence may be construed either to mean 
the sealing was sufficient to authenticate that it was the devisor’s will, or that 
the sealing was sufficient because the devisor wrote the will in his own hand 
and clearly identified himself.163 However, this decision may well not have been acceptable to many judges, for in Smith v. Evans,164 Lord Chief Baron Parker and 
Clive and Smythe BB denounced this decision as ‘a very strange doctrine’. It was considered that signing with a seal would open the possibilities of forgery, 
a comment that reflected a change in judicial attitude from the middle ages, 
indicating the reduced importance given to a seal in England and Wales. In a later case, that of Warneford v. Warneford,165 Raymond CJ ruled that the sealing 
of a will was also a signing within the Statute of Frauds 1677. The report of this case is merely a statement of the decision, which does not make it a 
persuasive authority. This case predated the comments made in Smith v. Evans. The reporting of decisions such as this were clearly in the mind of a later Chief Justice when he commented upon this issue in Ellis v. Smith.166 That a seal could be a substitute for a signature was quashed by Willes CJ:
162 (1681) 3 Lev 2; 83 ER 545.163 In the case of Dormer v. Thurland (1728) 2 Eq Ca Abr 663, 22 ER 557; 2 P Wms 506; 24 ER 837, a will had to be signed and sealed to be effective, and because it was signed but not 
sealed, it was declared void for want of being sealed.164 (1751) 1 Wils K B 313; 95 ER 636.165 (Easter 13 Geo 1) 2 Strange 764; 93 ER 834.166 (1754) 1 Ves Jun 11; 1 Ves Jun Supp 1; 30 ER 205; 34 ER 666.
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Nor do I think, sealing is to be considered as signing; and I declare so now, because, if that question ever comes before me, I shall not think myself precluded from weighing it thoroughly and decreeing, that it is not signing, notwithstanding obiter dicta, which in many cases were nunquam dicta; but barely the words of reporters; for upon examination I have found many of the sayings ascribed to that great man, Lord Chief Justice Holt, were never said by him. 
(italics in the original).167
1.81 Two arguments were put forward to distrust a seal. In Grayson v. 
Atkinson,168 the Lord Chancellor suggested that it was not possible to determine whose seal was used:169
… how can it be said, that putting a seal to it would be a sufficient 
signing? For any one may put a seal; no particular evidence arises 
from that seal: common seals are alike, and one man’s may be like 
another’s; no certainty or guard therefore arises from thence.’
1.82 Another reason for rejecting the use of a seal was given by Sir John Strange,170 suggesting that the nature of a seal was such that it cannot act to identify an act:
… that sealing is signing, I am not convinced; for sealing identifies 
nothing; it carries no character … and most seals are affixed by the 
stationers, who prepare the paper.
1.83 It seems the court in the case of Ellis v. Smith had sufficient weight of authority, comprising, as it did, the Lord Chancellor, Master of the Rolls, Chief Justice and Chief Baron, to prevent future submissions that a seal could be a 
substitute for a signature. A further variation of the use of a seal occurred in the case of Re Emerson’s Goods,171 where a hand written document ended with 
the words ‘Signed, sealed, and delivered by me, the first day of February, 1881’. The seal marked, with his initials, was added in the presence of the subscribing 
witnesses, and the testator also placed one of his fingers on the wax impression 
and stated before the witnesses ‘This is my last will, and this is my hand and seal’. 
Warren J granted probate on the basis that the testator used the words ‘this is my 
hand’, intending this statement to be his signature. This decision was followed by Warren J in the case of Re Lemon’s Goods, 172 where the testator was too ill 
167 (1754) 1 Ves Jun 11 at 13.168 (1752) 2 Ves Sen 455; 28 ER 291; Ves Sen Supp 382; 28 ER 556.169 28 ER 556 at 292.170 Ellis v. Smith (1754) 1 Ves Jun 11 at 13, at 15.171 (1882–3) 9 LR Ir Ch 443.172 (1896) 30 IrLTR 127.
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to write, so he stamped his initials in wax on the paper in the presence of the 
witnesses.
1.84 Interest in real property Seals used to be attached to an indenture respecting an interest in property, and Lord Eldon LC took up the discussion relating to the use of a seal in the case of Wright v. Wakeford,173 where indentures 
were signed, sealed and delivered. However, the memorandum of attestation 
only stated that they were signed and delivered. Bearing in mind the value of the estate, at £15,988, this became a technical issue of great importance to 
both parties. After the death of Thomas Wood the elder, who was a party to the indenture, the two attesting witnesses endorsed a further memorandum, stating they witnessed the signing at the same time as the original document was sealed 
and delivered. Eldon LC rejected the proposition that a subsequent attestation 
was acceptable. He accepted that the document may have been signed, sealed 
and delivered, but it was not attested to this effect. As a consequence, he held that the members of a jury could not presume that the act of signing was done in 
the presence of the attesting witnesses. In comparison to the other cases cited in 
relation to whether a seal is sufficient as a signature, the decision in this case was 
decided upon the technical issue of regularity of the attestation. Lord Eldon took the opportunity, at 458–9, to make further observations about the use of a seal as a means of authentication:It is true, at one time it was decided, that sealing was signing 
(Lemayne v. Stanly, 3 Lev. 1. Warneford v. Warneford, 2 Sir. 764); and when it was urged, that the Legislature meant more than 
sealing, first, from the circumstance, that sealing is not mentioned as to Wills: secondly, as the Legislature must have proposed some evidence from the hand-writing of the party, the objection was, that a person may sign by his mark: an act affording no material testimony; and upon such reasoning it was decided originally, that sealing was signing: but upon a review of that the contrary has been held for a long time; and, so far as sealing from being equivalent to signing, that it is determined, that sealing is not 
necessarily; and that sealing without signing is not a sufficient 
execution of a Will (see Ellis v. Smith, 1 Ves, jun. 11; and that attestation by a mark is good, Harrison v. Harrison, Addy v. Grix, 8 
Ves. 185, 405): the converse holding as to a deed; which cannot be without sealing and delivery: if signed, it may be a writing: but, if delivered, it may be a good deed, whether signed, or not, and, if it is to be executed under a power with signature and sealing, 
both are required.
173 (1811) 17 Ves Jun 455; 34 ER 176.
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1.85 This decision may have been unique to the facts of the case, given the value of the estate in question, and can be distinguished from Re Emerson’s Goods174 for 
this reason.
1.86 By comparison, another technicality arose in Lord Lovelace’s Case,175 where 
a swaynemoote roll was authenticated with one seal by an officer of the forest 
by the assent of all the verders, regarders and other officers. In this instance, 
it was held that a single seal was a good obligation of them all. Similarly, in Ball 
v. Dunsterville,176 one partner executed a deed for himself and his partner, by 
authority of the partner and in his presence. This act was a sufficient execution, 
even though only one seal was used. In Cooch v. Goodman,177 two people entered 
into a lease in their capacity as governors of a hospital. The defendant signed the 
lease and added his seal, and the lessors affixed a common seal to the lease, but 
did not sign it. No decision was made, because the seal was that of a corporation, 
not of the individuals, which meant the wrong parties initiated the action. Lord Denman CJ commented, at 598, that a single seal may serve a number of people:It is true that one piece of wax may serve as a seal for several persons, if each of them impress it himself, or one for all, by proper authority, or in the presence of all, as was held in Ball v. Dunsterville 
(4 T.R. 313), following Lord Lovelace’s Case (W. Jones, 268).
1.87 More recently, the case of First National Securities Ltd v. Jones178 considered the effect on a legal charge sealed with a circle printed on the document containing 
the letters ‘L.S.’ with the signature of the first defendant affixed across the seal. 
It was held to be sufficiently executed where the seal has been placed with the 
intention of serving the purpose of a seal. Buckely LJ indicated at 118 C-D:… it is a very familiar feature nowadays of documents which are intended to be executed as deeds that they do not have any wax, or even wafer, seal attached to them, but have printed at the spot where formerly the seal would probably have been placed, a printed circle, which is sometimes hatched and sometimes the 
letters ‘L.S.’ within it, which is intended to serve the purpose of a seal if the document is delivered as the deed of the party executing 
it.
In the present case there is not only the circle with the letters ‘L.S.’ within it upon the document, printed as part of the printed version of the document, but also there is the feature that the mortgagor 
174 (1882–3) 9 LR Ir Ch 443.175 W. Jones, 268, 82 ER 140; W. Jones, 270, 82 ER 141.176 4 TR 313; 100 ER 1038.177 (1842) 2 QB 580; 114 ER 228.178 [1978] Ch 109, [1978] 2 All ER 221, CA.
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has placed his signature across the circle. In my judgment those features and the attestation, in the absence of any contrary 
evidence, are sufficient evidence to establish that the document 
was executed by the first defendant as his deed.
1.88 Goff LJ emphasized at 119E that the intent behind the act was important: ‘In my judgment, in this day and age, we can, and we ought to, hold that a document purporting to be a deed is capable in law of being such although it has no more 
than an indication where the seal should be’, and Sir David Cairns suggested at 
121B what the modern view might be on the use of seals: ‘Moreover, while in 1888 the printed indication of a locus sigilli was regarded as being merely the 
place where a seal was to be affixed, I have no doubt that it is now regarded by most business people and ordinary members of the public as constituting the seal 
itself’. The decision reached in this more recent case mirrors the approach taken by the members of the court in Re Sandilands,179 where a deed had pieces of green ribbon attached to places where the seals should be, but no wax or other material 
to receive an impression. It was held there was sufficient evidence that the deed 
was sealed. Bovill CJ observed at 413 ‘Here is something attached to this deed which may have been intended for a seal, but which from its nature is incapable 
of retaining an impression’, while Byles J also offered the opinion at 413 that ‘The sealing of a deed need not be by means of a seal; it may be done with the end of a 
ruler or anything else’.
1.89 Court records However, despite the reluctance by some judges to accept a seal as a signature in the 18th century, the members of the Exchequer of Pleas 
in the 19th century decided a seal was sufficient in relation to office copies from the Insolvent Court, being a court of record, in the case of Doe d Phillips, Jones and 
Morris v. Evans and Lloyd.180 It was possible for an office copy to be adduced as 
evidence without further proof, although it had to be signed by an officer of the 
court. Having discussed the relevant statutory provisions in his judgment, Bayley 
B came to the conclusion that where an office copy was sealed with the seal of 
the Insolvent Debtors’ Court, ‘The seal of the Court then becomes the signature 
of the Court and of the officer’.181 It seems that this decision provided for the authentication of the insolvent petition either where the document contained 
the signature of the officer or his deputy and the seal of the court, or where the 
document only contained the seal of the court. Given the comment by Bayley B, it 
appears that the seal of the court was sufficient for the purpose of authentication. In R v. St Paul, Covent Garden Inhabitants,182 relating to the settlement of an illegitimate child, it was not considered necessary that an order of the justices be 
sealed with wax. Two Justices of the Peace signed the order. The order was made 
179 (1871) LR 6 CP 411.180 (1833) 1 C & M 450; 149 ER 476; (1833) LJ Ex 2 NS 179.181 (1833) 1 C & M 450 at 461.182 (1844) 5 QB 671; 114 ER 1402; (1845) 7 QB 232; 115 ER 476.
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on a pre-printed form. From time to time the parish officers of St Martin in the Fields caused a printer to print a large number of the forms, and on each sheet a stationer was employed to impress two marks in ink with wooden blocks, and these impressions, when made at the foot, were intended to serve as seals for the 
justices when they signed such orders. The court in the Quarter Sessions held 
that the impression in ink made by such blocks was a sufficient seal to make the order, and when signed and delivered by the justices, it constituted a good and 
valid order.
1.90 In the United States of America, seals have generally been upheld, although 
there seems to have been a divergence between adopting the word ‘seal’ as an acknowledgment that a document has been sealed, and refusing to accept a 
document has been sealed unless an impression of a seal has been affixed.183 Recognition of the Japanese seal is illustrated in the Pennsylvanian case of Zenith 
Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.,184 where Becker DJ 
commented, at 1224, that a Japanese seal ‘should be given weight equivalent 
to a signature’. The 1916 New York case of Matter of the Probate of the Will of 
Severance185 dealt with an unusual form of seal. The testator affixed a holiday seal 
(containing the inscription ‘Merry Christmas. American Red Cross, 1912 Happy 
New Year’) to his will and inscribed it with his initials. It was held to constitute a subscription where the testator intended the holiday seal and inscription as a 
signature.
The use of a fingerprint
1.91 In the same way that a mark is accepted as a form of signature, in what seems to be a unique case in England, the impression of a thumb smeared in ink was accepted as a signature, although Langton J commented that the method did 
not commend itself to him.186 Thumb prints are also accepted in South Africa,187 
and in China, where a party affixes a fingerprint to a contract, it has the same 
effect as a signature or stamp.188
The use of a printed name
1.92 Statute of Frauds The legal constraints relating to commerce were gradually amended during the 19th century, and the case of Saunderson v. 
183 For a list of cases relating to the adoption of seals, see R. A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, I 
(4th edn., n.p.: Thompson West, 1990), 2:2.184 505 F.Supp. 1190 (1980).185 96 Misc. 384, 161 N.Y.S. 452.186 Re Finn (1935) 105 LJP 36; both parties accepted a thumb print was capable of being a signature in the case of In the Estate of Parsons, Borman v. Lel [2002] WTLR 237.187 Putter v. Provincial Insurance Co. Ltd., 1963 (3) SA 145 (W).188 ‘Supreme People’s Court, interpretation on several issues concerning the application of 
the PRC contract law’, China Law & Practice, 23(2009), pp. 41 and 69.
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Jackson189 at the turn of the century serves to illustrate how the judges began to deal with the practical issues relating to contractual disputes where the 
‘signature’ was affixed by the use of technology. In this instance, a bill of parcels 
was delivered, part of which was printed as follows: ‘London. Bought of Jackson 
and Hankin, distillers, No 8 Oxford Street’ and there followed in manuscript 
writing ‘1000 gallons of gin, 1 in 5 gin £350 7s’. A dispute occurred, and Lord 
Eldon articulated the single question as follows: ‘Whether if a man be in the habit of printing instead of writing his name, he may not be said to sign by his 
printed name as well as his written name?’190 In this instance, the bill of parcels 
was not considered to be of sufficient evidence on its own to be viewed as a note or memorandum of the contract, although a subsequent letter signed by one of the parties acted to connect the two documents, and thus took the matter outside 
the Statute of Frauds. The later case of Schneider v. Norris191 distinguished the facts in Saunderson v. Jackson.192 In this instance, Messrs John Schneider bought 
cotton yard and piece goods from Thomas Norris, who acted as agents. The bill 
of parcels read as follows: ‘London, 24 October 1812. Messrs John Schneider and 
Co bought of Thomas Norris and Co, Agents. Cotton yard and piece goods. No 3 
Freeman’s Court, Cornhill’, all of which was printed, except the words ‘Messrs 
John Schneider and Co’, which were hand written by an agent or employee of the 
defendant. The defendant refused to deliver the yarn. At the subsequent trial, the defendants did not accept that a contract had been formed, and relied on the absence of a note or memorandum in writing of the contract, as required by 
the Statute of Frauds 1677. Lord Ellenborough CJ overruled this objection and 
Schneider and Co obtained a verdict. On appeal, Lord Ellenborough reiterated his opinion at the trial, and considered that the printed name of the defendants, 
as it appeared on the bill, was recognized as a signature. This occurred when 
the name ‘Messrs John Schneider and Co’ was added to the bill of parcels that 
included the printed name of Norris and Co. By writing the name of the firm on 
the bill, Schneider’s identified themselves with the other party to the transaction. Le Blanc and Bayley JJ concurred with this decision, and Dampier J added that the act of a person handwriting the name of the plaintiffs on the bill served to authenticate it as a memorandum of the bargain struck between the parties, and 
went on to explain, at 290: ‘The defendant has ratified the sale to Schneider and Co by inserting their name as buyer to a paper in which he recognizes himself as 
seller’. Thus the names of the two firms on the same bill provided evidence of the 
agreement. There is a fine distinction between these two cases. The additional manuscript comments to the bill of parcels in Saunderson v. Jackson referred to 
the price and quantity of the order. This was not considered sufficient evidence, 
in the absence of the later signed letter, to demonstrate a contract existed. In comparison, the additional manuscript comments to the bill of parcels in 
189 (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 238; 126 ER 1257.190 (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 238 at 239.191 (1814) 2 M & S 237; 105 ER 388.192 (1800) 2 Bos & Pul 238; 126 ER 1257.
1. The signature 45
Schneider v. Norris contained the name of one of the parties to the contract. This meant that both parties to the contract in Schneider v. Norris were identified in 
the bill of parcels, and this was sufficient to establish a commercial relationship 
between the parties.193
1.93 At the same time as these cases were being determined, another problem occurred of a similar nature in circumstances where one of the parties retained 
evidence of the orders they received in loose cases and memorandum books. The 1809 case of Allen v. Bennet194 illustrated the problem. Wright, the agent for Bennett, agreed to sell goods to Allen, writing the orders into a book owned 
by Allen. The book was described as ‘a sort of waste book, containing various 
memoranda of different natures’. Mr Allen’s name was not written upon or in 
any part of the book. Bennett failed to deliver the goods. It was considered that the orders entered by the agent for Bennett were made in that capacity, and in conjunction with the exchange of correspondence between the parties, this was 
sufficient as a memorandum and a signature by Bennett. Mansfield CJ observed a wider question that occupied the courts on this issue at the time when he said, at 176:… every one knows it is the daily practice of the Court of Chancery to establish contracts signed by one person only, and yet a court of equity can no more dispense with the statute of frauds than a court of law can, there is no reason therefore to set aside the verdict, and 
the rule must be discharged.
1.94 A similar set of facts occurred in 1856 in the case of Sarl v. Bourdillon,195 
where the defendant, about to proceed to India, ordered goods from the plaintiff. Having selected the goods, a list was entered into an order book retained for the 
purpose, with the words ‘Order Book’ printed in gold letters on the outside and 
the names ‘Sarl & Son’ written on the flyleaf at the beginning. At the foot of the 
entry, the plaintiff wrote the name and address of the defendant. The defendant 
failed to pay for the goods, and claimed there was no sufficient memorandum of 
the sale as required by s17 of the Statute of Frauds. It was held that the names 
of the contracting parties sufficiently appeared to satisfy the statute.196 The 
judgments did not explain the reasoning for this decision. Jervis CJ indicated at the end of the submissions by counsel that there was only one point worth 
considering at length, and merely commented, at 195, that ‘We also think that 
193 In Hubert v. Treherne 3 Man. & G. 743, 133 ER 1338 the names of the parties appeared in the body of a draft agreement that neither party signed: it was held that the agreement 
was not signed. Both Saunderson v. Jackson and Schneider v. Norris were cited, and Tindal CJ indicated, at 754, that the decision in Saunderson v. Jackson depended ‘for its authority 
more upon the subsequent recognition than upon the printed names’.194 3 Taunt. 169, 128 ER 67; the spelling of Bennet differs as between the name of the case and 
the description of the firm in the report.195 1 CB (NS) 188; 140 ER 79.196 Jacob v. Kirk 2 M & R 221; 174 ER 269 was argued on different facts.
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the names of the contracting parties sufficiently appear, to satisfy the statute of 
frauds’. Cresswell J proceeded to deliver the judgment of the court more fully at a later date, and he said, at 195:In this case, inasmuch as the defendant declined to go to the jury, and insisted that there was no evidence of a memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, it may be assumed that the defendant 
wrote his name in the plaintiff ’s book, intending it as a signature to an order to the plaintiffs, whose order-book it was, and whose 
names were written in the beginning of it in the usual way. This, with the observations made in the course of argument, disposes of 
all the objections raised.
1.95 It is interesting to note that Cresswell J mentioned that the name ‘Sarl & 
Son’ was written in the beginning of the order book ‘in the usual way’. It might be inferred from this comment that Cresswell J was referring to the usual method of taking an order, and that it was common knowledge that note books containing 
pages to enter orders were widely used. If this was the case, the importance of this decision should not go unnoticed, because a decision the other way would have caused business people to alter the way they conducted business, and it is usually the case that judges in England and Wales looked to the common custom 
in reaching a decision.197
1.96 The use of a printed name was also challenged in the case of Evans 
v. Hoare198 where an employer authorized a clerk to draw up a contract of employment, which was signed by the employee, as follows:
5, Campbell-terrace, Cannhill Road, Leytonstone, E. Feb 19, 1890. 
Messrs Hoare, Marr, and Co., 26, 29, Budge Row, London, EC. 
Gentlemen, In consideration of your advancing my salary to the sum of £130 per annum, I hereby agree to continue my engagement in 
your office for three years, from and commencing January 1, 1890, at a salary at the rate of £130 per annum as aforesaid, payable 
monthly as hitherto. Yours obediently, George E Evans.
1.97 The members of the jury found a verdict for Mr Evans, but the assistant 
judge of the Mayor’s Court did not accept there was a memorandum signed by 
the firm in accordance with s4 of the Statute of Frauds, so gave judgment for the 
defendants. This decision was reversed upon appeal on the basis that the clerk 
197 In Joshua Buckton and Co. (Limited) v. London and North-Western Railway Company (1917–
18) 34 TLR 119 a contract signed with the printed name of the firm ‘Joshua Buckton and 
Co. (Limited)’ was accepted by Astbury J as a regular business practice at 121: ‘having regard to the long practice of signing these consignment notes and to the fact that notes 
so signed have been accepted and recognized by the Court as fulfilling the requirements 
of the section’, the printed name was a signature under the provisions of s7 of the Railway 
and Canal Traffic Act 1854.198 [1892] 1 QB 593; (1892) 66 LTRep NS 345.
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was authorized by the firm to draw up the document.199 Reference was made to 
the firm by the use of ‘your’ in the text and the name of the firm was included 
at the top of the document. The comments by Cave J reflected the difference in procedure between the passing of the statute and the time this case was heard:The Statute of Frauds was passed at a period when the legislature was somewhat inclined to provide that cases should be decided 
according to fixed rules, rather than to leave it to the jury to 
consider the effect of the evidence in each case. This, no doubt, arose to a certain extent from the fact that in those days the plaintiff and the defendant were not competent witnesses … No doubt, in attempting to frame a principle, one is obliged to depart somewhat 
from the strict lines of the statutes.200
1.98 A variation of this theme, which also indicated the way people conducted their daily business, is illustrated by the case of Jones Brothers v. Joyner,201 where an order for hops was written down in a note book owned by the Jones Brothers, 
and Joyner signed the order. The paper book in which this order was placed was, 
in turn, slipped into a leather cover, upon which the name ‘James Jones’ was 
stamped. When the paper memorandum book was full, it could be withdrawn 
and a fresh one inserted in the same leather cover. Mr Joyner contended there 
was no sufficient memorandum to satisfy s4 of the Statute of Frauds, as re-
enacted by s4 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, because the name of the plaintiff did 
not appear in the memorandum signed by him. Jones Brothers contended that 
the name on the cover constituted a sufficient signing. Sir Richard Harington held that the cover and the book were two distinct articles, distinguishing the decision in the case of Sarl v. Bourdillon. The decision at first instance was reversed on 
appeal before Darling and Bucknell JJ. In reaching his decision, Darling J focused on the relationship between the note book and the cover, at 769:
… when the memorandum was made they were only one. Take the 
case of the letter and envelope. First of all the letter is written, it is placed in an envelope, and the name of the other person appears 
on the envelope. In such a case there may be two distinct articles, 
which are used as one. Further, I think it makes no difference that 
the words “order book” do not appear. In fact, the orders were 
placed in a book which was used for that purpose.202
199 A hop factor is capable of acting as the agent for both parties to a contract: Durrell v. Evans 
(1862) 1 H & C 174; 31 LJ Ex 337; 9 Jur NS 104; 10 WR 665; 7 LT 97; 158 ER 848, Ex Ch; an auctioneer is an authorized agent for the vendor where the auctioneer enters the name of the vendor on a printed agreement form for the sale of real property: Leeman v. Stocks 
[1951] 1 Ch 941, [1951] 1 All ER 1043.200 [1892] 1 QB 593 at 597. For a more robust and less polished version of this part of the 
decision by Cave J, see (1892) 66 LTRep NS 345, 347.201 (1900) 82 LTNS 768.202 Compare the decisions in Champion v. Plummer 5 Esp. 239; 170 ER 798; 1 Bos. & P. (NR) 
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1.99 Real property The principles set out in Schneider v. Norris203 were subsequently followed by Hall VC in Tourret v. Cripps,204 where Mr Cripps wrote 
in his own hand on a sheet of memorandum paper an offer to lease property. The 
memorandum was not signed, but contained, at its head, the words ‘From Richd. 
L Cripps’ and his address. Tourret accepted the offer, and was subsequently 
granted judgment for specific performance. The letter was in the handwriting of Cripps, it contained his name and it was actually sent by him, thus the court inferred that his intention was to grant the lease, and his name at the head of 
the letter authenticated this intention. In Ireland, the members of the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the case of Casey v. Irish Intercontinental 
Bank Limited,205 where a memorandum for the sale of a property was typed on the headed notepaper of the auctioneers, with the names of the directors printed 
at the bottom of the letter. The only manuscript signature was that of the buyer.
1.100 Public notices The use of a printed name was beginning to be used by 
local authorities in the late 19th century. In the case of Brydges (Town Clerk of 
Cheltenham) v. Dix,206 the Cheltenham council required the town clerk to execute 
certain works. When the owner of the property refused, the council sent a notice 
to the owner on a printed form, duly filled in, with the name of the town clerk 
printed at the foot of the notice. The council subsequently undertook the work 
and then sought to recover their costs. Matters dealing with the authenticity of the notice were set out in s266 of the Public Health Act 1875, as follows:Notices, orders, and other such documents under the Act may be in writing or print, or partly in writing and partly in print, and if the same require authentication by the local authority the signature thereof by the clerk to the local authority, or their surveyor or 
inspector, shall be sufficient authentication.
1.101 An objection was taken that the signature of the clerk was a requisite and 
that it should be affixed by hand. The magistrates accepted this argument and 
refused to make an order for payment. Pollock B and Charles J heard the appeal in 
the Queen’s Bench Division. They allowed the appeal and came to the conclusion 
that if a signature was required, a manual signature was not necessary: ‘all that was necessary was that the notice should be authenticated as coming from the 
town clerk, and that sufficiently appeared in this notice’.207 The printed signature 
was held to be sufficient. This observation was also to be noted by Romer LJ in 
252; 127 ER 458; Allen v. Bennet 3 Taunt. 169, 128 ER 67; Jacob v. Kirk 2 M & R 221; 174 
ER 269.203 (1814) 2 M & S 237; 105 ER 388.204 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567; 27 WR 706. These cases were reviewed by Buckley J in Hucklesby v. 
Hook 82 LT 117.205 [1979] IR 364.206 (1890–1) 7 TLR 215.207 (1890–1) 7 TLR 215 at 216(a).
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Goodman v. J Eban Limited,208 where he pointed out that the recipient could verify 
the authenticity of the notice by confirming its contents directly with the clerk.
1.102 Generally, judges in the United States of America, in combination with the approach adopted in various model acts to provide a degree of uniformity 
to the law, have agreed with their brethren in England. The range of illustrations includes printing on bank notes,209 bills of lading,210 bonds,211 brokers contracts,212 court papers213 (although printed names have not always been 
accepted),214 and a printed name can be the subject of forgery (including a name 
208 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 564; [1954] 1 All ER 763; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.209 Federal, 7th circuit: Hill v. United States, 288 F. 192 (the facsimile signatures of the governor and cashier of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis on bank notes are true and genuine 
signatures) (1923).210 Pennsylvania: Carna t/d/b/a/ T.C. Trucking Company v. Bessemer Cement Company, 558 
F.Supp. 706 (1983) (the pre-printed company name on bill of lading held to be a sufficient 
signature).211 California: Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565, 1874 WL 1399 (Cal.) (a bond signed by a printed facsimile of the President of the Reclamation Fund Commissioners held to be 
sufficient) (1874). It is reported that the Attorney-General argued, at 567, that ‘A printed 
fac simile … could be more easily forged than an autograph; and such a signature would be 
no more protection than no signing at all’; Williams v. McDonald, 58 Cal. 527, 8 P.C.L.J. 23, 
58 Cal. 527, 1881 WL 1946 (Cal.) (a resolution of intention with the printed name of the 
clerk affixed was sufficient because he intended the printed name to be adopted).212 Nebraska: Berryman v. Childs, 98 Neb. 450, 153 N.W. 486 (where the plaintiffs signed a 
contract with their printed name, they are entitled to the benefit of the contract) (1915).213 California: Hancock v. Bowman, 49 Cal. 413, 1874 WL 1548 (Cal.) (a judgment is not void 
because the name of the plaintiff ’s attorney is printed on the compliant) (1874); Ligare v. 
California Southern Railroad Company, 76 Cal. 610, 18 P. 777 (a summons signed with the 
printed signature of the clerk accompanied with the seal of the court held to be sufficient 
signature) (1888); Smith v. Ostly, 53 Cal.2d 262, 1 Cal.Rptr. 340, 347 P.2d 684 (a name printed on a notice of appeal can be adopted as a signature providing the petitioner 
intended to authenticate the document) (1959).Indiana: Hamilton v. State, 103 Ind. 96, 2 N.E. 299, 53 AmRep. 491 (it is sufficient that 
the name of the prosecuting attorney appears in print on an indictment) (1885).
Iowa (1908): Cummings v. Landes, 117 N.W. 22, 140 Iowa 80 (an original notice is 
signed when the name of the attorney is printed thereon).Minnesota: Ames v. Schurmeier, 9 Minn. 221, 1864 WL 1409 (Minn.), 9 Gil. 206 
(a summons in a civil action is void where the name of the plaintiff or their attorney is 
printed where handwriting is required); Herrick v. Morrill, 37 Minn. 250, 33 N.W. 849, 5 
Am.St.Rep. 841 (a summons in a civil action may be subscribed by the printed signature of 
the plaintiff or his attorney) (1887).
New York: Barnard v. Heydrick, 49 Barb. 62, 32 How. Pr. 97, 2 Abb.Pr.N.S. 47 (a summons issued by an attorney with his name typed at the end is subscribed by him 
within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Procedure) (1866). Note the cases cited and discussion of the decision of Ingraham J in The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company 
v. Dickson, 9 Abb.Pr. 61).Wisconsin: Mezchen v. More, 54 Wis. 214, 11 N.W. 534 (a summons in a civil action 
with the printed names of the attorneys is subscribed) (1882).214 Arkansas: Lee v. Vaughan Seed Store, 101 Ark 68 (1911), 141 S.W. 496, 37 L.R.A.N.S. 352 (a 
printed name was not accepted as evidence of authentication); California: Marks v. Walter 
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on a rubber stamp),215 promissory notes (subject to suitable evidence),216 public documents,217 Statute of Frauds (with rare exceptions) generally,218 with respect 
G. McCarty Corporation, 33 Cal.2d 814 (1949), 205 P.2d 1025; New York: The Farmers’ 
Loan and Trust Company v. Dickson, 9 Abb.Pr. 61 (a summons issued by an attorney with 
his name typed at the end was a nullity) (1859).215 Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Ray, 3 Gray 441, 69 Mass. 441, 1855 WL 5701 (Mass.) 
(a printed or engraved name can be forged) (1855); Wellington v. Jackson, 121 Mass. 157, 
1876 WL 10902 (Mass.) (a person who knows a signature is forged on a promissory note, but who acknowledges it as his own, assumes the note to be his as if it was signed with his 
authority).Oklahoma: Boyer v. State, 68 Okl.Cr. 220, 97 P. 779 (a person can forge a name if they 
use a rubber stamp) (1939).216 Illinois: Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424, 1864 WL 2948 (Ill.) (a printed name adopted on an 
instrument for value).Minnesota: Brayley v. Kelly, 25 Minn. 160, 1878 WL 3577 (Minn) (a printed name on 
a promissory note was not admissible as the act of the party without further evidence).Oregon: Toon v. Wapinitia Irrigation Co., 117 Or. 374, 243 P. 554 (a printed signature 
attached to an interest coupon payable to bearer is sufficient to authenticate the 
instrument) (1926).217 North Carolina: State of North Carolina v. Watts, 289 N.C. 445, 222 S.E.2d 389 (the 
mechanical reproduction of the name of an authorized officer placed on a public record is 
properly authenticated where the officer intends to adopt the mechanical reproduction as 
his signature) (1976).Wisconsin: Potts v. Cooley, 13 N.W.Rep. 682 (a tax certificate with the words ‘Assigned 
May 19, 1877. J P. Carpenter, County Clerk’ partly written by hand and partly printed on 
the face of the certificate is sufficient for the purposes of the statue) (1882).218 Arizona: Bishop v. Norell, doing business as Al Norell Company Realtors, 88 Ariz. 148, 353 
P.2d 1022 (a name and address printed on a listing agreement is signed in accordance with 
the statute provided it is done with the intention of signing) (1960).
Georgia: Kohlmeyer & Company v. Bowen, 126 Ga.App. 700, 192 S.E.2d 400 (the 
name of a securities brokerage firm printed on a confirmation statement for the sale of securities was held to be intended as a means of authentication and thus met the signature 
requirement under the Statute of Frauds) (1972). Note the dissenting judgment of Evans J and his comments in respect of Evans Implement Company v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 117 
Ga.App. 279, 160 S.E.2d 462.Illinois: Prairie State Grain and Elevator Company v. Wrede, 217 Ill.App. 407 (the name 
‘Ben. B. Bishopp, Grain Broker’ printed on a memorandum is adopted and signed by him, especially because he had used such a signature for years as if it had been personally 
placed on the memorandum) (1920).Kansas: Southwest Engineering Company, Inc., v. Martin Tractor Company, Inc., 205 
Kan. 684, 473 P.2d 18 (the name ‘Ken Hurt, Martin Tractor, Topeka, Caterpillar’ printed 
on a memorandum with the details of specifications for a generator written by hand was 
sufficient authentication) (1970).Michigan: Grieb v. Cole, 60 Mich. 397, 27 N.W. 579, 1 Am.St.Rep. 533 (a warranty 
printed on the back of a purchase order with the vendor’s printed signature binds the 
warrantor) (1886).Missouri: Defur v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 677 F.Supp. 622 (E.D.Mo. 1988) 
(a Relocation Policy/Home Sale Program had the defendant’s name printed on every page, 
held to constitute a writing signed by the defendant).
New York: Vielie v. Osgood, 8 Barb. 130 (names printed at the foot of a contract held 
not to be a sufficient subscription within the Statute of Frauds) (1849); 1913 case of 
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to letterheads219 and in matters pertaining to voting.220 The burden of proving a printed name was adopted is on the party asserting the nature of the signature, as illustrated by the 1949 Californian case of Felt v. L. B. Frederick Co., Inc.221 In addition, care must be taken over proving the link between the printed name or letterhead, and the intent to authenticate, as in the 1949 Californian case of 
Marks v. Walter G. McCarty Corporation,222 where the letterhead stationery of the 
Goldowitz v. Henry Kupfer & Co., 80 Misc.Rep. 487, 141 N.Y.S. 531; 1920 cases of Pearlberg v. 
Levisohn, 112 Misc. 95, 182 N.Y.S. 615 and United Display Fixture Co., Inc., v. S. & W. Bauman, 
183 N.Y.S. 4.; Cohen v. Arthur Walker & Co., Inc., 192 N.Y.S. 228 (the printed name of the 
defendant corporation on an order for goods is sufficient compliance with the statute) 
(1922); Mesibov, Glinert & Levy, Inc., v. Cohen Bros. Mfg. Co. Inc., 245 N.Y. 305, 157 N.E. 148 
(no proof of intent is demonstrated when a paper with the name of a firm is printed at the 
top and not signed) (1927); Reich v. Helen Harper, Inc., 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 1048, 1966 WL 
8838 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.) (sales confirmation sent on stationery imprinted with the name 
of the seller’s agent upon which the name of the seller’s principal was handwritten was 
signed within the meaning of the UCC) (1966).219 Federal 3rd circuit: Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. The Big Wheel Distributing Company, 
355 F.2d 114 (1966).Federal 7th circuit: Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corporation, 931 F.2d 1178 (7th 
Cir. 1991).Connecticut: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Cole, 189 Conn. 518, 457 A.2d 
656 (Conn. 1983).
Georgia (1974): Evans v. Moore, 131 Ga.App. 169, 205 S.E.2d 507.
Georgia: Troutt v. Nash AMC/Jeep, Inc., 157 Ga.App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (the seller’s 
standard printed form, with the seller’s company name, address and other information on 
the letterhead amounted to a signature) (1981).Illinois: Automotive Spares Corp. v. Archer Bearings Company, 382 F.Supp. 513 (1974) 
Bauer, J at 515 ‘This Court recognizes the need to use common sense and commercial 
experience in regards to this signature question. Often times merchants exchange 
documents which control the transaction that do not bear their signature’.Maryland: Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546, 1882 WL 4502 (Md.), 42 Am.Rep. 343.Mississippi: Dawkins and Company v. L & L Planting Company, 602 So.2d 838 (Miss. 
1992) (a letter on the buyer’s letterhead with the name of the sender typewritten at the 
bottom of the document is a sufficient signing to meet the merchant’s exception to the 
Statute of Frauds).
New York (1980): B & R Textile Corp. v. Domino Textiles, Inc., 77 A.D.2d 539, 430 
N.Y.S.2d 89, 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 396.Ohio: Alarm Device Manufacturing Company v. Arnold Industries, Inc., 65 Ohio App.2d 
256, Ohio App., 417 N.E.2d 1284 (the letterhead on the seller’s invoice was sufficient to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds) (1979).220 Kentucky: Lamaster v. Wilkerson, 143 Ky. 226, 136 S.W. 217 (trustees caused their names to be printed on a notice prepared by them of the time and place of holding an election to 
issue bonds: the printed names were sufficient providing they authorized the printing of 
their names and adopted them as their legal signatures) (1911).Massachusetts: Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 318, 26 Mass. 312, 1830 WL 25334 (Mass.) 
(in the election of governor, votes may be printed).New Jersey: Matthews v. Deane, 201 N.J.Super. 583, 493 A.2d 632 (names printed on 
recall petitions are valid) (1984).221 92 Cal.App.2d 157, 206 P.2d 676.222 33 Cal.2d 814, 205 P.2d 1025.
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name of a hotel used for the purpose of providing carbon copies was held not to 
be sufficient to show intention to adopt the letterhead as a signature, as indicated 
by Shenk J at 822: ‘Here the defendant’s letterhead was printed on its stationery at 
some earlier time for a purpose unconnected with the transaction in suit’. Carter J 
gave a strong dissenting judgment in this case, which has much to recommend it.
The use of a lithographed name 
1.103 The use of printed forms to reduce wasted time is an accepted way of 
doing business. However, there are occasions when a manuscript signature is required under statute, more particularly with respect to the rules governing the 
running of a firm of solicitors. In the case of R v. Cowper,223 the name of the firm of 
solicitors was lithographed in bulk on to a county court bill of particulars. Spaces 
were left blank to fill in the form as necessary. A claim was made in respect of a 
debt and costs. At the hearing, the registrar refused an order for costs because the solicitors had not signed the particulars in accordance with the County Court 
Rules, 1889, order VI, r 10. The matter was then heard before the Divisional 
Court, which upheld the decision of the registrar. An appeal was subsequently 
heard in the Court of Appeal. Lord Esher pointed out that the name of a firm was 
included on the particulars to ensure the court may control its officers, and asked 
at 535 ‘If that was the object, how is it affected by the objection, that the name 
appears in a lithograph form?’ and concluded that if the forms were misused, 
such misuse would inevitably be found out and punished. Further, he went on to demonstrate the reason for the rule at 535:The whole object of the rule seems to me to be to get the document 
authenticated as coming from a solicitor’s office, and if the solicitor has authorized the issue of the lithograph form that object is 
attained. He means it to be his signature and sends it forth as his, 
and that seems to me sufficient compliance with the Act.
1.104 However, Fry LJ disagreed with Lord Esher. He thought that blank forms 
that can be filled up at any time did not offer any guarantee that the solicitor or a person authorized to act on their behalf had given their personal attention 
to a particular form. Also, and more compellingly, he argued, at 536, that ‘the signature required is intended to be something to authenticate the particulars and the accuracy of the copies, and to make the solicitor responsible for them as 
an officer of the Court’. Thus attempts by solicitors to ease the burden of filling in forms has not always met with agreement from the bench, and in this case, because the members of the Court of Appeal did not agree, the decision of the 
Divisional Court was not changed. In comparison, a lithographed name on bonds has been held to a valid signature in the United States of America, although the 
position would not be any different in England and Wales.224
223 (1890) 24 QBD 60, 533, (1890) 59 L.J.K.B. (NS) 265, CA.224 California: Hewel v. Hogin, 3 Cal.App. 248, 84 P. 1002 (the lithographic signatures of a 
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The use of a rubber stamp
1.105 An early record of the use of a stamp, although not made with rubber, 
is that of the signature of the monarch from the Tudor period in England. Apparently the signet of Mary Tudor occurs with a stamp signature of the queen, 
of which more than 20 specimens appear on signet warrants. Also, there are examples of rubber stamps being used instead of seals in the 19th century by 
various sheriffs for official documents.225 From the case law in relation to rubber stamps, it is generally, if reluctantly in some instances, accepted that a rubber stamp is capable of being accepted as a form of signature, providing the stamp is used with the authority of the person whose signature it is: for instance, in 
Macdonald v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,226 a medical expert retained by the defence was not permitted to testify after he stated that his signature 
stamp had been affixed to a medical report without his authority. The question of his signature arose when it became clear that the report he referred to during his testimony differed substantially from the one served on the plaintiff and 
filed with the court. The court did not consider any relevant legislation, but 
determined the issue on the basis of existing principles.
1.106 Wills The case of Jenkins v. Gainsford and Thring227 illustrates the problems that people suffering from ataxia encounter, and what measures they 
take to resolve them. Towards the end of his life, John Jenkins had great difficulty 
in writing and signing his name, so he had an engraving of his signature made. Thereafter, when he was required to sign a letter or other document, he would 
direct his amanuensis to affix an impression of his name to the document by using 
the engraving. Mr Jenkins left a will and executed two codicils. An affidavit by his amanuensis accompanied the codicils, stating the manner in which they were 
executed: he was ordered and directed by the testator to affix the signature to 
the codicil using the engraving, in the presence of the other subscribing witness. 
After the signature was affixed, the testator placed his hand on the codicil and acknowledged the signature as his own and said the codicil was to be a codicil 
to his will. The two witnesses then attested and subscribed the codicil. The same 
procedure was followed on both occasions. Sir C. Cresswell held that the codicils 
were duly executed. He observed that a testator has sufficiently signed by making their mark, and went on to note at 96:
secretary of an irrigation district were sufficient evidence of his signature to the bonds) 
(1906).Missouri: McKee v. Vernon County, 3 Dill. 210, 16 F.Cas. 188, No. 8851 (railroad bonds are valid where the signature of the presiding justice and clerk of the county are 
lithographed on the bond) (1874).Mississippi: Town Council of Lexington v. Union National Bank, 75 Miss. 1, 22 So. 291 
(railroad bonds are valid with the signature of the clerk of the council lithographed on the 
bond) (1897).225 Barnes and Hector, Guide to Seals, 47 note 2 and 52.226 [2006] O.J. No. 4428 (Sup. Ct.) (QL), 2006 CanLII 41669 (ON S.C.).227 (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 93; 164 ER 1208; (1862–3) 11 WR 854.
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Now, whether the mark is made by a pen or by some other instrument cannot make any difference, neither can it in reason make a difference that a fac-simile of the whole name was 
impressed on the will instead of a mere mark or X.
1.107 The instrument or stamp was intended to stand for and represent the 
signature of the testator. The form the signature took was not relevant, providing 
the evidence surrounding the affixing of the stamp went to show that the testator 
intended to be bound by the content of the codicils.228
1.108 However, in Scotland, the use of a stamp on a will is not acceptable in 
accordance with the provisions of Statute 1540, chapter 117. In Stirling Stuart 
v. Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees,229 the testator signed a second deed by means of 
a stamp he was in the habit of using because he suffered from scrivener’s palsy, 
and had great difficulty in writing.
1.109 Voting The case of Bennett v. Brumfitt,230 was brought under s17 of the 
Parliamentary Voters Registration Act 1843 before the Court of Common Pleas. 
The usual signature of William Brumfitt was engraved in facsimile and made 
into a stamp, which was subsequently used to sign a notice of objection. Bovill CJ observed at 31:
The ordinary mode of affixing a signature to a document is not by the hand alone, but by the hand coupled with some instrument, 
such as a pen or pencil. I see no distinction between using a pen or a pencil and using a stamp, where the impression is put upon the 
paper by the proper hand of the party signing.
1.110 It is the personal act of the signatory that is relevant. Byles and Willes JJ agreed, and as to the genuineness of a signature, Keating J could not see why a 
signature ‘is better authenticated by a signature by means of a pen than by means 
of an impression of a stamp affixed by the party’s own hand’.231
1.111 Judicial use The development of technology permits actions that are 
repetitive in nature to be less onerous in their execution. Thus the use of a rubber 
stamp can alleviate the requirement that a manuscript signature be affixed to numerous documents by the same person in circumstances where the intention 
is to authenticate a document. Changes in technology included the adoption of 
stamps in the courts. In Blades v. Lawrence,232 a case was transferred to the City of 
London court by the order of a Master. The order was, in the words of Blackburn 
228 For almost identical facts where the deceased could no longer write because of arthritis and a stroke, see Phillips v. Najar, 901 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995).229 (1885) 12 R. 610.230 (1867–68) 3 LRCP 28.231 (1867–68) 3 LRCP 28 at 32.232 (1873–4) 9 LRQB 374; (1874) 43 LJR QB 133.
1. The signature 55
J, issued in the ordinary way ‘according to the practice long established at 
Judge’s Chambers, by the clerk of the judge, having on it the signature of the 
judge, stamped by the clerk’.233 The judge in the London court inquired into the circumstances under which the order was made, and because the judge had not signed the order, he refused to hear the case and ordered the entry to be struck 
out. It was unanimously held by Cockburn CJ, Blackburn, Quain and Archibald JJ that such an order was properly authenticated and it was not for the judge 
of the London court, in the words of Cockburn CJ, ‘to determine the validity or 
invalidity of the order bearing the proper authentication on its face’.234 Where it was doubted that the order was genuine, the judge should have applied to a 
superior court to set the order aside. In this instance, the judge was ordered to 
pay the costs of the case.
1.112 Consideration was given to the judicial use of rubber stamps in Ireland in the case of The State v. His Honour Judge P. J. Roe,235 where it was determined that 
a justice of the peace may sign a committal warrant by means of a rubber stamp. 
Gavan Duffy P said, at 186–7:As to the rubber stamps, if one man may sign by a mark, another may use a rubber facsimile as a signature; but, where the device 
is questioned by a man entitled to call for proof, the affixing of the stamp by the Justice must be proved, either by the Justice himself or by another witness who can swear positively to the making by the Justice of the particular signature questioned; and that may not be easy evidence for a Court clerk to give, if a Justice makes a habit 
of stamping his name on a sheaf of documents at one time. If the fact be that pressure of work makes the use of a rubber stamp a necessity, or almost a necessity, for a very busy Justice, one would expect to see the need expressly recognised in the code, with stringent rules for the safe custody of the stamp and a peremptory 
veto upon any delegation of its use to a clerk or any other person.
1.113 The acceptance of the use of a rubber stamp in legal proceedings is also illustrated in the Canadian case of R v. Burton,236 in which an informant affixed a facsimile signature to an information by means of a rubber stamp, which in turn was sworn before a justice of the peace, who signed the information with 
a manuscript signature. The information was held to be a sufficient signature in 
absence of proof that the officer who signed the jurat failed to comply with the 
duties imposed upon him. In reaching his decision, Lacourciere J observed, at 387:
233 (1873–4) 9 LRQB 374 at 377.234 (1873–4) 9 LRQB 374 at 376.235 [1951] IR 172.236 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 381, [1970] 2 O.R. 512, 8 C.R.N.S. 269 (Ont. H.C.J.).
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In my opinion the use of a rubber stamp signature by the informant is a practice that should be discouraged and indeed deprecated, as it detracts from the solemnity of an important step in the machinery of law, and may give rise to public suspicion that the 
officer taking the oath has done less than his duty. The partially stamped information, however, is not a nullity, in the absence of 
proof that the officer who signed the jurat failed to comply with the 
requirements set out above.
1.114 In comparison, an Ontario Court of Appeal held in the case of Re R v. 
Welsford237 that an information charging an accused with a summary conviction offence under a provincial statute is a nullity if the jurat bears a facsimile rubber 
stamp signature of the justice of the peace.
1.115 Statute of Frauds In McDonald v. John Twiname Ld238 the plaintiff entered into an apprenticeship with the company, but an authorized representative from 
the company failed to sign the agreement. The name of the company was stamped 
on the document with a rubber stamp. In this instance, Evershed MR and Birkett LJ agreed that not only had the document had been signed by the company, but 
there was sufficient evidence to show they adopted, acted upon and affirmed the 
existence of the agreement.
1.116 Ecclesiastical use The ecclesiastical use of rubber stamps is demonstrated in De Beauvais v. Green,239 where the bishop of Gloucester issued an order to the 
new incumbent to pay for repairs. One of the points raised in argument was that the bishop failed to sign the relevant order in triplicate in his own hand, as required by ss35 and 60 of the Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act 1871, but 
authorized the use of a stamp for this purpose. It was held that the order by the 
bishop was sufficient in form to satisfy the requirements of the relevant sections.
1.117 Solicitors Act 1974 Solicitors, in the normal course of events, are 
required to sign bills of costs. In the case of Goodman v. J Eban Limited,240 a sole practitioner sought to recover for professional services provided to the defendant 
company. The solicitor affixed his name to the bill by means of a rubber stamp. The solicitor sent a bill of costs to the defendants, which was accompanied by a 
letter which ended in the words typewritten at the bottom of the letter ‘Yours 
faithfully, Goodman, Monroe & Company’. Below the name, the solicitor affixed 
a facsimile of his signature by means of a rubber stamp. The defendants refused to pay the solicitor because the bill of costs did not satisfy the requirements 
of s65(2)(i) of the Solicitors Act 1932. It was held, with Denning LJ dissenting, that the bill had been signed for the purposes of s65, although, Evershed MR 
237 [1967] 2 O.R. 496, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 1, 2 C.R.N.S. 5.238 [1953] 2 QB 304 CA.239 (1905–6) 22 TLR 816.240 [1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 1 All ER; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.
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observed, at 554, that ‘as a matter of good practice, the “signature” of a bill of costs, or of a letter enclosing such a bill, by means of a rubber stamp seems to me 
in general undesirable’. He went on to comment that the purpose of the statute was to impose a personal responsibility for any bill of costs delivered, and the client was to have the assurance by means of personal authentication that the bill 
was a proper bill.241 Romer LJ noted that the rubber stamp did not, on the face of it, constitute a signature,242 although he accepted that when the matter was considered in the light of authority and the function that a signature is intended to perform, the conclusion must be that the rubber stamp did constitute a 
signature. He also concluded that a repetition of the name of the firm under the typewritten name would be otiose if it was only to repeat the typed name of the 
firm. It was plain that Mr Goodman intended the rubber stamp to ‘be regarded as 
a signature for the purpose of authenticating the letter’.243 Should the client doubt 
its authenticity, all they had to do was ask Mr Goodman, by telephone or letter.244 Romer LJ might have also adopted, had he been aware of it, the reasoning of Clay J in the 1934 Kentucky case of Wurts v. Newsome,245 where a judge signed ballots 
by means of a rubber stamp. Clay J stated, at 450:The opportunities for fraud when a rubber stamp is used are no 
greater than the opportunities for fraud by forgery. It would be 
just as difficult to ascertain that the ballots had not been signed, and have a rubber stamp prepared, as it would be to employ one 
to imitate the signature of the judge who failed to sign. Besides, the statute, though designed to prevent fraud, has operated in 
several instances to defeat the popular will. In numerous contests that have come before this court, the successful candidate has lost by the failure of one of the judges, either through ignorance, 
mistake, or fraud to sign the ballots. In the circumstances we are not inclined to go further and adopt a construction so technical as 
to make the situation even worse. A rubber stamp identifies the 
241 The signature of lawyer on a document is usually considered that the document has been read by the lawyer, as noted in the litigation following foreclosure claims as a result of the banking crisis in 2008, for which see November Oversight Report [Submitted under Section 
125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343 Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and 
Foreclosure Mitigation] (Congressional Oversight Panel, 16 November 2010), available at 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010313/http://cop.senate.gov/
documents/cop-111610–report.pdf; Office of the Inspector General US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Bank of America Corporation Foreclosure and Claims 
Process Review Charlotte, NC (Memorandum No. 2012–FW-1802, 12 March 2012), 
available at https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/Audit_Reports/2012–FW-1802.pdf; In Re Hill, 437 B.R. 503 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010).242 [1954] 1 QB 550, at 563.243 [1954] 1 QB 550, at 564.244 [1954] 1 QB 550, at 563–564.245 253 Ky. 38, 68 S.W.2d 448.
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ballot just as clearly as the written signature of the judge. If not placed on the ballot either by him, or someone else in his presence, and at his direction while the election is being conducted, that may be shown in a context just as it may be shown that the written 
signature appearing on the ballot was not his act. We therefore conclude that the signing of the ballots by a rubber stamp was a substantial compliance with the statute, and that all the ballots so 
signed should have been counted.
1.118 Dissenting, Denning LJ suggested that a person must make their mark, 
whatever the format, by themselves. In discussing the way in which rubber stamps were used, he introduced extraneous opinion to support his assertion, at 561, which was no more than prejudice and irrelevant to the matter being dealt with: 
‘This is such a common knowledge that a “rubber stamp” is contemptuously used to denote the thoughtless impress of an automaton, in contrast to the reasoned 
attention of a sensible person’. He overlooked several points. A rubber stamp is used to sign hundreds of letters or forms for the convenience and saving in labour, as the case law illustrates, rather than the contemptuous use by a thoughtless 
automaton, the purpose of which is different to a solicitor’s bill. Also, he clearly did not appreciate, and if he did, did not acknowledge, the fact that some people 
do not have the ability to sign documents. The issue was not the widespread 
use of rubber stamps in various other activities. In this judgment, Denning LJ refused to distinguish between the form a signature took and the function it was to perform, which has been the main thrust of judicial decision-making over the 
past two hundred years. Interestingly, the use of a stamp by judges and bishops 
during the 19th century was not raised or discussed in this case. If Denning LJ thought the personal signature of a solicitor was so necessary on a bill of costs, it may be equally as desirable when a judge orders a case to be transferred to another court, as in Blades v. Lawrence.246
1.119 The decisions from other jurisdictions, together with the rationale articulated for accepting rubber stamps is also an instructive counterpoint to the 
comments by Denning LJ. In Canada, the judgment in Goodman v. J Eban Limited was discussed in R v. Burton,247 where an informant affixed a facsimile signature 
to an information by means of a rubber stamp was held to be a sufficient signature 
in absence of proof that the officer who signed the jurat failed to comply with 
the duties imposed upon him. In the 1976 North Carolina case of State of North 
Carolina v. Watts,248 the mechanical reproduction of the name of an authorized 
officer placed on a public record of the Division of Motor Vehicles was held to 
246 (1873–4) 9 LRQB 374; (1874) 43 LJR QB 133.247 [1970] 3 C.C.C. 381, [1970] 2 O.R. 512, 8 C.R.N.S. 269 (Ont. H.C.J.); in R v. Blumes, 2002 
BCPC 45 (CanLII), it was not possible to determine whether the signature was an original signature, rubber stamp or facsimile signature; see also R v. Pearce, 2000 BCSC 0376; R v. 
Parkinson [2002] O.J. No. 5478 (Ct. J.) (QL).248 289 N.C. 445, 222 S.E.2d 389.
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be properly authenticated where the officer intended to adopt the mechanical 
reproduction as his signature. Branch J indicated, at 392, why the physical reality of mechanical means of rendering a signature had become relevant:
The purpose of authentication and certification of records is to avoid the inconvenience and sometimes the impossibility of 
producing original public documents in court. Obviously the 
admission of certified records tends to expedite the trial of cases. It is just as obvious that to require the manual signing of every record 
certified from the Division of Motor Vehicles would be extremely 
time-consuming and expensive.
1.120 The comments made by Branch J were reinforced by Hallett J in Re 
United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd,249 where proxy forms submitted with a facsimile 
or mechanically rendered signature were considered to be sufficient. Hallett J explained the rationale at 289 paragraph 17:
Today’s business could not be conducted if stamped signatures 
were not recognized as legally binding. The affixing of a stamp conveys the intention to be bound by the document so executed 
just as effectively as the manual writing of a signature by hand. I would point out that no one questions the validity of millions of 
payroll cheques signed by facsimile signatures.
1.121 He also addressed the fallacious argument that one form of signature was more prone to fraud than any other at 305 paragraph 64:In my opinion, in view of the obvious opportunities for fraud with respect to votes to be cast by registered shareholders where a bare signature is normally accepted, I cannot see any reason to differentiate between the degree of proof required by a chairman 
to be satisfied that a proxy has actually been executed by the 
registered individual shareholder (the degree of proof being 
virtually nothing) and the degree of proof urged upon the court by the Buckley group with respect to proxy voting of brokers for their 
clients. In the absence of evidence that there was no authority for the execution of proxies by brokers by facsimile signature, the proxy vote should be accepted and counted as is apparently 
the practice. To conclude otherwise, the chairman is presuming dishonesty on the part of the brokers who tendered the proxies on 
behalf of their clients. In the absence of evidence, such a conclusion 
is unwarranted.
249 (1980) 12 B.L.R. 130; 76 A.P.R. 282; 41 N.S.R.(2d) 282 (T.D.).
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1.122 Administrative use The inconvenience of affixing a manuscript signature to documents was also tested in administrative proceedings in the case of British 
Estate Investment Society Ltd v. Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes),250 where an 
Additional Commissioner personally affixed his signature to certificates of 
authenticity by using a rubber stamp. The rubber stamp was retained by the 
Additional Commissioner, or the Clerk to the Commissioners. Danckwerts J rejected all of the arguments by British Estate, and on the matter of the stamped signature, he observed, at 86:Of course, this is a case, if ever there was a case, in which the signing by means of a stamped signature is proper, because everybody knows that Commissioners of this kind have to deal with numerous documents, and it is an onerous duty if they have 
to be signed by the writing of the Commissioner himself.251
1.123 Contemporaneously, the case of Lazarus Estates Ltd v. Beasley252 was heard, in which documents in the form prescribed by the Housing Repairs and Rents Act 1954 were signed with the name of the company by means of a rubber 
stamp. No objection was taken as to the validity of the signature in the county 
court, and the matter could not be addressed on appeal. However, Denning LJ could not resist commenting, at 710, that:
The statutory forms require the documents to be ‘signed’ by the 
landlord, but the only signature on these documents (if such it 
can be called) was a rubber stamp ‘Lazarus Estates Ltd.’ without 
anything to verify it. There was no signature of a secretary or of 
any person at all on behalf of the company. There was nothing to 
indicate who affixed the rubber stamp. It has been held in this court that a private person can sign a document by impressing a rubber stamp with his own facsimile signature on it: Goodman v. J 
Eban Limited [[1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 2 WLR 581; [1954] 1 All ER 
763, CA], but it has not yet been held that a company can sign by its 
printed name affixed with a rubber stamp.
1.124 This comment by Lord Denning was not to the point, and in the light of the extensive case law relating to this topic, from both England and Wales and the 
United States of America, it may be safe to indicate that Lord Denning’s remarks 
250 (1954–8) 37 Tax Cas 79; [1956] TR 397; 35 ATC 413; 50 R & IT 33.251 (1954–8) 37 Tax Cas 79, at 86.252 [1956] 1 QB 702.
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on the topic are irrelevant. Of interest is the case of Fitzpatrick v. Secretary of 
State for the Environment,253 in which enforcement notices signed with the rubber 
stamp of the appropriate official bearing their facsimile signature were held to 
be valid in accordance with the provisions of s234(2) of the Local Government 
Act 1972. The members of the Court of Appeal reached their decision without, it 
appears, reference to any relevant case law.254
1.125 United States of America The use of rubber stamps as a means of authenticating documents in the United States of America has only been tempered with the need to ensure the version of the signature in the form of an impression of a rubber stamp was used with the intent to authenticate 
the document. The range of uses to which rubber stamps have been put, and 
which judges have accepted with minor exceptions, include cheques (checks),255 matters pertaining to the Fifth Amendment,256 elections,257 finance statements,258 
253 [1990] 1 PLR 8, CA.254 This is of interest, bearing in mind the comments by Buxton and Brooke LJJ in Copeland v. 
Smith [2000] 1 WLR 1371.255 Pennsylvania: Robb v. The Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, 
40 W.N.C. 129, 3 Pa.Super. 254, 1897 WL 3989 (Pa.Super. 1897) affirmed by 186 Pa. 456, 
40 A. 969; for a dissenting opinion, see 186 Pa. 456, 41 A. 49.256 Federal 2nd circuit: Biegeleisen v. Ross, 158 F.3d 59 (2nd Cir. 1998) (a valid IRS levy based on a notice signed with a signature stamp rather than a manuscript signature does not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).257 Kentucky: Wurts v. Newsome, 253 Ky. 38, 68 S.W.2d 448 (it is a valid signature where a 
judge signs ballots by means of a rubber stamp) (1934).258 Colorado: In the Matter of Colorado Mercantile Co., 299 F.Supp. 55 (1969) (a financing statement submitted with a stamped signature was acceptable, even though the 
requirement at the time of filing was for a manual signature).Connecticut: In re Bengston, 1965 WL 8262 (Bankr.D.Conn.), 3UCC Rep.Serv. 283 (a name printed in ink – understood to mean stamped with a rubber stamp – on a standard 
form financing statement satisfied the requirement that the secured party signed the 
financing statement).Texas: Brooks v. The State of Texas, 599 S.W.2d 312 (a pen packet reflecting convictions 
for theft burglary where the facsimile signature of the clerk is affixed by means of a rubber 
stamp did not bar admission of the pen packet at the penalty stage) (1979).Connecticut: In re Deep River National Bank, 73 Conn. 341, 47 A. 675 (the signature 
of Clinton B. Davis, affixed to a promissory note ‘D., Treasurer’ was held to be a valid 
signature) (1900).
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when affixed to letters,259 public documents,260 but not receipts.261 The judicial use of rubber stamps appears to have been widely taken up in various states, and although a federal court accepted that a search warrant signed with rubber stamp by a magistrate was held to be valid in the seventh circuit case of United 
States of America v. Juarez,262 Tone CJ did not fully approve, at 1114:
259 Federal 6th circuit: National Accident Society v. Spiro, 78 F. 774, 24 C.C.A. 334 (the facsimile 
signature of an officer of the company affixed to a printed letter head of the company was 
sufficiently proven) (1897).Wisconsin: Kocinski v. The Home Insurance Company, 154 Wis.2d 56, 452 N.W.2d 360 
(Wis. 1990) (a facsimile signature stamped on a document with a rubber stamp satisfied 
the requirement that the document be subscribed).260 Arizona: Maricopa County v. Osborn, 60 Ariz. 290, 136 P.2d 270 (the facsimile signature of 
the treasurer applied by rubber stamp was sufficient for refunding bonds) (1943).Carolina: Smith v. Greenville County, 188 S.C. 349, 199 S.E. 416 (the facsimile signature using a rubber stamp by a county treasurer on a tax execution is the signature of the 
treasurer) (1938).Florida: State v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 149 Fla. 177, 5 So.2d 263 (facsimile signatures 
affixed to city hospital revenue certificates and the attached coupons are valid) (1941).
New York: Tenement House Department of City of New York v. Weil, 76 Misc. Rep. 273, 
134 N.Y.S. 1062 (an order issued under the Tenement House Law containing a facsimile 
signature affixed by an official by means of a rubber stamp is valid) (1912); Brooklyn City 
Railroad Company v. City of New York, 139 Misc. 691, 248 N.Y.S. 196 (a notice of claim with 
the signatures of an officer and of a notary public affixed to the document with a rubber 
stamp were sufficient) (1930).North Dakota: Andre v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 295 N.W.2d 128 (a 
record of a speeding violation with the words ‘STAT. FEE JUL 24 1979 THOMAS EWING’ stamped on the back of the paper was adequate for the intended purpose of informing the 
State Highway Department of an admission or adjudication of a traffic violation) (1980); 
State of North Dakota v. Obrigewitch, 356 N.W.2d 105, (N.D. 1984) (an order of suspension 
and driving record is valid where a rubber stamp was used to affix the signature of the 
director of the Drivers License Division of the State Highway Department).Oklahoma: Moss v. Arnold, 63 Okl.Cr. 343, 75 P. 491 (the facsimile signature of the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners applied by means of a rubber stamp 
is sufficient to authenticate requisitions) (1938); State of Oklahoma ex rel. Independent 
School District Number One of Tulsa County v. Williamson, 1960 OK 126, 352 P.2d 394 
(Okla. 1960) (the Uniform Facsimile Signature of Public Officials Act is valid and officials may use facsimile signatures on public bonds as a substitute for manuscript signatures as 
required by law).Utah: Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (the signatures of a police 
officer and city judge to a complaint, affixed by means of a rubber stamp, are sufficient) 
(1967).261 Georgia: Bell Bros. v. Western & A. R. Co., 125 Ga. 510, 54 S.E. 532 (a freight receipt for a car containing cabbages signed by stencil with the name of the agent of the defendant company was not accepted because there was no proof that the agent signed the receipt, adopted the signature, or that it was his custom to sign his name to receipt by this type of 
stamp) (1906).Massachusetts: Boardman v. Spooner, 13 Allen 353, 95 Mass. 353, 1866 WL 5009 
(Mass.), 90 Am.Dec. 196 (a bill of sale of goods bearing the purchaser’s name stamped 
upon it is not sufficient proof to show that the stamp was adopted as a signature).262 549 F.2d 1113 (1977).
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Defendant also contends that the search warrant should be invalidated because the magistrate used a signature stamp instead 
of signing it personally. We do not approve the use of a signature 
stamp by a magistrate. Its use creates the appearance that the 
user lacks the sensitivity a federal judicial officer should have to 
the important values which the warrant is designed to protect. 
Nevertheless, in this case the magistrate testified unequivocally that he remembered placing the signature stamp on the warrant, 
and the District Court credited this testimony. We cannot say that 
it was clearly erroneous for the court to have done so. We therefore 
do not find that it was in error to refuse to declare the warrant invalid and thereby exclude the evidence seized pursuant to the 
warrant, despite our condemnation of the magistrate’s practice.
1.126 At a state level, the use of rubber stamps has been widely accepted,263 and 
Maine: Mahoney v. Ayoob, 124 Me. 20, 125 A. 146, 37 A.L.R. 85 (where a disclosure commissioner endorsed a capias signed with his facsimile signature impressed with a 
rubber stamp is not a signature because the signature was not under his hand) (1924).263 Florida: State of Florida v. Hickman, Fla., 189 So.2d 254 (the facsimile signature of a justice 
of the peace affixed to a warrant by a rubber stamp is valid, even when affixed by the chief 
clerk under the authority of the justice) (1966).Illinois: Streff v. Colteaux, 64 Ill.App. 179, 1896 WL 2352 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.) (a declaration 
may be signed with the names of the plaintiff ’s attorneys by means of a rubber stamp) 
(1896); People of the State of Illinois v. Stephens, 297 N.E.2d 224 (a search warrant signed 
by a magistrate with a rubber stamp was not invalid) (1973).Iowa: Loughren v. B. F. Bonniwell & Co., 125 Iowa 518, 101 N.W. 287, 106 Am.St.Rep. 319 
(the subscription by a justice with a rubber stamp bearing the facsimile of his signature is 
sufficient for a notice, even when carried out by another, but with his authority) (1904).Massachusetts: Wheeler v. Lynde, 1 Allen 402, 83 Mass. 402, 1861 WL 6171 (Mass.) 
(it is a signature where an attorney at law signs the back of a writ by means of a rubber 
stamp) (1861).New Mexico: Costilla Estates Development Co. v. Mascarenas, 33 N.M. 356, 267 P. 74 
(the signature of a court clerk by means of a rubber stamp as a method of endorsement of 
filing papers was held sufficient) (1928).Pennsylvania: Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. Ballard, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 
310, 331 A.2d 578 (the signature of a traffic court judge by means of a rubber stamp was 
not inadmissible where the seal of the court was also applied to the record) (1975).Texas: Ex parte Spencer, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 339, 349 S.W.2d 727 (a complaint is valid where 
the complainant and the deputy clerk both affixed their signatures by means of a facsimile 
rubber stamp) (1961); Ex parte Britton, 382 S.W.2d 264 (a facsimile stamped signature 
of the governor on extradition papers does not affect the validity of the warrant) (1964); 
Parsons v. The State of Texas, 429 S.W.2d 476 (a complaint was sufficiently signed with 
the facsimile signature of the complainant with a rubber stamp) (1968); Estes v. State, 
484 S.W.2d 711 (a facsimile signature applied to a document from the Department 
of Corrections by means of a rubber stamp was a sufficient signature) (1972); Huff v. 
The State of Texas, 560 S.W.2d 652 (the facsimile signature of the country district clerk 
stamped on certified copies of a judgment and sentence is valid) (1978); Paulus v. 
The State of Texas, 633 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (there was no error when an indictment is signed with the facsimile signature of the foreman of a jury by means of 
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Hood AJ indicated how widely rubber stamps were used in the 1943 Columbia case of McGrady v. Munsey Trust Co.,264 where the chief deputy clerk personally 
applied a facsimile representation of their signature to a summons. Hood AJ 
indicated the general use of the methods in his comments at 106: ‘This practice was adopted many years ago and is a matter of great convenience since more than 
4,000 landlord and tenant complaints are filed in the trial court each month’. The legal and practical position of rubber stamps was put into context by Lattimore J in the 1930 Texas case of Stork v. State,265 in which the facsimile signature of a 
justice of the peace affixed by rubber stamp to affidavit and liquor search warrant 
was held to be a sufficient signing. Lattimore J considered a number of cases, and stated, at 735:The writer is of opinion that when it appears without question, 
as in this case, that the magistrate in person took the affidavits of those who swore to same, and also so issued the search warrant, 
and that to each he affixed his name, it would be a matter of no 
moment whether he so affixed said name by one stroke as by the use of a stencil or rubber stamp, or whether he sat down at a typewriter and wrote his name with same upon such document, or that he wrote it out in what we commonly call longhand, provided that in each such case the facts must allow the name to have been 
affixed by the officer himself, or under his immediate authority 
and direction and in his presence.
A stencil-pen
1.127 An interesting variation of technology for appending a copy of a manuscript signature was used in the case of Whyte v. Watt,266 before the 
Registration Appeal Court in Scotland. An objector signed a notice of objection 
using an instrument called a stencil-pen. The letters forming his signature were 
a rubber stamp); Benavides v. State of Texas, 763 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 
1988) (a penitentiary packet stamped with a rubber stamp producing a facsimile of an 
original signature is an acceptable means of signing legal documents); Kemp v. State of 
Texas, 861 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.App. – Houston 14th Dist. 1993) (the use of a rubber stamp to 
produce a facsimile of a county judge’s signature on a list of previous criminal records did 
not affect the authenticity of the signature); In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1998) (the 
signature of a judge affixed by a rubber stamp is a signature on a judgment, even when 
affixed to the document by an intermediate authority at the direction of the judge).Utah: State of Utah v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983) (clerk of the court affixing 
an imprint of the judge’s signature with authority to documents as being true originals).Wisconsin: Dreutzer v. Smith, 56 Wis. 292, 14 N.W. 465 (a rubber stamp with a 
facsimile of the signature of the County Clerk affixed to a tax deed was considered to be 
writing the name) (1882).264 32 A.2d 106.265 114 Tex.Crim. 398, 23 S.W.2d 733.266 (1893) 21 R. 165; see also Henderson v. Watt (1893) 1 S.L.T. 342.
1. The signature 65
perforated upon a prepared wax skin, stretched on a frame. He then placed the 
notice under the waxed skin, and passed an inked roller over the waxed skin. As the ink from the roller passed through the perforations in the waxed skin, it 
produced the signature on the notice. Mr Watt formed the signature; no other 
person was employed in the operation. When letters or words have been formed on the waxed skin by the stencil-pen in this way, up to 100 sheets of paper – or more – can be placed successively under the waxed skin, and as the inked roller passes over the waxed skin, so the letter or words are produced on the sheet 
of paper immediately under the waxed skin. The validity of the signature was 
challenged, in that it did not comply with the provisions of s4 of 19 & 20 Victoria 
chapter 58, Registration of Burgh Voters (Scotland) 1856, in particular, according 
to forms 4 and 5 of schedule A.
1.128 Kinnear, Trayner and Kincairney LL dismissed the appeal without calling 
on counsel for the respondent. They followed the judgment of the English court in the case of Bennett v. Brumfitt,267 and held that the provisions of the statute requiring that a notice of objection should be signed by the objector had been 
satisfied. It was noted that such a signature would not be sufficient to satisfy the conditions of the Statute regulating the subscription and attestation of probative deeds, but that was not necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of the 
Statute now under construction. Kinnear L said, at 166–7:
The word “signed” is not a technical word but a word of ordinary 
language. Subscription is a method of signing. It is not the only 
method. We are therefore to consider whether the method of 
authentication described in the case can properly be called “signing.” Now, upon that question, we have the advantage of a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, in the construction of a similar 
provision in the 6th of the Queen, chapter 18, which requires that 
a “notice of objection shall be signed by the objector.” In Bennett 
v. Brumfitt, L. R., 3 C. P. 28, the Court held that this requirement 
was satisfied although the objector had not subscribed the notice 
but had affixed his name to it by means of a stamp on which was 
engraved a facsimile of his ordinary signature. I cannot suppose that when the Legislature has employed the same language in a Scots Act as in a previous English Act, it intended to prescribe one method of authentication in England and another in Scotland, and I should be very slow to differ from the learned Judges in England 
as to the meaning of an ordinary word in the English language.
Signature machines
1.129 Machines for writing multiple copies of a signature have a long history. 
John Isaac Hawkins (1772–1855) is credited with inventing what is generally 
267 (1867–68) 3 LRCP 28.
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referred to as an autopen, known at the time as a pentagraph.268 Such devices 
have a long history. An ‘autopen’ featured in a case begun by the chef Gordon Ramsay, who took legal action against his father-in-law, Christopher Hutcheson, 
over a lease for a pub called the York & Albany in London. The lease was signed 
in 2007 for an annual rent of £640,000. Mr Ramsay’s signature was affixed to the 
lease using a Ghostwriter Manual Feed Signature Machine. Mr Ramsay claimed 
that the signature was a forgery. Morgan J described how the machine worked 
at [75]:To use the machine, an operator needed a number code, to be 
tapped into the machine by use of a key pad, and a signature card. 
The signature card identified the signature which the machine 
would produce. It was also necessary to fit a pen to the machine. In this case, the pens which were used included a pen which produced the result of using a felt tip pen and another pen which 
gave the appearance of a pen with a fine knib being used. The felt tip signature was suitable for signing books or photographs and 
the fine knib pen was suitable for signing legal documents and 
cheques.
1.130 Mr Justice Morgan decided that because Mr Hutcheson was acting as an agent for Mr Ramsay at the time, he had acted within the authority conferred on 
him by Mr Ramsay, and he had not exceeded his authority. Mr Ramsay was bound 
by the guarantee in the lease of the premises.269 The discussion elsewhere in this book regarding the protection of the private key to a digital signature and how to 
guard a rubber stamp apply equally to the use of such machines.
Mechanical marks by human action
1.131 The application of legal principles applies to new technology in the same 
way as it relates to more established ways of conducting business.
Typewriting
1.132 Once the typewriter had developed sufficiently to enable a typist to 
type faster than a human could write, the machine began to be widely used. An early example of litigation respecting the value of a typed signature was a case involving a remonstrance in 1905 in Indiana, that of Ardery v. Smith.270 In this case, an attorney had the authority to sign a remonstrance against the issue of a 
liquor licence for and on behalf of voters, and being afflicted with erysipelas in his right hand, he caused the names to be typed in his presence and under his 
268 Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 25 (1866), pp. 512–14, available at http://
www.icevirtuallibrary.com/doi/pdf/10.1680/imotp.1866.23204.269 Ramsay v. Love [2015] EWHC 65 (Ch).270 35 Ind.App. 94, 73 N.E. 840.
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supervision. It was held to be immaterial that the names were added by means of 
a typewriter. Roby J summed up the position at 841:In an opinion given in 1842 by William Wirt, then Attorney 
General, the question submitted being whether the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized by a statute requiring warrants to be drawn and signed by him to have his name impressed thereon 
by means of copper plate, the following language was used: ‘There 
would be great difficulty in maintaining the proposition, as a legal one, that, when the law required signing, it means that it must be 
done with pen and ink. No book has laid down the proposition, or 
even given color to it. I believe that a signature made with straw dipped in blood would be equally valid and obligatory, and, if so, where is the legal restriction on the implement which the signer 
may use? If he may use one pen, why may he not use several – a 
polygraph, for example, or types, or a stamp? The law requires 
signing merely as an indication and proof of the parties’ assent.’ 
1 Opinions of Attorneys General, 670. The quotation is an apt one, 
as applied to the facts now under consideration. The typewriter is 
a modern convenience. The signature made by it was in this case the signature of the attorney; the operator being in fact his agent, 
exactly as the keys and the types were his agents.
1.133 From an evidential point of view, the person whose name was typed on the 
document must adopt the typed version as their signature.271 Crane J illustrated 
the difficulty in the 1911 New York case of Landeker v. Co-operative Bldg. Bank,272 demonstrating that it is necessary to link the application of the typewritten name 
271 For Australia see Neill v. Hewens (1953) 89 CLR 1; for the United States of America, see Federal, 10th circuit: Roberts v. Johnson, 212 F.2d 672 (it must be proven to be intended 
to be the signature of the witness where a form designating a beneficiary is signed with 
a typewritten name) (1954); California: Estate of Moore, 92 Cal.App.2d 120, 206 P.2d 413 
(a will signed with a typewritten name cannot be considered to be signed in the absence of evidence to show it was typed by the testator or that it was typed in his presence and 
at his direction by another) (1949); Maine: Maine League Federal Credit Union v. Atlantic 
Motors, 250 A.2d 497, 6 UUC Rep.Serv. 198 (there was no intent to adopt a typewritten 
name on a financing statement; it was only through inadvertence that the document was 
not signed with a manuscript signature) (1969); Massachusetts: Andre v. Ellison, 324 
Mass. 665 (1949) 88 N.E.2d 340; Missouri: First Security Bank of Brookfield v. Fastwich, 
612 S.W.2d 799 (Mo.App. 1981) (the burden of establishing the typed signature of a 
corporation arises when it has been put in issue by a specific denial. The burden is on the party claiming under the signature, but he is aided by the presumption that it is genuine 
or authorized); in the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong in the case of Shenzhen Tian He 
Jian Sang Electronic Holdings Company Limited v. Hong Kong Jian Sang Electronics (Group) 
Limited [2008] HKCFI 387; HCA 1587/2007, 9 May 2008, Hon Fung J held that it could not be inferred that an unsigned copy of a letter with the typed name of the second defendant 
was intended to be a signed copy addressed to the plaintiff.272 130 N.Y.Supp. 780.
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to proof that the name was typed with authority and intent.273 Interestingly, a number of cases dealing with typewritten signatures are of relatively recent origin, and it is to be wondered, when reading some of the reports, whether the points ought to have been taken at all, given the long and liberal history adopted by the common law in relation to the form a signature takes and set out in this 
book.274 Examples include arbitration,275 mechanics’ lien,276 Statute of Frauds,277 
273 See also the 1911 Californian case of Little v. Union Oil Company of California, 73 Cal.App. 
612, 238 P. 1066; the Maryland case of Cambridge, Inc., v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company, 471 F.Supp. 1309 (1979) where a typewritten name of a lease did not bind where it was not intended to bind as a legal signature, and the 1926 Pennsylvania case of Tabas v. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 9 F.2d 648 affirmed United States Shipping Board 
Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Tabas, 22 F.2d 398 where the government of the United States was not deemed to have executed a contract because its name was typed on paper 
in the absence of evidence to show it authorized or adopted such signature.274 Although see the Maine case of In re Carlstrom, 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 766, 1966 WL 8962 
(Bankr.D.Me.) where a typewritten name on a financing statement was not accepted 
as a signature. Note the astounding views of Conrad, Referee in Bankruptcy, negating the concept that a symbol can be considered a signature, and his hostile comments on the decision in Benedict, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Lillian E. Hargrove d/b/a Hargrove 
Typesetting Services v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (1965).275 Illinois: Just Pants, an Illinois limited partnership v. Wagner, 617 N.E.2d 246 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 
1993) (the typewritten name of an arbitrator at the end of a memorandum of decision can 
serve to execute and give legal effect to the contents).276 New Jersey: J. D. Loizeaux Lumber Company v. Davis, 124 A.2d 593, 41 N.J. Super. 231 (the 
name of the plaintiff typed on a materialman’s notice of intention was held to be intended 
to be a signing as well as to serve other functions disclosed by the printed material) 
(1956).277 Federal, 9th circuit: In the Matter of Save-On-Carpets of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (1976) 
(a typewritten signature on a UCC financing statement satisfied the signature requirement 
of the Statute of Frauds).Alaska: A & G Construction Co., Inc., v. Reid Brothers Logging Co., Inc., Alaska, 547 
P.2d 1207 (the name ‘Glenn W. Reid’ typed at the bottom of a letter was considered to be 
signed) (1976).Florida: Ashland Oil, Inc., v. Pickard, Fla., 269 So.2d 714 (the typed words on notepaper 
with the letterhead of the company and with the word ‘Harold L. Slam, President’ typed at 
the bottom is a signature) (1972).
Maryland (1967): Dubrowin v. Schremp, 248 Md. 166, 235 A.2d 722.Massachusetts: Irving v. Goodimate, Co., 320 Mas. 454, 70 N.E.2d 414, 171 A.L.R. 
326 (the name of the employer typed at the end of a letter to an employee is a sufficient 
signature) (1946).Minnesota: Radke v. Brendon, 271 Minn. 35, 134 N.W.2d 887 (a prospective vendor’s 
letter including the prospective purchaser’s name and typewritten name of the vendor is 
tantamount to a written signature, given the intent) (1965).Mississippi: Dawkins and Company v. L & L Planting Company, 602 So.2d 838 (Miss. 
1992) (a letter written on a buyer’s letterhead including the typewritten name of the 
sender is a sufficient signing to meet merchant’s exception to the Statute of Frauds).
New York (1919): Cohen v. Wolgel, 107 Misc. Rep. 505, 176 N.Y.S. 764 affirmed 191 
A.D. 883, 180 NY.S. 933.New Mexico: Watson v. Tom Growney Equipment, Inc., 721 P.2d 1302 (N.M. 1986) 
(a name typed on a purchase order was held to be a sufficient signature, because the 
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mortgages,278 pleadings,279 secured transactions,280 bonds,281 taxation282 and 
wills.283
1.134 In New Zealand, this concept is called the ‘authenticated signature fiction’ and is illustrated by the case of Bilsland v. Terry,284 where an agreement for the sale of land had the names of both parties set out in the document, but it 
was only signed with the manuscript signature of one party. It was held to be a 
sufficient signing to satisfy s2 of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956. Quilliam J commented, at 50:
Upon the authority, therefore, of the cases I have cited I find that the 
agreement was a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the 
signatory had deliberately filled out other details on the order form).
Wisconsin (1912): Garton Toy Co. v. Buswell Lumber & Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 341, 136 N.W. 
147.278 Federal 2nd circuit: Benedict, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Lillian E. Hargrove d/b/a Hargrove 
Typesetting Services v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (1965) (the insertion of the name in the body 
of a financing statement was held to be a sufficient signing. The intent to authenticate was established by the act of a secretary in typing his name at his direction and subsequently 
filing the statement).279 Indiana: City of Gary v. Russell, 112 N.E.2d 872 (a notice of claim was sufficiently signed 
when the plaintiff ’s name was typewritten at the end) (1953).North Dakota: Hagen v. Gresby, 159 N.W. 3, 34 N.D. 349, 5 L.R.A. 1917B, 281 (the 
typewritten name and address of an attorney on a summons is sufficient. The attorney, F. 
B. Lambert, had not written a summons with a manuscript signature since 1896) (1916).280 Federal 4th circuit: Calaway v. Admiral Credit Corporation, 407 F.2d 518 (a financing statement with a typed name was not invalid for lack of manuscript signature where a 
typewritten signature was provided) (1969).Federal 5th circuit: In the Matter of Bufkin Brothers, Inc., 757 F.2d 1573 (1985) (a 
secured creditor’s typewritten corporate name on a continuation statement was sufficient 
to validate the statement).Connecticut: In re Horvath, 1963 WL 8592 (Bankr.D.Conn.), 1UCC Rep.Serv. 624 (a 
typewritten name considered a signature) (1963).
Georgia: Peoples Bank of Bartow County v. Northwest Georgia Bank, 139 Ga.App. 264, 
228 S.E.2d 181 (the printed name of the bank on a financing statement served to reinforce 
a manuscript signature that was not easily identified) (1976).281 Texas: B. F. Bridges & Son v. First Nat. Bank of Center, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 454, 105 S.W. 1018 (a 
typed signature to a bond is sufficient if adopted) (1907).282 Massachusetts: Assessors of Boston v. Neal, 311 Mass. 192, 40 N.E.2d 893 (an application for abatement was inadvertently not signed with a manuscript signature, but it was 
accompanied with a letter signed by the Treasurer of the First People’s Trust, held that the 
application signed with a typewriter was sufficient) (1942).283 In the 1944 Texas case of Zaruba v. Schumaker, 178 S.W.2d 542, a will written by the deceased on a typewriter with her typewritten name was held to be signed; compare the 1949 case in California of Estate of Moore, 92 Cal.App.2d 120, 206 P.2d 413 where a will signed with a typewritten name cannot be considered to be signed in the absence of evidence to show it was typed by the testator or that it was typed in his presence and at 
his direction by another.284 [1972] NZLR 43.
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Contracts Enforcement Act, and is binding on the parties. I should mention that it was contended by Mr Luck that the conclusion I was invited to draw upon the basis of the authorities I have cited was plainly wrong, and that if I were to adopt it I should be introducing 
into the realm of conveyancing a hazard which should not be there. I realize that the rule to which I have referred is probably unknown to many conveyancers, but this alone is hardly a reason for not 
applying it where the facts render it applicable. The rule appears to 
be well established and I can see no reason why I should ignore it.
1.135 This decision was followed in Short v. Graeme Marsh Ltd,285 but not in 
Carruthers v. Whitaker286 (Bilsland v. Terry was not referred to in this judgment). The Bilsland v. Terry and Short v. Graeme Marsh Ltd cases were later distinguished in Stuart v. McInnes,287 where a contract for the sale of land was held not to be 
enforceable where neither party signed the agreement. Wilson J discussed the 
‘authenticated signature fiction’ at 733–4:Although, over the years, the basis for the authenticated signature 
fiction seems to have changed somewhat, the line of cases in 
England which includes Tourret v. Cripps, Evans v. Hoare and 
Leeman v. Stocks has now settled the law on this topic. From these cases it is clear that, in England, the principle applies if, and only if, these conditions obtain:
(1) the contract, or the memorandum containing the terms of contract, must have been prepared by the party sought to be charged, or by his agent duly authorised in that behalf, 
and must have that party’s name written or printed on it.
(2) It must be handed or sent by that party, or his authorised 
agent, to the other party for that party to sign.
(3) It must be shown, either from the form of the document or from the surrounding circumstances, that it is not intended to be signed by anyone other than the party to whom it is sent and that, when signed by him, it shall constitute a complete and binding contract between the 
parties.
I think the justification for the fiction is to be found in the last 
condition. Where the form of the memorandum or the surrounding circumstances show the intention that the contract shall be binding on both parties although not signed by the one who prepared it, the terms of the statute are not really applicable with reference to that 
285 [1974] 1 NZLR 722.286 [1975] 2 NZLR 667.287 [1974] 1 NZLR 729.
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one, so the fiction is introduced to meet the case. It is easy to see the justice of the result, but I confess to a regret that the solution found was to describe as a signature something that is not a signature and 
was never intended to be such. It might have been preferable to hold that such memoranda were outside the ambit of the statute in regard to the party whose signature was not contemplated as being 
necessary.
1.136 He went on to discuss the decisions in Bilsland v. Terry and Short v. Graeme 
Marsh Ltd at 734–5, which he declined to follow. The same decision was reached in Van der Veeken v. Watsons Farm (Pukepoto) Ltd,288 where a contract for the sale of property called for the signature of both parties, and the authenticated 
signature fiction was considered not relevant to the fact of this case; the decision in Bilsland v. Terry was also distinguished. It seems the current position in 
New Zealand is governed by TA Dellaca Ltd v. PDL Industries Ltd,289 where the approaches taken in Bilsland v. Terry and Short v. Graeme Marsh Ltd were 
rejected. The members of the court favoured the approach taken by Wilson J in 
Stuart v. McInnes and Beattie J in Van der Veeken v. Watsons Farm (Pukepoto) Ltd. 
Tipping J commented, at 99: ‘I agree with their observations that go further than the approach summarised by Wilson J really amounts to an unacceptable judicial 
repeal of the Contracts Enforcement Act 1956. The authenticated signature 
fiction is itself quite a significant departure from the literal terms of the Act’.
1.137 In Canada, the use of a typed signature in combination with an authorized manuscript signature of a departmental lawyer was the issue in the case of R 
v. Fredericton Housing Limited.290 The question was whether the typewritten 
signature of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada was acceptable on a statement of claim, together with the manuscript signature of a lawyer in the 
department. The manuscript signature ‘F. J Dubrule’ was affixed to the statement of claim by a solicitor in the Tax Litigation Section of the Department of Justice, 
of which section Mr Dubrule was the director. It was held that the signature was 
the signature of Mr Dubrule. It was duly authorized by him, and the typed name 
‘D. S. Maxwell’, when it was authenticated by the subscription of the signature 
of Mr Dubrule, and became the signature of the Deputy Attorney General 
of Canada. Cattanach J made a useful observation, at 223, in discussing the 
difference between using a rubber stamp to affix a signature and a typewriter: ‘If 
the typewritten name “D. S. Maxwell” is not “writing” (as I think it is) it is most 
certainly a mechanical method of affixing and I cannot distinguish in principle an 
affixing by keys striking a ribbon from a rubber stamp with ink on it’.
1.138 Sale of property rights The members of the Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the requirement of a signature on a document for the sale of 
288 [1974] 2 NZLR 146.289 [1992] 3 NZLR 88.290 [1973] FC 196; [1973] CTC 160.
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land in the case of Firstpost Homes Ltd v. Johnson.291 In this case a director of the company reached an oral agreement with Miriam Fletcher, the owner of land in 
Staffordshire whereby she agreed to sell the land. A secretary typed a letter on 9 
April 1993 for Mrs Fletcher to sign. Mrs Fletcher’s address was typed on the top right-hand side of the letter and it was addressed to Mr Hale of Firstpost Homes 
Ltd, followed by the address of the company. The letter continued:
Dear Geoff, re: Land and rear of Fulfen Farm, Burntwood Further to our recent discussions I now agree to sell you the above land 
shown on the enclosed plan which extends to 15·64 acres in 
consideration of the sum of £1,000 (One thousand pounds) per 
acre. Yours sincerely.
1.139 Then there was a gap, and typed underneath the words ‘M. Fletcher 
(Mrs)’. A plan, a copy of an Ordnance Survey plan showing the land in question, 
was attached to the letter by a paper clip. Mr Hale signed the plan at the foot. Mr Hale delivered the letter to Mrs Fletcher on Friday 1 April 1993 and returned 
on Sunday 11 April. Mrs Fletcher signed the letter and the plan. She died on 12 
May 1993. The personal representatives refused to conclude the contract for 
the sale of the land and the company sought specific performance. His Honour 
Judge Farrer QC refused the application. The appeal was dismissed. In giving a 
substantial judgment, Peter Gibson LJ pointed out the legislature had intended to make radical changes, and the changes were intended to simplify the law and 
avoid disputes when enacting the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1989. While the letter indicated Mrs Fletcher intended to sell the land, it was 
not clear that she intended to sell the land to the company. As a result, it was the letter, and not the plan, that formed the document of sale, and only Mrs Fletcher 
had signed this document. It was argued by the company that the typed name and 
address of the company were sufficient to show it was signed by the company. 
However, Peter Gibson LJ rejected this submission, because it was based on previous authorities that in turn were based on earlier legislation, and not on 
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. He considered it ‘is 
an artificial use of language to describe the printing or the typing of the name of an addressee in the letter as the signature by the addressee when he has printed 
or typed the document’292 and mentioned approvingly the comments made by Evershed MR and Denning LJ in Goodman v. J Eban Limited.293 Peter Gibson LJ no longer considered the interpretation of the modern Act should be governed by the authorities in relation to the Statute of Frauds 1677 or s40 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925. It was decided that the company had not signed the letter, 
and there was, therefore, no contract in place, although this decision was ‘limited to a case where the party whose signature is said to appear on a contract is only 
291 [1995] 1 WLR 1567 CA.292 [1995] 1 WLR 1567 at 1575 F-G.293 [1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 1 All ER 763; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.
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names as the address of a letter prepared by him’.294 Hutchinson and Balcombe LJJ agreed with this analysis, and Balcombe LJ reiterated the point, at 1577E, that 
the ‘policy of the section is to avoid the possibility that one or other party may be able to go behind the document and introduce extrinsic evidence to establish 
a contract, which was undoubtedly a problem under the old law’. The move from 
form to function has certainly been halted in the case of the sale of property.295 It is the view of Julian Farrand and Alison Clarke that the decision in Goodman 
does not provide the support that Peter Gibson LJ claimed, and the decision in Firstpost ‘not only involved flaws in law but also enabled an unmeritorious 
escape from contractual obligations’.296
Telegram
1.140 The development of telegraphy in the early 19th century brought about the same types of dispute that occur in the era of the internet, and judges were 
required then, as now, to adapt old laws to new technologies. The telegram and 
its various technologies, including the telex, was widely used from the outset. In 
Godwin v. Francis,297 an offer to buy a property was accepted by telegram. It was held 
that the telegram, together with other correspondence, was sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and the signature of the telegraph clerk was considered 
a sufficient signature. In response to the argument that the instructions for the sending of the telegram cannot be a signature of the contract, because the paper was a mere instruction to the telegraph clerk, Bovill CJ responded, at 301–2:
Assuming that argument to be correct (though I am not prepared 
to adopt it), that would be instructions to the company to do that 
which in the ordinary course of their business is done. Now, the ordinary course of business is to transmit, to write out, an exact 
copy of that which is intended to be conveyed, and to forward it. The 
acceptance of the plaintiff ’s offer is in the body of the document. The telegraph clerk copies it, signs it, and sends it to the plaintiff, 
the name of the seller appearing thereon. A correspondence ensues between the parties on the footing that there had been a binding contract for the sale of the estate; and, if the defendant had authority, it is clear that what was done did constitute a binding 
contract. But, independently of that, I am prepared to hold that the mere telegram written out and signed in the way indicated by the telegraph clerk, if done with the authority of the vendors, would 
have been a sufficient signature within the Statute of Frauds.
294 [1995] 1 WLR 1567 at 1576 E.295 For signatures relating to the law of property, see J. Farrand and A. Clarke, Emmet on Title 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), ch. 2 pt 2, 2.041–2.043.296 Farrand and Clarke, Emmet on Title, 2.041.297 (1870) LR 5 CP 295; 22 LT Rep NS 338.
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1.141 It was necessary to resolve the distinction between the contents of the document containing the message to be sent and subsequently presented to the 
telegraph office, and the document received by the recipient. In this respect, Willes J observed, at 302–3 that:
The message was left, signed by the defendant, at the office of 
the Telegraph Company. A copy was sent by the company to the 
plaintiff, and authenticated by them in the usual way. If the message so sent had been contained in a letter sent by post, there can be 
no doubt that would have been a sufficient contract to satisfy the 
statute, That is because the General Post Office has been held to be 
the common agent of the parties employing it.
1.142 Brett J also noted, at 303:I think there is evidence that the defendant, when he signed the instructions, intended that to operate as his signature to the contract, and that it constituted a binding contract signed by him, 
if he had authority to enter into it. Then, it was objected that the 
defendant’s name appearing on the paper received by the plaintiff 
was insufficient, because the defendant had no power to delegate 
to the telegraph clerk an authority to sign his name. I think, however, it must be assumed as against him that he had authority to delegate to the clerk the power to sign for him, and that the 
signature so placed was binding upon him.
1.143 A number of cases dealing with the exchange of telegrams were dealt with in a similar way as some forms of electronic signature are dealt with today: 
the point was not raised in argument, and therefore the issue of the efficacy of the signature not challenged, inferring an acceptance of the proof of intent of 
the parties in the case.298 It is plain that the introduction of technology was not 
an excuse to prevent the application of legal principles to new technology. In 
McBlain v. Cross299 it was held that the signature in a telegram was sufficient 
to come within the Statute of Frauds. Willes J was not going to let technology 
impede the way the law was interpreted, commenting, at 806 that ‘If we did 
298 In Henkel v. Pape (1870) 6 L.R.Exch. 7 and L. Roth and Co. (Limited) v. Taysen, Townsend, 
and Co. (1896–7) 12 TLR 211, CA contracts were formed by exchange of telegrams; the signature point was not raised in either case, but can be inferred that it was accepted; in 
Sadgrove v. Bryden [1907] 1 Ch 318, the words ‘Consent, Shaw’ sent by cablegram, which 
was, in turn, stamped with a 10 shilling stamp as power of attorney, was held sufficient to validate a form of proxy signed in advance but not dated in accordance with the provisions of s80 of the Stamp Act 1891; in Behnke v. Bed Shipping Co. [1927] 1 KB 649 a contract for the sale and purchase of a ship was conducted by letter, telegram and telephone, and it was held that a name added to a telegram is a signature where it is adopted or recognized by 
the party to be charged.299 (1872) LT 804.
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not hold such to be the law, the convenience which the modern invention of the electric telegraph has bestowed upon mankind would be in a great measure 
subverted’. In 1886, it was determined that a person may provide authority to sign a name to a memorandum of association under the Companies Act 1862,300 and Vaughan Williams J had the foresight to issue a novel form of order in the case of In re English, Scottish, and Australian Chartered Bank.301 In this case, the principal business of the bank was in Australia, but it was ordered that the bank 
had to be wound up in England. A scheme of reconstruction was proposed, and Vaughan Williams J directed that meetings of shareholders and creditors be 
held to ascertain their wishes. The majority of the creditors were in Australia, and because of the need for speed, Vaughan Williams J made an entirely new 
form of order directing a form of proxy to be sent by the Official Receiver by 
telegraph to Australia, appointing specified persons to vote for or against the 
scheme at the meeting to be held in London. A number of objections were taken 
on the result of the vote in the meeting. One of the objections was that the judge had no power to order the Australian proxies to be communicated by telegram 
to the meeting. The proxies ought to have been produced at the meeting. It was held that the judge had the power under s91 of the Companies Act 1862, in combination with s2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870, to direct the particulars of the Australian proxies to be communicated by telegraph, and there was no need for the proxies to be physically produced at 
the meeting. Lindley LJ commented, at 410: ‘Now, that is an entirely new form 
of order. I need hardly say that it is adapted to the necessities of the time – it is ingeniously using the improved methods of communication by telegraph, 
which it would be folly to shut out and not use if you can do it’ and Smith, LJ said, at 417:
I wish to add a few remarks upon a point which for the first time arises in this case, that is as to whether or not the electric telegraph can be made use of to carry out what was eminently needed, and 
indeed was absolutely necessary to do justice in this case.
1.144 Telegrams were as widely used in South Africa302 and the United States 
of America as in any other jurisdiction. In 1869, the process involved in sending and receiving a telegram was outlined by Sargent J in the New Hampshire case of 
Howley v. Whipple.303 In this instance, the decision centred on the requirements to provide for the proper evidentiary foundation necessary in adducing evidence 
of a telegram into proceedings. In addition, it also follows that telegrams may constitute adequate memorandum of the contract, and a contract can be construed 
300 In re Whitley Partners Callan’s Case (1886) 55 LJCh (NS) 540.301 [1893] 3 Ch 385.302 Hersch v. Nel, 1948 (3) S.A. 686 (A.D.); Luttig v. Jacobs, 1951 (4) S.A. 563 (O.P.D.) the legal effect of the signature was not discussed; Balzun v. O’Hara [1964] 3 All SA 368 (T).303 48 N.H. 487 (1869).
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by reference to several letters and telegrams.304 The use of telegrams covered a range of situations, including bills,305 judicial use306 and the Statute of Frauds.307 
Generally, members of the judiciary have taken a robust view of telegrams, as illustrated in the 1912 Missouri case of Leesley Bros. v. A. Rebori Fruit Co.,308 
304 Florida (1920): Meek v. Briggs, 80 Fla. 487, 86 So. 271.305 Kentucky (1918): Selma Savings Bank v. Webster County Bank, 206 S.W. 870, 182 Ky. 604, 2 
A.L.R. 1136.306 Kentucky: Blackburn v. City of Paducah, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 395 (a telegram sent by Judge John 
B. Blackburn resigning from his post constituted a writing and was signed. The Board of Commissioners accepted the resignation and subsequently another police judge was 
appointed to fill the vacancy. When the appellant later attempted to act in this capacity, 
he was arrested) (1969). Clay, Commissioner, remarked, at 398, ‘Perhaps we have 
belaboured the obvious too much. Here appellant selected the medium to the transmittal 
of his message, composed its content and authorized his signature thereto. It is difficult to 
understand how he can now question the legal efficacy of the written instrument he had 
drafted for the sole purpose of tendering his resignation’.Oklahoma: State ex rel. West v. Breckinridge, 34 Okla. 649, 126 P. 806, 1912 OK 283 
(where the resignation of the county attorney by telegram was acceptable).307 Alabama: McMillan, Ltd v. Warrior Drilling and Engineering Company, Inc., 512 So.2d 14 
(Ala. 1986) (the name in telegram was a signature).California: Brewer v. Horst and Lachmund Company, 127 Cal. 643, 60 P. 418, 50 L.R.A. 
240 (telegrams buying and selling hops were held sufficient for purposes of Statute of 
Frauds) (1900).Florida: Heffernan v. Keith, Fla., 127 So.2d 903 (a telegram is signed by the telegraph 
company with authority of the sender) (1961).Florida: Ashland Oil, Inc., v. Pickard, Fla., 269 So.2d 714 (a telegram constitutes a 
signed memorandum) (1972).
Massachusetts (1972): Providence Granite Co., Inc., v. Joseph Rugo, Inc., Mass., 291 
N.E.2d 159, 362 Mass. 888.
Michigan (1890): Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 10 S.Ct. 913, 34 L.Ed. 447.Montana: Hillstrom v. Gosnay, Mont., 614 P.2d 466 (provided the necessary intent to authenticate the signature on a telegram is shown, the typewritten signature is a proper 
subscription) (1980).Nebraska: Hansen v. Hill, 340 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1983) (a telegram accepting an offer to 
buy land to which the vendor’s name has been affixed was considered signed under the 
Statute of Frauds).
New York: Dunning & Smith v. Roberts, 35 Barb. 463 (the manipulations of a telegraph operator, upon the oral instructions of a person to send a dispatch for him, are the 
equivalent to a signing by that person within the Statute of Frauds) (1862).Texas: Adams v. Abbot, 151 Tex. 601 (1952), 254 S.W.2d 78 (a valid memorandum of contract may consist of letters and telegrams signed by the party to be charged and addressed to his agent or the other party to contract, or even to a third person not 
connected with transaction).
Trevor v. Wood, 9 Tiffany 307, 36 N.Y. 307, 1867 WL 6445 (N.Y.), 3 Abb.Pr.N.S. 355, 93 
Am.Dec. 511, 1 Transc.App. 248 (where dealers bought and sold bullion by exchange of 
telegrams, the telegrams are sufficiently signed under the Statute of Frauds) (1867).But see Vermont: Pike Industries, Inc., v. Middlebury Associates, 398 A.2d 280 affirmed 
on other grounds 436 A.2d 725, cert denied, 455 U.S. 947 (the contents of a telegram were 
not signed because the name of the party was not included in the body of the text) (1992).308 162 Mo.App. 195, 144 S.W. 138.
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where it was held that an exchange of two telegrams between the parties to buy and sell a carload of onion sets was held to be in substantial compliance with the 
Statute of Frauds. Nixon PJ remarked at 142: ‘to hold otherwise would certainly embarrass present business methods and increase the expense and impair the 
usefulness of the telegraph as a necessary instrumentality in modern commerce’. 
This view was shared by Wolff, Referee in the 1961 New York case of La Mar 
Hosiery Mills, Inc., v. Credit and Commodity Corporation,309 where he held that a 
name included in a telegram constituted a signature. He commented, at 190:It does not matter whether the telegram as delivered was copied 
from one written by an officer or employee of the defendant or was telephoned to the telegraph company by someone in the 
defendant’s behalf. Precisely what happened here was not shown. The defendant could not well be heard to disclaim responsibility for the telegram and it is to the credit of the defendant that it has 
not attempted to do so. The telegram with the typed signature 
of defendant’s name emanated from the defendant which is 
responsible for it. The signature on the telegram in suit, although 
typed in the office of the telegraph company, is therefore defendant’s authorized signature within the requirements of the statute of 
frauds. In view of the way in which business is done nowadays, any other view would be unrealistic and would produce pernicious 
consequences, impeding the conduct of business transactions.
1.145 The 1970 case of Yaggy v. The B.V.D. Company, Inc.310 from North Carolina 
reinforced this point, where a telegram sent to the plaintiff accepting the latter’s 
offer to purchase property was binding on the defendant. It was held that the 
defendant’s name in print and affixed to the telegram by the same mechanical process employed by the telegraph company in reproducing other portions of the 
message constituted a signing within the Statute of Frauds. In the Pennsylvania case of Hessenthaler v. Farzin,311 it was held that a mailgram that the vendor sent to 
a prospective purchaser of real estate confirming acceptance of sale constituted a 
signed writing. After revising a number of cases, Hoffman J indicated, at 993 that 
‘We agree with these authorities that the proper, realistic approach in these cases is to look to the reliability of the memorandum, rather than to insist on a formal 
signature’. He went on, at 994:The detail contained in this mailgram is such that there can be 
little question of its reliability. Appellants were careful to begin 
the mailgram by identifying themselves. They then made certain that their intention would be properly understood by declaring 
309 28 Misc.2d 764, 216 N.Y.S.2d 186.310 70 N.C.App. 590, 173 S.E.2d 496, 72 Am.Jur.2d.311 564 A.2d 990 (Pa.Super. 1989).
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their acceptance, and identifying both the property and the 
consideration involved. In light of the primary declaration of identity, combined with the inclusion of the precise terms of the 
agreement, we are satisfied that the mailgram sufficiently reveals 
appellants’ intention to adopt the writing as their own, and thus 
is sufficient to constitute a ‘signed’ writing for purposes of the 
Statute. Moreover, this result is consistent with the holdings of courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed the question of whether or not a telegram can be a signed writing for purposes of 
the Statute.
1.146 Where an agent purports to act for a principal, it was determined by the Supreme Court of California in the case of McNear v. Petroleum Export 
Corporation312 that the inclusion of the words ‘Smith of Petroleum Export’ at the 
beginning of the telegram acted as a means of identification, not authentication 
and was therefore not a signature.
Telex
1.147 When compared to the jurisprudence developed in Europe and the United States of America relating to the formation of contract, Japan is less concerned 
for contracts to be in writing and conform to a Statute of Frauds, but defines a 
contract as a judicial act to join two opposing wills.313 As a result, the formation 
of a contract does not necessarily require either party to sign a contract. It is instructive to observe that the methods of communication do not appear to 
pose a problem in determining whether a contract has been formed in Japan. In the case of Fawlty & Co Ltd v. Matsui Shoten K.K.,314 the plaintiff, a New Zealand 
company, agreed to ship meat to Kobe port. The defendant attempted to cancel the contract and refused to accept delivery, which meant the plaintiff had to sell 
the meat at a loss. The contract was negotiated by a mix of letters sent by airmail 
and exchanges by telex. The court held that there was a contract for the purchase 
and sale of the meat. Although the court did not have to determine whether the communications sent and received by telex were signed by the parties, nevertheless the court must have reached the conclusion that a contract had been formed in the light of the totality of the evidence, including the content of 
the correspondence conducted by telex. The inference is, that if signatures were necessary in Japan, it is probable that a signature sent by telex will have been 
acceptable.
312 280 P.R.Cal. 684.313 N. Kashiwagi and E. A. Zaloom, ‘Contract law and the Japanese negotiation process’, in The 
Business Guide to Japan, ed. G. P. McAlinn (Singapore: Butterworth-Heinemann Asia, 1996), 
pp. 89–101, republished in K. L. Port and G. P. McAlinn, Comparative Law: Law and the 
Legal Process in Japan (2nd edn., Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), p. 459.314 Showa 33 (Wa) No.681, 10 November 1962, translated by H. Kaneko in Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012), pp. 109–13.
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1.148 In the English case of Clipper Maritime Ltd v. Shirlstar Container Transport 
Ltd The Anemone,315 Staughton J had to determine whether a valid contract existed 
to perform a guarantee under the Statute of Frauds 1677. Clipper Maritime let their vessel Anemone on time charter to Afram Line Ltd. Shirlstar were in the 
business of leasing and operating containers. By May 1983, Shirlstar was owed 
US$275,000 by Transaltic, an associated company to Clipper Maritime. Owners of 
ships became reluctant to let their ships to such a charterer without security. The charter in respect of Anemone was negotiated by the owners’ brokers on behalf 
of the charterers. It was agreed at an early stage there would be a guarantee, and 
the charter was eventually drawn up. The owners alleged that US$107,115.92 
was due under the charter and claimed this amount from Shirlstar. Shirlstar 
denied they entered into a contract of indemnity. Evidence relating to the 
contract between the parties was partly contained in three telexes. Staughton J determined that the context in which the telexes were exchanged demonstrated the existence of a contract, even if only implied from the circumstances by which 
the correspondence took place.316 Although the point did not arise, Staughton J offered extra-judicial comments in relation to the nature of the exchange of 
telexes in the context of s4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677: ‘I reached a provisional conclusion in the course of the argument that the answerback of the sender of a telex would constitute a signature, while that of the receiver would not since it 
only authenticates the document and does not convey approval of the contents’.317
1.149 This conclusion followed the analysis of older cases. When a person sends a telex, it can be assumed they did so either because they intended the 
contents to be acted upon, or had the authority so to do. Upon receipt of the answerback, the sender may wish to revoke the original document, although to 
retract the document effectively may be difficult. Whether a document can be 
effectively revoked in this way will depend upon the circumstances of the case. When the transmission of a telex is completed, the recipient will have received the document in much the same way as if the document had been sent through 
the post. The recipient cannot be said to approve the content until it takes such 
action that demonstrate its approval. A number of issues were not examined in 
the judgment. Although none of these issues were in dispute in this case, they could arise in the future, as pointed out by Professor Reed:It does not consider the effect of the cases which appear to require a mark to be made;
The identification messages of telex machines (and fax machines 
and computers) only identify the sending machine, not the sender;
It is quite possible to program a telex (or a fax machine or a 
computer’s modem) to send a false identification message; and
315 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546.316 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546 at 556(b).317 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 546 at 554(b).
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If the message is stored on disk by the recipient, it is possible to 
edit the contents and amend the identification message to take 
account of the alteration.318 [italics in the original]
1.150 In 2003, a case relating to the Limitation Act 1980 was heard before 
the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), that of Good Challenger Navegante SA v. 
Metalexportimport SA (The ‘Good Challenger’).319 This case was described by 
Clarke LJ as ‘remarkable’, because it involved an attempt by the respondent to 
enforce an award made by arbitrators in London against the appellant. The appellant appealed against a decision to enforce an order previously issued in 
1993. In essence, there were three issues for the Court of Appeal to deal with: whether the proceedings to enforce the aware were time barred, whether there 
was an abuse of process, and whether the award could be enforced. There were a number of matters for the court to deal with in respect of the claim that the award had become time barred, the second of which was whether the claim was time barred in England and Wales at the relevant time as a matter of English law under s7 of the Limitation Act 1980, which provides as follows:An action to enforce an award, where the submission is not under seal, shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the 
date on which the cause of action accrued.
1.151 The respondents relied upon what they claimed were part payments and acknowledgments, which they said meant that the claim was not time barred 
under the provisions of ss29(5) and 30 of the Limitation Act 1980. The relevant document for the purposes of the appeal was whether a telex relied upon by the appellants could be considered as an acknowledgment in writing and signed by 
the person making it within the meaning of s30(1). The respondent relied upon 
two part payments by way of authorized agents, and four acknowledgements. The 
validity of the award was not challenged, but no payment was made immediately. Attempts were made to obtain payment during the following years, and the respondent relied upon two telexes, each between the respective agents of the 
parties, as acknowledgements of the obligation to pay the amount of the award. 
At appeal, the appellant submitted that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘signed’ requires the maker of the document to inscribe their name or a characteristic mark on the document in their own hand, and that there is no reason to give it any 
other meaning in respect of s30(1) of the Limitation Act. It would follow that the 
section was not satisfied where a telex contained a typed signature. There was no 
authority on this question in the context of s30 of the Limitation Act. The content of one telex dated 17 February 1988 is set out in the judgment of Mr Michael 
Crane QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in the Commercial Court.320 The 
318 Reed, ‘What is a signature?’, 4.1.319 [2003] EWHC 10 (Comm), appealed [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67, [2003] EWCA Civ 1668.320 [2003] EWHC 10 (Comm) at 55–7.
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telex was signed with the typewritten name ‘NAVLOMAR’ as authorized agent 
for the appellant. The question was whether the word ‘NAVLOMAR’ acted as a 
signature. The judge commented, at 61, that:As a matter of general principle, in my view a document is signed by the maker of it when his name or mark is attached to it in a 
manner which indicates, objectively, his approval of its contents. How this is done will depend upon the nature and format of the 
document. Thus in the case of a formal contract which prints the names of the parties and leaves a space under each name for the parties to write their names, the document will not have been 
signed by a party until he writes in his name in the space provided. Conversely, with a telex, where there is no such facility, the typed 
name of the sender at the end of the telex not only identifies the maker but leads to the inference that he has approved its contents: 
the typed name, therefore, constitutes his signature. Thus in my judgment each of the telexes relied on by the Claimant was signed by the sender typing in its name, or his name, at the foot of the 
document.
1.152 The comments by the judge reflected the previous decisions held by numerous judges over the previous three hundred years, and were approved by Clarke LJ at 22, before discussing the language used in s30 of the Limitation Act and pointing out that the language was similar to that in s4 of the Statute of 
Frauds 1677.321 There was no suggestion that the name typed on to the telex was a forgery or added without authority, and Clarke LJ articulated the reasoning of the court for accepting that the signature typed on to the telex was considered a signature under s30, at 27:
The crucial point here is that Navlomar’s typed signature appeared on the telex in circumstances in which it is evident that it was put 
on with Navlomar’s authority so that it can be seen that Navlomar 
(and thus the charterers) were acknowledging the debt. The purpose of the statute is to be sure that the person said to be 
acknowledging the debt has in truth done so. That purpose is to my mind achieved by the conclusion reached by the judge and would 
be thwarted were we to accede to the charterers’ submissions. We were referred to a number of other authorities but, in my judgment, none of them is directly in point or affects the conclusion of the 
judge. I would only add that I am pleased to be able to reach this conclusion because, although telexes are not so common now, there was a time when they were the usual form of communication between chartering brokers and their principals and any other 
conclusion would not be commercially sensible.
321 [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 67, [2003] EWCA Civ 1668 at 24.
Electronic signatures in law82
1.153 It followed that the claim was not time barred under English law.
1.154 The acceptance of communications by telex in Australia occurred in 1985,322 and there is a long history of recognition in the United States of America 
at the federal level.323 Newman CJ indicated in the federal second circuit case of 
Apex Oil Company, v. Vanguard Oil & Services Co.,324 that the hasty formation of 
contracts did not pose a problem for the courts. It was held that an exchange 
of communications by telex satisfied the merchants exception to the Statute of Frauds, and he indicated, at 423, that:Parties seeking the opportunity to make money with hurriedly 
arranged and briefly documented transactions ought not to expect appellate courts to provide them with extra protection against the risk that on occasion they will be held to the terms of an agreement 
that not every fact-finder would have found had been made.
1.155 Decisions at state level in relation to the Statue of Frauds follow this trend,325 exemplified in the early 1948 Californian case of Joseph Denunzio Fruit 
Co., v. Crane,326 where signatures included in messages exchanged by teletype 
constituted a signature. O’Connor DJ observed at 128:As the court understands the modus operandi of the teletype machines in modern business practice, and particularly in 
connection with this lawsuit, Raymond R. Crane and A. B. Rains, 
Jr., each had a teletype machine in his office and as the machine 
was operated in one office, it would type the message or 
memorandum simultaneously in the other office; each party was 
readily identifiable and known to the other by the symbols or code letters used, and there is no contention that the messages did not 
originate in the office of one and terminate in the office of the other. 
The question is just what does constitute a ‘signature’ or ‘signing’ 
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds in California.
322 Torrac Investments Pty Ltd v. Australian National Airlines Commission [1985] ANZ Conv R 82.323 Federal, 2nd circuit: Interocean Shipping Company v. National Shipping and Training 
Corporation, 523 F.2d 527 (1975) (a signature typed into a telex under authority was 
sufficient to bind the principle).324 760 F.2d 417 (1985).325 New York: Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank International Corp., 406 F.Supp. 452 (1975) fn. 36, at 483 discusses the validity of a signature by way of a telex message, and raised the issue as 
to whether a test key on telex is capable of being a signature.Pennsylvania: The Ore & Chemical Corporation v. Howard Butcher Trading Corp., 455 
F.Supp. 1150 (1978) (the exchange of telex messages between parties can constitute a 
written contract).Texas: Hideca Petroleum Corporation v. Tampimex Oil International, Ltd., 740 S.W.2d 
838 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1987) (the negotiation of sale for Dubai crude oil 
largely by means of exchange of telex messages).326 79 F.Supp. 117 reversed on other grounds upon rehearing 89 F.Supp. 962.
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The court must take a realistic view of modern business practices, and can probably take judicial notice of the extensive use to which the teletype machine is being used today among business 
firms, particularly brokers, in the expeditious transmission of 
typewritten messages.
Facsimile
1.156 Documents sent by facsimile transmission have generally been accepted 
in common law jurisdictions.327 The use of a facsimile transmission to send a copy of a document to a recipient was considered in the Australian case of Molodysky 
v. Vema Australia Pty Ltd,328 where the issue of whether a facsimile transmission 
was considered to be service of an agreement signed by the vendor. The judge followed the test formulated in Goodman v. J Eban Limited329 and concluded that the vendor intended their signature on the facsimile transmission to be effective.
1.157 In the Singapore case of Chua Sock Chen v. Lau Wai Ming330 in relation to 
the service of a notice to complete a transaction, Grimberg JC held that a notice to complete was properly served when sent by means of a facsimile transmission and where the original papers were subsequently sent by post to arrive the day 
after transmission. The judge responded to the argument that the notice sent by facsimile transmission was not a good service for the purposes of condition 
29(2) and (3) the Singapore Law Society’s Conditions of Sale 1981 at 1126B-C:
I am unable to accept that contention. Neither of the two conditions I have quoted calls for the giving or servicing of notice 
to complete by a stipulated method. In these days of instantaneous communication it would be unrealistic and retrogressive, in the 
absence of clear words to the contrary under condition 29(2) and 
(3) by fax or telex is bad.
1.158 Although the decision on the substance of the case was reversed on appeal, the members of the Court of Appeal offered no comments in relation to 
this aspect of the decision by Grimberg JC, which leads to the inference that his 
comments were adopted.
1.159 A similar issue arose in England and Wales in the case of Re a debtor (No. 
2021 of 1995), ex parte, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. The debtor; Re a debtor 
327 For Poland, see Case note: Poland, I KZP 29/06, Resolution of the Polish Supreme Court, 
commentary by A. Lach, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), 
147 – 148.328 (1989) NSW ConvR 55–446, [1989] AUConstrLawNlr 143; note by J. Tyrril, Australian 
Construction Law Newsletter, 9 (1989), p. 24.329 [1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 1 All ER 763; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.330 [1989] SLR 1119, the decision on the substance of the case was reversed on appeal [1992] 
2 SLR 465.
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(No. 2022 of 1995), ex parte, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. The debtor.331 On Friday 9 June 1995 the Commissioners of Inland Revenue sent a completed form of 
proxy by first-class post with directions to the chairman of a meeting of creditors 
to vote against the debtors’ proposals for voluntary arrangements. On the morning of the meeting, the Commissioners sent a facsimile transmission of the completed 
form of proxy to the chairman’s office. Although not stated in the report of the case, it is probable that the form transmitted included the manuscript signature of the 
relevant official. When it was received, the chairman sought to verify the contents 
of the transmission by telephoning the Commissioners’ office, but he was not able 
to speak to the officer handling the case. He refused to act upon the instructions 
sent by facsimile transmission. The original form of proxy arrived the following 
day. The Commissioners appealed the decision at first instance, where the district judge decided that the proxy sent by facsimile transmission was not signed as 
required by r8.2(3) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 SI 1986/1925. The question was whether the facsimile transmission of the form of proxy should have been accepted 
and acted upon by the chairman. In reaching his decision, Laddie J noted that given 
there was no direct authority on this point, he had to approach the issue from first 
principles. Having reviewed Jenkins v. Gainsford and Thring332 and Goodman v. J 
Eban Limited,333 he observed that:… in the overwhelming majority of cases in which the chairman 
of a creditors’ meeting received a proxy form, the form will bear 
a signature which he does not recognise and may well be illegible. Authenticity could only be enhanced if the creditor carrying 
suitable identification signed the form in person in the presence 
of the chairman. Even there the possibility of deception exists.334
1.160 Interestingly, he went on to suggest ‘that the function of a signature is to indicate, but not necessarily prove, that the document has been considered 
personally by the creditor and is approved of by him’.335 Laddie J then took the matter one stage further, and made the following observation, which is directly related to the concept of an electronic signature:It may be said that a qualifying proxy form consists of two 
ingredients. First, it contains the information required to identify the creditor and his voting instructions and, secondly, the signature 
performing the function set out above. When the chairman receives a proxy form bearing what purports to be a signature, he is entitled to treat it as authentic unless there are surrounding circumstances 
which indicate otherwise.
331 [1996] 2 All ER 345, Ch D.332 (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 93; 164 ER 1208.333 [1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 1 All ER 763; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.334 [1996] 2 All ER 345, Ch D at 351 (b–c).335 [1996] 2 All ER 345, Ch D at 351(d).
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1.161 In reaching the conclusion that a proxy form is acceptable when sent by facsimile transmission,336 Laddie J noted that two things happen at the same 
time. The contents of the form are sent, and so is the signature applied to the form, described thus:The receiving fax is in effect instructed by the transmitting creditor to reproduce his signature on the proxy form which is itself being 
created at the receiving station. It follows that, in my view, the received fax is a proxy form signed by the principal or by someone 
authorized by him.337
1.162 This decision was reached in November 1995 without, it seems, the 
benefit of the knowledge of the decision by Waller J in Standard Bank London 
Ltd v. Bank of Tokyo Ltd,338 which was delivered on 13 March 1995. The decision by Waller J is based on a tested telex between banks, which is a slightly different concept to a facsimile transmission, because a tested telex provides for a separate 
method of authenticating the content of the transmission. Nevertheless, in both cases, an emphasis was placed on the fact that a document sent by such means can be considered authentic and reliable, provided the recipient was not aware 
of any particulars that might indicate the document cannot be trusted. A case similar to that determined by Waller J in Standard Bank London Ltd v. Bank of 
Tokyo Ltd was heard before Tay Yong Kwang JC in Singapore in 2003, in which he held, in the case of Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v. Banco Ambrosiano 
Veneto SpA339 that a message using an authentication code sent through the 
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system has the legal effect of binding the sender bank according to its contents, and where a recipient bank undertakes further checks on credit standing or other 
aspects, it does not detract from this proposition. The effect of the comments made by Laddie J, taken together with the comments by Waller J, suggest a move towards a responsibility by a recipient to consider all the circumstances of the means of authentication before acting upon the authority340 – although it could be argued, in accordance with established practice between banks – that 
a receiving bank is entirely justified in wholly relying on an instruction based 
exclusively on confirmation of the test code. The practical conclusion to this 
question is highly significant. The Bangladesh Bank is fortunate that employees 
in the New York Federal Reserve and an employee in an intermediary bank 
questioned a series of transactions authorized via the SWIFT financial 
336 Laddie J indicated that the decision he made was only in relation to Part 8 of the Insolvency 
Rules 1986, and said ‘Different considerations may apply to faxed documents in relation to 
other legislation’ at 352d–e.337 [1996] 2 All ER 345, Ch D at 351(h).338 [1995] CLC 496; [1996] 1 C.T.L.R. T-17.339 [2003] 1 SLR 221.340 V. Mallet and A. Chilkott, ‘Bangladeshi job: how cyber heist netted $81m’, Financial Times, 
19 March/20 March 2016, p. 8.
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transaction system in February 2016. Thieves had placed malicious software 
into the computer system of the central bank. They then initiated thirty-five 
transfers to the value of US$951m via the SWIFT financial transaction system. 
Five orders were executed to a value of US$101m, although a spelling error 
sent to an account in Sri Lanka enabled the bank to recover US$20m, resulting 
in a loss of US$81m.
1.163 The Vice-Chancellor, Sir Andrew Morritt, was required to reach a decision on the identical point to Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v. Banco Ambrosiano 
Veneto SpA in the case of PNC Telecom plc v. Thomas,341 as to whether the service of a notice sent by facsimile transmission for an extraordinary general meeting 
on a members’ requisition under s368 of the Companies Act 1985 was valid. By s368, notice to call a meeting is required to be deposited at the registered 
office of the company. The claimant argued that the notice was not valid on three counts: because it was sent by facsimile transmission, and the use of a 
facsimile transmission was not permitted within the meaning of ‘deposited’ in 
s368; that the Companies Act 1985 (Electronic Communication) Order 2000 (SI 
2000/3373) had made service by electronic means in respect of some sections of the 1985 Act, but not for s368, and there was a requirement to know that the 
notice received at the registered office was genuine, which meant that it was not 
permissible to send a notice by facsimile transmission. Sir Andrew referred to a number of authorities in which a facsimile transmission had been accepted by 
the courts, and rejected all of the arguments put forward by the claimant. He considered the deposit of the notice by facsimile transmission was valid, and robustly responded, at 94 a–b, to the illogical claim about the reliability of such a means of transmitting a document thus:For the reasons given by Laddie J in the last citation, there is nothing inherent in a fax transmission to make it more or less 
reliable than the post. It is true that a fax may be falsified by a 
cut and paste operation but forgery and falsification is equally possible, usually by other means, in connection with postal and 
personal transmission too.
1.164 The same position with respect to facsimile transmissions holds in Canada, where, in the case of Re United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd,342 proxy forms submitted with 
a facsimile or mechanically rendered signature were held to be sufficient. Hallett J at 289 paragraph 17 made the following point:
Today’s business could not be conducted if stamped signatures 
were not recognized as legally binding. The affixing of a stamp conveys the intention to be bound by the document so executed 
just as effectively as the manual writing of a signature by hand. I 
341 [2003] BCC 202, [2004] 1 BCLC 88, [2002] EWHC 2848, 2002 WL 31676421.342 (1980) 12 B.L.R. 130; 76 A.P.R. 282; 41 N.S.R.(2d) 282 (T.D.).
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would point out that no one questions the validity of millions of 
payroll cheques signed by facsimile signatures.
1.165 This view is echoed in the Singapore decision of Lim Teong Qwee JC in the case of Masa-Katsu Japanese Restaurant Pte Ltd v. Amara Hotel Properties Pte 
Ltd,343 in which he held that a facsimile transmission of a request to extend the 
term of a lease was a valid form of communicating. He commented, at 18:The written request dated 4 October 1997 was in fact received by 
the landlord. It was received by fax on 10 October 1997. It was not 
suggested that it was received other than at the landlord’s office 
where it could be attended to immediately. It was undoubtedly 
in writing when it was received. Communication by fax is not 
uncommon. It is fast. It is efficient. It accords with the practice of 
the business community. It seems to me that where as in this case a 
written request is to be made it is sufficiently made as much where the request is written on paper that is physically transported to 
the office of the person to whom the request is made as where it 
is transmitted by fax and received in written form at that person’s 
office.
1.166 Consideration was also given to a signature sent by way of facsimile 
transmission in the German case of GmS-OGB 1/98 before the Gemeinsamer 
Senat der obersten Gerichtshöfe des Bundes (Joint Senate of the Federal High 
Courts) in 2000. In this instance, the court had to decide whether or not a 
facsimile transmission sent directly from a computer (Computerfax) with a scanned signature complied with the requirements of written form for formal 
court pleadings. In the normal course of events, various rules of German procedural law require formal court pleadings to be signed with a manuscript signature, and a number of Federal High Courts have reached decisions on this 
point.344 The court held that it was sufficient to transfer pleadings electronically in this manner, providing the documents are signed with a scanned signature, or if the document transmitted indicates that the document could not be signed 
personally because of the method of transmission. The members of the court reached the conclusion on the basis that the formal requirements of procedural law do not serve as an end in themselves, and the purpose of requiring court proceedings to be in written form is to identify the sender and ensure the 
document was sent with the sender’s knowledge and intent. As a result, the intention of the sender is not seriously in doubt because of the method of 
343 [1999] 2 SLR 332.344 Federal Social Court, Beschluß vom 15.10.1996 – 14 BEg 9/96; Federal Administrative 
Court, Beschluß vom 19.12.1994 – 5 B 79/94.
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transmission.345 Similar decisions were made in Hungary346 and Lithuania,347 in which the Supreme Administrative Court in its ruling of 13 April 2006 held that the copy of an administrative decision sent by facsimile transmission 
constituted a proper form of notification by the governmental institution of its 
decision.
1.167 In the United States of America, a federal court on the ninth circuit found itself severely constrained by a set of extremely strict rules laid down by the Bureau of Land Management in the case of Gilmore v. Lujan348 respecting 
documents sent by facsimile transmission. In this instance, an application was sent by facsimile transmission because the original postal application had not 
arrived on time. The Bureau refused to accept the documents sent by facsimile 
transmission because the papers were not signed with a manuscript signature. Upon appeal, this decision was upheld because the signature was required to 
be as manuscript signature only, and no other form was permitted. The Bureau of Land Management required applications to be holographically signed in ink by each potential lessee, and machine or rubber-stamped signatures were not 
acceptable. The rule was altered after the case of W. H. Gilmore,349 where Gilmore protested the lease was awarded to an applicant that used a rubber stamp as a 
signature. The regulations were deliberately altered to only permit manuscript 
signatures thereafter. Although the regulations required the signature to be in ink, nevertheless the Board determined, in the later case of Jack Williams,350 
that a signature signed with a lead pencil was adequate. Nelson CJ criticized the decision, indicating, at 142, that:Justice Holmes observed that citizens dealing with their 
government must turn square corners … Gilmore turned all but the last millimetre, but that millimetre, whose traverse is jealously 
guarded by the BLM, was his undoing. Relief to Gilmore in this narrow case would expose BLM to no fraud or risk of fraud, as 
his bona fides are beyond question. If Gilmore and those other few luckless applicants whose documents are stored rather than delivered by the Postal Service are to get any relief, it must come at 
the hands of the BLM. As shown by this case, those hands are more 
iron than velvet. We can only suggest to BLM that the body politic would not be put at risk by the granting of relief in these narrow 
and rare situations.
345 M. Knopp, case note, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 2(2005), pp. 103–4.346 Case number BDT 2001/496.347 UAB ‘Bite Lietuva’ v. Communications Regulatory Authority AS14–77–06.348 947 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1991).349 41 IBLA 25 (1979).350 91 IBLA 355 (1986).
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1.168 The use of facsimile transmissions have been challenged in other situations, such as arbitration351 and elections,352 although in Bogue v. Sizemore353 there was 
no dispute about a contract disseminated by facsimile. In addition, cases have occurred under the Statute of Frauds,354 although not always successfully.
1.169 In Canada, forms of proxy sent by facsimile transmission were the subject matter of the British Columbia case of Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 and 
Company, Limited Partnership.355 In this case, it was held that forms of proxy sent 
by facsimile transmission were sufficient to meet the signature requirements 
under a limited partnership agreement. Hinds J indicated, at 383 that ‘The faxed proxies were not themselves signed, but they bore the photographic reproduction 
of the original of the limited partner who executed the particular proxy’. He went 
on to say at 383, that ‘The law has endeavoured to take cognizance of, and to 
be receptive to, technological advances in the means of communication. The development of that approach may be observed in a number of cases, including 
the following’. At 385 he addressed the argument relating to the theoretical possibility that such transmissions might be the subject of fraud, which is hardly an argument to use when the authenticity of the document in question has not been challenged:It was argued by counsel for the Fund that validating faxed proxies would increase the risk of fraud, create uncertainty, and give an unfair advantage to those limited partners who had access to a 
351 New York: In the Matter of American Multimedia, Inc., v. Dalton Packaging, Inc., 143 Misc.2d 
295, 540 N.Y.S.2d 410 (an order was transmitted by facsimile machine that only contained 
the first of two pages of an order form, stating that all orders were subject to the terms and 
conditions on the reverse of the form, which was not sent. It was held that the terms did 
apply, because the petitioner had filed over 100 such orders in the previous three years) 
(1989).352 New Jersey: Madden v. Hegadorn, 565 A.2d 725 (N.J.Super.L. 1989), 236 N.J.Super. 280, 
affirmed 571 A.2d 296 (N.J. 1989), 239 N.J.Super. 268 (a document sent by facsimile 
transmission containing a manuscript signature was deemed effective for filing a 
nomination petition, and any technical defects were cured when the candidate filed the 
original documents the day after the facsimile transmission).353 241 Ill.App.3d 250, 608 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill.App.4th Dist. 1993).354 New York: WPP Group USA, Inc., v. The Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc., 644 N.Y.S.2d 
205, 228 A.D.2d 296 (it was premature to decide whether the Statute of Frauds was 
satisfied where an unsigned facsimile transmission on the letterhead of the sender was 
sent) (1996). For the merchant’s exception see the New York case of Bazak International 
Corp. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 140 Ad.2d 211, 528 N.Y.S.2d 62, 6 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 375, appeal 
granted by 72 N.Y.2D 808, 529 N.E.2d 425, 533 N.E.2d 57 (N.Y. 1988), Order reversed by 
73 N.Y.2D 113, 535 N.E.2d 633, 538 N.Y.2d 503, 57 USLW 2520, 82 A.L.R.4th 689, 7 UCC 
Rep.Serv.2d 1380 (N.Y. 1989) where annotated telecopies (‘telecopies’ is a trademark 
sometimes used for a facsimile machine) of headed purchase order forms signed by the alleged purchaser and sent to the alleged seller and retained without objection came 
within the merchant’s exception to the Statute of Frauds.355 25 B.C.L.R.2d 377 (1988).
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telecopier or fax machine. I reject that argument. Faxed proxies 
are, in effect, a photocopy of an original copy. They reveal what is depicted on an original copy, including an exact replica of the 
signature of the person who signed the original proxy. I observe no greater opportunity for the perpetration of a fraud by the 
use of faxed copies than by the use of original copies. The same 
observation applies to the matter of uncertainty.
The writing material
1.170 In the days before the development of techniques to identify microscopic indentations or traces of lead on paper, the material used to write on a document 
could cause conceptual problems. The nature of the writing material used to 
affix a signature was raised in the case of Geary v. Physic.356 An objection was 
taken where a promissory note was signed using a pencil. At the trial, the Lord 
Chief Justice, Abbott CJ, thought the promissory note was sufficiently indorsed, 
and directed the members of the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff. He also 
permitted the plaintiff to challenge this finding. The matter was subsequently 
argued before Abbott CJ, Bayley and Holroyd JJ. In his judgment, the Lord Chief 
Justice pointed out, ‘There is no authority for saying that where the law requires 
a contract to be in writing, that writing must be in ink’.357 This decision was made before the development of the forensic analysis of materials and the use 
of technology as a means of detecting changes to materials. Although it is now 
possible to detect the erasure of a manuscript signature if it were to be affixed 
using a pencil, the principle established by this decision remains sound. The 
rationale for this decision is the principle that a signature was affixed to the 
document with an intent that it should be acted upon. Hence the type of writing 
material used is irrelevant, providing it is not removed from the document. This decision may also be considered correct on the premise that the promissory note was only valid for a limited period of time, and the use of a pencil to sign the note may not have been considered relevant because there was no requirement to 
retain a permanent record of the note.358
1.171 A similar issue arose in Lucas v. James,359 where a series of remarks on a 
draft under-lease were written in pencil, including the words ‘I agree to these 
terms, subject to the above observations. W. M. James’. In this instance, the 
plaintiff sought specific performance, while the defendant denied an agreement had been reached, arguing in part that the comments made by him on the draft, 
being made in pencil, were not intended to be binding. Although the claim failed 
356 (1826) 5 B & C 234; 108 ER 87.357 (1826) 5 B & C 234 at 237.358 For a case on the use of a ballpoint pen, see J. Bing and J. Hvarre, ‘Case note Denmark: U 
1959.40/1H’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), p. 277.359 (1849) 7 Hare 410; 68 ER 170.
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for other reasons, Sir James Wigram VC made the extra-judicial remark that these words, taken in conjunction with a previous comment made by the defendant on 
the same draft, would, on the face of it, bind him to the terms of the under-lease.360 The Vice-Chancellor considered that the remarks made in pencil demonstrated 
a willingness to be bound by the amended document. In this instance, the use of pencil on the document was deemed perfectly acceptable as evidence of the 
writer’s intent to agree the terms of the document.
1.172 Whether the nature of a document that has been changed sufficiently as the result of alterations made in pencil was the subject of Co-operative Bank plc v. 
Tipper.361 Mr and Mrs Tipper entered into a personal guarantee with the bank, but it transpired that the document erroneously described the defendants personally 
as both the customer (i.e. the principal debtor) and the guarantor. The bank applied 
to the court to rectify the error after Mr and Mrs Tipper’s company went into 
liquidation. Mr and Mrs Tipper opposed the application of the bank on the basis that where a document is altered in a material way, the document becomes void, and 
therefore unenforceable. In this instance, a person unknown working for the bank used a pencil to strike out the names of Mr and Mrs Tipper and added the name and 
address of the company. Cooke J concluded that the proper evidential inference to 
draw was that the alterations constituted a drafting amendment. The changes made in pencil were not intended to alter the substance of the document, but were meant 
to propose that the names be put in the correct place in the document. As a result, the use of pencil did not alter the content of the document because the use of a 
pencil constituted a series of suggestions to correct errors in the document.
1.173 In a case from Scotland, Jollie v. Lennie,362 the testator wrote a purported 
will by hand in pencil on each side of a single sheet of A5 paper. The testator 
signed the will before a witness, who also signed. Both signatures were in pencil. 
The will was held to be effective.
1.174 The use of a lead pencil has also been the subject of a number of decisions in the United States of America, include bills of exchange,363 Statute of Frauds,364 
360 (1849) 7 Hare 410 at 419.361 [1996] 4 All ER 366 Ch.362 [2014] CSOH 45, 2014 WL 978942.363 New York: Brown v. The Butchers & Drovers’ Bank, 6 Hill 443, 41Am.Dec. 755 (the 
endorsement of a bill of exchange using a lead pencil is sufficient) (1844).Vermont: Clossen v. Stearns, 4 Vt. 11, 1831 WL 2104 (Vt.), 23 Am.Dec. 245 (the 
endorsement of a promissory note by means of a lead pencil held to be valid) (1831).364 Missouri: Great Western Printing Co. v. Belcher, 127 Mo.App. 133, 104 S.W. 894 (the words 
‘Guaranteed. Belcher’ written in lead pencil across the face of the original account is a 
signature, even though the signature did not include a first name) (1907).
New York: Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns. 102, 7 Am.Dec. 286, 12 N.Y.S.C. 1814–15 92 
affirmed as The Executors of Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484 (where a memorandum of a 
contract was written down in a note book using a lead pencil, the document is a sufficient 
memorandum within the Statute of Frauds) (1817).South Carolina: Draper v. Pattina, 29 S.C.L. 292, 2 Speers 292, 1844 WL 2584 
(S.C.App.L.) (a memorandum written using a lead pencil was not a valid objection) (1844).
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wills365 and deeds, as in the 1920 Missouri case of Kleine v. Kleine,366 in which John Kleine granted his sister a lease on a portion of land, and he signed it with a 
lead pencil. It was held to be a valid instrument. Graves J, indicated, at 610 what he thought of Kleine and his motive for using a lead pencil in this instance:
Kleine’s testimony in the case tends to leave a bad taste in the 
judicial mouth. Among other things, he requested that the lease be 
signed with a lead pencil, and says that he ‘figured’ that it was no 
good when he signed it, ‘because there was no starting point.’ All 
this was after the sister had put her money into the improvements.
1.175 The judge went on, at 611, to observe that:The real issue in the case is not the views expressed by John Kleine, 
to the effect that he signed the lease (in lead pencil, at his own 
suggestion) because he thought it invalid, owing to the absence of 
a starting point. He seems not only to have had that idea, but the other erroneous view, entertained by many laymen, that a deed 
must be signed with a pen and ink.
1.176 His comments illustrate the frustration by many lawyers of the erroneous and endlessly inaccurate comments made by lay people in respect of legal issues 
relating to all manner of things.
1.177 However, it is the use of a lead pencil on a judicial document in 1823 that serves to illustrate the fallacy about the use of lead pencil as a means of 
affixing a signature to a document, and also in relation to whether a document 
is open to attack. In the Columbia case of United States v. Thompson,367 it was held that an indictment for assault and battery for violently beating a slave and 
signed by a Justice of the Peace with a lead pencil was not a sufficient signature. 
The reason given by Cranch CJ was that ‘it is liable to be so easily obliterated’. 
This is a false conclusion based on an erroneous premise. The logic of the 
reasoning runs as follows: a material that can be erased was used to affix the signature to the document, ergo the signature is not valid because it is possible 
to erase the signature. It is correct that the material impressed on to paper by a lead pencil can be erased, but the possibility that the writing can be erased 
does not prevent the document from having been signed. In this instance, the 
document was signed with the manuscript signature of a Justice of the Peace. The evidence of the signature was clear for all to see, which meant the signature 
was sufficient. Had the signature been erased, then the integrity of the document would have been questioned, and, depending on the strength or weakness of the evidence tendered and tested before the court, a decision could be made as to 
365 Pennsylvania: Appeal of Knox, 131 P. 220, 18 A. 1021, 6 L.R.A. 353, 17 Am.St.Rep. 798 (an 
instrument written in lead pencil was sufficient to be admitted as a will) (1890).366 219 S.W. 610, 281 Mo. 317.367 2 Cranch C.C. 409, 28 F.Cas. 89, 2 D.C. 409, No 16484.
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the authenticity of the document, which in turn would enable the trier of fact to 
determine whether the document had been signed or not.
1.178 Lawyers often use this argument relating to documents in electronic 
and digital format. The argument runs like this: because it is possible to forge 
an email, facsimile transmission or electronic signature (any form of electronic 
signature); ergo the email, facsimile transmission or electronic signature should 
not be admitted because of the possibility of forgery. Astonishingly, this argument 
was successfully used in the German case of AG Bonn Urteil vom 25.10.2001 3 C 
193/01 Beweiskraft von Emails, JurPC Web-Dok. 332/2002, where the claimant 
sued the defendant for a broker’s fee for acting as an intermediary for the sale of 
cigarettes. The claim was dismissed on the basis that there was no sufficient proof, because the emails submitted in evidence had no value as evidence because it is 
generally known that emails can be easily altered or forged. This argument is also 
fallacious. Any paper document can be forged, such as a letter from a commercial entity or a government, and lawyers are required to sift through documentary 
evidence regularly to test the authenticity of documents. The forgery of evidence is hardly new, and if this argument were to be accepted by judges, which it seems to be in some cases, then by logical extension, any item of documentary evidence 
could be excluded because it was possible to forge. If it is suggested an item of evidence is forged, the question should be raised before trial, so that the party relying on the evidence has the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove the 
document is genuine. Unsound arguments based on a flawed foundation have no 
place in a court.
The absence of a signature
1.179 Two further illustrations demonstrate the willingness of judges to imply a 
document has been signed in the absence of a manuscript signature. In the case of Rist v. Hobson,368 an agreement for the sale and purchase of an estate had been 
drawn up but not signed by either party. The vendor sought an order for specific performance, and Sir John Leach VC reached the conclusion that where the agreement was in writing, it would be presumed the document was signed unless 
evidence to the contrary was adduced to rebut the presumption. It is not clear from the report whether the agreement had been committed to writing by either 
of the parties in this instance. However, in the later case of Bleakley v. Smith,369 
the agreement had been written in the hand of one of the parties. Mr Bridges 
agreed to sell five houses in Liverpool to John Bleakley. The only evidence to this 
agreement was a memorandum, written by Mr Bridges: ‘July 26th, 1839. John Bleakley agrees with J R Bridges to take the property in Cable Street for the net sum of £248 10s’. Mr Bridges died on 10 February 1840, but had not conveyed 
the property. In an action against Mr Bridges’s executors, the Vice-Chancellor 
368 (1824) 1 Sim & St 543; 57 ER 215.369 (1840) 11 Sim 149; 59 ER 831.
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made a declaration that the memorandum was a valid and binding contract and 
ordered specific performance and execution of a conveyance of the properties. 
The Vice-Chancellor merely stated that the agreement was sufficiently signed to 
take it out of the Statute of Frauds. In all probability, the reason for so finding was partly because the memorandum was drawn up in the hand of Mr Bridges and 
he had received the purchase price. In such circumstances, there was sufficient 
evidence to show he intended to sell the properties. It appears that the obligation 
was considered to be ‘entire’, thus permitting an order for specific performance.
1.180 These cases illustrate that, despite failing to comply with the formal requirements, the content of a document can be authenticated where there is 
sufficient evidence to show the person signing the document adopted the content.
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 
2016), chapter 2, ‘International initiatives’, pp. 95–116.
2International initiatives
2.1 The approach taken by a government in determining how legislation is to be enacted can affect the infrastructure of the electronic environment in 
a particular jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions favour the use of digital signatures carried on smart cards for the signature process, while others have developed a 
state public key infrastructure, with a certification authority acting as a trusted 
third party. Other governments have enacted legislation that seeks to be neutral, 
thus allowing for the changes in technology that are bound to occur over time.
United Nations Commission on International Trade 
(UNCITRAL) 
2.2 Sets of uniform rules have been prepared by UNCITRAL: the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures,1 and the 2005 United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in 
International Contracts.2 The Model Laws are intended to provide help, guidance 
and act as an instrument for national states to use in forming legislation. While states are encouraged to incorporate both the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the Model Law on Electronic Signatures fully into their domestic legislation, 
changes can be made to the content. The Model Laws are complementary to each other, although many states enacted legislation relating to electronic signatures 
before the final version of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was adopted. The following discussion is intended to bring the salient issues to the attention 
of the reader.
Model Law on Electronic Commerce
2.3 The objectives of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce are set out in 
the accompanying Guide to Enactment, as follows:
(a) To provide a set of rules acceptable to the international 
community relating to electronic communications.
1 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was adopted by the Commission on 12 June 
1996, following its 605th meeting, which in turn was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 51/162 at its 85th plenary meeting on 16 December 1996, and includes an additional article 5 bis as adopted by the Commission at its 31st meeting in June 1998. The Commission at its 727th meeting on 5 July 2001 adopted the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures.
2 New York (2005), adopted on 23 November 2005, entered into force on 1 March 2013.
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(b) To illustrate how obstacles to electronic commerce can be removed by national legislators, such as rules relating to the use of 
‘written’, ‘signed’ or ‘original’ documents, and to help create legal 
certainty in the electronic environment.
(c) To help remedy any disadvantages because inadequate 
legislation creates obstacles to international trade.
(d) To act as a means to interpret existing international conventions and other instruments that may create legal obstacles when using 
electronic commerce.
(e) To foster efficiency in international trade.3
2.4 The Model Law is predicated upon the recognition that most legal 
requirements relate to documentation based on paper. It was thought that new rules might have to be developed to take into account the many distinctive 
differences between paper-based documents and electronic data. A new 
approach was established, called the ‘functional equivalent approach’, based on 
the analysis of the purposes and functions of a paper carrier. The functions a paper carrier provides for include:
(a) To provide that a document would be legible by all.
(b) To provide that a document would remain unaltered over time.
(c) To allow for the reproduction of a document so that each party 
would hold a copy of the same data.
(d) To allow for the authentication of data by means of a signature.
(e) To provide that a document would be in a form acceptable to 
public authorities and courts.4
2.5 It was considered necessary that the approach would not require higher standards of security and related costs than already existed in the paper-based 
environment. Hence the adoption of a flexible standard, because data in digital 
format is not the equivalent of a paper document. Documents in paper and digital format are different in nature, and neither can perform the same functions as 
the other. Thus the Model Law seeks to establish the functions that a paper-based document will perform and then provides criteria that, if met, will enable 
electronic data to be recognized in the same way as a paper document. Part One 
Chapter I of the Model Law deals with electronic commerce in general. Chapter II 
provides for the legal requirements relating to data messages.
Legal recognition of data messages
2.6 Article 5 provides for the legal recognition of data messages as follows:
3 Introduction to the Model Law Part A, paragraphs 1–6.
4 Introduction to the Model Law Part B paragraph 16.
2. International initiatives 97
Article 5. Legal recognition of data messagesInformation shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of 
a data message.
Article 5 bis. Incorporation by reference (as adopted by the 
Commission at its thirty-first session, in June 1998)Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is not contained in the data message purporting to give rise to such legal 
effect, but is merely referred to in that data message.
2.7 The provisions of article 5 establish the principle that electronic data should 
not be treated any differently from paper documents because of the form it takes. Article 5 bis provides guidance when reference is made to other documents in the 
text of another document. This occurs frequently in the paper-based world, and 
the aim is to ensure it can also be effective in the electronic environment. Thus the 
commentary in paragraph 46-2 to the Guide to Enactment suggests that advantage can be taken of the ability to have links to databases, code lists or glossaries, by 
making use of abbreviations. In addition, the use of embedded uniform resource locators that can direct a reader to a referenced document by way of a hypertext link 
is another method of referring to other, related documents.5 An example could be 
where an individual or legal entity uses an individual identity certificate provided 
by a certificate authority.6 This is a signed structured message that seeks to assert 
the existence of an association between a particular set of data that identifies a key 
holder with a particular public key. A certificate authority invariably incorporates the terms and conditions of use that limit its liability for the individual identity 
certificate by reference.
Writing
2.8 The term ‘writing’ is considered in article 6:
Article 6. Writing
(1) Where the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement is met by a data message if the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for 
subsequent reference.
5 Guide to Enactment paragraph 46-5.
6 The reader should be aware that there are different classes of certificate, and it is not 
always clear what a particular certification authority means by a certificate and how 
they distinguish between types of certificate. See R. Clarke, ‘Conventional public key 
infrastructure: an artefact ill-fitted to the needs of the information society’, prepared for 
submission to the ‘IS in the Information Society’ track of the European Conference in 
Information Systems, Bled, Slovenia, 27–29 June 2001, available online at http://www.
rogerclarke.com/II/PKIMisFit.html.
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(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being in 
writing.
(3) The provisions of this article do not apply to the 
following [...]
2.9 The purpose of article 6 is to define the basic standard that an electronic 
data message must meet. It is not a requirement that electronic data should 
conform to the functions of writing affixed to a carrier. Rather it is a provision that the electronic data should be made available by being rendered into a format 
that can be interpreted and read: that is, ‘accessible’, and the data must also be 
‘useable for subsequent reference’. This refers to two functions: the ability of a human to read the content of the data; and the processing of the data by a 
computer.
Signature
2.10 Matters pertaining to the signature are set out in article 7, as follows:
Article 7. Signature
(1) Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if:
(a) a method is used to identify that person and to 
indicate that person’s approval of the information contained in the data message; and
(b) that method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the 
circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply 
provides consequences for the absence of a signature.
(3) The provisions of this article do not apply to the 
following [...]
2.11 The provisions of article 7 do not claim to establish any standards or procedures to be used as substitute for a signature, because it was felt that there was a risk that the legal framework would be tied to a particular state of 
technological development. The aim of article 7 is to provide a basic standard of authentication between two parties, whether the parties are linked by an 
agreement, or where they have no previous relationship. It sets out general conditions under which electronic data can be regarded as authentic and enforceable, focusing on two of the functions of a manuscript signature, that is: 
to identify the author of a document and to confirm the author approved the 
content of the document. There are two elements to this process.
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(i) The first element, set out in paragraph (1)(a), provides that where a signature is required by law, the requirement is met if a method is used to identify the person, and to indicate their 
approval of the information contained in the data message. The person sending the message becomes the originator of the data 
message.
(ii) The second element is set out in paragraph (1)(b). The method 
used to generate or communicate the message must be sufficiently reliable and appropriate, bearing in mind the circumstances, for its 
intended purpose.
2.12 The Guide sets out a number of legal, technical and commercial factors that should be taken into account when determining whether the method used 
was sufficiently reliable and appropriate:
(1) the sophistication of the equipment used by each of the parties;
(2) the nature of their trade activity;
(3) the frequency at which commercial transactions take place between the parties;
(4) the kind and size of the transaction;
(5) the function of signature requirements in a given statutory and regulatory environment;
(6) the capability of communication systems;
(7) compliance with authentication procedures set forth by intermediaries;
(8) the range of authentication procedures made available by any intermediary;
(9) compliance with trade customs and practice;
(10) the existence of insurance coverage mechanisms against unauthorized messages;
(11) the importance and the value of the information contained in the data message;
(12) the availability of alternative methods of identification and the cost of implementation;
(13) the degree of acceptance or non-acceptance of the method of 
identification in the relevant industry or field both at the time the method was agreed upon and the time when the data message was communicated; and
(14) any other relevant factor.7
7 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 58.
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2.13 The legal effectiveness of the method used to apply to an electronic 
signature depends, in accordance with the Guide to Enactment to the Model Law on Electronic Signatures,8 on demonstrating its reliability to the person 
trying the fact. However, the reliability of the method does not demonstrate a 
link between the owner of the electronic signature and the act of affixing the 
signature to a document in digital format. The Guide to Enactment to the Model Law on Electronic Commerce notes that when an electronic document is signed by means of a functional equivalent of a manuscript signature, it does not follow 
that the electronic data is legally valid. The relevant provisions set out in national 
law govern this matter.9
Model Law on Electronic Signatures
2.14 This Model Law is predicated on the principles underlying article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, and is intended to assist states in setting out 
a legal framework for electronic signatures. The Model Law considers technical reliability and legal effectiveness, while setting out a number of basic rules of 
conduct for the parties to an electronic signature (sending party, receiving party 
and third-party certification authority). The objectives of the Model Law include the encouragement of facilitating the use of electronic signatures and providing equal treatment for all documents whether they are in electronic format or stored 
on a physical carrier.10 In this respect, the Model Law has focused on the roles or functions relating to public key cryptography, which usually implies a trusted third party acts to certify the identity of an entity by means of an individual identity 
certificate. However, it should be noted that trust in a key could be established 
bilaterally, without the services of a trusted third party. These functions consist 
of the signatory function, relying function and certification function. While the 
signatory and relying functions remain constant, the certification function may 
differ, depending on the system used. While other techniques, such as biometric 
measurements, are not specifically covered in the Model Law, the aim has been to deal with the legal issues at an intermediate level between the generality of the 
Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the specific issues when considering a 
particular electronic signature technique.
2.15 As the Model Law is predicated on article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, it was not a foregone conclusion that a new Model Law would be 
created. Consideration was given to incorporating the new rules into the Model Law on Electronic Commerce as a new Part III, but because so many states had 
8 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 76.
9 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 61; for a list of those states that have implemented and 
adopted the Model Law, or where Uniform legislation has been influenced by the Model 
Law and the principles on which it is based, see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996Model_status.html.10 The history of this Model Law illustrates differences had to be resolved before the final 
version was agreed. The reader is referred to Part C, paragraphs 12 to 25 of the Guide that 
accompanies the Model Law for more information.
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already implemented the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, it was felt that 
a separate instrument was more appropriate. To provide for consistency, the following articles have been reproduced from the Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce: articles 1 (Sphere of application); 2 (a), (c) and (d) (Definitions of 
‘data message’, ‘originator’ and ‘addressee’); 3 (Interpretation); 4 (Variation 
by agreement) and 7 (Signature). The notes in the Guide to Enactment make it explicit that the Model Law only offers a framework within which laws can be structured, and it is not intended to set forth all the requirements that may 
be necessary to implement any given electronic signature law. For instance, it does not set out the rules and regulations that may be necessary to implement 
electronic signature techniques. Nor does it deal with liability, leaving the national law to determine what liability a party may be subject to in accordance 
with applicable law. However, the Model Law does set out criteria against which 
an adjudicator might assess the conduct of the parties.
Consumer protection
2.16 The comments in the Guide to Enactment indicate that the Model Law has not been drafted with any special provisions in mind regarding the protection 
of consumers.11 There was no reason why conditions relating to consumers should be excluded from the scope of the Model Law, especially because it was 
considered that the Model Law could be beneficial to a consumer. This does not prevent the consumer from being protected independently, as provided for in article 1:
Article 1. Sphere of applicationThis Law applies where electronic signatures are used in the 
context of commercial activities. It does not override any rule of 
law intended for the protection of consumers.It is for individual states to determine whether they should exclude or modify rules in relation to consumers and their use of electronic 
signatures.
Definitions
2.17 The Model Law provides a number of definitions in article 2, as described 
below.
2.18 Electronic signature The definition of an electronic signature is set out 
in article 2(a):
‘Electronic signature’ means data in electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated with, a data message, which may be used 
11 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 91.
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to identify the signatory in relation to the data message and to 
indicate the signatory’s approval of the information contained in 
the data message.
2.19 This definition is intended to include all traditional uses of a manuscript signature, and emphasizes the use of an electronic signature as a functional 
equivalent of a manuscript signature.12 There are two elements to this definition 
of an electronic signature. The first element provides for the link between 
different types of electronic data: electronic signature data that is ‘in, affixed to 
or logically associated with, a data message’.
(i) The word ‘in’ operates where the signature data is contained 
in a message or document. It can be seen when it is opened and 
read, or when it is printed. When used ‘in’ the data message, the signature data consists of additional text in the document or 
message.
(ii) There does not appear any difference in meaning between the 
words ‘affixed to’ and ‘logically associated’. The use of the phrase 
‘affixed to’ probably means signature data contained in a file sent 
as an attachment to an email. However, this example falls into the 
meaning ‘logically associated’ in any event.13
(iii) The phrase ‘logically associated’ with a message or document 
is where signature data is contained in a separate file from the 
data that has been signed. It is not visible in the data itself. The 
signature data can only be verified where a signature verification 
application is used. This uses the data that purports to have been 
signed, the purported signature file and the verification key to 
determine whether the verification is valid. The signature data will 
only be verified if the relevant logical association is demonstrated: if the purportedly signed data was in fact signed with the signature 
key corresponding to the verification key used.
2.20 The second element provides for the purpose of the associated data, that 
of identifying the signatory and the signatory’s approval of the content of the 
message. The data specifically provides for the identification of the signatory.
(i) The first part of this element permits the use of associated data 
that ‘may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data 
12 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 93.13 The definition of what constitutes an electronic signature was discussed on various 
occasions at meetings of Working Group on Electronic Commerce. A proposed change to 
the definition was agreed at a session in Vienna between 8 and 19 February 1999. The 
change is noted in A/CN.9/457 dated 25 February 1999 at paragraph 28: ‘“Electronic 
signature” means data in electronic form which (a) is included in, affixed to or logically 
associated with a data message’. No reason was ascribed to the inclusion of two phrases 
that appear to have similar meanings.
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message’. The use of the word ‘may’ acknowledges that there is a difference between the legal notion of a signature and the different technical functions that can be used to create an electronic 
signature, but can also be used for other purposes.14 Whether an electronic signature merely acts to authenticate interactions between protocols or to identify the sender, will be determined by the ability to establish a connection between the signature and the 
person affixing the signature to the data.
(ii) The second part of the element provides for the associated 
data to ‘indicate the signatory’s approval of the information 
contained in the data message’. The aim of this part of the element 
is to cover the traditional use of the manuscript signature. The 
comments in the Guide to Enactment indicate the nature of the 
problem: ‘defining an electronic signature as capable of indicating approval of information amounts primarily to establishing a technical prerequisite for the recognition of a given technology 
as capable of creating an equivalent to a handwritten signature’.15 However, it is to be observed that the method that can be used for the production of a signature with legal meaning can also be used 
for other purposes, such as to authenticate or identify an entity. Thus the context and intention of the method used must be taken into account before it can be inferred that a document has been 
‘signed’. A message or document may include data that seeks to link the person to the message or document without indicating 
their approval of the content.
2.21 Certificate Article 2(b) provides a definition of a certificate:
‘Certificate’ means a data message or other record confirming the 
link between a signatory and signature creation data.
2.22 The Guide to Enactment to the Model Law points out that a ‘certificate’ as 
defined is no different from any other meaning of a document, other than it is in 
digital format. The aim of such a document is to confirm facts. Thus the purpose 
of a certificate is to ‘recognize, show or confirm a link between the signature 
creation data and the signatory’.16 According to the commentary, the link is 
created when the signature creation data is generated. This must be wrong. The link is created when the possessor of the signature key wishes to obtain a 
certificate for the verification key, and perhaps accepts obligations to procure the 
issue of the certificate. The signature creation data is, when using asymmetric 
cryptography, the cryptographic key pair. The private key is the operative element 
14 Guide to Enactment, paragraphs 93 and 94.15 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 93.16 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 96.
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in the process and it is the private key that is referred to in the phrase ‘signature 
creation data’. However, it is also meant to include the confirmation of the link 
between the signatory and their public key.
2.23 Data message The definition provided in article 2(c) is as follows:
‘Data message’ means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means including, but not 
limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy; and acts either on its own behalf or on 
behalf of the person it represents.
2.24 This definition is drafted to cover a broad range of data, including 
records. It does not follow that a data message has to be communicated. The 
definition seeks to include all forms of document not on paper, as well as future 
developments in technology.17
2.25 Signatory Article 2 (d) provides the following definition of a signatory:
‘Signatory’ means a person that holds signature creation data and acts either on its own behalf or on behalf of the person it 
represents.
2.26 The meaning of ‘person’ includes all types of person, including physical, 
corporate and other forms of legal entity. The digital environment permits a legal 
entity to have an electronic signature in its own name. A legal entity can sign 
documents in two ways. The method most frequently used is when authorized 
officers affix their manuscript signatures to a document with the requisite 
authority. Alternatively, the organization can use its own signature, with the 
impression of the seal. Whether an electronic signature has been added to digital data with authority is a matter for the law governing the relationship between 
the person whose actions affix the electronic signature and the legal entity.18
2.27 Certification service provider Article 2(e) provides the following 
definition of a certification service provider:
‘Certification service provider’ means a person that issues 
certificates and may provide other services related to electronic 
signatures.
2.28 The commentary mentions that the certification service provider will have 
to provide a certification service in order to be brought within this definition, 
although it can supply other services. It does not have to undertake the work 
directly, but can sub-contract the service. The definition does not include entities 
17 Guide to Enactment, paragraphs 98 to 100.18 Guide to Enactment, paragraphs 102 and 103.
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that issue certificates for internal purposes. It is only intended to cover activities 
of commercial providers of such services.19
2.29 Relying party The definition of a relying party is to be found in article 
2(f):
‘Relying party’ means a person that may act on the basis of a 
certificate or an electronic signature.
2.30 The inclusion of what is meant by a ‘relying party’ is meant to provide 
symmetry in the definition of the various parties involved in a transaction 
involving an electronic signature. Interestingly, the commentary also suggests 
that the word ‘act’ should be interpreted broadly, covering a positive action 
and a failure to act. This issue was the subject of discussion, and concern was 
expressed that in some legal systems the word ‘act’ would not cover acts of 
omission.20 The comments in the Guide to Enactment illustrate the intention is to create an obligation upon a recipient to undertake acts of due diligence, as further demonstrated by the terms of article 11:
Article 11. Conduct of the relying partyA relying party shall bear the legal consequences of its failure:
(a) To take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b) Where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, to take reasonable steps:
(i) To verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the 
certificate; and
(ii) To observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
2.31 It is not certain that a recipient should be made to undertake due diligence, although there may be good reasons of public policy to enforce organizations 
such as banks to take steps to authenticate the identity of their customers.21 However, taking into account the discussion of this issue elsewhere in this text, it may be appropriate for both sending and receiving parties to be aware of the 
risks and limitations that attend the use of electronic signatures. The comments 
19 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 104.20 Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the work of its 37th session 
(Vienna, 18–29 September 2000) A/CN.9/483, paragraphs 105–8.21 When the issue of authentication is of central concern, the decision that a judge reaches can 
be highly contentious, for which see Shojibur Rahman v. Barclays Bank PLC, commentary 
by S. Mason and N. Bohm, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013), 
169–74; Shojibur Rahman v. Barclays Bank PLC (on appeal from the judgment of Her 
Honour District Judge Millard dated 24 October 2012), commentary by S. Mason and N. Bohm, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013), 175–87; Rahman 
v. Barclays Bank PLC [2014] EWCA Civ 811.
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in the Guide to Enactment suggest the recipient should bear in mind whether 
it is reasonable to rely on a certificate in the circumstances.22 Furthermore, the Model Law is not intended to overrule any rules with respect to the protection of consumers, but it was thought that imposing such a duty on consumers would play a role in educating recipients about the standard of conduct expected of 
recipients.23 Bearing in mind the complexity of the infrastructure surrounding different types of electronic signature, especially digital signatures, perhaps the failure to carry out an act is something that should be borne in mind when assessing the evidence in the event of a dispute, depending on the circumstances 
of the case.24 This aspect of the meaning for the word ‘act’ should be considered in the light of the provisions of article 4:
Article 4. Interpretation
1. In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith.
2. Questions concerning matters governed by this Law which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the 
general principles on which this Law is based.
2.32 The commentary indicates that article 4 is based upon the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and is reproduced 
from article 3 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce. The aim of paragraph 1 is to ensure the interpretation of the Model Law is by reference to its international 
origin, with the aim of ensuring uniformity in its interpretation. It is hoped that the Law, once incorporated into national law, will not be subject only to local 
legislation.25 The Model Law may act as a guide in dealing with a dispute, but national courts will be required to implement national law, especially national 
consumer law. Although the concept of utilizing a device to create a signature means the signing party should look to control its use and protect it from unauthorized use, it is debatable whether a duty should be imposed upon a 
recipient to verify the certificate and the link between the certificate, public key 
and identity of the sending party.
The requirement for a signature
2.33 The Model Law, by way of the provisions set out in articles 3 and 6, seeks to ensure that whatever form a signature takes, whether in electronic format or a manuscript signature placed on a physical document, it is subject to the 
same treatment. For an electronic signature to be acceptable, it must fulfil the 
22 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 148.23 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 149.24 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 106.25 Guide to Enactment, paragraphs 108 and 109.
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requirements of articles 6 and 7. In addition, provisions are made for the conduct of the various parties that may be connected to an electronic signature, including 
that of the signatory (article 8) and the certification service provider (articles 9 
and 10).26
International Chamber of Commerce
2.34 The International Chamber of Commerce produced the first version of 
a set of guidelines entitled ‘General Usage for International Digitally Ensured 
Commerce’ (GUIDEC) on 6 November 1997. This was revised in October 2001. 
The introduction to the first version of the Guide sets out one of the aims respecting electronic signatures:
The GUIDEC aims to draw together the key elements involved in electronic commerce, to serve as an indicator of terms and an 
exposition of the general background to the issue. It also addresses one of the key problems in talking about electronically signed messages, in that they are not signed physically, but require the 
intervention of an electronic medium. This in turn alters the function of the signer, and introduces problems which a physical signature does not encounter, most especially the possibility of 
use of the medium by a third party. The GUIDEC therefore adopts 
a specific term, ‘ensure’, to describe what elsewhere is called a 
‘digital signature’ or ‘authentication’, in an attempt to remove the 
element of ambiguity inherent to other terms employed.
2.35 The revised version continued to expand on the use of digital signature technology, as indicated in the aims:
The aim of the GUIDEC
The GUIDEC framework attempts to allocate risk and liability equitably between transacting parties in accordance with existing business practice, and includes a clear description of the rights and 
responsibilities of subscribers, certifiers, and relying parties.
The aim of the GUIDEC is to enhance the ability of the international business community to execute trustworthy digital transactions utilizing legal principles that promote reliable digital authentication 
and certification practices.
The GUIDEC treats the core concepts, best practices and 
certification issues in the context of international commercial 
26 For a list of legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures that has 
been adopted or influenced by the principles on which the Model Law is based, see http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2001Model_status.html.
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law and practice. In so doing, the document assumes practices in which transacting parties are expert commercial actors, operating 
under the lex mercatoria. The document does not attempt to 
define rights and responsibilities for transactions involving 
consumers. Nor is it intended to outline practices for transactions in which overriding national or other public interests may demand additional transactional security, such as notarial or other public intervention, although many notarial principles are enshrined 
in the document. In this regard, it is also important to note that 
the GUIDEC does not attempt to set out rules for certification of 
information relating to authority, legal competence, etc., which 
notaries are often called upon to certify.
Although the GUIDEC is organized primarily as an outline for parties 
involved in public key based systems (i.e. digital signatures), the fact that it draws upon existing law means most of its principles 
will apply for other technologies.
2.36 The guidance, which has no legal force, sets out some best practices that 
might be considered when deciding to form contracts electronically. However, in 
the introduction to the second version, the main objective is set out in part I(1) as follows: 
The principal [sic] objective of the GUIDEC is to establish a general framework for the authentication of digital messages, based upon 
existing law and practice in different legal systems. In so doing, the 
GUIDEC provides a detailed explanation of principles, particularly as they relate to information system security issues, public key 
cryptographic techniques and emerging biometric capabilities. It also provides succinct standard practices or recommendations relating to secure authentication and processing of digital 
information.
2.37 The assumptions that underpin the Guide are set out in part III:The movement to open network communications systems, such as 
the Internet, poses significant challenges to the implementation 
of a global electronic trading system. Among the most significant barriers to global electronic commerce over open networks are 
those pertaining to the security of the information involved (i.e. 
its integrity, availability and confidentiality). The application of security and reduction of the risk of fraud and unauthorized access is vital to the growth of the number and volume of international 
commercial transactions over networked computers.Appropriate information security enables a level of trust and 
confidence to be present in the transfer of information between 
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parties. Industry recognizes the need for a reliable framework for identifying and certifying parties to a transaction and 
authenticating the transaction itself.
2.38 It is interesting to note that the security of information has become 
paramount. It is as if the security of information has never been relevant, such as when contracts were formed by using the latest technologies, such as telegram, 
telex and facsimile transmissions. Part IV of the Guide traverses the UNCITRAL model laws, the now repealed European Union Directive on electronic signatures, the 1998 OECD Ottawa Ministerial Declaration, and the United States legislation, 
the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (Public Law 106-
229). Parts V to VIII deal with the broad principles of electronic contracting, and 
parts IX and X deal with best practices, comprising authenticating a message and 
certification respectively.
2.39 The provisions of part IX respecting the appropriate practice when 
authenticating a message are discussed within the confines of a digital 
signature. No other means of proving intent seems to be considered. Item 4 
provides, ‘A signatory must authenticate a message by a means appropriate 
under the circumstances’ (bold in the original). First, it is to be noted that the guidance issued under the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts has ameliorated the requirement 
that a court need to consider the reliability test. Second, it is most unusual for a person signing a message or communication to be required to authenticate a 
message. Authentication was not required with telegrams, so it is to be wondered 
why it is necessary in the digital environment. In the comment on ‘clarification’, 
to this point, the word ‘must’ is amplified:
‘must’: The consequence of a failure to authenticate a message 
properly is that the message may be disregarded. In general commercial practice and unless otherwise agreed, a message may be ignored if the manner of authenticating it either contravenes an agreement by the parties, is not suited to impart the legal 
efficacy intended by the parties for the message, or if reliance on the message as authenticated would not be reasonable under the 
circumstances.
2.40 Even before the advent of the internet, contracts would be formed 
between business and individuals and business at a distance. The most striking example is that of contracts conducted by way of the post: such issues were commonplace two hundred years before the internet, and it is to be wondered why businesses need such guidance when they have been dealing with such 
issues for such a long period of time. Further evidence of the reliance on digital signatures and the public key infrastructure is manifest in the provisions of 
part X. Paragraph 1 discusses the effect of a certificate issued by a certification authority:
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A person may rely on a valid certificate as accurately representing the fact or facts set forth in it, if the person has no notice that 
the certifier has failed to satisfy a material requirement of 
authenticated message practice. (Bold in the original)
2.41 This statement is bold indeed, and is predicated, as pointed out in the 
commentary, on the proposition that the parties ‘are acting in good faith and 
without deception or negligence in conducting their business’. This statement on its own undermines the entire rationale of the reason for implementing 
the Guide, because if the parties are known to each other and recognize the 
communications sent between each other, there is no need for a Guide and no need for either to have digital signatures: the email address alone, together with 
the content, will suffice (as it does in reality) to provide sufficient evidence that 
the authenticity of the communications is not in doubt.27
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts
2.42 This United Nations Convention was adopted in the 53rd plenary meeting 
of the UN on 23 November 2005. It was open for signature by all states from 16 
January 2006, and 18 states had signed the Convention by 16 January 2008. The 
development of the Convention was based on the UN resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, which established the Commission on International Trade 
Law with the mandate to undertake the harmonization and unification of the law of international trade, and a decision in the 34th session in 2001 to prepare an international instrument dealing with issues of electronic contracting, which also aimed at removing obstacles to electronic commerce in existing uniform law 
conventions and trade agreements. Working Group IV (Electronic Commerce) 
was requested to prepare a draft Convention. In summary, the Convention covers the following, and is only relevant between commercial entities:
(i) Contracts between parties whose places of business are in different states, excluding contracts for personal, family or 
household purposes, amongst other forms of contract (Articles 1 
and 2).
(ii) Parties may exclude the application of the Convention or 
derogate or vary the effect of any of its provisions (Article 3).
(iii) Location and information requirements (Articles 6 and 7).
(iv) Requirements to recognise contracts in electronic format and to recognize various requirements of form, including methods of 
27 For a practical examples of where businesses in Poland would not use digital signatures, 
see P. Krawczyk, ‘When the EU qualified electronic signature becomes an information 
services preventer’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), 7–18.
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identifying the parties and indicate intention (Articles 8 and 9).
(v) The technical issues relating to the formation of contract are 
covered by Articles 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
Signature provisions
2.43 Article 9(3) sets out the provisions for a signature, incorporating and extending the provisions of the Model Laws, introducing an abstract reliability 
test (the word ‘signature’ is not defined):28
3. Where the law requires that a communication or a contract should be signed by a party, or provides consequences for the absence of a signature, that requirement is met in relation to an electronic communication if:
(a) A method is used to identify the party and to indicate that 
party’s intention in respect of the information contained in the electronic communication; and
(b) The method used is either:
(i) As reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic communication was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement; or
(ii) Proven in fact to have fulfilled the functions 
described in subparagraph (a) above, by itself or 
together with further evidence.
2.44 It can be observed that article 9(3) changes the emphasis in respect 
to electronic signatures in comparison to the provisions in the Model Laws. 
Weight is given to the reliability of the method (‘method’ is not defined) used to sign a document, the purpose for which the communication is generated or communicated, and, more importantly, whether the method of signature used 
actually fulfilled the functions, either on its own, or if taken together with 
further evidence. The provisions of article 9(3) indicate that a significant change 
has taken place, away from the approaches taken in the Model Laws. This new approach allows for any form of electronic signature to be used, in keeping with 
the decisions made by judges across the globe before this Convention was agreed. 
The commentary to the Convention reflects this change in view.29
28 The text is very similar to that of s10(1)(a) and (b) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 
(Cth) of Australia.29 United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International 
Contracts (Including explanatory notes by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the United 
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts) 
(New York: United Nations, 2007), paragraphs 147–64.
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2.45 Of note are the comments respecting the reliability of the signature 
method. If not understood, the abstract reliability test could increase the risks of invalidity after the event, where the form of signature had never posed problems 
of authentication previously. The emphasis is on assessing the evidence when 
considering the methods used under article (9)(3)(a). The explanatory notes highlight the nature of the technical evidence in place to validate a particular 
signature. For instance, paragraph 162 provides as follows:
162. Legal, technical and commercial factors that may be taken into account in determining whether the method used under 
paragraph 3 (a) is appropriate, include the following: (a) the sophistication of the equipment used by each of the parties; 
(b) the nature of their trade activity; (c) the frequency at which 
commercial transactions take place between the parties; (d) the 
kind and size of the transaction; (e) the function of signature requirements in a given statutory and regulatory environment; 
(f) the capability of communication systems; (g) compliance 
with authentication procedures set forth by intermediaries; (h) the range of authentication procedures made available by any 
intermediary; (i) compliance with trade customs and practice; 
(j) the existence of insurance coverage mechanisms against 
unauthorized communications; (k) the importance and the value of the information contained in the electronic communication; 
(l) the availability of alternative methods of identification and 
the cost of implementation; (m) the degree of acceptance or non-
acceptance of the method of identification in the relevant industry 
or field both at the time the method was agreed upon and the time 
when the electronic communication was communicated; and (n) 
any other relevant factor.
2.46 The criteria is, according to the commentary at paragraph 163, proposed… with a view to ensuring the correct interpretation of the principle 
of functional equivalence in respect of electronic signatures. The 
‘reliability test’, which appears also in article 7, paragraph 1 (b), of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, reminds courts of the need to take into account factors other than technology, such as the purpose for which the electronic communication was generated or communicated, or a relevant agreement of the parties, in ascertaining whether the electronic signature used was 
sufficient to identify the signatory.
2.47 Depending on the rules relating to admissibility, if the authenticity of the document is not in dispute between the parties, the method by which the document is generated is irrelevant: if there is a dispute, the parties generally 
define the issues to be adjudicated, and unless a party raises the issue of the 
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authenticity of the document, it does not necessarily follow that the court will 
raise the issue on its own initiative. The practical problem relating to this issue 
was raised in the context of the Australian Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) in the case of Getup Ltd v. Electoral Commissioner,30 which is discussed elsewhere 
in this text.
2.48 Further guidance is given in paragraph 164 in an attempt to pre-empt a party from using the proposed test to prevent the signature from being admitted, even though there is no dispute that the communication was sent and received and the communication signed:
164. However, UNCITRAL considered that the Convention should 
not allow a party to invoke the ‘reliability test’ to repudiate its signature in cases where the actual identity of the party and 
its actual intention could be proved. The requirement that an 
electronic signature needs to be ‘as reliable as appropriate’ should not lead a court or trier of fact to invalidate the entire contract on the ground that the electronic signature was not appropriately reliable if there is no dispute about the identity of the person signing or the fact of signing, that is, no question as to 
authenticity of the electronic signature. Such a result would be particularly unfortunate, as it would allow a party to a transaction in which a signature was required to try to escape its obligations 
by denying that its signature (or the other party’s signature) was valid—not on the ground that the purported signer did not sign, or that the document it signed had been altered, but only on the 
ground that the method of signature employed was not ‘as reliable 
as appropriate’ in the circumstances. In order to avoid these 
situations, paragraph 3 (b)(ii) validates a signature method—regardless of its reliability in principle—whenever the method 
used is proven in fact to have identified the signatory and indicated 
the signatory’s intention in respect of the information contained in 
the electronic communication.
2.49 This guidance is essential to understand and bring to the attention of the parties in the event of a dispute, otherwise it is conceivable that lawyers may 
fail to comprehend the full import of the commentary. This is of the utmost importance, because many states have enacted legislation incorporating the 
provisions of article 9(3) in full. However, in so doing, the provisions of the 
article are taken out of context. The legislation applies to all forms of electronic 
signature between any party, and not just commercial entities.
2.50 The provision of the abstract reliability test merits further observations. 
John D. Gregory provided four reasons as to why he was sceptical of any legal 
30 [2010] FCA 869 (13 August 2010); see also J. Forder, ‘The inadequate legislative response 
to e-signatures’, Computer Law & Security Review, 26 (2010), 418–26, at 3.3.
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requirement that electronic signatures must be as reliable as appropriate in the circumstances:31
The first reason for not having such a rule is that there is no such 
rule for handwritten signatures (or any of the other marks on paper 
that may constitute a signature at law). The person relying on a signature always takes the risk that the signature is not genuine, so 
he or she acts accordingly. That is to say, the relying party evaluates the risk that the signature is not genuine and protects himself or 
herself or itself accordingly.…These precautions and judgments are not a matter of law but a 
matter of prudence. The law applicable to electronic signatures 
can be the same.…Second, the common law does not impose any form requirement on signatures – which means it is arguable that an electronic 
signature is a good signature without any law reform.…Third, … I would submit that the law does not add any value to this 
lack of familiarity with an ‘appropriate reliability’ test. Such a test merely transfers the prudential judgment from the relying party to a judge – who may be no more competent to make it, though 
he or she may have the advantage of expert evidence. It may be a 
complicated decision. …Fourth, a reliability requirement risks becoming a trap for the 
unwary, or a potential loophole for the unscrupulous.…In short, the reliability test does not deal with what parties should reasonably be expected to ascertain – who signed what for what 
purpose? It adds an unforeseeable element, an optional escape method, for attacking a signature with respect to which all relevant 
questions are answered. And it does not help answer any of those 
questions independently.
2.51 As previously mentioned, the form of the signature is not only irrelevant; 
it does not have a legal effect.
31 J. D. Gregory, ‘Must e-signatures be reliable?’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 10 (2013), 67–70.
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 3, ‘The practical issues in using electronic signatures in different jurisdictions’, pp. 
115–47.
3The practical issues in using electronic signatures in different jurisdictions
3.1 The framework within which legislation is drafted invariably depends 
on the decisions made by politicians. While the existence of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and Model Law on Electronic Signatures have acted as a guide for many states when enacting legislation, other factors help shape the formation of legislation, such as the approach taken regionally by the European Union in the form of the now repealed Directive on electronic 
signatures.1 In early reports published by the Internet Law and Policy Forum,2 it was suggested it is possible for there to be a tension between legislation that seeks to be technologically neutral and the establishment of legal rules to provide 
for electronic authentication. The tension is illustrated in the judicial reaction to 
electronic signatures. This is because electronic signatures do not appear to be 
well understood in some jurisdictions (by lawyers or judges), and in what might 
be called civil law jurisdictions (although not exclusively), the emphasis has been 
on the required use of digital signatures.3 Of interest, a number of countries 
have decided to specifically exclude some forms of electronic signature: that is, 
signatures by facsimile or by way of a scanning device.4
Approaches to legislation
3.2 There are three broad approaches to legislating for electronic signatures: 
the prescriptive approach, minimalist approach and two-tier approach.
1 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L13, 19.01.2000, p.12.
2 T. F. Rebel, O. Darge and W. Koenig, Approaches of digital signature legislation (Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science 1402, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 1998), pp. 39–51; S. Baker and M. 
Yeo ‘Survey of international electronic and digital signature initiatives’, available online at 
http://www.ilpf.org/groups/survey.htm; C. Kuner, R. Barcelo, S. Baker and E. Greenwald, 
‘An analysis of international electronic and digital signature implementation initiatives a 
study prepared for the internet law & policy forum’ (2000), available online at http://www.
ilpf.org/groups/analysis_IEDSII.htm; ‘Promoting confidence in electronic commerce: legal 
issues on international use of electronic authentication and signature methods’ (Vienna: 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 2009), pp. 36–43, 63–103.
3 For discussions relating to Belgium and Italy, see J. Vandendriessche, ‘Hybrid signatures 
under Belgian law’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012), pp. 
79–80; A. Merone, ‘Electronic signatures in Italian law’, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review, 11 (2014), pp. 85–99.
4 Grenada: Electronic Transactions Act, 2008, s4; Jamaica: Electronic Transactions Act, 
2006, s2; Saint Lucia: Electronic Transactions Act 2007, s2.
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The prescriptive approach
3.3 A number of jurisdictions have established legislation that is prescriptive 
in nature. This means that a particular type of technology (encryption by way 
of digital signatures) is the method adopted to replace a manuscript signature 
in the digital environment. This approach is also referred to as the ‘functional 
equivalent concept’. For the sake of clarity, the term ‘prescriptive approach’ is used, because it is a more accurate description of the approach taken by 
some states. This approach to legislation generally only provides that a digital signature can be acceptable as a form of electronic signature to the exclusion 
of all forms of electronic signature. However, this approach is ambiguous, because it neither provides for legal certainty nor for the further development 
of e-commerce, as claimed in the recitals of some legislation. Befuddled by technicians, many politicians have been misled into the false premise that only digital signatures can be the legal equivalent of a manuscript signature, mainly because of the incorrect assurances that digital signatures are secure and safe 
from interference. Attitudes change, and the Indian Information Technology Act 2000 only provided for digital signatures, but the Act has now been amended, and 
India can now be considered to have adopted the two-tier approach.5 Some of the legislation listed has been drafted in such a way that it is sometimes ambiguous 
whether other forms of electronic signature may be acceptable. The first law passed in the Russian Federation6 only appeared to provide for ‘electronic digital 
signatures’, although other forms of signature also appeared to be acceptable by 
agreement, as set out in the relevant Russian Code.7 The new law now explicitly provides for other forms of electronic signature, thus placing the law into the 
two-tier approach. Although there is an emphasis on the digital signature as the functional equivalent of a manuscript signature in the laws taking this approach, the legislation sometimes permits the use of other forms of electronic signature, although it is not always clear whether other forms of electronic signature 
would have the same effect in law. The Electronic Transactions Act 2007 of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines illustrates this confusion. This legislation adopts 
the prescriptive approach with a little latitude: s22(4) provides that parties may agree to use any method of electronic signature, although where no particular 
method is agreed, s22(4) provides that the only form of signature that has legal 
force is the digital signature.
3.4 An explicit example of a law providing for the specific type of electronic signature as a digital equivalent of the manuscript signature is s62 of the Digital 
Signature Act 1997 of Malaysia. The positions is as follows:
5 Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008.
6 Federal Law No. 63-FZ on electronic signatures, adopted by the State Duma on 25 March 2011 and approved by the Federation Council approved on 30 March 2011, which repealed 
Federal Law No. 1-FZ on Electronic Digital Signature.
7 V. Naumov and T. Nikiforova, ‘Electronic signatures in Russian law’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 2 (2005), pp. 62–6.
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PART V
EFFECT OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE
62. (1) Where a rule of law requires a signature or provides for certain consequences in the absence of a signature, that 
rule shall be satisfied by a digital signature where –
(a) that digital signature is verified by reference to the 
public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed 
certification authority;
(b) that digital signature was affixed by the signer with the intention of signing the message; and
(c) the recipient has no knowledge or notice that the signer –
(i) has breached a duty as a subscriber; or
(ii) does not rightfully hold the private key used to 
affix the digital signature.
(2) Notwithstanding any written law to the contrary –
(a) a document signed with a digital signature in accordance with this Act shall be as legally binding as a document 
signed with a handwritten signature, an affixed thumb-print or any other mark; and
(b) a digital signature created in accordance with this Act 
shall be deemed to be a legally binding signature.
3.5 In comparison, article 14 of the Electronic Transactions Law of Saudi Arabia has the same effect, but the language used is not as explicit:
Article (14):
1. If a signature is required for any document or contract or 
the like, such requirement shall be deemed satisfied by an 
electronic signature generated in accordance with this Law. The electronic signature shall be equal to a handwritten 
signature, having the same legal effects.
2. Any person generating an electronic signature shall do so in accordance with the provisions of this Law and the 
conditions, requirements and specifications set by the Regulations, and shall take into consideration the following:
a. Take necessary precautions to prevent unlawful use of signature generating data or the personal 
equipment related thereto. The Regulations shall 
specify such precautions.
b. Notify the certification service provider of any unauthorized use of his signature in accordance 
with the procedures specified in the Regulations.
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3. If an electronic signature is provided in any legal procedure, the following shall be deemed valid, unless proven otherwise or the concerned parties agree to the contrary:
a. The electronic signature is the signature of the 
person identified in the relevant digital certificate.
b. The electronic signature was provided by the 
person identified in the relevant digital certificate 
for the purpose specified therein.
c. The electronic transaction has not been altered 
since the electronic signature was affixed thereto.
4. If an electronic signature does not satisfy the conditions and requirements set forth in this Law and the Regulations, 
the presumed validity established in paragraph (3) of this Article shall not apply to said signature nor to the electronic 
transaction associated therewith.
5. Any person relying on an electronic signature of another person shall exercise due diligence in verifying the authenticity of the signature, using relevant electronic 
signature verification data in accordance with the 
procedures set forth by the Regulations.
3.6 Although the Ley De Firma Digital Nº 25.506 passed by Argentina in 20018 is more accurately described as adopting the two-tier approach, nevertheless a digital signature is considered to be the equivalent of a manuscript signature, as provided by article 3:ARTICULO 3º – Del requerimiento de firma. Cuando la ley requiera 
una firma manuscrita, esa exigencia también queda satisfecha por 
una firma digital. Este principio es aplicable a los casos en que la 
ley establece la obligación de firmar o prescribe consecuencias 
para su ausencia.
ARTICLE 3. – On the requirement of signature. When the law requires a handwritten signature, this requirement is also met by 
a digital signature. This principle is applicable to those cases in which the law establishes the obligation of signing or prescribes 
consequences for the absence of a signature.
3.7 As with the approach taken by Argentina, some jurisdictions adopting the two-tier approach have a tendency to require the use of digital signatures in 
specific situations.
8 The English translation is from the Firma Digital website at http://www.pki.gov.ar.
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The minimalist approach
3.8 The minimalist approach to electronic signature legislation aims to be 
technologically neutral in determining what an electronic signature can be. The rationale is set out with clarity by the report of the expert group appointed by 
the Attorney General of Australia to report on a proposed legal framework for 
electronic commerce. The expert group conducted a wide-ranging survey of the laws that had been or were to be enacted, and concluded that it was appropriate not to take a prescriptive approach towards the legal recognition of electronic signatures for a number of reasons:A legislative electronic signature regime is not requiredConsideration of the legal issues raised by electronic commerce is sometimes complicated by the discussion of electronic signatures, a term which is used to refer to a range of technologies intended to ensure the security and certainty of electronic commerce, and 
in particular one of these technologies, namely digital signatures. Many jurisdictions overseas have enacted or drafted legislation 
to facilitate the use of electronic signatures. We have analysed a number of these enacted or proposed legislative regimes in 
Chapter 3. These legislative regimes go beyond ensuring the legal effect of electronic signatures and their functional equivalence 
with paper based signatures.It is our view that the enactment of legislation which creates a detailed legislative regime for electronic signatures needs to be 
considered with caution. There is the risk, particularly given the lack of any internationally uniform legislative approach, that an inappropriate legislative regime may be adopted without regard 
to market-oriented solutions. Given the pace of technological development and change in this area, it is more appropriate for the market to determine issues other than legal effect, such as the 
levels of security and reliability required for electronic signatures. Accordingly, we have recommended that legislation should deal 
simply with the legal effect of electronic signatures. While a number of articles in the Model Law deal with electronic signature issues that go beyond legal effect, it is our view that these issues should be left 
to the existing law in Australia. Whether the existing Australian law deals with these issues adequately or not, the same situation should 
apply to both paper based commerce and electronic commerce. At this stage we are not persuaded of the need to give a legislative advantage to electronic commerce not available to traditional means 
of communication. If a clear need to deal with these issues appears 
in the future the recommended legislation can be amended.9
9 ‘Electronic commerce: building the legal framework’, report of the electronic commerce 
expert group to the Attorney General 31 March 1998 Executive Summary.
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3.9 The Australian government followed the recommendations of the expert 
group and adopted article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. This decision was made on the premise that there is no internationally uniform legislative approach to this issue, and it is important merely to deal with the 
legal effect of electronic signatures. By taking this approach, the Australian government decided to allow the market to determine the issues that do not 
have a legal effect, such as levels of security and reliability. The view taken by the 
expert group is reflected in the provisions of s10 of the Electronic Transactions 
Act 1999 (Cth) of the Commonwealth of Australia:10 SignatureRequirement for signature
(1) If, under a law of the Commonwealth, the signature of a person is required, that requirement is taken to have been met in relation to an electronic communication if:
(a) in all cases—a method is used to identify the 
person and to indicate the person’s approval of the information communicated; and
(b) in all cases—having regard to all the relevant circumstances at the time the method was used, the method was as reliable as was appropriate for the purposes for which the information was communicated; and
(c) if the signature is required to be given to a Commonwealth entity, or to a person acting on behalf of a Commonwealth entity, and the entity requires that the method used as mentioned in 
paragraph (a) be in accordance with particular 
information technology requirements—the entity’s requirement has been met; and
(d) if the signature is required to be given to a person who is neither a Commonwealth entity nor a person acting on behalf of a Commonwealth entity—the person to whom the signature is required to be given consents to that requirement being met by way of 
the use of the method mentioned in paragraph (a).
3.10 No form of electronic signature is set out. The focus is on the method used to communicate intention and to ensure it is appropriate for the purposes 
of the information. Hence an ‘I accept’ icon can be equally as effective when used to indicate the agreement for the purchase of goods or services from a trader operating a website, as the complexity associated with the use of a digital 
signature. The important issue is whether the intent is manifest and the method 
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is appropriate to the particular transaction. The case of Faulks v. Cameron10 is interesting from the perspective of whether the method used is appropriate 
to the particular transaction. In this case, involving a separation between two people, there was an exchange of emails, and the plaintiff successfully sought 
to submit that the email correspondence constituted a separation agreement. Inevitably whether the method is appropriate seems to be somewhat irrelevant, given the propensity of individuals to use whatever form of communication is available, without thought to the legal consequences of the actual method of communication: it was ever thus, and seems somewhat unusual that legislators 
should begin to impose specific technical requirements (such as the use of 
a digital signature) in the internet age, especially as such detailed technical 
requirements were not imposed in the age of the telegram.
3.11 The Uniform Law Conference of Canada prepared two important documents that have helped shape legislation in Canada, the Uniform Electronic 
Evidence Act and the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act. The primary focus of the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act is to replace the concept of an original document with the proof of the reliability of a system instead of the reliability of an individual record, and using standards to demonstrate the reliability of a 
system.11 The Uniform Electronic Commerce Act provides a single, media neutral, 
definition of an electronic signature in s1(b):
(b) “electronic signature” means information in electronic form that a person has created or adopted in order to sign a document 
and that is in, attached to or associated with the document.
3.12 Other examples of clauses adopting the minimalist approach include 
Guernsey, for which see s22(1):12
“signature in electronic form” means a signature wholly or partly in electronic form attached to or logically associated with information in electronic or non-electronic form, and references to a signature being in electronic form shall be construed accordingly
3.13 And the United States of America, in s106(5):13
(5) ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE. – The term “electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed 
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
10 [2004] 32 Fam LR 417; [2004] NTSC 61.11 It is difficult to imagine how the submission of a standard to prove a fact in a court of 
law is helpful. For a discussion, see S. Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence, (3rd edn., London: 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), ch. 4.12 Electronic Transactions (Guernsey) Law, 2000.13 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7003.
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3.14 The definition of an electronic signature permits any format of electronic 
signature to be acceptable, and this is reflected in the case law discussed 
elsewhere in this text, although in the state of New York, an insurer is free to reject electronic signatures and insist upon the use of a manuscript signature 
when making a claim.14
The two-tier approach
3.15 The United Nations adopted the two-tier approach with the two 
Models Laws. Article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce provides for an electronic signature that relates to the form such a signatures takes and whether it is appropriate in the circumstances, and the Model Law on Electronic Signatures has taken one step further by incorporating the provisions of article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and adding a provision relating to the 
reliability of a signature, indicating in article 6(3) the preference for the digital signature:Article 6 Compliance with a requirement for a signature
1. Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the 
light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
2. Paragraph 1 applies whether the requirement referred to therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides 
consequences for the absence of a signature.
3. An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory and of no other person;
(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is detectable; and
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that information 
after the time of signing is detectable.
4. Paragraph 3 does not limit the ability of any person:
14 DWP Pain Free Medical P.C. v. Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co., 14 Misc.3d 800, 831 N.Y.S.2d 
849.
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(a) To establish in any other way, for the purpose of satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1, the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b) To adduce evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic 
signature.
3.16 The provision of certainty as to the legal effect that follows the use of an electronic signature is left for the enacting state, although the Model Law seeks to expressly establish the legal effects that will result where the technical 
characteristics set out in article 6(3)(a) to (d) apply, and which a digital signature 
is capable of conforming to.
3.17 The European Union Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC15 is one such approach, in which the Regulation distinguishes between an electronic signature, advanced electronic signature, 
and qualified electronic signature. The two-tier approach has also been adopted 
by Singapore in the Electronic Transactions Act Ch 88.16 This legislation also 
differentiates between electronic signatures and secure electronic signatures. The Act provides that an electronic signature can be proved in any manner, as provided for in the amended version of s8, closely following article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce:
8. Where a rule of law requires a signature, or provides for certain consequences if a document or a record is not signed, that 
requirement is satisfied in relation to an electronic record if —
(a) a method is used to identify the person and to indicate 
that person’s intention in respect of the information contained in the electronic record; and
(b) the method used is either —
(i) as reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic record was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement; or
(ii) proven in fact to have fulfilled the functions 
described in paragraph (a), by itself or together with 
further evidence.
3.18 This amended definition includes the abstract reliability test in s8(b)
(i), but also overrides the test in s8(b)(ii) where it is proven that the form of 
electronic signature has actually fulfilled the functions, regardless of the test. 
15 OJ L257, 28.8.2014, p. 73–114.16 This act repeals the Electronic Transactions Act Ch 16 of 2010, which in turn repealed the 
Electronic Transactions Act 1998.
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The removal of the word ‘symbol’ and substitution of the word ‘method’ does not alter the meaning, thus the type of electronic signature can extend to any form of electronic data, as indicated by the decision of Prakash J in SM Integrated 
Transware Ltd v. Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd with respect to the name forming 
part of an email address.17 The definition of a secure electronic signature in s18, in contrast, very similar to the advanced electronic signature set out in article 
2(2) of the repealed European Union Directive on electronic signatures.
3.19 China has also adopted the two-tier approach in the Electronic Signatures 
Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2015.18 Article 2 provides a definition of electronic signature and data message, both of which are widely drafted:
“Electronic signature” in this law means data in electronic form in or 
affixed to a data message, which may be used to identify the signatory 
in relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory’s 
approval of the information contained in the data message.
“Data message” means information generated, sent, received or 
stored by electronic, optical, magnetic or similar means.
3.20 Confusingly, article 3 provides that the parties are free to determine whether to use electronic signatures in civil activities, which implies that the type of signature referred to in article 2 is a digital signature, although digital 
signatures are clearly referred to in chapter 3 article 13, even if the word ‘digital’ is not used:Article 13: An electronic signature is deemed to be a reliable electronic signature if the following requirements are met:
(1) The signature creation data, when used to an electronic signature, is linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(2) The signature creation data is under the control of the signatory and of no other person when signing;
(3) Any alteration to an electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is detectable;
(4) Any alteration to the content or form of a data message, 
made after the time of signing, is detectable.
3.21 Although article 14 provides that ‘The reliable electronic signature has 
the same legal effect as the hand-written signature or seal’, nevertheless this 
17 [2005] 2 SLR 651, [2005] SGHC 58.18 Order No. 24 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated on and 
effective since 4 April 2015, amending the 2004 law. M. Wang and M. Wang, ‘Introduction 
to the Electronic Signatures Law of the People’s Republic of China’ together with an 
unofficial translation, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 2 (200), 
79–85; C. Cao, ‘A note to China’s new law on electronic signatures’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 13 (forthcoming 2016).
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approach has not prevented judges concluding that data sent by way of text messages between mobile telephones is capable of being admitted into evidence, as in Yang Chunning v. Han Ying.19
Digital signature presumptions
3.22 Where a law adopts the aim of substituting an electronic signature as a functional equivalent of a manuscript signature, that is, the digital signature, a 
number of presumptions may be included in the legislation. Illustrated below are some of the presumptions set out in various laws, illustrating the need to take care to fully understand the provisions of individual laws when entering or 
advising on the validity of electronic signatures between jurisdictions. Perhaps the law in Puerto Rico sums up the position:20
§ 8703a. Challengeable assumptionsA valid electronic signature generates the following challengeable assumptions:
(a) There is the challengeable assumption that the 
document has not been modified from the time it had been signed, if it is possible to use a device to verify the electronic signature and the contents of an electronic document that is able to successfully corroborate the signature and the 
contents thereof.
(b) There is the challengeable assumption that the electronic signature belongs to the signer who holds the 
electronic signature certificate containing the data for the 
verification of the corresponding signature.
(c) There is the challengeable assumption that the electronic signature was added by the signer to an electronic document 
with the intent to sign the same.
(d) There is the challengeable assumption that the 
information contained in an electronic signature certificate 
in effect is correct.
Default form of signature
3.23 Of interest are the provisions set out in s13(1) of the South Africa 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 and s6(1) of the 
19 (2005) hai min chu zi NO.4670, Beijing Hai Dian District People’s Court. For a translation of this case with a commentary, see Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 
5 (2008), pp. 103–5.20 Puerto Rico Ley de Firmas Electrónicas de Puerto Rico, Ley número 359 de 16 de 
Septiembre 2004 (Electronic Signature Act 359/2004); 3 L.P.R.A. § 8701.
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Zambia Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2009. Both are identical, and relate to the legal position where a law requires a signature, but 
where no particular type of signature is specified in the legislation. The default position is as follows:
13. (1) Where the signature of a person is required by law and such law does not specify the type of signature, that requirement in relation to a data message is met only if an advanced electronic 
signature is used.
Validity of the signature
3.24 In some jurisdictions a digital signature is only valid when certain criteria 
are met, including that the certificate that identifies the owner of the private key 
was issued or recognized by a certification authority licensed by the government, 
as provided by article 9 of the Argentinean Ley De Firma Digital Nº 25.506:ARTICULO 9º – Validez. Una firma digital es válida si cumple con los siguientes requisitos:
a) Haber sido creada durante el período de vigencia del certificado 
digital válido del firmante;
b) Ser debidamente verificada por la referencia a los datos de 
verificación de firma digital indicados en dicho certificado según 
el procedimiento de verificación correspondiente;
c) Que dicho certificado haya sido emitido o reconocido, según el 
artículo 16 de la presente, por un certificador licenciado.
ARTICLE 9. – Validity. A digital signature is valid if it complies with the following requirements:
a) That it was created during the period of time in which the 
signing party’s digital certificate was valid;
b) That it has been duly verified by reference to the digital 
signature verification data indicated in this certificate according to 
the corresponding verification procedure;
c) That such certificate was issued or recognized, according to 
article 16 of the present law, by a licensed certification authority.
3.25 In China, a ‘reliable’ electronic signature has the same legal effect as a manuscript signature or a seal in accordance with the provisions of article 14 of 
the Electronic Signatures Law of the People’s Republic of China of 2015, although 
the provisions of article 13 will also have to be met.
3.26 In addition to considering practical matters, such as obtaining evidence of the application of electronic signatures in cross-border transactions, it is necessary to pay careful attention to the legislation and regulations surrounding 
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digital signatures in the jurisdictions in which the parties intend to exchange 
documents or contracts.
Integrity of the digital signature
3.27 Article 8 of the Argentine Ley De Firma Digital Nº 25.506 establishes 
a presumption that the verification procedures applied to a digital signature 
demonstrate it has not been modified:
ARTICULO 8º – Presunción de integridad. Si el resultado de un procedimiento de verificación de una firma digital aplicado a un documento digital es verdadero, se presume, salvo prueba en 
contrario, que este documento digital no ha sido modificado desde 
el momento de su firma.
ARTICLE 8. – Integrity presumption. If the result of the verification procedure of a digital signature applied to a digital document is 
true, it is presumed, unless otherwise specified, that this digital 
document has not been modified as from the moment it was signed.
Presumption the user affixed the digital signature
3.28 Some legislation tends to avoid setting the presumptions relating to an electronic signature, especially of a digital signature, although a number of countries have provided that a message is to be attributed to the sender in given circumstances, and Israel has made such a presumption explicit in article 3 of Electronic Signature Law, 5761 – 2001:
3. An electronic message signed with a secure electronic signature is admissible in any legal procedure, and will constitute prima-facie evidence that:
(1) the signature is that of the owner of the signing device;
(2) the electronic message is that which was signed by the owner 
of the signing device.
3.29 By article 3 of the Japanese Law Concerning Electronic Signatures and 
Certification Services (Law No.102 of 2000), a record shall be genuinely complete when signed by the sender:Chapter 2: Presumption of the authenticity of an electro-magnetic recordArticle 3:An electro-magnetic record which is made in order to express 
information (with the exception of one drawn by a public official 
in the exercise of his official functions) shall be presumed to be 
authentic if an electronic signature (limited to those that, if based 
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on the proper control of the codes and objects necessary to 
perform the signature, only that person can substantially perform) is performed by the principal in relation to information recorded 
in the electro-magnetic record.21
3.30 This provision highlights the need for a user to control their private key very carefully, as well as provide for the proper security of their computer to 
prevent a signature from being misused. In Argentina, any person using a digital signature will be presumed to have sent it, even where it is sent automatically, 
according to article 10 of the Argentine Ley De Firma Digital Nº 25.506:
ARTICULO 10. – Remitente. Presunción. Cuando un documento digital 
sea enviado en forma automática por un dispositivo programado 
y lleve la firma digital del remitente se presumirá, salvo prueba en 
contrario, que el documento firmado proviene del remitente.
ARTICLE 10. – Sender presumption. When a digital document is 
sent automatically by a programmed device and bears the sender’s 
digital signature it shall be presumed, unless otherwise specified, 
that the signed document was originated by the sender.
3.31 This position is also set out in the Electronic Transactions Order 2000 
of Brunei Darussalam, which has a two-tier model. The Electronic Transactions 
Order provides for electronic signatures, as defined in s2:
‘electronic signature’ means any letters, characters, numbers or other symbols in digital form attached to or logically associated with an electronic record, and executed or adopted with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic record;
3.32 An electronic signature is capable of satisfying a rule of law that requires a signature, as provided in s8:
Electronic signatures.
8. (1) Where any rule of law requires a signature, or provides for certain consequences if a document is not signed, an electronic 
signature satisfies that rule of law.
(2) An electronic signature may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a procedure existed by which it is necessary for a party, in order to proceed further with a transaction, to have executed a symbol or security procedure for the purpose of 
verifying that an electronic record is that of such party.
3.33 However, there is also provision for a secure electronic signature, as provided by s17 in Part V of the Order:
21 Taken from the translation available at http://www.meti.go.jp.
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Secure electronic signature
17. If, through the application of a prescribed security procedure or a commercially reasonable security procedure agreed to by the 
parties involved, it can be verified that all electronic signature was, at the time it was made —
(a) unique to the person using it;
(b) capable of identifying such person;
(c) created in a manner or using a means under the sole control of the person using it; and
(d) linked to the electronic record to which it relates in a manner such that if the record was changed the electronic signature would be invalidated, such signature shall be treated as a secure 
electronic signature.
3.34 The Order appears to distinguish between a secure electronic signature 
and a digital signature, because the term digital signature is defined in s2 and 
references are made to the effect of digital signatures in Part VI, although s18(4) 
provides that a secure electronic signature can comprise a digital signature. The importance of the secure electronic signature is revealed in the presumptions set out in s18:
Presumptions relating to secure electronic records and signatures.
18. (1) In any proceedings involving a secure electronic record, it shall be presumed, unless evidence to the contrary is adduced, that 
the secure electronic record has not been altered since the specific 
point in time to which the secure status relates.
(2) In any proceedings involving a secure electronic signature, it shall be presumed, unless evidence to the contrary is adduced, that —
(a) the secure electronic signature is the signature of the person with whom it correlates; and
(b) the secure electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the 
electronic record.
(3) In the absence of a secure electronic record or a secure electronic signature, nothing in this Part shall create any presumption relating to the authenticity and integrity of the electronic record 
or an electronic signature.
3.35 This clause demonstrates that the user of a secure electronic signature is 
presumed to have affixed the signature to any electronic data and that there is a 
direct link between the user and the signature.
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3.36 The Singapore Electronic Transactions Act Ch 88 also provides a presumption that the signature is that of the person with whom it is associated, 
and a further presumption that the person affixed their signature with the 
intention of signing or approving the document sent, as provided for in s19(2):
(2) In any proceedings involving a secure electronic signature, it shall be presumed, unless evidence to the contrary is adduced, that –
(a) the secure electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
(b) the secure electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the 
electronic record.
3.37 The nexus between the digital signature and the act of affixing it to a document or message is the subject of a rebuttable presumption in s9 of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Republic Act No 8792 of the Philippines:
Sec. 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. – In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that –
(a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic document knows or has notice of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic 
signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.
3.38 In this instance, it appears that the recipient may act upon receipt of an 
electronic document or message where an electronic signature has been affixed, 
whilst s9(b) implies that the recipient may be required to take action and thereby 
become a verifying party before relying on the signature. However, the provision is that a recipient only needs to take any action where they know or have notice of any defects or unreliability that would make it unreasonable to rely on the 
signature. The provision is not a mandatory requirement to authenticate the 
electronic signature. However, if the recipient were to rely on the signature to their detriment in circumstances that they should have been aware that they might not be able to trust the signature, then they will have the burden of proving 
its authenticity in accordance with the provisions of s11(b).
3.39 Article 6(3) of the Bahrain Legislative Decree No 28 of 2002 with respect to electronic transactions has a similar provision, although the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply to any other form of electronic signature:
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3. In any legal proceedings involving an electronic signature that 
is associated with an Accredited Certificate, it shall be presumed unless the parties have agreed otherwise or unless evidence to the contrary is adduced that:
(i) such electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates;
(ii) such electronic signature was affixed by that person to whom it correlates for the purpose of signing such electronic record;
(iii) the electronic record that is signed with such signature has not been altered since the time at which the electronic 
signature was affixed.
4. If the electronic signature is not made with the use of an 
Accredited Certificate, the presumption of an authenticity created under the provisions of the preceding Paragraph shall not be 
attached to the electronic signature or record.
3.40 The presumption that where a person obtains a digital signature, they are 
presumed to have affixed the signature, is a good example of the reversal of the 
burden of proof. Normally, the relying party must prove the signature was that 
of the signatory. Where a digital signature is used, the claimant can prove that a 
particular verification key serves to verify the signature, but all it demonstrates is 
that some corresponding signature key was used to make the signature. It does not 
prove the person whose key it was caused the signature to be affixed. By making it clear to the person obtaining a digital signature that they will have to prove they did not use their private key, the law puts an emphatic and clear duty on the signing 
party to put robust security measures in place to protect the private key. This means, in circumstances where a digital signature is used, that where the signatory 
claims they did not affix the signature to the document or communication, the signatory is, in effect, refusing to be bound by a promise because they claim a third party sent the communication or document without permission or authorization, which in turn means their defence is that they were either unable to provide for the 
proper security of their private key (bearing in mind the risks discussed elsewhere 
in this text, this would be a good defence), or they were negligent.22
Presumption of ownership
3.41 In article 7 of the Ley De Firma Digital Nº 25.506 of Argentina, it is 
presumed that a digital signature belongs to the holder of the certificate:
22 For the Russian banking cases and digital signatures, see O. I. Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of 
electronic digital signatures in banking relationships in the Russian Federation’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 51–7; A. Dolzhich, ‘Digital 
evidence and e-signature in the Russian Federation: a change in trend’, Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), pp. 181–3.
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ARTICULO 7º – Presunción de autoría. Se presume, salvo prueba en 
contrario, que toda firma digital pertenece al titular del certificado 
digital que permite la verificación de dicha firma.
ARTICLE 7. – Authorship presumption. Unless it is otherwise proved, every digital signature is presumed to belong to the holder 
of the digital certificate that permits the verification of the digital 
signature in question.
3.42 A similar presumption is also included in article 3 of the Israeli law:23
3. An electronic message signed with a secure electronic signature is admissible in any legal procedure, and will constitute prima-facie evidence that:
(1) the signature is that of the owner of the signing device;
(2) the electronic message is that which was signed by the 
owner of the signing device.
3.43 It is refreshing to observe that some politicians in some countries are 
willing to make the implicit explicit.
Certification authorities 
3.44 It is a matter of public policy whether a state sets up an implementation scheme to provide for a technical framework for electronic authentication, 
or permits a voluntary scheme to operate. A scheme may include some or all of the following: the provision of national and international standards for products and services relating to electronic authentication; the provision of a 
framework to regulate the supervision, accreditation and certification of some or 
all authentication products and services. Where such a framework is in place, it may be one that is established by the state or a voluntary accreditation scheme, and the provision of guidelines, best practice and other matters that relate to the 
provision of authentication infrastructures.
Licensed certification authorities
3.45 The states of Latin America have, to a large extent, adopted a licensing 
system for certification authorities. For instance, the Argentine government started a public key infrastructure project in 1996, which includes a fully operational root 
certification authority, a licensed certification authority (the Ministry of Economy) 
and other bodies that have started to issue licenses. Chapter III of the Ley De Firma 
Digital Nº 25.506 establishes the regime for a certification authorities, and article 
17 provides for certification authorities to be licensed:
23 Electronic Signature Law, 5761 – 2001.
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ARTICULO 17. – Del certificador licenciado. Se entiende por 
certificador licenciado a toda persona de existencia ideal, registro 
público de contratos u organismo público que expide certificados, 
presta otros servicios en relación con la firma digital y cuenta con 
una licencia para ello, otorgada por el ente licenciante.
La actividad de los certificadores licenciados no pertenecientes al 
sector público se prestará en régimen de competencia. El arancel 
de los servicios prestados por los certificadores licenciados será 
establecido libremente por éstos.
ARTICLE 17. – Of the licensed certification authority. A licensed 
certification authority is any person, public registry of contracts or 
a government agency which issues certificates and renders other services related to digital signatures and holds a license for this 
purpose, issued by the Licensing Institution.
The activity of the licensed certification authority which does not belong to the public sector shall be governed by a competitive 
regime. The licensed certification authorities shall freely establish 
their fees.
3.46 The provisions relating to the certification authority include its functions,24 methods for becoming licensed,25 the duties,26 rights and duties of the holder of 
a digital certificate,27 provisions relating to the control of the licensing regime,28 and matters relating to the Application Authority, auditing and the formation of 
an Advisory Commission.29
3.47 Malaysia has opted for a compulsory licensing regime, as set out in Part 
II to the Digital Signature Act 1997 (note the provisions relating to electronic 
signatures in the Electronic Commerce Act 2006). The advantages of a compulsory licensing regime can be seen in the provisions of Part IV of the Act, 
which set out the duties of licensed certification authorities and subscribers, including the need of both parties to use trustworthy systems,30 the conditions 
that must be fulfilled when issuing a certificate,31 the warranties and obligations 
a certification authority must adhere to32 and the duties of the subscriber.33 Of particular note is the duty of the subscriber as set out in clause 43:
24 Article 19.25 Article 20.26 Article 21.27 Chapter IV articles 24 and 25.28 Chapter V.29 Chapters VI, VII and VIII.30 Section 27.31 Section 29.32 Sections 34 to 37.33 Sections 30 to 42.
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43. By accepting a certificate issued by a licensed certification 
authority, the subscriber named in the certificate assumes a duty to exercise reasonable care to retain control of the private key and prevent its disclosure to any person not authorised to create the 
subscriber’s digital signature.
3.48 The duty of the subscribing party to provide for the proper security of 
their private key, enforced by contractual measures as between the certification 
authority and subscribing party, is thus enshrined in law in Malaysia. Taiwan has also established a compulsory licensing regime by article 11 of the Electronic 
Signatures Law 2001.34
Voluntary licensing
3.49 The government of Singapore has adopted a voluntary licensing 
regime, and certification authorities can apply to be licensed by the Controller 
of Certification Authorities in accordance with the Electronic Transactions 
(Certifications Authority) Regulations 2010, issued under the authority of the 
third schedule of the Electronic Transactions Act 2010. However, all certification authorities, whether they are licenced or not, are subject to the relevant 
provisions of the Act. In particular, Part II to the third schedule sets out the duties 
that affect every certification authority.
Recognition of foreign certificates
3.50 Legislation either remains silent on the matter of the recognition of foreign 
certificates, or expressly provides for the recognition of foreign certificates with 
requirements attached. Where recognition is not mentioned in legislation, the 
inclusion or exclusion of evidence relating to the certificate will be a matter for 
procedural rules and the exercise of the judicial function. In addition, the effect of any terms relating to applicable law, jurisdiction and time and place of when and where the contract was formed will also be the subject of substantial law and 
decisions by the courts. Where legislation expressly provides for the recognition 
of certificates issued by certification authorities beyond the boundary of a nation 
state, the provisions may merely give legal effect to the certificate, or require the 
certification authority to conform to requirements laid down in the legislation. An example of such a requirement is provided for in article 16 of the Ley De 
Firma Digital Nº 25.506 of Argentina, which provides as follows:
ARTICULO 16. – Reconocimiento de certificados extranjeros. Los 
certificados digitales emitidos por certificadores extranjeros 
34 P.-H. Ou and A. Tsai, with N. Kaiser, ‘The e-signature in Taiwan: consent, integrity and 
accessibility’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 13 (forthcoming 
2016).
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podrán ser reconocidos en los mismos términos y condiciones exigidos en la ley y sus normas reglamentarias cuando:
a) Reúnan las condiciones que establece la presente ley y 
la reglamentación correspondiente para los certificados 
emitidos por certificadores nacionales y se encuentre 
vigente un acuerdo de reciprocidad firmado por la República 
Argentina y el país de origen del certificador extranjero, o
b) Tales certificados sean reconocidos por un certificador licenciado en el país, que garantice su validez y vigencia 
conforme a la presente ley. A fin de tener efectos, este 
reconocimiento deberá ser validado por la autoridad de 
aplicación.
ARTICLE 16. – Recognition of foreign certificates. Digital 
certificates issued by foreign certification authorities shall be considered valid in the same terms and conditions required by law and its regulation, when:
a) They meet the conditions established by the present law and its corresponding regulation decree for the 
certificates issued by national certification authorities and there is in force a reciprocity agreement signed by the Argentine Republic and the country of origin of the foreign 
certification authority; or
b) They are recognized by a local licensed certification authority that guarantees their validity in accordance with 
the present law. In order to have effect, the Application 
Authority should validate this recognition.
3.51 Similar provisions apply in the Dominican Republic, and article 43 of the law in Colombia makes an almost identical requirement:
Artículo 43. Certificaciones recíprocas. Los certificados de firmas 
digitales emitidos por entidades de certificación extranjeras, 
podrán ser reconocidos en los mismos términos y condiciones 
exigidos en la ley para la emisión de certificados por parte de 
las entidades de certificación nacionales, siempre y cuando tales 
certificados sean reconocidos por una entidad de certificación autorizada que garantice en la misma forma que lo hace con sus 
propios certificados, la regularidad de los detalles del certificado, 
así como su validez y vigencia.
Article 43. Reciprocal certification. The digital signature certificates 
issued by foreign certification entities may be recognized in the same terms and conditions required by the law for the issuance of 
local certificates by national certification entities; provided said 
certificates are recognized by an authorized certification entity who 
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guarantees equally as it does with its own certificates, the regularity 
of the details in the foreign certificate, as well as its validity and effect.
3.52 The European Union will also recognise certificates or classes of 
certificates that are issued as qualified certificates from foreign certification authorities under the provisions of the Regulation, as provided in article 14:International aspects
1. Trust services provided by trust service providers established in 
a third country shall be recognised as legally equivalent to qualified 
trust services provided by qualified trust service providers established in the Union where the trust services originating from the third country are recognised under an agreement concluded between the Union and the third country in question or an 
international organisation in accordance with Article 218 TFEU.
2. Agreements referred to in paragraph 1 shall ensure, in particular, that:
(a) the requirements applicable to qualified trust service 
providers established in the Union and the qualified trust services they provide are met by the trust service providers in the third country or international organisations with which the agreement is concluded, and by the trust services they provide;
(b) the qualified trust services provided by qualified trust service providers established in the Union are recognised as legally equivalent to trust services provided by trust service providers in the third country or international organisation 
with which the agreement is concluded.
3.53 A number of other jurisdictions have similar provisions to the European Union, including Bermuda35 and Brunei Darussalam.36 Provision for the 
recognition of foreign certificates is included in s19 of the Information Technology Act 2000 passed in India:37
19. Recognition of foreign Certifying Authorities.
(1) Subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be specified by regulations, the Controller may with the previous approval of 
the Central Government, and by notification in the Official Gazette, recognise any foreign Certifying Authority as a Certifying Authority 
for the purposes of this Act.
35 Section 21, Electronic Transactions Act 1999.36 Section 43, Electronic Transactions Order, 2000.37 The Information Technology (Certifying Authority) Regulations 2001 were passed in July 
2001 under the provisions of s89 of the Act.
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(2) Where any Certifying Authority is recognised under sub-section 
(1), the Digital Signature Certificate issued by such Certifying 
Authority shall be valid for the purposes of this Act.
3.54 A similar provision is provided in s40 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 2002 passed by South Africa, as well as under article 15 of the Electronic Signatures Law 2001 passed by Taiwan, subject to permission 
from the competent authority.
Liability
3.55 Various provisions are made in legislation for the liability of the 
certification authority, the holder of the digital signature and, to a lesser extent, 
the recipient of a digital signature. Where legislation fails to deal adequately, or at all, with the issues of liability, the general law that applies to these issues will 
be considered by national courts.
Liability of the certification authority
3.56 The Electronic Transactions Order 2000 passed by Brunei Darussalam 
provides for a presumption in relation to the information listed in a certificate 
issued by a certification authority, which few other jurisdictions have implemented. 
With the exception of information that has not been verified by the certification authority, the information will be presumed to be correct, as provided in s21:
Presumptions regarding certificates.
21. It shall be presumed, unless evidence to the contrary is 
adduced, that the information listed in a certificate issued by a 
licensed certification authority is correct, except for information 
identified as subscriber information which has not been verified, if 
the certificate was accepted by the subscriber.
3.57 Thus any contract term that purports to negate this aspect of a 
certificate will have no effect in Brunei Darussalam, and any certification authority attempting to avoid this provision by refraining from verifying information provided by an applicant will probably negate the requirements of 
their certification practice statement, or, if there is no such provision in their 
certification practice statement, any certificate they issue without verifying the 
information supplied by the applicant will mean the certificate has very little 
value. Also, the Order provides a further assurance of reliance in s23:
Reliance on certificates foreseeable.
23. It is foreseeable that persons relying on a digital signature will 
also rely on a valid certificate containing the public key by which 
the digital signature can be verified.
Electronic signatures in law138
3.58 By comparison, article 42 of the law in the Dominican Republic excludes the foreseeability as a requirement:
Art. 42.- Responsabilidad de la entidad de certificación.
Salvo acuerdo entre las partes, las entidades de certificación 
responderán por los daños y perjuicios que causen a toda persona.
ARTICLE 42. – Liability of the certifying entity.Excepting by agreement between the parties, the certifying entities shall be liable for the damages and harm which they cause to any 
person.
3.59 In Barbados, the certification service provider has a significant liability by s20 of the Barbados Electronic Transactions Act, 2001, an authorized 
certification service provider is liable to the recipient, where the recipient relies 
on the certificate, for the following:
(1) By issuing an accredited certificate, an authorized certification service provider is liable to any person who reasonably relied on 
the certificate for
(a) the accuracy of all information in the accredited 
certificate as from the date on which it was issued, unless 
the authorized certification service provider has stated 
otherwise in the accredited certificate;
(b) assurance that the person identified in the accredited 
certificate held, at the time the accredited certificate was issued, the signature creation device corresponding to 
the signature verification device given or identified in the 
accredited certificate;
(c) assurance that the signature creation device and 
the signature verification device functioned together in a complementary manner, where the service provider generates both devices, unless the person who relied on 
the accredited certificate knows or ought reasonably to 
have known that the authorization of the certificate service 
provides has been revoked.
Liability of the sender
3.60 Where legislation provides for digital signatures, such as the Ley De Firma 
Digital Nº 25.506 of Argentina, the provisions relating to the holder of a digital 
certificate are expressed in the form of duties in article 25:
ARTICULO 25. – Obligaciones del titular del certificado digital. Son 
obligaciones del titular de un certificado digital:
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a) Mantener el control exclusivo de sus datos de creación de firma digital, no compartirlos, e impedir su divulgación;
b) Utilizar un dispositivo de creación de firma digital técnicamente 
confiable;
c) Solicitar la revocación de su certificado al certificador licenciado ante cualquier circunstancia que pueda haber comprometido la 
privacidad de sus datos de creación de firma;
d) Informar sin demora al certificador licenciado el cambio de 
alguno de los datos contenidos en el certificado digital que hubiera 
sido objeto de verificación.
ARTICLE 25. – Duties of the digital certificate holder. These are 
duties of the holder of a digital certificate:
a) To keep exclusive control of his digital signature creation data, not to share it, and to prevent it from being publicly known;
b) To use a technically reliable digital signature creation device;
c) To request the licensed certification authority to revoke his 
certificate if faced with any circumstance which might have compromised the privacy of his signature creation data;
d) To inform the licensed certification authority without delay of 
any change in any of the data which has been subject to verification 
contained in the digital certificate.
3.61 In China, article 27 of the Electronic Signatures Law provides for the liability of the signing party:Where the signatory knows that the signature creation data has been compromised or may have been compromised, but fails to notify the relevant parties without undue delay and to cease to utilize the signature creation data, or where the signatory does not provide genuine, complete and accurate information to the 
certification service provider, or is responsible for any other faults, he shall be responsible for any damages suffered by the relevant 
relying parties and the certification service provider.
3.62 The liability is contingent upon the signing party being aware that the signature creation data has been compromised or may have been compromised, although article 15 requires the signatory to exercise reasonable care to protect 
the signature creation data. The Dominican Republic has provided a slightly more detailed approach to the duties of a signing party in article 53:
Art. 53. – Deberes de los suscriptores. Son deberes de los suscriptores:
a) Recibir de las claves por parte de la entidad de 
certificación o generar las claves, utilizando un sistema de 
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seguridad exigido por la entidad de certificación;
b) Suministrar información completa, precisa y verídica a la 
entidad de certificación;
c) Aceptar los certificados emitidos por la entidad de 
certificación, demostrando aprobación de sus contenidos 
mediante el envío de éstos a una o más personas o solicitando la publicación de éstos en repositorios;
d) Mantener el control de la clave privada y reservada del conocimiento de terceras personas;
e) Efectuar oportunamente las correspondientes solicitudes 
de suspensión o revocación.
Párrafo. – Un suscriptor cesa en la obligación de cumplir con los anteriores deberes a partir de la publicación de un aviso de 
revocación del correspondiente certificado por parte de la entidad 
de certificado.
ARTICLE 53. – Duties of the signers. The duties of the signers are:
a) To receive the passwords from the certifying entity, or to generate the passwords, using a security system required by the certifying entity;
b) To provide complete, precise, and accurate information to the certifying entity;
c) To accept the certificates issued by the certifying entity, demonstrating approval of its contents by means of the sending of same to one or more persons or requesting the publication of same in repositories;
d) To maintain the control of the private reserved password from the knowledge of third persons;
e) To perform opportunely the corresponding requests for 
suspension or revocation.
Paragraph. – A signer ceases to be obligated to comply with the abovegoing duties as of the publication of a notice of revocation of 
the corresponding certificate by the certifying entity.
3.63 The provisions of article 53 set out, in slightly more explicit detail, the duties expected of a person where they decide to obtain and use a digital 
signature, the definition of which includes a link to the password, as defined in 
article 2(i) as:
i) Firma digital: Se entenderá como un valor numérico que se adhiere a un mensaje de datos y que, utilizando un procedimiento 
matemático conocido, vinculado a la clave del iniciador y al texto del mensaje, permite determinar que este valor se ha obtenido exclusivamente con la clave del iniciador y el texto del mensaje, y 
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que el mensaje inicial no ha sido modificado después de efectuada la transmisión;
i) Digital signature: It will be understood as a numerical value attached to a data message and which, by using a known mathematical procedure, linked to the password of the initiator and to the text of38 the message, allows one to determine that this 
value has been obtained exclusively with the inititator’s password and the text of the message, and that the initial message has not 
been modified after the transmission has been effected;
3.64 The liability of a sender, once their duties are set out, is provided for in article 55:
Art. 55. – Responsabilidad de los suscriptores.
Los suscriptores serán responsables por la falsedad o error en 
la información suministrada a la entidad de certificación y que 
es objeto material del contenido del certificado. También serán responsables en los casos en los cuales no den oportuno aviso de 
revocación o suspensión de certificados en los casos indicados 
anteriormente.
ARTICLE 55. – Liability of the signers. The signers shall be liable for falseness or error in the information supplied to the certifying entity and which is the material object of the contents of the 
certificate. They shall also be liable in those cases in which they do 
not give prompt notice of revocation or suspension of certificates 
in the cases indicated above.
3.65 In comparison, the Australian Commonwealth Electronic Transaction Act provides for a presumption in s15:15 Attribution of electronic communications
(1) For the purpose of a law of the Commonwealth, unless otherwise agreed between the purported originator and the addressee of an electronic communication, the purported originator of the electronic communication is bound only if the communication was sent by the purported originator or with the authority of the 
purported originator.
3.66 This provision only binds the sending party where the originator accepts 
they sent the communication, or authorized the sending of the communication. There is no presumption that the electronic signature is that of the sending 
party. It seems, therefore, that the recipient is required to prove the signing 
party signed; but it may be that proof of verification puts an evidential burden 
38 The word ‘ot’ in the original translated text altered to read ‘of.’
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on the purported signing party to introduce evidence that they did not sign the 
communication.
Liability of the recipient
3.67 Where a person or legal entity relies on a signature, it is for them to prove the signature is not a forgery in circumstances where the signature is challenged by 
the purported signing party.39 In terms of electronic signatures, this is illustrated 
by s24 of the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Electronic Transactions Act 2007, 
which provides: ‘A person relying on an electronic signature shall bear the legal consequences of his failure to take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an 
electronic signature’. Arguably, this is such a well-established rule that it is not necessary to set out what actions a recipient needs to follow in order to rely on 
an electronic signature. By way of example, the provisions of article 21 of the Dubai Law of Electronic transactions and Commerce No 2/2002 do go some way to set out such a duty:
1. A person is entitled to rely on an Electronic Signature or an 
Electronic Certificate to the extent that it is reasonable to do so.
2. Where an Electronic Signature is supported by a Certificate, the Relying Party in respect of such signature shall bear the legal consequences of its failure to take reasonable and necessary 
steps to verify the validity and enforceability of the Certificate, as to whether it is suspended or revoked, and of observing any 
limitations with respect to the Certificate.
3. In determining whether it was reasonable for a person to rely 
on an Electronic Signature or a Certificate, regard shall be had, if appropriate, to:
a. the nature of the underlying transaction which was intended to be supported by the Electronic Signature;
b. the value or importance of the underlying transaction, if this is known;
c. whether the Relying Party in respect of the Electronic 
Signature or certificate has taken appropriate steps to determine the reliability of the Electronic Signature or the 
Certificate;
d. whether the Relying Party in respect of the Electronic 
Signature or certificate took reasonable steps to verify if the 
Electronic Signature was supported by a Certificate, or if it should be expected to be so supported;
e. whether the Relying Party in respect of the Electronic 
Signature or Certificate knew or ought to have known 
39 For case law where electronic signatures are forged, see chapter 6.
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that the Electronic Signature or the Certificate had been compromised or revoked;
f. any agreement or course of dealing between the Originator and the Relying Party, or any trade usage which may be applicable;
g. any other relevant factor.
4. If reliance on the Electronic Signature or the Certificate is not reasonable in the circumstances, having regard to the factors in 
paragraph (2) of this Article, the party relying on the Electronic 
Signature or Certificate assumes the risk of the Electronic Signature 
or the Certificate not being valid.
3.68 Exceptions in the commercial arena includes IdenTrust and Bolero, 
both of which operate a system that binds the three parties (user, certification 
authority and receiving party) to a relationship governed by contractual terms.
3.69 The Argentine government, in article 23, have responded by imposing a mild form of limitation on the recipient of a digital signature by way of a rule 
against relying on the validity of the certificate:
ARTICULO 23. – Desconocimiento de la validez de un certificado 
digital. Un certificado digital no es válido si es utilizado:
a) Para alguna finalidad diferente a los fines para los cuales fue extendido;
b) Para operaciones que superen el valor máximo autorizado cuando corresponda;
c) Una vez revocado.
ARTICLE 23. – Lack of recognition of the validity of a digital 
certificate. A digital certificate is not valid if it is used:
a) For a purpose different from that for which it was issued;
b) For transactions that exceed the maximum value authorized when applicable;
c) Once it has been revoked.
3.70 In comparison, the provisions of the Singapore Electronic Transactions Act Ch 88 permits the recipient to presume that the document or message that is 
signed with a digital signature has been affixed by the person or entity to whom the digital signature is associated with, although it is a presumption that can be rebutted, as provided in s5 of the third schedule:Unreliable digital signatures
5. Unless otherwise provided by law or contract, a person relying on a digitally signed electronic record assumes the risk that the digital signature is invalid as a signature or an authentication of 
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the signed electronic record, if reliance on the digital signature is not reasonable under the circumstances having regard to the following factors:
(a) facts which the person relying on the digitally signed electronic record knows or has notice of, including all facts 
listed in the certificate or incorporated in it by reference;
(b) the value or importance of the digitally signed electronic record, if known;
(c) the course of dealing between the person relying on the digitally signed electronic record and the subscriber and any available indicia of reliability or unreliability apart from the digital signature; and
(d) any usage of trade, particularly trade conducted by 
trustworthy systems or other electronic means.
3.71 The provisions of this section have, it appears, been influenced by article 
13 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Whilst the provisions 
of this section appear to be reasonable, the reference in s5(a) of the phrase 
‘including all facts listed in the certificate or incorporated in it by reference’ seems to imply that to rely on the signature, the recipient will have to consider 
becoming a verifying party before relying on the signature. Section 22 of the Electronic Transactions Order 2000 issued by Brunei Darussalam has an almost 
identical provision to that mentioned above.
3.72 Where the certification authority is regulated, as in Malaysia, s63 of the Digital Signature Act 1997 takes a pragmatic view where a recipient is not sure of the authenticity of the signature:
63. (1) Unless otherwise provided by law or contract, the recipient of a digital signature assumes the risk that a digital signature is forged, if reliance on the digital signature is not reasonable under 
the circumstances.
(2) Where the recipient determines not to rely on a digital signature under this section, the recipient shall promptly notify the signer of its determination not to rely on a digital signature and the grounds 
for that determination.
3.73  The provisions of this section appear to have taken into account the comments made by Romer LJ in Goodman v. J Eban Limited, where he pointed out 
that ‘If in fact his clients entertained any doubt as to the authenticity of the letter, 
nothing could be easier than to ask him, by telephone or letter, to confirm it.’40 If in doubt, the recipient is advised to make a telephone call, send an email or use such old fashioned technology as a facsimile transmission or the postal services 
to confirm the signature with the person that sent the message or document. By 
40 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 564.
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confirming the signature in this fashion, the recipient does not have to consider 
becoming a verifying party, and the terms ‘verifying party’ and ‘relying party’ 
used by certification authorities thereby become meaningless.

S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 4, ‘The European Union’, pp. 147–68.
4The European Union
4.1 The European Union took an active stance on issues relating to the 
information society by 1996. In September 1996, the European Parliament passed a resolution asking the Commission to prepare proposals covering security and 
confidentiality, authentication and to safeguard privacy,1 and in November 1996 the Council of Ministers requested the Member States and the Commission to prepare consistent measures to ensure the integrity and authentication of 
electronically transmitted documents.2 Further initiatives continued, with the 
OECD adopting ‘Guidelines for cryptography policy’ on 27 March 1997,3 which set out general principles to guide countries in formulating policies related to 
the use of cryptography. A European Ministerial Conference took place in Bonn 
in July 1997, entitled ‘Global information networks: realising the potential’, 
which led to the Bonn Ministerial Declaration, the objective of which was ‘to 
broaden the common understanding of the use of Global Information Networks, to identify barriers to their use, to discuss possible solutions and to undertake an open dialogue on further possibilities for European and international co-
operation’. The Declaration covered the topic of electronic signatures, specifically 
digital signatures.
4.2 The Commission subsequently produced a communication in response 
to the resolution from the Parliament, ‘Ensuring security and trust in electronic communications: towards a European framework for digital signatures and 
encryption’.4 This document made it explicit that the only method of electronic 
signatures that was under consideration was that of the digital signature. In arguing the case, assertions were made in the Executive Summary without reference to any evidence, or the accuracy of the premise upon which the assertion 
was made, such as: ‘As cryptographic services and products are more and more 
demanded’, and ‘As, in addition, they need a specific regulatory framework to take 
1 European Parliament Resolution A4-244/96, 19.9.96, OJ320, p.164, 28.10.96 Europe and 
the global information society – Recommendations to the European Council.2 Council Resolution 96/C 376/01 of 21 November 1996 on new policy-priorities regarding 
the information society, OJ No C 376, 12.12.96, p. 1.
3 Conference conclusions, ‘A borderless world: realising the potential of global electronic 
commerce’, 7–9 October 1998, Ottawa, Canada (Directorate for Science, Technology and 
Industry Steering Committee for the Preparation of the Ottawa Ministerial Conference, SG/
EC(98)14/REV6); A global action plan for electronic commerce prepared by business with 
recommendations from governments, 7–9 October 1998, Ottawa, Canada (Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Steering Committee for the Preparation of the Ottawa 
Ministerial Conference, SG/EC(98)11/REV2).
4 Communication from the Commission, ‘Ensuring security and trust in electronic 
communications: towards a European framework for digital signatures and encryption’, 
COM(97) 503 Final, 8 October 1997.
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into account their legal implications’. One comment made was factually incorrect: 
‘Digital signatures could even bring significant law enforcement benefits as they allow for example messages to be attributed to a particular reader and/or 
sender’ because no form of electronic signature, including the digital signature, is capable of proving the person whose private key was used was the person who 
caused the digital signature to be affixed to a document or communication. On the subject of digital signatures, it was asserted that the failure of digital signatures 
to be offered as a service was predicated on ‘the absence of legal recognition 
of digital signatures’.5 There was a fear amongst some that the European Union needed to regulate electronic signatures, especially as some nation states had 
already begun to pass laws on the topic.
4.3 On 1 December 1997, the Council invited the Commission to submit a 
proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on digital signatures. 
The proposal was to be offered as soon as possible. A draft proposal was produced by May 1998,6 and submitted by the Commission on 16 June 1998.7 The Council consulted the Economic and Social Committee on 30 July 19988 and 
the Committee of the Regions, which had reviewed the proposal by early 1999.9 By 14 April 1999, the proposal had been reviewed and a number of amendments 
were proposed by the Parliament.10 Apparently there was a difference of opinion over what legal effect an electronic signature would have when created using 
products (secure signature-creation devices) that meet a minimum level of 
technical security.11 This matter was the subject of debate at the Council meeting 
of 27 November 1998. The security requirements relating to these products 
were enumerated in Annex III of the Directive. The opposition to setting out such 
criteria was voiced in the main by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The reason for the objection was the concern that the industry could not meet the 
conditions laid down in the Annex. At the time, it was suggested that the matters might be resolved by making the contents of Annex III a strong recommendation, 
or by reducing the requirements relating to the products.12 In the event, the 
5 Part II, paragraph 3.6 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a common framework for 
electronic signatures, COM(1998) 297 final 13.05.1998.7 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a common framework for 
electronic signatures, OJ C 325, 23.10.98, p. 5.
8 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a European Parliament 
and Council Directive on a common framework for electronic signatures’, OJ C 40, 
15.2.1999, p. 29.
9 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Directive on a common framework for electronic signatures’, OJ C 93, 6.4.1999, p. 
33.10 Electronic signatures, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a 
common framework for electronic signatures, OJ C 104, 14.4.1999, p. 49.11 Recital 15 and definition in Article 2.12 J. Dumortier and P. Van Eecke, ‘The European draft directive on a common framework for 
electronic signatures’, CLSR, 15 (1999), pp. 106–12, 111–12.
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content of Annex III was split between requirements and recommendations for 
secure signature-creation devices. The views expressed by some countries may 
also have influenced the decision to revise the meaning of an electronic signature and produce more than one version of an electronic signature, which seems a somewhat bizarre concept, because a document is either signed or it is not 
signed.
4.4 The Directive was adopted by the European Parliament and Council on 
13 December 1999, and came into force on 19 January 2000.13 Member states were required to implement the Directive by 19 July 2001,14 and a review of the operation of the Directive was prepared and delivered to the European Parliament 
and to the Council by 19 July 2003.15 A further development took place in 2005 
with the establishment of an Expert Group on electronic commerce with a remit 
to set up working groups to study specific subjects on the basis of the mandate, 
and to invite experts and observers with specific knowledge to participate in 
the work of the Group and the working groups,16 and in 2011 it was decided 
to review the Directive again.17 There have been a number of European Union studies in relation to electronic signatures that shaped the landscape in the EU 
(set out at the end of this chapter), and it was decided to revise the Directive in 
the light of the need to widen the scope to include electronic identification and 
trust services for electronic transactions.18
The Regulation
4.5 The Directive is repealed with effect from 1 July 2016 by article 50 of 
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.19 A 
13 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.01.2000, p.12.14 Article 13(1).15 Article 12(1). The contract to prepare a review for the Commission was prepared by J. 
Dumortier and P. Van Eecke, The Implementation of the European Directive on Electronic 
Signatures Status Report (Landwell and Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & Information 
Technology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2002).16 Commission Decision of 24 October 2005 establishing an expert group on electronic 
commerce (2005/752/EC), OJ L 282, 26.10.2005, p. 20.17 Commission from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for 
Europe /* COM/2010/0245 f/2 */ (2.1.2).18 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (Text 
with EEA relevance){SWD(2012) 135}{SWD(2012) 136} Brussels, 4.6.2012, COM(2012) 
238 final.19 OJ L257, 28.8.2014, pp. 73–114.
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regulation is a binding legislative act that must be applied in its entirety across the member states of the EU in accordance with article 288 of the consolidated 
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.20 This means that the legislation in place across all member states of the European Union will 
be amended and repealed in due course. What is striking about this Regulation is the transfer of power to the executive in the form of a substantial amount of delegated legislation that has been authorized under the Regulation, for which 
see the list at the end of this chapter.
4.6 The purpose of the Regulation is broadly set out in recital 1:Building trust in the online environment is key to economic 
and social development. Lack of trust, in particular because of a perceived lack of legal certainty, makes consumers, businesses and public authorities hesitate to carry out transactions electronically 
and to adopt new services.
4.7 The provisions of article 1 set out the content of the Regulation:Subject matterWith a view to ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market while aiming at an adequate level of security of electronic 
identification means and trust services this Regulation:
(a) lays down the conditions under which Member States recognise 
electronic identification means of natural and legal persons falling 
under a notified electronic identification scheme of another Member State;
(b) lays down rules for trust services, in particular for electronic transactions; and
(c) establishes a legal framework for electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, 
electronic registered delivery services and certificate services for 
website authentication.
4.8 The Regulation covers far more than electronic signatures. The discussion 
in this chapter is restricted to electronic signatures.21 As with the Directive, the Regulation provides for three types of electronic signature under article 3: 
electronic signature; advanced electronic signature, and a qualified electronic 
signature.
4.9 There is a significant difference between the types of signature, and one 
that is not readily imported into a legal framework based on common law. The legal effects of electronic signatures are set out in article 25:
20 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 171–2.21 The Regulation includes electronic seals, time stamps and registered delivery services.
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Legal effects of electronic signatures
1. An electronic signature shall not be denied legal effect and admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in an electronic form or that it does not meet the 
requirements for qualified electronic signatures.
2. A qualified electronic signature shall have the equivalent legal 
effect of a handwritten signature.
3. A qualified electronic signature based on a qualified certificate 
issued in one Member State shall be recognised as a qualified 
electronic signature in all other Member States.
4.10 Article 18 provides that the Regulation should be applied in accordance 
with national rules on liability, and continues: ‘Therefore, it does not affect those 
national rules on, for example, definition of damages or relevant applicable 
procedural rules, including the burden of proof’. In addition, article 46 provides 
that ‘An electronic document shall not be denied legal effect and admissibility as 
evidence in legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form.’ For which see the case of I Up 505/2003,22 decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia in 2003 regarding the status of an email, and two cases from 
Finland from 2004, discussed in earlier editions of this text.23
The electronic signature
4.11 The Regulation provides the definition of an electronic signature in article 
3(10):
‘electronic signature’ means data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated with other data in electronic form and which is used by the signatory to sign;
4.12 The definition is very broad, in keeping with the wide nature of what is capable of constituting a signature in digital terms, and therefore includes any 
means that is capable of demonstrating proof of intent. This definition will 
include any of the forms of electronic signature discussed elsewhere in this text. The elements of an electronic signature comprise:
(i) Data in electronic form.
(ii) The data must be attached to or logically associated with other 
electronic data.
(iii) The electronic signature is to be used by the signatory to sign 
the data.
22 For a case note, see Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007), p. 97.23 Combined cases 106/04/JH (140/04/JH and 147/04/JH, judgment MAO: 161/04, 162/04, 
163/04 of 27.8.2004) available online in Finnish at http://www.finlex.fi.
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4.13 The process of authentication is between software protocols, not between human beings and it is not clear whether the authentication relates to the origin 
of the data, or acts to verify the identity of a person or entity.
The advanced electronic signature
4.14 An advanced electronic signature is a more elaborate construct than an 
electronic signature. There is no definition of an advanced electronic signature, 
but article 3(11), taken with the provisions of article 26, sets out a number of characteristics relating to performance:
‘advanced electronic signature’ means an electronic signature which meets the requirements set out in Article 26;
4.15 Article 26 reads:An advanced electronic signature shall meet the following requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using electronic signature creation data that the 
signatory can, with a high level of confidence, use under his sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data signed therewith in such a way that any 
subsequent change in the data is detectable.
4.16 Aside from a minor change in one word in article 26(d), the most 
significant alteration is in the re-drafting of 26(c), which previously read, under 
the Directive: ‘it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his 
sole control’. In essence, an advanced electronic signature is a digital signature 
in all but name. An advanced electronic signature is required to meet the 
requirements laid down in Annex I (article 28), and devices that create qualified 
electronic signatures must meet the requirements laid down in Annex II. Each of 
the four attributes noted above are discussed below.
Uniquely linked to the signatory
4.17 No form of electronic signature can conform to this part of the requirement. For instance, a user relinquishes control over their scanned signature once it has 
been sent. A digital signature is not linked to the person creating it: the unique 
link is made with the private key, not the user. Nobody is capable of committing a private key to memory,24 because it is far too complicated. Below is an example of 
24 ‘Guidelines on memory and the law recommendations from the scientific study of 
human memory’ (The British Psychological Society Research Board, 2008), http://www.
forcescience.org/articles/Memory&TheLaw.pdf.
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a private key in TXT format (2048 bits), by way of example:25




25 This example is from Symeon (Simos) Xenitellis, ‘The open-source PKI book: a guide to 
PKIs and open-source implementations’ and quoted under GNU Free Documentation 
License, Version 1.3, 3 November 2008 published by the Free Software Foundation: http://
ospkibook.sourceforge.net/docs/OSPKI-2.4.7/OSPKI-html/sample-key-components.htm. 
For an example of a private key in PEM format, see http://ospkibook.sourceforge.net/
docs/OSPKI-2.4.7/OSPKI-html/sample-priv-key.htm.
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coefficient:00:90:c8:8a:b9:61:c2:b1:5c:82:69:bd:d1:51:fe:97:03:d8:1d:de:a6:23:be:61:0b:02:d7:c2:4c:81:ad:4b:5b:51:e4:f8:05:21:5f:86:7a:78:22:56:85:9c:fe:19:23:f1:20:47:67:3d:67:d7:12:cd:ec:a0:d-f:f3:24:94:d3:a3:03:82:00:74:0b:68:1d:5b:88:49:fa:05:c9:2b:2f:a0:7f:79:85:e4:a9:a3:0e:d9:29:8c:61:d0:cc:f1:7a:bc:e7:bd:d3:bc:b9:35:02:ef:54:51:97:52:af:c5:20:96:71:07:c9:17:00:6d:ab:7d:27:c9:74:71:26:d8:ce
4.18 This means that private keys are retained on a computer, disk or smart 
card. It is not possible to create an electronic signature that can be uniquely 
linked to the signatory. Professor Sorge disagrees with this analysis:
‘Mason … states the unique link of a signature to a person was impossible to achieve, as the required private key cannot be memorized and must be stored in a computer or on a smart 
card. The consequence is that third parties cannot be excluded 
from signature generation with absolute certainty. Following this 
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opinion, advanced electronic signatures would not be possible at 
all – a result that was obviously not intended by the legislator. As a consequence, the problem pointed out by Mason is not considered 
in most legal literature.’26
4.19 His argument is first, that because the politicians responsible for enacting the Directive did not intend that this characteristic would not be effective, it 
follows that the analysis set out in previous editions of this text is wrong. The second limb of the argument is that because the problem is not considered 
in most of the legal literature, it follows that the point is therefore irrelevant. Professor Sorge did not cite Lorna Brazell, who said, in relation to this precise point regarding the digital signature:
‘ … the signature is not uniquely linked to the signatory: it is 
uniquely linked only to the signatory’s private key. In the real world, no one is ever going to keep their private key in their head, 
inaccessible to others. The number is simply too long.’27
4.20 These are strange arguments. First, it is pertinent to observe that where the text of the legislation is defective, it is for the politicians responsible for 
enacting the legislation to rectify the mistake. Second, Professor Sorge argues 
that because the ‘consensus’ is that some commentators ignore this important 
point, it follows that it is not relevant. In science, consensus counts for little – although the consensus was, at one time, that the sun orbited the earth – yet 
such harmony among the learned did not mean the assumption was true. What 
is important are facts and logic.
Capable of identifying the signatory
4.21 Any form of electronic signature is capable of identifying the person that 
signed it.
Created using electronic signature creation data that the signatory 
can, with a high level of confidence, use under his sole control
4.22 Any form of electronic signature can be created under the sole control of the user, but when a private key to a digital signature is used, a recipient will not know 
whether it was the owner that actually used the private key. A digital signature 
does not authenticate the purported signer. A digital signature authenticates that a 
certain private key was used to create the relevant digital signature.
26 C. Sorge, ‘The legal classification of identity-based signatures’, Computer Law & Security 
Review, 30 (2014), pp. 126–36 at p. 130.27 L. Brazell, Electronic Signatures and Identities: Law and Regulation (2nd edn, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), pp. 135–6.
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4.23 It is also arguable whether the signatory can ever maintain that the electronic signature is under their sole control when located on a computer, given that computers are not trustworthy, because their design is open, complex, 
flexible and the software that runs them is not perfect, and the ease by which a 
key on a computer can be misused.28 The case law discussed elsewhere in this text illustrates this point – especially where forms of electronic signature have been retained on a main frame, and others have used the signature for improper 
purposes or without authority. As pointed out by Petr Švéda and Václav Matyáš 
Jr.,29 a trustworthy signature system will need to incorporate a ‘restrictive 
configuration’ that would only provide a few elementary tasks in order to assure 
functional integrity. This means that such a computer would not be able to be 
used for any other purpose. It would also need a special dedicated machine that 
was used only for the purpose of signature creation and verification,30 and to provide for trust, this type of system would have to be under the direct control 
of the user. Where electronic signatures only use software, especially when the private key of a digital signature is placed on a personal computer, the problem for the person whose key it is, is that they cannot be absolutely sure that they 
signed what they see on the screen. In addition, they ‘cannot be sure that no further signature processes will be executed in the background when using his 
private key’.31
4.24 If the private key is loaded on a smart card (which is increasingly the case 
for bank cards, for instance), the ease by which a smart card can be stolen or 
‘borrowed’ by another person is so significant as to undermine the suggestion that the signature can remain under the sole control of the person whose signature 
it is.32 Even the members of the Forum of European Supervisory Authorities for 
Electronic Signatures accept this. The concept of ‘sole control’ was discussed in a 2004 paper:33
28 For further information, see P. A. Loscocco, S. D. Smalley, P. A. Muckelbauer, R. C. Taylor, S. 
J. Turner and J. F. Farrell, ‘The inevitability of failure: the flawed assumption of security in 
modern computing environments’ (National Security Agency, 14 November 1998).29 P. Švéda and V. Matyáš Jr., ‘Digital signatures and electronic documents: a cautionary tale 
revisited’, Upgrade, III (2004), pp. 35–45, 37.30 However, even if a secure signature creation device was used under the provisions of 
Annex III, there is a significant flaw: the device signs a binary string which the human 
user has no means of verifying. This is highly significant, for which see N. Bohm, ‘Watch 
what you sign!’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006), pp. 45–
9.31 Švéda and Matyáš Jr., ‘Digital signatures and electronic documents’, p. 37.32 S. C. Rennie and J. R. Rudland, ‘Differences in medical students’ attitudes to academic 
misconduct and reported behaviour across the years – a questionnaire study’, J Med Ethics, 
29 (2003), pp. 97–102, in which medical students admitted they would forge signatures 
on work submitted.33 ‘Working paper on advanced electronic signatures’ (Forum of European Supervisory 
Authorities for Electronic Signatures, 12 October 2004).
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c) ‘sole control’Creation and storage of signature-creation dataMost requirements on the creation and storage of signature-creation data have their foundation in Annex III and Annex II j 
who do not apply on advanced electronic signatures. However, 
the advanced electronic signature must be ‘created using means 
that the signatory can maintain under his sole control’. This does not require the use of a special hardware device as a signature-creation device, but it requires – especially in the case where the private key is stored in software – the use of security measures by 
the signatory to maintain his control over the key (e.g. encryption 
of the file which stores the private key, restriction of access to the 
computer and this file).
What does ‘sole control’ mean in the context of (automatically 
signing) systems which are maintained by several system 
administrators (this is also relevant for systems that sign qualified 
certificates)? If the certificate is issued to a certain natural person, 
the security concept and the configuration of the server must 
ensure that only this person has control over the private key. How 
the person executes her control is defined in the security concept. 
If the certificate is issued to a legal person (which is not possible in 
most countries) the personnel of the legal person maintains ‘sole 
control’ over the private key by its security concept.
4.25 In a 2005 paper ‘Public statement on server based signature services’,34 
the members of the Forum elaborated on ‘sole control’ in relation to server-based signature services:Sole control
The meaning of ‘sole control’ in Article 2 of the Directive has been discussed in the FESA working paper on advanced electronic 
signatures. According to that paper, the use of special hardware as 
signature creation device is not required. However, the signatory 
must take measures to maintain control over his key. The security 
concept and the system configuration of the server must ensure that only the signatory, who is either a natural or a legal person, 
has control over the corresponding signature creation data.If signatures are created automatically at a server, the signatory is 
usually not present in person. However, the signatory has control over security measures, and has the responsibility to select 
suitable security measures.
34 ‘Public statement on server based signature services’ (Forum of European Supervisory 
Authorities for Electronic Signatures, 17 October 2005), now noted on the Forum website 
as ‘outdated’, although no reason is given.
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For server based signature services, the signatory is not present in 
person either. But neither can he select suitable security measures. 
He can only choose whether or not to enlist the services. The signatory can decide whether or not security measures taken by 
the service provider are sufficient for him. For making this decision, the signatory needs at least access to a comprehensible version 
of the security concept and confidence that the service provider 
sticks to the security concept (confidence can be strengthened by audits performed by a trusted third party like an independent 
auditor or a supervisory authority).In addition, sole control requires certain cryptographic qualities of algorithms and of signature creation data that have been discussed 
in the working paper mentioned above.Under these premises, FESA members believe that sole control at least of the signature creation data can be achieved and that advanced electronic signatures can be created by a server based 
signature service.
4.26 The authors of these papers indicate the tenuous nature of the digital 
environment, and how it cannot be under the sole control of anybody. In addition, 
the authors of the second paper include a footnote to the final sentence, thus: 
‘Note that according to German law, “sole control” implies physical control and 
that therefore in Germany, server based signature services cannot be used for 
creating advanced electronic signatures and definitely not for creating qualified 
electronic signatures’. The position in Germany must be correct, otherwise the 
meaning of ‘sole control’ becomes distorted beyond measure.
4.27 Birgit Pfitzmann demonstrated the weakness of a device such as a smart card in 1996, in that smart cards tend to communicate through another device 
under the control of a third party, such as a point-of-sale terminal or ATM. This means the person signing does not have any control over what message is 
actually signed. This in turn means that ‘this arrangement cannot provide the 
authenticity function, or at least no better than blank signatures can’.35 Further, 
Petr Švéda and Václav Matyáš Jr. indicate that they ‘know of no technology that can make a hardware device fully resistant to penetration by a skilled 
and determined attacker’ and pointed out that many ‘successful attacks have occurred because smart cards were exposed to more sophisticated attackers 
than designers anticipated’.36
4.28 A smart card does not solve the problem. This is because the signatory trusts the computer to correctly reveal what data is being sent to the card for 
signature. Malicious software could operate so as to sign documents without the knowledge of the signing party, because the smart card does not have its own 
35 B. Pfitzmann, Digital Signature Schemes General Framework and Fail-Stop Signatures 
(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1996), 1.4.36 Švéda and Matyáš Jr., ‘Digital signatures and electronic documents’, p. 37.
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keyboard or display. No doubt the design of smart cards will change and improve, but the ability of intelligent people to overcome the security will always ensure smart cards and the systems that interact with them will be undermined in some 
way.
4.29 Thus a signatory will not know whether the ‘means’ was working correctly, 
or what it was doing, or what changes (such as security fixes and upgrades) were 
happening to it over time, and so it seems impossible to obtain ‘sole control’ 
of the technology. The organization issuing the ‘means’ may be able to assure 
the signatory that the ‘means’ will operate correctly and be under the issuer’s 
‘control’, but then the signatory must trust the issuer. In turn, the issuer will have 
to trust the manufacturer, developer and any other person in the chain.
4.30 It seems that the European Union has accepted this criticism,37 and amended the relevant clause from:
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control;
4.31 To read:
(c) it is created using electronic signature creation data that the 
signatory can, with a high level of confidence, use under his sole control;
4.32 It is refreshing to note the change to this provision, although there is no 
guidance to the citizen as to how they determine the level of confidence.
Linked to the data signed therewith in such a way that any 
subsequent change in the data is detectable
4.33 The only form of electronic signature that is capable of complying with this element is the private key of digital signature, which acts to encrypt the date, 
but even a digital signature is not immune from attack. This provision applies to 
the advanced electronic signature and the qualified electronic signature.
Qualified electronic signature
4.34 A qualified electronic signature is defined in article 3(12):
‘qualified electronic signature’ means an advanced electronic 
signature that is created by a qualified electronic signature 
creation device, and which is based on a qualified certificate for electronic signatures;
37 Stephen Mason, ‘Informal debate on the issues relating to terminology and clarification of 
concept in respect of the EU e-signature legislation’, SCRIPTed, 9 (2012), pp. 64–85, and 
previous editions of this text.
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4.35 A qualified electronic signature consists of three component parts: an 
advanced electronic signature, a qualified certificate and a qualified electronic signature creation device that must comply with the requirements set out in 
Annexes I and II.
Service providers
4.36 The Regulation provides, under article 3(19) and (20) for ‘trust service 
providers’ and ‘qualified trust service providers’. Recital 35 provides that all trust service providers are subject to the requirements of the Regulation:All trust service providers should be subject to the requirements of this Regulation, in particular those on security and liability to ensure due diligence, transparency and accountability of their 
operations and services. However, taking into account the type of services provided by trust service providers, it is appropriate to distinguish as far as those requirements are concerned between 
qualified and non-qualified trust service providers.
4.37 The duties of trust service providers are covered in depth by the 
Regulation, but this text does not explore the status of trust service providers.
Liability
4.38 Liability in general is provided for in article 11:
1. The notifying Member State shall be liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person due to 
a failure to comply with its obligations under points (d) and (f) of 
Article 7 in a cross-border transaction.
2. The party issuing the electronic identification means shall be liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person due to a failure to comply with the obligation 
referred to in point (e) of Article 7 in a cross- border transaction.
3. The party operating the authentication procedure shall be liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person due to a failure to ensure the correct operation of the 
authentication referred to in point (f) of Article 7 in a cross-border 
transaction.
4. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be applied in accordance with 
national rules on liability.
5. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 are without prejudice to the liability under national law of parties to a transaction in which electronic 
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identification means falling under the electronic identification 
scheme notified pursuant to Article 9(1) are used.
4.39 The position on liability and burden of proof in respect of trust service providers is set out in article 13:
1. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, trust service providers shall be liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently to any natural or legal person due to a failure to comply with the 
obligations under this Regulation.
The burden of proving intention or negligence of a non-qualified trust service provider shall lie with the natural or legal person 
claiming the damage referred to in the first subparagraph.
The intention or negligence of a qualified trust service provider 
shall be presumed unless that qualified trust service provider 
proves that the damage referred to in the first subparagraph 
occurred without the intention or negligence of that qualified trust 
service provider.
2. Where trust service providers duly inform their customers in advance of the limitations on the use of the services they provide and where those limitations are recognisable to third parties, trust service providers shall not be liable for damages arising from the 
use of services exceeding the indicated limitations.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be applied in accordance with national 
rules on liability.
Relying party
4.40 A relying party is defined in article 3(6):
‘relying party’ means a natural or legal person that relies upon an 
electronic identification or a trust service;
4.41 The only reference to the need for a relying party to assure themselves of the validity of a signature is in recital 57:
(57) To ensure legal certainty as regards the validity of the 
signature, it is essential to specify the components of a qualified electronic signature, which should be assessed by the relying party 
carrying out the validation. Moreover, specifying the requirements 
for qualified trust service providers that can provide a qualified validation service to relying parties unwilling or unable to carry 
out the validation of qualified electronic signatures themselves, should stimulate the private and public sector to invest in such 
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services. Both elements should make qualified electronic signature 
validation easy and convenient for all parties at Union level.
4.42 Interestingly, the recital acknowledges the central risk regarding the complexity of validating a digital signature, as discussed elsewhere in this text, and article 33 expressly provides for such a service:
Qualified validation service for qualified electronic signatures
1. A qualified validation service for qualified electronic signatures 
may only be provided by a qualified trust service provider who:
(a) provides validation in compliance with Article 32(1); and
(b) allows relying parties to receive the result of the validation 
process in an automated manner, which is reliable, efficient and bears the advanced electronic signature or advanced electronic 
seal of the provider of the qualified validation service.
2. The Commission may, by means of implementing acts, establish 
reference numbers of standards for qualified validation service 
referred to in paragraph 1. Compliance with the requirements laid down in paragraph 1 shall be presumed where the validation 
service for a qualified electronic signature meets those standards. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the 
examination procedure referred to in Article 48(2).
4.43 What is missing in the provisions of article 32(1) is the assurance that the 
signature was affixed by the person whose signature it purports to be.
Review of the Regulation
4.44 The Regulation is to be reviewed no later than 1 July 2020 in accordance 
with the provisions of article 49.
References
Delegated legislation under the Regulation
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/650 of 25 April 2016 laying down 
standards for the security assessment of qualified signature and seal creation 
devices pursuant to Articles 30(3) and 39(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and 
trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (Text with EEA 
relevance) C/2016/2303, OJ L109, 26.4.2016, p. 40–42
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1984 of 3 November 2015 
defining the circumstances, formats and procedures of notification pursuant 
4. The European Union 163
to Article 9(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market (notified under document C(2015) 7369) 
(Text with EEA relevance), OJ L289, 5.11.2015, p. 18–25
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1505 of 8 September 2015 laying 
down technical specifications and formats relating to trusted lists pursuant 
to Article 22(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L235, 9.9.2015, 
p. 26–36
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502 of 8 September 2015 
on setting out minimum technical specifications and procedures for assurance 
levels for electronic identification means pursuant to Article 8(3) of Regulation 
(EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market 
(Text with EEA relevance), OJ L235, 9.9.2015, p. 7–20
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1506 of 8 September 2015 
laying down specifications relating to formats of advanced electronic signatures and advanced seals to be recognised by public sector bodies pursuant to Articles 
27(5) and 37(5) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions in the internal market (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L235, 9.9.2015, 
p. 37–41
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1501 of 8 September 2015 
on the interoperability framework pursuant to Article 12(8) of Regulation 
(EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market 
(Text with EEA relevance), OJ L235, 9.9.2015, p. 1–6
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/806 of 22 May 2015 laying 
down specifications relating to the form of the EU trust mark for qualified trust 
services (Text with EEA relevance) C/2015/3364, OJ L128, 23.5.2015, p. 13–15
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/296 of 24 February 2015 establishing procedural arrangements for cooperation between Member 
States on electronic identification pursuant to Article 12(7) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market 
Text with EEA relevance, OJ L53, 25.2.2015, p. 14–20
StandardsThe authority to provide for stems from Directive 98/34 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down a procedure for the provision of 
information in the fields of technical standards and regulations and of rules on 
information services, OJ L 204 of 21.7.1998, p.37, as amended by Directive 98/48 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 217 of 5.8.1998, p. 18.
Electronic signatures in law164
Three European Standards Organisations are recognized: CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI (Commission Decision of 14 July 2003 on the publications of reference of generally recognised standards for electronic signature products in accordance with Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
2003/511/EC, OJ L 175 15.7.2003, p. 45).The following standards are set out in the Annex:CWA 14167-1 Security Requirements for Trustworthy Systems Managing 
Certificates for Electronic Signatures – Part 1: System Security Requirements; CWA 14167-2 Security Requirements for Trustworthy Systems Managing 
Certificates for Electronic Signatures – Part 2Cryptographic Module for CSP signing operations with backup – Protection 
profile (CMCSOB-PP) and CWA 14169 Secure Signature-creation devices ‘EAL 4+’
See also the ‘Standardisation Mandate to the European Standardisation 
Organisation CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the field of Information and 
Communication Technologies applied to electronic signatures,’ M/460 (European 
Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General, Innovation Policy, ICT 
for Competitiveness and Innovation, Brussels, 22 December 2009).
EU Reports
2002
J. Dumortier and P. Van Eecke, The Implementation of the European Directive on 
Electronic Signatures Status Report (Landwell and Interdisciplinary Centre 
for Law & Information Technology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2002)
2003
J. Dumortier, S. Kelm, H. Nilsson, G. Skouma and P. Van Eecke, The Legal and 
Market Aspects of Electronic Signatures (Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & 
Information Technology, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2003)
2006Report on the operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community framework 
for electronic signatures, COM(2006) 120 final, 15.3.2006
Rambøll Management, Benchmarking of existing national legal e-business 
practices, from the point of view of enterprises (e-signature, e-invoicing and 
e-contracts) (European Commission, Directorate-General for Enterprise and 
Industry, Draft Final Report, November 2006)
K.U.Leuven-ICRI (Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & ICT) and Lawfort, Legal 
study on Legal and Administrative Practices Regarding the Validity and Mutual 
Recognition of Electronic Documents, with a View to Identifying the Existing 
Barriers for Enterprises (D3.6 – Final Report, November 2006), prepared for 
the DG Enterprise and Industry, and D3.4 – First Interim Report (country 
reports, July 2006)
2007
S. Lacroix, O. Delos, P. van Eecke, M. Custers and W. Janin, Study on the 
Standardisation Aspects of e-Signature (EU DG Information Society and Media, 
final report dated 22 November 2007)
4. The European Union 165
2008
‘Action plan on e-signatures and e-identification to facilitate the provision 
of crossborder public services in the Single Market Brussels’, 28.11.2008 
COM(2008) 798 final
2009
H. Graux, Study on electronic documents and electronic delivery for the purpose of 
the implementation of Art. 8 of the Services Directive (European Commission 
Internal Market Directorate-General, version 1.3, 24 February 2009)
R. Cimander, M. Hansen and H. Kubicek, Electronic Signatures as Obstacle for 
Cross-Border E-Procurement in Europe Lessons from the PROCURE-project 
(Institut für Informationsmanagement Bremen GmbH, June 2009)
H. Graux, C. Staffe and E. Meyvis, European Federated Validation Service Study 
Solution Profile – A-SIT Signature Verification Service (IDABC European 
eGovernment Services, July 2009)
H. Graux and C. Staffe, Study on European Federated Validation Service (EFVS): 
Feasibility and Global Implementation Plan (IDABC European eGovernment 
Services, September 2009)
H. Graux, G. Lambert, B. Jossin and E. Meyvis, Study on Mutual Recognition of 
e-signatures: update of Country Profiles Analysis & Assessment Report (IDABC 
European eGovernment Services, October 2009)
E. Coscia, M. Megliola and C. Rubattino, eProcurement Map (IDABC Programme 
and ePractice, v2.0, October 2009)
J. Millard, J. Shahin, K. Pedersen, N. Huijboom and T. van den Broek, i2010 
eGovernment Action Plan Progress Study Final Report (SMART 2008/0042, 
November 2009)
‘Standardisation mandate to the European Standardisation Organisation CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI in the field of information and communication technologies 
applied to electronic signatures’, M/460 (European Commission, Enterprise 
and Industry Directorate-General, Innovation Policy, ICT for Competitiveness 
and Innovation, Brussels, 22 December 2009)
2010
H. Graux, O. Delos and S. Lacroix, Completion of the Framework for Signature 
Validation Services (IDABC European eGovernment Services, March 2010)
SEALED, time.lex and Siemens, ‘Study on cross-border interoperability of 
e-signatures (CROBIES)’ (Version 1.0, 31 July 2010)
2011
A. Rosenkötter, A. Hoffmann, A. Gyulai-Schmidt, A. Fritz and E. Kühn, Digital 
Internal Market Study (Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection, IP/A/IMCO/ST/2011-04, June 2011)
2012
L. A. Remotti, A. F. van Veenstra, M. van Lieshout, L. Kool, G. Rumpf, B. Ipektsidis 
and T. Damvakeraki, EU online Trustmarks – Building Digital Confidence in 
Europe, Final Report (A study prepared for the European Commission DG 
Electronic signatures in law166
Communications Networks, Content & Technology, 2012, Contract number: 
SMART 2011/0022)
H. Graux, M. De Soete, P. Van Eecke, O. Delos, T. Debusschere, M. Hansen, M. Sel and 
R. Genhini, Study to support the implementation of a pan-European framework 
on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the 
internal market (SMART 2012/0001)
2013
DLA Piper, SEALED, Time.lex, Pricewaterhousecoopers, SGA, Feasibility study on 
an electronic identification, authentication and signature policy (IAS) Final 
Report (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2013)
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 5, ‘Un’, pp. 167–82.
5England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland
The Electronic Communications Act 2000
5.1 The first draft of a bill, the Electronic Communications Bill, was 
published in July 1999. This Bill was withdrawn when it attracted a great deal 
of wrath regarding key escrow (which is now expressly excluded in the Act 
by s14) and provisions that were later incorporated into the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The Electronic Communications Act received 
the royal assent on 25 May 2000, and extends to Northern Ireland.1 The Act is in three parts:
Part 1: Cryptography service providers. This part of the Act provides for the establishment of a statutory register of approved 
providers of cryptography support services. It has not been 
implemented, and a voluntary scheme is in place.2 Further, by the 
terms of s16(4), Part I was repealed on 25 May 2005 because no 
order was made under s16(2) by the end of the period of five years 
beginning with the day on which the Act was passed.
Part II: Facilitation of electronic commerce, data storage, etc. This part is concerned with the legal recognition and admissibility of electronic signatures; permits the removal of statutory restrictions, which impose a requirement that a transaction must be in writing, and facilitates the use of electronic means to store information in 
an electronic format.
Part III: Miscellaneous and supplemental. This part makes a number of amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1984 
regarding the modification of telecommunications licences, and also covers the usual matters including interpretation; the short 
title, commencement and the territorial extent of the Act.
5.2 Sections 7, 11 and 12 came into force on 25 July 2000 in accordance with 
the provisions of the Electronic Communications Act 2000 (Commencement 
No 1) Order 2000 (SI 2000 No 1798); section 4(2) was amended by section 82, 
Schedule 4(10) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and section 
15(1) was amended by section 406(1), Schedule 17(158) of the Communications 
Act 2003, and sections 11 and 12 were repealed by section 406(7), Schedule 
19(1) of the Communications Act 2003. The Act was amended in 2016 by 
1 Section 16(5).
2 tScheme, available online at http://www.tscheme.org.
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The Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions 
Regulations 2016 (SI 2016 No 696).3
5.3 Unless there is a specific statutory requirement for a document to be signed, English law does not require any document to be signed to be both valid 
and effective. Thus in many instances, it was possible to sign a document with 
an electronic signature before the passing of the Act. The signature at the end of an e-mail, as in the case of Hall v. Cognos Limited4 was sufficient, providing the person signing the document intended to sign it and intended their signature to 
affect the authenticity of the document. If the identity of the person signing the document is in doubt, further evidence can be adduced to identify the person 
who affixed their signature to the document.
The international context
5.4 The Explanatory Notes to the Act were prepared by the Department 
of Trade and Industry. The commentary, at paragraph 19, suggested the Bill was consistent with the EU Electronic Signatures Directive, although it only implemented some of the provisions of the Directive – a Statutory Instrument 
was subsequently passed to implement the Directive in full.5 It was also suggested 
that the Bill was compatible with the Cryptography Guidelines published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development on 19 March 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law of Electronic Commerce, and the draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures and 
Certification Authorities.
The definition of an electronic signature
5.5 The amended definition of an electronic signature6 reads in s 7(2) as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature is so much of anything in electronic form as-
(a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically associated with any electronic communication or electronic data; and
(b) purports to be used by the individual creating it to sign.
3 Made on 30 June 2016; laid before Parliament 1 July 2016; into force on 22 July 2016.
4 Industrial Tribunal Case No 1803325/97.
5 The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No 318 (made on 13 February 2002, 
laid before Parliament 14 February 2002, in force on 8 March 2002). These Regulations are 
revoked by Regulation 4 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic 
Transactions Regulations 2016 (SI 2016 No 696).
6 Amended by The Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions 
Regulations 2016 (SI 2016 No 696) (made on 30 June 2016; laid before Parliament 1 July 
2016; in force on 22 July 2016).
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5.6 An electronic communication is defined in s15(1):7
‘electronic communication’ means a communication transmitted 
(whether from one person to another, from one device to another 
or from a person to a device or vice versa) -
(a) an electronic communications network; or
(b) by other means but while in an electronic form;
5.7 While an electronic signature does not have the same characteristics as a manuscript signature, it is the equivalent of a manuscript signature when 
it performs a similar function. The better view is to consider an electronic signature as a link between protocols of electronic devices that communicate via 
software, each with the other. The attention should be focused on the treatment 
of messages before they are transmitted and after they are received. By way of example, consider the steps taken in relation to a document in electronic format:
(i) Alice uses a computer to type a letter. She has two options. She can print it out and sign it manually before arranging for it to be 
delivered to its destination. This can be by means of the post, hand 
delivery or any other method. When the document is produced in printed format and is signed with a manuscript signature, the 
electronic version remains (unless expunged), but no longer 
governs the content. The paper version becomes the document 
that will govern the relationship between the parties. Alternatively, Alice can decide to sign the letter with the private key of a digital 
signature.
(ii) Signing the letter with the private key of a digital signature 
follows a protocol. The letter is in the form of a number of bits. For instance, Alice may instruct the software in her computer to perform 
a mathematical calculation on the file. She will do this by typing in a 
password to reveal the file containing the private key and clicking an 
icon to instruct the software to carry out the necessary actions. The program will then decrypt the private key with the password and 
calculate the signature. The calculation, called a signature, is then 
associated with the document by the computer. There is a direct 
association between the software in which the file has been created 
and the mathematical calculation that is used to sign the document. The signature is proof in mathematical terms that a value, known as a secret key, was present in the computer at the time the calculation 
was made. Thus there is an association between the secret key and the signing of the document, although it must be remembered that the encryption key is just a value, which must have been available 
to the system that originated the signature. It does not identify the 
7 As amended by s406(1), Schedule 17(158) of the Communications Act 2003.
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individual. Thus it does not follow that Alice caused the software to 
undertake the mathematical calculation. There is no nexus between the signing of the document by the software and any action on the 
part of Alice (it would be different if Alice accepts that it was her 
action that caused the connection to occur). A problem may occur if a person gains access to the computer by means of malicious software, such as, for instance, a Trojan horse that causes the software to display one message on the screen, while signing 
another document. It is possible for a third party to have written a 
suitable plug-in that infiltrates the computer, permitting a person to enter the computer remotely without authority and use the private 
key to sign documents without Alice’s consent or her knowledge. Should the computer have been taken over in this way, the status of 
the computer changes from being trusted to un-trusted. However, the owner or user may not be aware that the computer cannot be 
trusted.8
(iii) Consider another scenario. Alice creates a document and then 
saves it. Assume Alice attaches it to an e-mail to be sent at a time 
in the future. Assume the document is automatically signed with the private key of a digital signature as Alice sends it, without any 
action. It does not follow that the signature appended automatically 
can authenticate that is was Alice who signed the document.9
(iv) It is possible in principle to produce an electronic signature that 
can be trusted, and link the individual to the document. By having a computer that is not connected to any external connections, and never has been so connected at any time, and that incorporates no components that have ever been incorporated in a machine which has ever had any external connections, and by retaining complete physical control over access to the computer by anyone except Alice, it is possible to provide for the nexus between the electronic 
signature and Alice. However, this then requires the user to rely on the security of the software and hardware, which in turn poses 
even more problems.10
8 For cases where the digital signatures of companies have been used by criminals to transfer 
funds from company bank accounts, see O.I. Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of electronic digital 
signatures in banking relationships in the Russian Federation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 51–7, and O.I. Kudryavtseva, Case note: Resolution of the 
Federal Arbitration Court of Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 N КГ-А 40/8531-03-П, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 149–51.
9 To a certain extent, this matter will be dealt with by the organization. Access controls will be included in the infrastructure to determine which messages should be signed 
and by whom. The only problem is if an insider with sufficient rights of access alters the 
configurations.10 It is also possible to retain control by placing the computer in a safe, and burying the safe 
below six feet of earth. The debate then concerns whether the worms can be trusted.
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5.8 An electronic signature can be the equivalent of a manuscript signature where it performs a similar function, even though the two types of signature are 
conceptually different. The manuscript signature exists in the corporeal world 
and requires the physical application of matter to alter the surface of a carrier. An 
electronic signature can only be defined within the operational boundaries of the 
binary numbers used by computers.
The elements of an electronic signature
So much of anything in electronic form
5.9 This is a wide-ranging provision that should ensure new concepts yet to 
be invented are covered by the term ‘electronic form’.
Incorporation or logical association
5.10 The first element, ‘so much of anything in electronic form’ must either be incorporated or logically associated with any electronic communication or 
electronic data. This part of the requirement differs slightly from article 3(10) 
of the Regulation, which refers to ‘attached to or logically associated with’. 
However, the meaning of the word ‘attached’ is defined as ‘joined functionally’, 
which implies a similarity to the meaning of ‘incorporated’, which in turn is 
defined as to ‘be included as part of a whole’ or ‘embodied’.11 This seems to 
be a semantic difference that does not affect meaning. The signature could be 
incorporated by reference to the way it is created. For instance, with a digital signature, incorporation is possible when the software takes part of the plaintext 
and encrypts it (creating the message authentication code), so the recipient can 
check if the message has been altered. In effect, the message authentication code is a separate part of the message, but is also incorporated into the message by 
taking the message and encoding it. Alternatively, a biometric measurement can 
be attached to a message. This is where the biometric measurement, if used, must be logically associated with the message, otherwise it will not serve any 
function. Although the discussion above is predicated on particular methods of producing electronic signatures, the underlying principles are the same for all methods, including a name typed into an e-mail or an e-mail address, although the 
functions of an electronic signature may differ between products and methods.
Purports to be used by the individual creating it to sign
5.11 In this revised sub-clause merely recognises that it does not follow that 
where an electronic signature was affixed to data, it follows that the person whose signature it purports to be was the person that caused the signature to 
be affixed.
11 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition on CD-ROM (v. 4.0).
Electronic signatures in law172
5.12 In the context of the Act, the meaning of authenticity relates to the single 
issue of verifying the person or entity, as provided for in s15(2):
(2) In this Act-
(a) references to the authenticity of any communication or data are references to any one or more of the following-
(i) whether the communication or data comes from a particular person or other source;
(ii) whether it is accurately timed and dated;
(iii) whether it is intended to have legal effect;and
(b) references to the integrity of any communication or data are references to whether there has been any tampering with or other 
modification of the communication or data.
5.13 This definition relates to the evidential issues regarding the authentication 
of the communication or data. Where an electronic signature is in issue, whichever party has the burden of proof will be required to submit evidence in response to 
the guidance set out in s15(2), together with any other extrinsic evidence that 
may be necessary to support the evidential burden.
5.14 An electronic signature will have to be admissible before it can become 
legally effective.12 In addition, it does not follow that the communication will have a legal effect unless it is intended to have such an effect,13 and the provisions of s7 
do not address whether the signature is genuine. Section 7(1) of the Act provides for the admissibility of the electronic signature in two ways:
7(1) In any legal proceedings-
(a) an electronic signature incorporated into or logically associated with a particular electronic communication or particular electronic data, and
(b) the certification by any person of such a signature,shall each be admissible in evidence in relation to any question as to the authenticity of the communication or data or as to the 
integrity of the communication or data.
5.15 First, an electronic signature is admissible under the provisions of 
s7(1)(a) where it is incorporated into or logically associated with a particular 
electronic communication or data. Alternatively, in accordance with the 
provisions of s7(1)(b), the authenticity or the integrity of the communication or 
12 Law Commission, ‘Electronic commerce: formal requirements in commercial transactions 
advice from the Law Commission’ (2001), 3.27.13 Section 15(2)(a)(iii).
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data can be admissible where any person certifies the signature. The certificate would normally be provided by an entity such as a trusted third party, although 
it does not follow that such a certificate has to be provided by a trusted third 
party. For instance, it is perfectly possible for Bob to certify that Alice signed 
an e-mail she sent when she typed her name at the bottom of the text. It seems, therefore, that if a recipient receives an electronic communication which is 
signed with an electronic signature, and the certifying certificate relating to the 
electronic signature can be verified, the communication in question is admissible 
in evidence, subject to the provisions of s15(2) of the Act.14
5.16 The certification by any person mentioned in s7(1)(b) is satisfactory if the 
statement made includes the criteria set out in s7(3), as amended:
(3) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature incorporated into or associated with a particular electronic 
communication or particular electronic data is certified by any 
person if that person (whether before or after the making of the 
communication) has made a statement confirming that-
(a) the signature,
(b) a means of producing, communicating or verifying the signature, or
(c) a procedure applied to the signature,
is (either alone or in combination with other factors) a valid means 
of signing.
5.17 The person or organization certifying the electronic signature may need to certify before or after or both before and after sending the communication, that the signature is authentic and the integrity of the data or communication is 
therefore not to be questioned. From a practical point of view, the certification process will probably occur before the sending of the communication, although 
there may be circumstances where the certification process can occur after the 
communication is sent. The actual certification will probably be an assertion, that ought to be substantiated by suitable evidence, by the person or organization 
certifying the signature that there is an association that links the verification key 
(if a digital signature) with an entity, and certifies that the use of the verification key is a valid way of verifying whether a private key issued to the person named 
was used in creating the signature. The link between the components of the key 
pair, if this were to be challenged, would have to be the subject of expert evidence. 
It is possible for a certificate in isolation to be sufficient in some instances. In all 
probability, where a party seeks to adduce evidence of a certificate as establishing the authenticity or integrity of the communication or message or both, additional 
evidence may be required. It is the provision of this extrinsic evidence that is 
14 It should be noted that all this evidence would have been admissible anyway, just as it has 
been in the past.
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necessary to provide evidence of the user’s identity. From the practical point of 
view, it may be difficult to obtain such evidence if the communication in question 
is the subject of legal action years after it was sent. Even if such a certificate is 
accepted as evidence of the facts contained in the certificate, it will not link the 
act of signing with the individual or entity whose signature it is. Whether the 
certification is provided electronically or physically, it may have to be the subject 
of proof that part of the content of the certificate is acceptable as to the truth of the content, because the information relating to the subscribing party will be a hearsay statement in relation to any facts not within the knowledge of the 
certification service provider. It should be noted that the provisions of s7 do not consider whether the signature is genuine, or if it demonstrates the necessary 
intent by the signing party. The section, in dealing with admissibility, leaves the 
question of evidential weight to the adjudicator.
Other forms of electronic signature and the electronic seal
5.18 The Regulation, which is directly applicable, also provides for the 
advanced electronic signature and the qualified electronic signature. These forms 
of signature are discussed in the chapter on the European Union. The concept of 
the electronic seal has also been introduced by the Regulation (by article 3(25)), 
including the advanced electronic seal (article 3(26)) and qualified electronic 
seal (article 3(27)). These have been included in the Act by the incorporation of 
new section 7A dealing with electronic seals and related certificates.
The power to modify legislation
5.19 There are many thousands of references in statutes and statutory instruments which require the use of paper or can be interpreted to require the use 
of paper, as well as the use of manuscript signatures. Amending such provisions 
with an overall catch-all clause was not possible, nor desirable. However, it is pertinent to observe a comment by the Law Commission in relation to this issue:15While section 7 deals with admissibility, it does not provide that 
electronic signatures will satisfy a statutory signature requirement. It does not, therefore, assist in determining to what extent existing 
statutory signature requirements are capable of being satisfied 
electronically.
5.20 In any event, power has been delegated to Ministers to modify, by order made by statutory instrument, the provisions of any enactment or subordinate legislation, or instruments made under such legislation, for which they are 
responsible. The government recognizes the need for a coordinated approach 
between departments in enacting such subordinate legislation. Following the 
recommendation noted in paragraph 10.45 to the Performance and Innovation 
15 Law Commission, ‘Electronic commerce: formal requirements in commercial transactions 
advice from the Law Commission’ (2001), 3.27.
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Unit Report ‘e-commerce@its.best.uk’ (September 1999), the Central IT Unit 
in the Cabinet Office was given the task of developing guidelines to ensure 
Departments follow a consistent approach.
5.21 The authority granted to Ministers is provided by s8(1). Ministers have the power to modify by statutory instrument the provisions of:16
(a) any enactment or subordinate legislation, or
(b) any scheme, licence, authorisation or approval issued, granted or given by or under any enactment or subordinate legislation,
in such manner as he may think fit for the purpose of authorising or facilitating the use of electronic communications or electronic 
storage (instead of other forms of communication or storage) for 
any purpose mentioned in subsection (2).
Limitation of powers
5.22 The power granted to the Minister is limited by the terms of s8(3), where 
consideration must be given to the arrangements for record keeping. Changes must not be made that make the new arrangements for record keeping less 
satisfactory than before the changes were made. A further limitation is set out 
in s8(6), which provides that an order ‘shall not require the use of electronic 
communications or electronic storage for any purpose’. This subsection is 
qualified by s8(6)(b), which permits a period of notice to expire before effect is 
given to a variation or withdrawal of an election or other decision.
Purposes for which modification can be made
5.23 Modification of an enactment can be made for the following purposes, by permitting the use of electronic means as follows:
(a) The doing of things that may need to be evidenced in writing or 
where a document, notice or instrument is required.17
(b) Alternative means of delivery where the post or other specified 
means of delivery is required.18
(c) Where there is a requirement for a matter to be authorized by 
a person’s signature or seal, or where it is required to be delivered 
as a deed or witnessed.19
16 By s8(7), matters under the care and control of the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue or Customs and Excise are not included, because there are corresponding powers in s132 of the Finance Act 1999, which have already been exercised by way of statutory 
instruments relating to electronic tax and VAT returns.17 Section 8(2)(a).18 Section 8(2)(b).19 Section 8(2)(c).
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(d) Where a statement may be required to be made under oath or 
to be contained in a statutory declaration.20
(e) Where records have to be kept, maintained or preserved in relation to any account, record, notice instrument or other 
document.21
(f) The provision, production or publication relating to any 
information or other matter.22
(g) The making of any payment.23
The provisions a Minister may make
5.24 The Act provides the Minister with a power to provide for a range of issues 
when drafting a statutory instrument. The list is set out in s8(4). The provisions 
of s8(4)(g) cross refer to s8(5). These two sections provide Ministers with the powers to determine such issues as matters relating to the legal presumption 
and the burden of proof. Section 8(4)(g) reads as follows:
(g) provision, in relation to cases in which the use of electronic communications or electronic storage is so authorised, for the determination of any of the matters mentioned in subsection 
(5), or as to the manner in which they may be proved in legal proceedings;
5.25 Section 8(5) provides:
(5) The matters referred to in subsection (4)(g) are-
(a) whether a thing has been done using an electronic communication or electronic storage;
(b) the time at which, or date on which, a thing done using any such communication or storage was done;
(c) the place where a thing done using such communication or storage was done;
(d) the person by whom such a thing was done; and
(e) the contents, authenticity or integrity of any electronic data.
5.26 These two sections, taken together, indicate a Minister has a great deal of control over how electronic communications are to be handled, and what 
presumptions will apply when using electronic communications. The combined 
20 Section 8(2)(d).21 Section 8(2)(e).22 Section 8(2)(f).23 Section 8(2)(g).
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effect of s8(4) and s8(5) permits a Minister to impose rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions, with the potential for shifting the risks from the receiving party to 
the purported signing party. This has the potential for doing great injustice, and 
as a result causing much harm to the prospects of electronic commerce. Arguably, the power is wider than just replacing paper documents with an electronic 
equivalent. An example would be replacing the circulation of statutory accounts to shareholders by post or as attachments to an e-mail, with an electronic notice 
of their availability at a nominated uniform resource locator.
5.27 The Electronic Communications Act 2000 as amended has not altered the 
underlying flexibility of the meaning of a signature. An electronic signature does 
not have to be in the specific form of digital signature for it to be accepted as 
a signature. By typing a name to an electronic document, all the person needs to do is intend the name they type to act as a means of authentication, and 
intend the recipient to act upon the content of the document. The act of typing 
a name in this fashion comes within the provisions of s7(2) of the Electronic Communications Act 2000, because the typed signature is incorporated with the content of the document for the purpose of establishing the authenticity of 
the communication.24 No further requirements are necessary to make a typed 
signature admissible. Whether a name in an e-mail address can be construed as a form of electronic signature is discussed at length elsewhere in this text in relation to the case of J Pereira Fernandes SA v. Mehta.25
Regulation of Investigatory Powers
5.28 The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), which extends 
to Northern Ireland, received the Royal Assent on 28 July 2000. For the purposes 
of this text, the powers relating to the disclosure of a key are relevant. The power to require disclosure is provided in s49, but of importance is what is the 
meaning of a key. What constitutes a key is widely defined, and includes codes 
and passwords. The definition in s56(1) is as follows:in relation to any electronic data, means any key, code, password, 
algorithm or other data the use of which (with or without other 
keys) –
(a) allows access to the electronic data, or
(b) facilitates the putting of data into an intelligible form;
24 In Golden Ocean Group Limited v. Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd [2011] EWHC 56 
(Comm), Mr Justice Christopher Clarke indicated at 103 that ‘an e-mail, the text of which 
begins “Paul/Peter”, may be regarded as signed by Peter because by that form of wording 
Peter signifies that he is addressing Paul and authenticates the content of the whole of 
what follows’.25 [2006] 1 WLR 1543; [2006] 2 All ER 891; [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885; [2006] All ER (D) 
264 (Apr); [2006] IP & T 546; The Times 16 May 2006; [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch).
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5.29 In the context of digital signatures, any person or organization that obtains and uses private keys should ensure the key is only suitable for the purposes of 
a digital signature, and it cannot be used for any other purpose.26 If a key can be used for purposes other than a digital signature, it may be the subject of a s49 
notice. Also, it will be important to ensure keys used for digital signatures are 
stored separately from any other types of private key used for other purposes.
Possession of a key
5.30 A person has possession of a key in accordance with the provisions of 
s56(2). A person may be deemed to have a key, even they do not have the key. The 
definition is as follows:
References in this Part to a person’s having information (including a 
key to protected information) in his possession include references-
(a) to its being in the possession of a person who is under his control so far as that information is concerned;
(b) to his having an immediate right of access to it, or an immediate right to have it transmitted or otherwise supplied to him; and
(c) to its being, or being contained in, anything which he or a person under his control is entitled, in exercise of any statutory power and without otherwise taking possession 
of it, to detain, inspect or search.
5.31 This is a fairly important provision, because the officers of an organization, whatever the legal form the organization takes, are the ones responsible for the 
proper management of the private key.27 This is because any s49 notice served 
will be served on an officer or senior manager. Control must, therefore, be 
exercised over the acquisition and use of private keys. For instance, a person at 
the highest level in an organization should be made responsible for this issue. Considerations in whether to use private keys will cover, but not be limited to:
(a) Deciding if information sent electronically needs to be 
encrypted. If it does, whether there are more appropriate means 
of delivering the information to the intended recipient.
(b) Deciding if documents or messages need to be digitally signed. 
26 It is possible for encrypted data to be encoded in such a way that it can be decoded in two separate ways, one to reveal the secret message and the other to reveal an innocuous 
message: D. Grover, ‘Dual encryption and plausible deniability’, Computer Law & Security 
Report, 20 (2004), pp. 37–40.27 R.J. Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems 
(2nd edn, Indianapolis: Wiley, 2008), ch. 25 for a discussion on the principles involved in 
this process.
5. England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland 179
If so, then the next question is whether a risk analysis has been conducted to determine the likely costs of resolving a dispute if a signature has been misused, bearing in mind the discussion 
elsewhere in this text relating to liability.
(c) If private keys are to be used, whatever the purpose, sufficient consideration must be given to storage, access for appropriately 
authorized officers and employees, and the provision of checks 
and balances to provide for security.
Exclusion of electronic signatures
5.32 Where a key is used only for the purpose of generating a digital signature, it does not have to be disclosed in response to a notice, providing it has not been 
used for any other purpose.28 It might be useful to recall that a key pair has more 
than the single function of producing a digital signature. The same key pair can 
be used to encrypt a message, depending on the algorithm used. An electronic 
signature is defined in s56(2) and means:anything in electronic form which-
(a) is incorporated into or logically associated with, any electronic communication or other data;
(b) is generated by the signatory or other source of the communication or data; and
(c) is used for the purpose of facilitating, by means of a link between the signatory or other source and the communication or data, the establishment of the authenticity of the communication or data, the establishment of its integrity, or both;
5.33 This exemption may be less effective than it seems. In a commercial context, where more than one person may properly have access to a key, the person served with the notice may not be able to be sure that a key, despite being intended for signature purposes, has never been used to decrypt a message 
encrypted with the corresponding public key. Although it is arguably for the prosecution to prove that a key has been used for such a purpose, and is therefore subject to seizure, the mere assertion of this fact by the person demanding access to the key would place the recipient of the notice in a position of impossible 
difficulty in resisting the demand.29
28 Section 49(9).29 For more detail, see S. Mason, ed., Electronic Evidence (3rd edn., London: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2012), ch. 6.

S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 6, ‘Introduction to the electronic signature’, pp. 181–201.
6Introduction to the electronic signature
6.1 While it is possible for an electronic signature to perform the same functions as a manuscript signature, the document to be signed does not exist as a physical object in the same way as the content of a document rendered on to a 
paper carrier.1 It is not necessarily intended that an electronic signature should be manifest in a physical form, which leads to the conclusion that the quality and extent of the evidence to provide intent becomes vitally important in the 
event it is disputed that an electronic signature was affixed to a document or 
communication.2
6.2 It does not follow that lawyers are even aware of electronic signatures,3 or the fact that electronic signatures can be used instead of manuscript signatures, and challenges have been made, claiming that an electronic signature should 
not be used instead of a manuscript signature.4 For instance, in the Californian case of Ni v. Slocum, as Chief Elections Officer5 electronic signatures were not permitted on an initiative petition without a change of law, and in Missouri, 
the City did not agree to conduct transactions by electronic means.6 Compare 
these decisions to (i) the decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in Anderson 
v. Bell,7 where an electronic signature satisfied the signature requirement for 
1 On occasion, arguments will be made that a manuscript signature must be used, especially 
in criminal proceedings. Judges tend to take a robust approach to such submissions, for which see, by way of example, United States of America v. Mariner, 2012 WL 60827, where 
the indictment only contained electronic signatures.2 By way of example, see a case from the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California: Ruiz v. Moss Bross. Auto Group, Inc., 232 Cal.App.4th 836 (2014), 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 
781, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,270, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 16,951, where Moss Bros 
failed to prove Ruiz signed an agreement electronically.3 The judge had to alert the lawyers to the case of Harding v. Brisbane City Council [2008] 
QPEC 75 (16 October 2008) in Morgan v. Toowoomba Regional Council (No 2) 2011 [2011] 
QPEC 61 2011, 2011 WL 2159617 – even though the first edition of this text was published 
in 2003.
4 Case translation: Sweden, Case No. 11534-13, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature 
Law Review, 12 (2015), pp. 103–6.
5 196 Cal.App.4th 1636 (2011), 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8306, 2011 Daily 
Journal D.A.R. 9936; a loan document signed with a digital signature could not be enforced under the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act § 478: Case translation: Denmark, 
U.2014.52 V, 6 September 2013, with a commentary by Professor Lars Bo Langsted, 11 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2014), 147 – 148; Case translation: 
Denmark, U.2014.712Ø, 13 November 2013, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 11 (2014), pp. 149–50.6 WCT & D, LLC, v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, --- S.W.3d ---- (2015), 2015 WL 8231576.
7 234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010), 234 P.3d 1147 (2010).
Electronic signatures in law182
nomination petitions that the Utah Code imposes on those who wish to run for 
statewide office but do not affiliate with a registered political party; (ii) the decision in Benjamin v. Walker,8 where the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia determined that an electronic receipt containing a unique transaction 
identifier is a sufficient signature of the contributor within the meaning of 
the West Virginia Code Chapter 3 Elections §3-12-9(b) regarding qualifying 
contributions, and (iii) Thompson Brothers (Construction) Ltd. v. Alberta 
(Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation),9 where the electronic 
signatures of counsel are accepted in Alberta, Canada. A similar question arose in England and Wales in FHG Publications Ltd v. Tee-Hillman,10 in the County 
Court at Southampton on 21 November 2000. In this case, FHG sent a single 
Statement of Truth accompanying a batch of proceedings to be issued. They were all sent electronically, and duly signed by an individual whose name was 
also printed on the document. The claim form received by Tee-Hillman had only the name of the solicitors inserted in its Statement of Truth, as issued 
by the Claims Production Centre. Tee-Hillman paid the sum in dispute on 31 
August, but refused to pay any costs, arguing although FHG had provided a single Statement of Truth satisfying paragraph of Practice Direction 7C para 
1.4(5), it was necessary for an individual’s signature to be present on the claim 
form received by him. It appeared that a copy of the electronic signature had 
not been transferred to the claim form by the Claims Production Centre. The 
application was dismissed.
Digital documents
Information relating to the carrier
6.3 When a manuscript signature is affixed to a physical carrier, two changes 
occur. First, the signature alters the carrier physically with the addition of a 
substance, such as ink, to the surface. Second, the signature increases the amount 
of information about the carrier, and thereby the document. An electronic signature, on the other hand, only tends to alter the information relating to 
the digital data. It does not necessarily alter the carrier in the same way as a 
manuscript signature, although an inline Pretty Good Privacy signature, for 
instance, is read with the message. The information associated with the carrier 
is termed the metadata. The metadata refers to the data about data. It is a digest 
of the structure and subject matter of a resource. For instance, the metadata in relation to a piece of paper may be:
8 786 S.E.2d 200 (2016).
9 2012 CarswellAlta 874, 2012 ABCA 150, [2012] A.W.L.D. 3031, [2012] A.W.L.D. 3036, 
[2012] A.W.L.D. 3098, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 576, 522 A.R. 184, 544 W.A.C. 184.10 [2001] C.L.Y. 662.
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Explicit from perusing the paper itself, such as the title of the document, the date, who wrote it, who received it and where the 
document is located.Implicit, which includes such characteristics as the types of type used, such as bold, underline or italic; perhaps the document is 
located in a coloured file to denote a particular type of document; labels may also act as pointers to allow the person using the document to deal with it in a particular manner, such as a 
confidential file, for instance.
6.4 With digital documents, the implicit data needs to be made explicit if it is 
to be used to help interpret the purpose of the document. Such data can include, and be taken automatically from the originating application software, or supplied 
by the person that originally created the record. As a result, a digital record will normally contain two main types of information, the content of the document and its internal structure, and the metadata, which describes the record and each 
of the constituent parts.
The nature of a document in digital form
6.5 A digital document can be evident as a physical document, where it is 
created using a computer and produced in physical format by being printed. However, it must be noted that the nexus between the printed document and 
the document stored in digital format will alter. First, the printed form of the 
document will capture the content of the document at the time it is printed. 
The physical manifestation of the electronic document (a contract or a will, for 
instance) can then be marked with a manuscript signature, and it then becomes 
a document in the physical sense. The information about the physical carrier 
will then alter over time. However, unless the metadata relating to the document stored in digital form is retained in such a way as to link the document, as printed, with the act of printing, the nexus between the printed version of the document 
and the electronic version may change. Such alterations to the metadata will take place when the original document stored in digital form is deleted or the content 
is modified or re-written. In such circumstances, the content on the printed 
carrier may differ from the content stored in digital form. While this will not matter when a standard letter, by way of example, is altered to change the name and address of the recipient, it will be of substantial concern when the document 
is a contract, and the printed version differs from the digital version. The information relating to the content of the document, the metadata, might then 
become a crucial aspect of the evidence.11 Alternatively, a person cannot observe a digital document that is stored in a digital form without using a computer with 
a screen. Even when a document is apparent to the eye on a screen, the viewer 
11 For case law on the importance of metadata, see S. Mason, ed., Electronic Evidence (3rd 
edn., London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), 2.09–2.10.
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is not looking at the underlying digital format of the carrier. This is because it is 
in binary form, which in turn is translated into a readable format on the screen.
6.6 Reference to electronic documents in this text will primarily be references 
to documents stored in digital format that are invisible to the human eye.
Signing without authority
6.7 The legal response to signing a document in electronic format without 
authority remains as for physical signatures. An electronic signature can, of 
course, be affixed without the authority of a person, as in the case of Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Penthouse International, Inc., n/k/a/ PHSL Worldwide, 
Inc.,12 where the electronic signature (the type of electronic signature is not made 
clear) of Robert C. Guccione, the principal executive officer and principal financial 
officer of Penthouse, was affixed to a certificate without his permission.13
6.8 Depending on the facts, a person can ratify the signature. The Supreme 
Court, New York County, New York concluded that where a personal assistant electronically signs a document for the purchase of property using dedicated electronic signature software without explicit authority, the signature is capable 
of being ratified by the principal.14 In the Ohio case of Cleveland Metropolitan 
Bar Association v. Brown-Daniels,15 Barbara Brown-Daniels used the electronic 
password and signature of Donald R. Murphy, an attorney with whom she 
began to work with after a court suspended her electronic-filing privileges. 
The court determined that Ms Brown-Daniels used Mr Murphy’s signature with his permission before he terminated their association, but her use of his authentication and signature after termination of their association was 
unauthorized.
Delegating the use of an electronic signature
6.9 Another can be a delegated person to sign a document, as in the Australian case of Whittaker v. Child Support Registrar16 where a person affixed 
the scanned electronic signature of another to a letter with authority. However, 
12 390 F.Supp.2d 344 (2005), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,565; see also the Kansas case of Robinson 
v. City of Arkansas, 912 F.Supp.2d 1045 (D.Kan. 2012).13 The enforcement action was settled by final judgments entered before the Honorable 
Robert W. Sweet of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
on 27 April 2007, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20110.htm; see also the Ontario case of Baird v. College of Chiropractors of Ontario 2015 ONSC 1484.14 In the Matter of an Article 75 Proceeding ADHY Investments Properties, LLC, Petitioner v. 
Garrison Lifestyle Pierce Hill LLC, 41 Misc.3d 1211(A), 980 N.Y.S.2d 274, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 
51634(U).15 985 N.E.2d 1289 (Ohio 2013), 135 Ohio St.3d 278.16 [2010] FCA 43 (5 February 2010).
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the indiscriminate use of a signature that is subject to professional regulations can lead to sanctions, as illustrated in the Ohio case of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Lorenzon.17 In 2008, Mr Lorenzon entered into an agreement with Consumer Law 
Group, P.A., a law firm in Florida that negotiates debt on behalf of consumers. Mr 
Lorenzon was paid US$1,000 annually to serve as local counsel for Consumer 
Law. He was required to execute a contract with each Ohio client. To simplify the execution of the contracts, Mr Lorenzon provided Consumer Law with his 
electronic signature and Ohio attorney registration number. Mr Lorenzon later discovered that Consumer Law had used his name, electronic signature and 
attorney-registration number to enter into contracts without his knowledge. He was subsequently charged with violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the decision of the Panel and Board, 
in that Mr Lorenzon was found guilty of infringing Rule 8.4(h) of the Professional Conduct Rules for permitting his electronic signature and attorney-registration 
number to be used without restriction.
Forged signatures
6.10 The use of electronic signatures can facilitate the smooth running of an organization, but sometimes undue pressures can be made on employees to such 
an extent that they carry out actions that they ought not to contemplate. This is illustrated in the Canadian case of Re: Jade Truman Kaiser Mason,18 where Mr 
Mason affixed the electronic signature of customer on to electronic documents without their knowledge, although it is not clear what form the electronic 
signatures took in this case.
6.11 An early case where the PIN to a corporate bank account was used without authority occurred in the Australian employment case of H. Sayner 
and Joblink Plus Limited – re Termination of employment,19 where Joblink had an electronic transfer policy, which stated that a member of the Board must 
enter a code into the system when transferring funds electronically. The codes were written on a piece of paper, placed in a sealed envelope and left with the 
Finance Manager to store in a safe location and to be opened in an emergency. The envelope had a direction written on the outside to the effect that the envelope was not to be opened except in an emergency in the event that neither Ms Esther Halliday, the Chair of the Board, or other members of the Board were 
able to attend the office to transfer money. Ms Sayner used the corporate PIN to pay for a holiday for the then Finance Manager, Mr Helanath Disanayake and his family to the Novotel Opal Cove Resort at Coffs Harbour using Joblink funds 
in the amount of A$2,241.50. This expenditure was improper and not approved 
by the Board.
17 978 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio 2012), 133 Ohio St.3d 332.18 2012 CanLII 42180 (CA MFDAC); 2012 CanLII 42181 (CA MFDAC).19 PR950280 [2004] AIRC 748 (30 July 2004).
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6.12 When forms of electronic signature are placed on a hard drive in such a way that there is no mechanism to prevent others from using the electronic signature of another person, they are exposed to being used without authority, as in the Canadian case of Adamo v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario,20 
where the electronic signature of another doctor was affixed to a falsified record 
without authority. Similar examples occurred in Australia in the cases of Salfinger 
v. Niugini Mining (Australia) Pty Ltd (No. 3)21 which concerned the forgery of 
purported assignments where Heerey J concluded that Mr Salfinger had access 
to Mr McCordic’s electronic signature, and concluded that Mr Salfinger affixed 
Mr McCordic’s electronic signature to a document without his authority, and in 
Re Macartney and Tax Agents’ Board of Victoria,22 where the applicant applied to 
the Victorian Tax Agents’ Board for registration as a tax agent. He was a qualified 
accountant, aged 64. At the time of making the application, he was about to lose 
his position with his employer. To support his application, he had to provide a 
statement of relevant employment. The statement was not to be signed by the 
applicant. Before he left his employment, he obtained a copy of the letterhead 
of the firm he was working for, together with an electronic signature of one of 
the partners of the firm. He then produced a statement of employment using 
the letterhead and electronic signature and sent it to the board. On appeal, McDonald, Deputy President, concluded that the actions of the applicant were 
such that he was not of good fame, integrity and character, and was not a fit and proper person to prepare income tax returns and transact business on behalf of 
income tax matters. He was suspended from applying for registration as a tax 
agent for a period of three months.
6.13 A further case that illustrates the ease by which documents can be forged is Djordje Mitic v. Eco Pro Australia Pty Ltd,23 where Djordje Mitic claimed that 
the termination of his employment by Eco Pro was unlawful. Part of the evidence was in the form of a letter dated 14 July 2008, which contained the signature of 
Mr Bikkemberg and his own signature. Djordje Mitic disclosed the letter before 
the proceedings. The content of the letter was similar to a letter dated 7 July 
2008, except that it was not confined to a period of employment for six months, 
and expressed entitlements in annual terms. Both letters contained errors of a typographical and formatting nature of which appear to arise from an imperfect 
knowledge of the English language. The evidence from Mr Bikkemberg tended to establish that the signature at the bottom of the letter of 14 July 2008 was 
electronically created on 20 August 2008. Mr Bikkemberg wrote the letter 
dated 20 August to Mr Mitic. This letter was, in turn, forwarded by Mr Noel to 
Mr Mitic as an attachment to an email on 22 January 2009. The letter contained 
Mr Bikkemberg’s electronic signature in electronic form. It is not clear from the 
judgment whether this was a scanned version of Mr Bikkemberg’s manuscript 
20 2007 CanLII 9873 (ON S.C.D.C.).21 [2007] FCA 1532 (8 October 2007).22 [2008] AATA 210.23 [2009] AIRC 503 (26 May 2009).
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signature. The recipient could therefore cut and paste the signature. The judge commented that the letter of 14 July was not professionally prepared, for example 
it had the addressee’s street number next to his name on the line above the street 
name. There was insufficient evidence for the judge to establish whether a letter of offer dated 14 July 2008 was ever authorized by Mr Bikkemberg and provided to Mr Mitic, but on the balance of probabilities, the judge concluded that no such 
letter existed at the time.24 
6.14 At issue in the case of Williams Group Australia Pty Ltd v. Crocker25 before the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales was the use of an electronic signature affixed to a guarantee allegedly given by a director of a company to secure the terms of 
a trade credit agreement. Williams Group began to use a commercial electronic 
signing system to permit directors to sign documents electronically. Before using the system, Mr Crocker had to provide a username and password to enable him to 
obtain access to the system before uploading his signature. Unfortunately, it is not 
certain what form the signature took, because it is not mentioned in the judgment. In early July 2012, IDH Modular submitted an application for commercial credit to Williams Group. The form included a deed of guarantee and indemnity. The application included signatures attributed to each of the three directors on both 
the application form and the deed of guarantee and indemnity. The signatures were 
dated 28 June 2012. Ms Harrison was noted as having witnessed the signatures. 
It was common ground that the two signatures attributed to Mr Crocker (on 
the application form and on the deed of guarantee and indemnity) were placed 
on those documents electronically using the electronic signing system. It is also 
common ground that Mr Crocker’s signature was affixed to the document on 2 July 
2012 from the Murwillumbah office, although it was Mr Crocker’s evidence, which 
was not contested, that he was not in Murwillumbah at that time. Williams Group eventually accepted that Mr Crocker did not place his signature on the documents, but contended that he was liable under the guarantee, either because he authorized 
an employee to affix his signature, or in the alternative he subsequently ratified it, or in the further alternative his conduct after the event was such that he accepted 
the guarantee. There was insufficient evidence for any of these arguments to be 
sustained, and McCallum J dismissed the claim. See also the New Zealand case of 
Gong v. Zhang,26 where one of the issues was whether an electronic signature was used without authority; and a further example of a forged electronic signature in the context of employment is provided in the British Columbia case of Caravel 
Management Corp. v. Roberts,27 where a senior employee used the electronic 
signature of an authorized signatory to steal.
24 See the Australian case of Tassone v. Kirkham [2014] SADC 134, 2014 WL 3889065 for 
an example of one person using another person’s email account to send defamatory 
comments to others.25 [2015] NSWSC 1907.26 [2014] NZHC 2838.27 2014 CarswellBC 2249, 2014 BCSC 1419, [2014] B.C.W.L.D. 6492, [2014] B.C.W.L.D. 6586, 
[2014] B.C.W.L.D. 6591, [2014] B.C.W.L.D. 6594, 243 A.C.W.S. (3d) 766.
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6.15 In the case of In re Edward Henry Josephson and Alissa R. Josephson, 
Debtors28 before the United States Bankruptcy Court in District of Montana, 
R. Clifton Caughron, an attorney, inserted both debtors’ electronic signatures 
to an Addendum preceded by “/s/”. The signatures were affixed without their 
authority. It was found that Mr Caughron violated the provisions of Local 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011-1(a) and Rule 9011(b) by falsely representing that the 
debtors signed the Addendum. Apparently this was not the first time that Mr Caughron was sanctioned under Rule 9011 of forging the electronic signatures 
of his clients.29 In Teltschik v. Williams & Jensen, PLLC,30 an attorney by the name of Meredith Kelley signed a conciliation agreement in her own name, ostensibly as attorney to Corwin Teltschik, although it was not clear in what capacity she 
signed. This particular issue did not have a great deal of apparent significance in 
the light of the facts of the case.
6.16 In Liberty Mortgage Corporation v. Fiscus,31 Vickie Casper-Fiscus, wife of Ray Fiscus, without his knowledge or authorization, signed his name on a 
General Power of Attorney, a Limited Power of Attorney, and a Power of Attorney 
(Real Estate), which together purported to appoint her as her husband’s lawful 
attorney. Her daughter from a previous marriage notarized the documents. Using the powers through the forged documents, the wife then raised money 
on the property. It appears that the forged signature was probably a manuscript signature, but the wife also signed his name on the tax return without his 
knowledge. It transpired that this was an electronic signature, because he had 
authorized electronic filing with the tax authorities.
6.17 Case law that covers criminal proceedings that includes the forgery of electronic signatures in the United States of America include a prosecution that arose from the establishment of One Fund after two bombs were detonated 
near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on 15 April 2013.32 One Branden 
E. Mattier and his half-brother Domunique D. Grice were convicted of various 
offences arising from a false claim to the fund. Mattier signed a claim form as a 
representative for his aunt. His signature was notarized. Attached to the claim 
form was a letter, purporting to be from Dr. Peter A. Burke, chief of trauma 
services at Boston Medical Center, with his purported signature. He created 
the letter using forms obtained from the internet. The letter, dated 2 May 
2013, claimed that both of his aunt’s legs had been amputated as a result of 
28 2008 WL 113861; for similar cases before the United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division, see In re Stomberg, 487 B.R. 775 (2013) and In re Bradley, 495 B.R. 747 
(2013); and for a case before the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit, see In re Singh, 2014 WL 842102.29 2008 WL 113861 at 4.30 683 F.Supp.2d 33 (2010).31 --- P.3d ----2016, WL 285970189, UCC Rep.Serv.2d 815, 2016 CO 31.32 Commonwealth v. Mattier, 50 N.E.3d 157, 474 Mass. 261 (2016); for an example in England and Wales, see Regina v. George Katcharian, Ian Yorkshire, Cemel Esmene [2013] EWCA 
Crim 2447, 2013 WL 6865176.
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injuries from the bombings. It was thought that this was a fraudulent claim, and One Fund and conducted an internal investigation, which established that 
his aunt died in 2000. The claim was rejected, and the administrators alerted 
the Attorney General’s office of the false claim. In Birge v. State of Indiana,33 
Deborah Birge provided her driver’s license information, but she signed the 
name “Charles Tippet” in the signature box of the electronic signature product 
for medication.
Evidence of intent to sign
6.18 An issue that can exercise the minds of the adjudicator is how to determine the actual act that constitutes the acceptance by the sender of the electronic 
signature, and when the act occurred. In the case of a manuscript signature, the person furnishes evidence of their intent by physically writing on a carrier, and 
providing there is sufficient text to link the person to the document, the proof of 
intent is demonstrated.34 The question of intent is illustrated in the New Zealand case of MFT Properties Limited v. Country Club Apartments Limited.35 In this case, 
which regarded negotiations by email, one email was signed ‘Gary’. It was not in 
dispute that this referred to Mr Gary McNabb, the sole director of MFT. The issue was whether he was expressing a personal view during the course of negotiations or whether he was expressing an intention to bind MFT to the reduced rent it had 
been receiving. Woolford J concluded, at [39], that:
The name ‘Gary’ sufficiently identifies Mr McNabb but I am of the view that it does not evidence his intention to bind MFT to the 
contents of the document.
6.19 However, in the digital context, the moment of authentication may not be when the person actually types in their name or adopts the signature text at the end of the email or put in automatically when a new email is begun where the 
program is set up to include a signature at the end of the email.
The automatic inclusion of the signature
6.20 The problems with the automatic inclusion of the signature block in facsimile transmissions, email and SWIFT communications have caused some 
differences in opinions between judges.
33 25 N.E.3d 828 (2014).34 For an example of failure to prove the electronic signature, see the Californian case of 
Rosas v. Macy’s, Inc., 2012 WL 3656274; where an electronic signature was not in issue; 
see Case note: France, CA Douai, 8e ch., 1re sect., 2 mai 2013, n° 12/05299: JurisData 
n° 2013-008597, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014), pp. 
180–1.35 HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-005913 [2011] NZHC 422 (13 April 2011).
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Facsimile transmission
6.21 Historically, it is useful to consider the cases of facsimile transmission 
first. The practice of programming the machine to include the name of the sender 
on the top or bottom of each page automatically was challenged in the New York case of Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc., v. Estate of Fred Short, d/b/a Sime 
Construction Co.36 In this instance, it was held that the automatic imprinting by the facsimile machine of the name of the sender at the top of each page transmitted 
did not satisfy the requirement that writing shall be subscribed. Smith J offered the following opinion:37The act of identifying and sending a document to a particular destination does not, by itself, constitute a signing authenticating the contents of the document for Statute of Frauds purposes and 
reject plaintiff ’s argument that such an inference is warranted here. 
It is undisputed that MRLS’ fax machine, after being programmed 
to do so, automatically imprinted ‘MRLS Construction’ on every page transmitted, without regard to the applicability of the Statute 
of Frauds to a particular document. We also reject plaintiff ’s contention that the intentional act of programming a fax machine, 
by itself, sufficiently demonstrates to the recipient the sender’s apparent intention to authenticate every document subsequently 
faxed. The intent to authenticate the particular writing at issue 
must be demonstrated.
6.22 In previous editions of this text, it was suggested that this decision by the 
members of the Court of Appeals in New York did not accord with the case law 
(see their references at 635) and the argument that no contract was made (at 
635) did not necessarily follow from the nature of the document sent by facsimile 
transmission. The decision in this case remains arguable on the facts. Miller J 
reached the same conclusion in the New Zealand case of Welsch v. Gatchell.38 
Having analysed a number of electronic signature cases. He said, at [63]:It follows from what I have said that a name written on a fax may 
amount to a signature. But a fax header printed using the machine’s capacity to add writing to the document as it is copied and sent cannot serve as a signature unless, perhaps, there is evidence that 
is was specifically inserted for the transaction concerned. A fax 
header identifies the owner of the sending machine, the sending 
36 155 Misc.2d 950, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Supp. 1992), motion for summary judgment affirmed, 
209 A.D.2d 495, 619 N.Y.S.2d 628 reversed 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1996), 640 N.Y.S.2d 477 
(Ct.App. 1996), 87 N.Y.2D 524.37 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1996) at 635.38 CIV 2005-406-279 [2007] NZHC 1898, [2009] 1 NZLR 241, (2007) 8 NZCPR 708, (2007) 5 
NZ ConvC 194,549 (21 June 2007).
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number and the time of despatch. There is no reason to suppose that it serves the added purpose of a signature, because every 
fax does not require a signature. And where the header is added automatically, it cannot qualify as a signature because it was not 
affixed to the particular writing with the intention that by adding 
his or her name the sender would adopt its contents.
6.23 In this case, a contract for the sale of land was formed orally and by 
facsimile. The sale of land requires the adoption of the contract by way of a 
signature. The document was not signed, which means there was no evidence to demonstrate an intent to be bound by the transaction, because the name and number printed automatically only acted to identify the person sending and 
receiving the document.
Email
6.24 An identical legal question arises in the case of email, and it begins with the early Missouri case of International Casings Group, Inc., v. Premium Standard 
Farms, Inc.39 A new contract for the purchase of hog casings was partly established 
by an exchange of emails between the parties. Kent Pummill signed some of his 
emails ‘Kent’, and some he sent without adding his name, while Tom Sanscki 
sent all of his emails without any form of salutation. Having concluded there 
was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a contract that contained all the essential terms, Laughrey DJ rehearsed the statutory provisions governing 
electronic signatures, and concluded that the signatures satisfied the UCC Statute 
of Frauds, providing each person had the intention to authenticate the document. The judge appeared to make it clear that where an email includes the name of the sender in the header or at the bottom of the email, the act of pressing the send icon on a computer constituted the authentication of the document and it was a valid electronic signature under the Missouri and North Carolina Electronic 
Transactions Act. The comments made by Laughrey DJ are recorded at 873:
There is overwhelming evidence that Sanecki’s and Pummill’s emails are authentic and that the information contained in them 
was intended by each to accurately reflect their communications 
with the other. Although they do not all contain a typed name at the bottom of the emails, each email contains a header with 
the name of the sender. Given the testimony at the preliminary hearing, it is clear that Sanecki and Pummill, by hitting the send button, intended to presently authenticate and adopt the content 
of the emails as their own writing. This is enough to satisfy the 
UCC given the breadth of the definition of signature, as well as 
the UETA which specifically refers to a ‘process attached to or 
logically associated with a record’. The judge took the opportunity 
39 358 F.Supp.2d 863 (W.D.Mo. 2005), 2005 WL 486784.
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to list relevant case law at 874, and distinguished the decision in 
Toghiyany d/b/a First Class Refurbishing v. Amerigas Propane, Inc40 
where emails were held not to include a signature. Examining the 
Toghiyany decision, Laughrey DJ noted that the contract was not 
enforceable because it lacked a term of duration; the definition of 
‘signature’ in the UCC did not apply to Toghiyany because the sale was not governed by the UCC, and the case was decided before the 
Missouri UETA was passed.
6.25 Contrast this case with the later decision of the Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, First Department, New York in the case of Bayerische Landesbank v. 45 
John Street LLC,41 where the court held that an email containing the reprinted 
name in a signature block did not constitute a sufficient writing under Statute of 
Frauds. There is no indication whether the court inferred that the signature block 
was not capable of being proof of intent to sign. In Texas, Godbey J considered the use of automatically attached signatures in Williamson v. The Bank of New York 
Mellon.42 The judge noted, at 710, that ‘[t]he question of whether automatically 
attached signature blocks qualify as signatures under Rule 11 is murkier’, concluding that although the signature block can be generated automatically, 
nevertheless such a signature is valid.43 The judge said, at 710–11:The Court respectfully disagrees with Cunningham and concludes, for three reasons, that the Texas Supreme Court would disagree 
as well.
First, McInnis’s email client did not create a signature block of its 
own volition. Rather, McInnis must have generated his signature 
block at some point in the past. He then directed his email client 
to attach the signature block to his subsequent outgoing email. 
The Court concludes that these actions affirmatively show intent 
to sign the record as required by TUETA. There is no fundamental difference between, on one hand, manually typing a signature block into a series of emails and, on the other, typing the block once and 
instructing a computer program to append it to future messages.
6.26 The judge acknowledged that the information had to be typed into the facsimile machine in Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc., v. Estate of Fred Short, 
40 309 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2002).41 102 A.D.3d 587 (2013), 960 N.Y.S.2d 64, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 00419.42 947 F.Supp.2d 704 (2013).43 Disagreeing with the contrary decision by the Court of Appeals on Texas in the case of 
Cunningham v. Zurich American Insurance Company, 352 S.W.3d 519 (2011). For technical 
reasons, the court did not reach a conclusion in the New York case of Mark Bruce 
International, LLC v. Blank Rome LLP, 2011 WL 1742017, 866 N.Y.S.2d 92, 2008 N.Y. Slip 
Op. 51081(U), affirmed 60 A.D.3d 550 (2009), 876 N.Y.S.2d 19, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 02254.
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d/b/a Sime Construction Co.,44 yet concluded that the name of the company 
did not constitute a signature. In Williamson v. The Bank of New York Mellon,45 
Godbey J also agreed that the signature block in the email had to be typed in by a human, and the human had to instruct the software code to attach the signature block to each email sent out – in this case, the signature acted as an electronic 
signature to bind the sender. Perhaps these cases can be distinguished. In the case of a facsimile transmission, the information typed into the machine is included 
automatically on each sheet that is sent. To remove the information would mean 
resetting the machine. In the case of an email (and depending on how the email 
client works), it is usually possible for a person to delete or amend the signature 
block when writing a new email or when replying to an email. Given the greater 
flexibility with email, these decisions can be reconciled.
SWIFT communications
6.27 In Singapore in 2003, Tay Yong Kwang JC held in the case of Industrial & 
Commercial Bank Ltd v. Banco Ambrosiano Veneto SpA46 that a message using an 
authentication code sent through the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication) system has the legal effect of binding the sender bank according to its contents, and where a recipient bank undertakes further checks on credit standing or other aspects, it does not detract from this 
proposition. In England, Blair J reached the same conclusion in WS Tankship II 
BV v. The Kwangju Bank Ltd.47 A guarantee was issued by Kwangju Bank, but the 
guarantee was not signed. Even the words ‘Kwangju Bank’ did not appear. The 
bank was referred to as ‘we’ in the guarantee. The case for the bank was that 
the guarantee was therefore not signed, and the bank was not bound. Blair J 
rejected this argument at [154], because the bank accepted that the guarantee was properly issued, fully authorized and intended to be relied upon by the 
beneficiary. In addition, it was sent by conventional means by way of the secure messaging system used between banks – that is, using a digital signature – 
and the words ‘Kwangju Bank Ltd’ were contained in the header to the SWIFT 
message. Blair J continued, at [155]:It is argued on behalf of Kwangju Bank that this is not text which it typed in, but an output message header, that is, text generated 
by the SWIFT messaging system. That may be correct, but the 
name appears, and in my opinion it is a sufficient signature for the 
purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The words ‘Kwangju Bank Ltd’ 
44 155 Misc.2d 950, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Supp. 1992), motion for summary judgment affirmed, 
209 A.D.2d 495, 619 N.Y.S.2d 628 reversed 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1996), 640 N.Y.S.2d 477 
(Ct.App. 1996), 87 N.Y.2D 524.45 947 F.Supp.2d 704 (2013).46 [2003] 1 SLR 221.47 [2011] EWHC 3103 (Comm).
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appear in the header, because the bank caused them to be there by 
sending the message. They were ‘voluntarily affixed’ in the words 
of the old cases (c.f. J Pereira Fernandes SA v. Mehta [2006] 1WLR 
1543 dealing with email addresses). Whether or not automatically generated by the system, and whether or not stated in whole, 
or abbreviated (in fact the name of the bank appeared here in 
complete form), this is in my judgment a sufficient signature for 
the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The position is analogous to that considered by Christopher Clarke J in Golden Ocean Group Ltd 
v. Salgaocar Mining Industries Pvt Ltd [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm) 
who at [103] observed that ‘an email, the text of which begins 
“Paul/Peter”, may be regarded as signed by Peter because by that 
form of wording Peter signifies that he is addressing Paul and 
authenticates the content of the whole of what follows’. Therefore, 
I reject Kwangju Bank’s submissions in this regard.
6.28 One commentator who agrees with the decision in this case also suggests 
it is arguable that the reasoning is wrong. Richard Bethell-Jones suggests that 
‘The automatic insertion of a name in a header is hardly something that any 
person (including a company) would regard as having the solemn authenticating 
properties of a “signature”’.48 It is suggested that this argument is to ignore the 
underlying rationale of the SWIFT system between banks.
6.29 Jeffrey Cole J made similar observations on this precise point in the Illinois case of Princeton Industrial, Products, Inc., v. Precision Metals Corp.,49 in which he said, at 820–1:It would seem that, for PMC, nothing can be done through email unless the individual sending the email goes through the physical 
process of typing her name at the bottom. It’s not clear how a recipient or anyone could distinguish between a physically 
keystroked name and one that is attached to the sender’s email 
automatically. So, for PMC, all electronic commerce would be held hostage to swearing contests over whether an individual typed their name or it was generated automatically by their email 
account. One might say that’s ridiculous or, as Judge Cardozo more artfully put it in regards to the statute of frauds:The statute must not be pressed to the extreme of a literal 
and rigid logic. Some compromise is inevitable if words are 
to fulfill their function as symbols of things and of ideas. How many identifying tokens we are to exact, the reason 
and common sense of the situation must tell us.
48 R. Bethell-Jones, ‘Digital signatures and the statutory signature requirement’, Lloyds 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 2 (2012), pp. 184–8 at p. 186.49 120 F.Supp.3d 812 (2015), 87 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 460.
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Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N.Y. 138, 143–144, 123 N.E. 139, 141 (1919). History – as well as reason and common sense – tells us we have 
sufficient identifying tokens here.…
Thus, contrary to what PMC seems to be driving at, Ms. Schleifer’s 
intent can be satisfied and shown without her having to testify at 
a trial. Otherwise, most signatures on most contracts, electronic or 
otherwise, would have to be tested at trial. And every contractual obligation could be avoided; in other words, fraud could be 
accomplished by the ‘extreme ... literal and rigid’ application of the 
statute of frauds that PMC appears to be espousing.
6.30 Approaching the question from the point of view of how the technology 
is set up is one way of helping to determine this particular issue. Arguably, if an organization authorizes an employee to insert the name, address and contact details of the legal entity into an email client, then it must be appropriate for the organization to put recipients on notice that they can or cannot use this information as a form of signature, or to prove intent, or that the recipient cannot 
rely on such information to bind the company for any legal purpose. When reaching judgments on such issues, it cannot be correct to ignore the way the 
technology is set up and used, although the question of intent remains.50
Attachments to emails
6.31 The issue of intent to sign is of relevance to attachments, as noted by Wall 
MJ in the New York case of Pepco Energy Services, Inc., v. Geiringer,51 in which the 
judge granted the plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment. In this instance, the defendant argued that a letter attached to an email was executed, despite the lack 
of a signature. The argument was based on the proposition that the name typed in the letter was a form of signature, and if it was not a form of signature, then the 
name in the email constituted an electronic signature that acted to sign the letter. 
The judge rejected these arguments. First, he indicated that the name typed on the letter was not capable of being a signature;52 the name, title and corporate 
50 The English case of J Pereira Fernandes SA v. Mehta [2006] 1 WLR 1543; [2006] 2 All ER 891; 
[2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885; [2006] All ER (D) 264 (Apr); [2006] IP & T 546; The Times 16 
May 2006; [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch) and the Singaporean case of SM Integrated Transware Ltd 
v. Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 651, [2005] SGHC 58 are discussed elsewhere.51 The letter is replicated in full in the Order discussed and set out in Pepco Energy Services, 
Inc., v. Geiringer, 2009 WL 3644295 (E.D.N.Y.) at 12; the order was reconsidered at the request of the defendant in Pepco Energy Services, Inc., v. Geiringer, 2010 WL 318284 
(E.D.N.Y.), where the judge considered the electronic signature in more detail.52 See the New York cases of 1911: Landeker v. Co-operative Bldg. Bank, 130 N.Y.Supp. 780 and 1919: Cohen v. Wolgel, 107 Misc. Rep. 505, 176 N.Y.S. 764 affirmed 191 A.D. 883, 180 
NY.S. 933 where, in construing statutes that have been repealed but replaced with similar 
statutes, a typewritten name was considered to be a signature.
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affiliation typed at the bottom of the letter appeared in a format that would normally appear under a manuscript signature, and there was no evidence to indicate that the letter was intended to be signed – in fact, there was evidence to 
demonstrate that there was no intent to sign the letter.
6.32 A similar question arose in SN4, LLC, v. Anchor Bank, FSB53 before the 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota. In this instance, a series of emails were exchanged 
between the parties relating to the sale and purchase of real estate. SN4 argued 
that Anchor Bank ‘signed’ the contract as the result of signatures in two relevant 
emails. The court rejected this argument. Both parties anticipated that they would enter into a written contract signed with manuscript signatures, a point 
stated explicitly in the relevant email exchanges. The court concluded, at 569, that:
… no reasonable fact-finder could determine that Nemec and Berg’s electronic signatures are logically associated with the purported 
July 18th agreement attached to their emails. Although the evidence indicates that Nemec and Berg intended to electronically 
sign their email messages, the evidence is insufficient to establish 
that they intended to electronically sign the email attachment.
6.33 In terms of the evidence of the sequence of the application of electronic signatures, the timing of the insertion of an electronic signature can be 
significant, as in R v. Delalla54 before the Supreme Court of British Columbia. In this case, an information was quashed because the Justice of the Peace who laid the information signed the attestation electronically 12 seconds before the 
informant signed his attestation.
Partial document with separate signature page
6.34 As technology is developed and used, so individuals will adjust their 
behaviour and adapt accordingly. It is undoubtedly the experience of many lawyers across the world that some clients will expect them to work at an impossibly fast 
pace when negotiating and entering into contractual relationships. The need for 
speed has increased significantly since the world became networked digitally. For this reason, contracts will be formed and real estate purchased solely relying 
of documents in digital format. In most cases, a document in digital format is 
a perfectly acceptable way of entering into legal relations. However, the digital 
environment often means that our concept of a ‘document’ has had to change. Technically, there is only digital data, but for the purposes of this discussion, we only know of documents on paper – thus we associate a contract as recorded on 
paper and signed with manuscript signatures on the relevant page. In developing the terms of a contract, the signature page is often left until the document is 
53 848 N.W.2d 559 (Minn.App. 2014).54 2015 BCSC 592. Compare R v. McGrath 2015 BCPC 5, [2015] B.C.W.L.D. 1815, [2015] B.C.J. 
No. 136, 119 W.C.B. (2d) 55 where the information was declared to be valid.
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finished to the satisfaction of the parties. What can then occur will depend on 
the parties and the advice they receive from their lawyers. A number of options arise: the signature page is signed with the manuscript signature of each party who happen to be together; the signature page, containing a number of signatures for people across continents is signed by each on a separate piece of paper and then scanned; perhaps each signatory appends a digital signature at 
different times to the document. Whatever method is used, it is highly likely that 
the document and the signature pages might well be separate documents. In such circumstances, it then becomes necessary to undertake appropriate measures to prevent additional pages from being added to the agreement that have not been agreed, and for the signature pages, or signatures generally, to be properly associated with the agreement,55 and for draft signature pages to be dealt with 
appropriately.56 In Scotland, this particular issue is now dealt with by the Legal 
Writings (Counterparts and Delivery) (Scotland) Act 2015.57
6.35 This cannot be the proper working mechanism in criminal matters. 
Morse J rejected an ‘e-ticket’ in the New York case of People v. Rose,58 where 
computer-generated simplified traffic information and supporting depositions 
were generated by a device. At the time, the e-ticket was ‘signed’ before any 
information was placed on the ticket. This meant the arresting officer was signing 
an essentially blank document.
Forms of electronic signature
6.36 Electronic signatures are manifest in a variety of forms, all of which 
can demonstrate the intent of the signing party to authenticate the data. 
Unfortunately, the terms ‘electronic signature’ and ‘digital signature’ tend to be 
55 For which see Garguilo v. Gershinson [2012] EWLandRA 2011_0377 in the context of a lease; Gopaul v. Naidoo [2014] EWHC 2684 (QB) regarding the undertaking of the 
redevelopment of two properties by conversion into six flats.56 For draft signatures, see Mercury Tax Group Ltd, R (on the application of) v HM 
Commissioners of Revenue & Customs [2009] BTC 3, [2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin), [2008] STI 
2670, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep FC 135, [2009] STC 743; Execution of documents by virtual means 
(16 February 2010) http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/practice-notes/execution-of-documents-by-virtual-means/; Note on execution of documents at 
a virtual signing or closing (The Law Society Company Law Committee and The City of 
London Law Society Company Law and Financial Law Committees, May 2009 (including 
minor amendments – February 2010)) http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/attachments/article/121/20100226-Advice-prepared-on-guidance-on-execution-of-documents-at-a-
virtual-signing-or-closing.pdf; Practice Note: Execution of a document using an electronic 
signature (21 July 2016), available at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/
advice/practice-notes/execution-of-a-document-using-an-electronic-signature/.57 H. MacQueen and C. Garland, ‘Signatures in Scots law: form, effect, and burden of proof’, 
Juridical Review (2015), pp. 107–34.58 11 Misc.3d 200 (2005), 805 N.Y.S.2d 506, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 25526.
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used interchangeably.59 This creates confusion.60 In essence, a digital signature is data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that 
allows a recipient of the data to prove the source and integrity of the data unit. 
The digital signature mechanism defines two processes, that of the purported signing of a data unit by the person initiating the signature, which is a private action, and verifying a signed data unit by using the procedures and information 
publicly available. A digital signature is a signature that is specifically based 
on asymmetric cryptography, coupled with a one-way hash function. A digital signature is a particular type of signature that is usually brought about by the 
use of a public key infrastructure.61 A digital signature is not a plain sequence of 
numbers.62 It is often asserted that the digital signature provides a higher degree 
of certainty for the recipient. However, little attention is paid to illustrating the 
significant technical and legal obstacles to this assertion, or that the verification process is opaque, that a digital signature can be removed from a document in electronic format without trace,63 and that a public key infrastructure provides 
for encryption, not the process of signing.
6.37 By comparison, the term ‘electronic signature’ is anything in electronic form that can be used to demonstrate a signing entity intended their signature 
59 This is also pointed out in paragraph 2.2 of the Final Report of the EESSI Expert Team dated 20 July 1999 European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative, and on page 
16 of OECD, A Global action plan for electronic commerce prepared by business with 
recommendations from governments, 7–9 October 1998, Ottawa, Canada (Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Steering Committee for the Preparation of the Ottawa 
Ministerial Conference, SG/EC(98)11/REV2); see also GUIDEC II, ‘General Usage for 
International Digitally Ensured Commerce’ for further discussion of the terms. GUIDEC 
II does not use the term ‘electronic signature’ but ‘digital signature’, thus adding to the 
confusion. In addition, the Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Signatures, dated 12 – 23 March 2001 (A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.88) also appears to refer to digital signatures and electronic signatures interchangeably, see paragraphs 
31 to 62. The European Union adds to the confusion even more by refusing to refer to the 
term ‘digital signature’ in the Directive for electronic signatures. Yet further confusion is 
rendered with the title of at least one legal text book: D. Campbell (ed.), E-Commerce and 
the Law of Digital Signatures (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 2005); A. Srivastava, 
Electronic Signatures for B2B Contracts: Evidence from Australia (Springer, 2013), although 
such confusion does not occur, however, in A. Srivastava, ‘Businesses’ perception of 
electronic signatures: an Australian study’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 6 (2009), pp. 45–65.60 Also noted by C. Adams and S. Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and 
Deployment Considerations (2nd edn., Boston, M.A.: Addison-Wesley, 2002), pp. 184–5.61 See also paragraph 33 to UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, Guide to 
Enactment.62 In Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal Decision No. 2877/07R 2008 
CarswellOnt 8624, 2008 ONWSIAT 3111, an NSR (a seven-digit number), where ‘NSR’ 
stands for ‘no signature required’, is incorrectly described as a digital signature.63 A. McCullagh, W. Caelli and P. Little, ‘Signature stripping: a digital dilemma’ Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology, 1 (2001), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/
elj/jilt/2001_1/mccullagh.
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to have legal effect, as illustrated in the Connecticut case of Peruta v. Outback 
Steakhouse of Florida, Inc.,64 where an employee gave evidence that tips were declared by putting the information into a computer when they left the restaurant 
and filled out a ‘checkout form’. It was a matter of law to be decided by the court at trial whether such an act constituted an electronic signature, but a glance 
at the Connecticut Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, especially Sec. 1-272, 
‘Legal recognition of electronic records, electronic signatures and electronic 
contracts’, taken together with the definition of an electronic signature at Sec. 
1-267(8), would appear that such an action was an electronic signature. An 
electronic signature, especially when defined in legislation, tends to represent a generic response to the concept of authentication, and is to be understood in 
such a context. A signature can be manifest in different forms,65 and the term 
‘electronic signature’ is used to reflect methods other than the use of a public key infrastructure to sign a message or document, such as the typing of a name on an 
electronic document, or the capture of the dynamics of a manuscript signature.
6.38 For the sake of clarity, the term ‘electronic signature’ is used to denote the generic concept of a signature that is brought about by the use of a computer or computer-like device, and includes a digital signature as one form of electronic 
signature.66 We should also be alert to new forms of electronic signature as 
they are developed and used.67 However, this does not prevent the terms used to describe electronic signatures from adding to or increasing the confusion for 
failing to describe the form of electronic signature at issue. This is illustrated in 
the Zimbabwean case of Tedco Mgmt Svcs (PVT) Ltd v. Grain Marketing Board,68 
in which an employee stole a total of $204,818.61 by adding the electronic 
signature of an authorized signatory to a series of cheques. The signatures were 
described as ‘machine’ signatures printed from the computer, which implies that the company caused authorized images of manuscript signatures to be scanned 
and stored on a computer. Another illustration is the Texas case of In re Piranha, 
Inc., Debtor, Berger v. Piranha, Inc.,69 where an electronic signature was attached to a form sent to the Securities and Exchange Commission purporting to be the 
resignation of a director. It was established that the legislation did not prevent the person whose signature was used from challenging the signature and 
64 50 Conn.Supp. 51, 913 A.2d 1160 (Conn.Super. 2006).65 The use of ‘s/’ instead of ‘/s/’ when indicating the electronic signature of an attorney is irrelevant: Federal, 3rd Circuit, Xu v. Naqvi, 537 Fed.Appx. 76 (2013), 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-
6538, 2013-2 USTC P 50,556.66 In the British Columbia case of Ghaed v. Telus Communications Co. 2013 BCSC 1675, a digital signature is referred to, but it is debatable whether this particular form of signature 
was in operation by Dr Ghaed, given his lack of technical knowledge.67 J. Friedman, ‘Signing your next deal with your Twitter @username: the legal uses of 
identity based cryptography’, Canadian Journal of Law and Technology, 13 (2015), pp. 
33–56. 68 1996 (1) ZLR 109 (SC).69 297 B.R. 78 (N.D.Tex. 2003), 2003 WL 21468504 (N.D. Tex.), affirmed 83 Fed.Appx. 19.
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contending he did not execute, adopt or authorize its use, but the report does not make it clear what type of electronic signature was under discussion, although consideration of the relevant regulation70 appears to indicate that it was a typed 
name.71
6.39 Examples of electronic signatures are discussed in the following chapters.
70 Part 232—Regulation S-T—General Rules and Regulations for Electronic Filings § 232.302 
Signatures.71 Other examples include:Florida: Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Haire, 836 
So.2d 1040 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2003); the corrected opinion is Haire v. Florida Department 
of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Nos SC03-446 & Sc03-552, February 12, 2004, 
available online at http://archive.law.fsu.edu/library/flsupct/sc03-446/op-sc03-446-
corrected.pdf.
New York: People of the State of New York v. Rose, 11 Misc.3d 200, 805 N.Y.S.2d 506; 
People of the State of New York v. Cortella, 12 Misc.3d 666, 814 N.Y.S.2d 514 – (both cases 
were in relation to the use of an electronic signature of a police officer on an electronically 
generated traffic deposition (which was accepted), but concern was expressed that the 
signature was already in the document before the document was completed by the officer).Texas: Gunda Corporation, LLC, v. Yazhari, 2013 WL 440577 (in this case it might have been a scanned signature, a copy of which was held by the organization, which in turn will mean the organization will need to prove that the signature could not be used by any other 
person with access to the system).Utah: Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147 (the use of electronic signatures of registered 
voters to enable a candidate to stand for election as governor).Missouri: Mead v. Moloney Securities Co., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 537 (electronic signature on 
a form sent to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).Pennsylvania: Walter v. Magee-Women’s Hospital of UPMC Health System, 876 A.2d 400.
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 7, ‘Electronic sound’, pp. 201–5.
7Electronic sound
7.1 It is possible to record sounds digitally when a person speaks to software 
code. In the United States of America, electronic signatures are defined by s 
106(5) of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 106-229, which provides:
Electronic signature. – The term ‘electronic signature’ means an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted 
by a person with the intent to sign the record.
7.2 In the June 2007 9th circuit case of Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless 
Services, Inc.,1 a person indicated their assent, and thereby executed an electronic 
signature over the telephone, by selecting the answer ‘Yes’ in response to the 
statement ‘You agree to the terms as stated in the Wireless Service Agreement and 
terms of service.’ Although the judgment of the Court of Appeals did not explicitly indicate that this form of electronic signature is valid under the Act, nevertheless 
this decision is in keeping with the definition of electronic signature, and is a 
perfectly acceptable form of electronic signature. In December 2007, the Court of 
Appeals in Kansas also reached a similar conclusion. In the case of In the Matter 
of the Marriage of Takusagawa,2 the appellant argued that the provisions of the Kansas Statute of Frauds required a written signature where an agreement to 
the transfer of land was part of the divorce settlement. The trial judge approved 
the terms of an oral separation agreement on the final day of the hearing, and 
the details of the agreement were put on the record. Both parties stated under oath that what was recorded by the court was their understanding of the terms 
of the agreement. The transcript indicated that the judge asked the appellant 
‘Ma’am, is that your understanding of the agreement?’ The appellant replied 
‘Yes’.3 It is certain that the appellant did not affix her manuscript signature to 
any document. The issue was whether the oral response to a judge was a form 
of signature. The judge who wrote the judgment of the court, Leben J, cited the 1921 decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Whitlow v. Board of Education,4 
in which the members of the school board voted at a meeting to sell some land. When the appellant handed her cheque over in payment and to complete the 
transaction, the members of the board refused to complete the sale. The minutes of the meeting indicated that a motion to sell the land to Josephine Whitlow was 
1 498 F.3d 976.
2 38 Kan.App.2d 401, 166 P.3d 440.
3 38 Kan.App.2d 401 at 410.
4 108 Kan. 604, 196 P. 772.
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made and passed, and that the members of the board authorized the president of 
the board to sign a deed in exchange for payment. The Supreme Court of Kansas rejected the argument of the school board that the Statute of Frauds prevented the agreement being enforced because the minutes of the board had not been 
signed. It was determined that the minutes as recorded by the clerk were an 
authentic record that the law required the board to keep. In this respect, the 
minutes constituted a sufficient memorandum of the contract to bind the board 
under the Statute of Frauds. In this instance, a signature was not necessary where a public record was maintained by law, which in turn provided authentication of 
the formation and terms of the contract. The members of the court considered 
that a properly certified transcript of a court hearing was superior to the minutes recorded by the clerk to the school board, and found that a signature was not 
necessary where ‘a court transcript providing the terms of the agreement and the oral assent of the party to be charged with the agreement that has been fairly 
stated on the record of the proceeding.’5 However, the discussion did not end 
at this point. Leben J then went on to consider the provisions of the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act K. S. A. 2006 Supp 16-1601, on the assumption that the transcript of the agreement was recorded on equipment that required 
electricity to enable it to work. Based on this assumption, the judge then 
considered ss 16-1602(f), (h) and (i), which reads as follows:
(f) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic or similar 
capabilities.
……..
(h) “Electronic record” means a record created, generated, sent, 
communicated, received or stored by electronic means.
(i) “Electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a record and 
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.
7.3 He concluded that where a party makes an oral statement in legal 
proceedings before a judge, and ‘… assuming that the court reporter’s equipment was consistent with modern practice, it would appear that the electronic capture 
of Mieko’s oral assent that this was the agreement would satisfy the statute of 
frauds. No more is needed to show that Mieko made or adopted the agreement’.6 This line of reasoning is far from convincing, and arguably stretches the meaning 
of electronic signature beyond the terms of the statute.7 The final claim to 
5 38 Kan.App.2d 401 at 409.
6 38 Kan.App.2d 401 at 410.7 The same could be argued if a will is recorded on tape, and not written down, as in the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Reed v. Buckley, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983); in Franklin 
County Cooperative v. MFC Services (A.A.L.), 441 So.2d 1376 (Miss. 1983) it was determined 
by the Supreme Court of Mississippi that the statement ‘OK, we will take care of it’ made 
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support the thesis that both parties entered into a binding agreement in court is more convincing: that an oral settlement placed on the record and acknowledged 
by the parties in open court should be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the Statute of Frauds, especially because the law in Kansas allowed for oral separation agreements in divorce proceedings, and such agreements can be 
incorporated into the decree of divorce if approved by the judge.
7.4 Where one party to a conversation records what is said without the knowledge of the other party or parties, it does not follow that promises made, including a statement that might be construed as an electronic signature, will be 
valid. In the case of Sawyer v. Mills,8 heard at appeal before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Barbara Sawyer and her husband recorded a conversation with 
Mr Mills, in which he made promises to make certain payments. Among other things, it was determined that any contract formed during this conversation 
was not enforceable under the provision of the Statute of Frauds. Further, the court considered that the agreement by Mr Mills did not constitute an electronic 
signature just because it was identifiable and was identified at trial as being his. In explaining this in giving the opinion of the court, Nobel J said, at 8:There must be intent to attach or logically associate the electronic signature to the agreement, that is, an intent to execute the 
contract. That was impossible here, because the medium on which the alleged agreement and electronic signature were recorded 
(the audio tape) was used surreptitiously. Mills did not know 
he was being recorded when he went to the Sawyers’ art studio. 
Thus, Mills’s identifiable voice on the tape, even if construed as 
an electronic signature, was procured without Mills’s knowledge or intent, and would be tantamount to a forgery which cannot be 
used to demonstrate a valid contract.
7.5 Although the comments made by Mr Mills were capable of being construed as an electronic signature, the text of the statute envisages more than a mere 
spoken assent that is recorded in secret. The statute requires the electronic equivalent of a signature, that is, an electronic sound, symbol, or process that 
demonstrates an intention to enter the agreement. Furthermore, the parties put 
the agreement into writing. Mr Mills refused to sign the written contract. This refusal to sign by Mr Mills demonstrated that he did not intend to execute or 
adopt anything he said in the conversation.
over the telephone had the capacity of proving intent to enter a contract when the words 
are subsequently written down in a memorandum.
8 Ky., 295 S.W.3d 79.

S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 8, ‘The “I accept” and “wrap” methods of indicating intent’, pp. 205–16.
8
The ‘I accept’ and ‘wrap’ methods of indicating intent
Click wrap
8.1 Clicking the ‘I accept’ or ‘I agree’ icon (also known as ‘click wrap’) to confirm the intention to enter a contract when buying goods or services electronically 
is now a very popular method of demonstrating intent. In the United States of 
America, the phrase ‘wrap’ has become common.1 The action of clicking an icon is capable of providing evidence of the process that is executed or adopted by the person clicking on the icon – that is, the user is required to undertake a positive 
activity.2 This is certainly implied in the Canadian case of Rudder v. Microsoft 
Corp,3 and has been widely accepted in the United States of America implicitly,4 and explicitly in respect of the formation of commercial online contracts and 
1 N. C. Kim, Wrap Contracts Foundations and Ramifications (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); S. Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd edn., Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis 
Butterworths Australia, 2015).2 Although technically literate people are capable of installing software and by-passing the 
need to click on the ‘I agree’ icon, for which see Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 134 Cal.App.4th 
544, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 229 (determined by members of the Court of Appeal, Second District, 
Division 4, California, to be a contract of adhesion); where there are a succession of changes to the terms uploaded on to a website, it is incumbent on the issuer of such terms to ensure they retain evidence to prove when a person clicked to acknowledge the new terms were received, as in the Maryland case of Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc., v. FNC, INC., 
575 F.Supp.2d 696; in Rogers v. Dell Computer Corporation, 127 P.3d 560 (Okla. 2005), Dell 
failed to provide evidence to demonstrate where the contract was formed.
3 (1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 474, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 168 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), FSR (1996) 367. See also 
Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc., (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 299 (Sup. Ct.).4 Federal 6th circuit: CompuServe, Incorporated v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).California: America Online, Inc., v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 90 Cal.App.4th 
1 (2001), 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 699, 01 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5191, Daily Journal D.A.R. 6367; 
Koresko v. RealNetworks, Inc., 291 F.Supp.2d 1157 (E.D.Cal. 2003).Florida: America Online, Inc., v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 2001).Illinois: In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litigation, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D.Ill.); 
Lieschke v. Realnetworks, Inc., 2000 WL 198424 (ND Ill.); DeJohn v. The .TV Corporation 
Int’l, 245 F.Supp.2d 913 (C.D.Ill. 2003).New Jersey: Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 323 N.J. Super. 188, 732 A.2d 528 
(N.J.Super.A.D. 1999).Texas: Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001).Washington: M. A. Mortenson Company, Inc., v. Timberline Software Corporation, 970 
P.2d 803 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1999) affirmed M. A. Mortenson Company, Inc., v. Timberline 
Software Corporation, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (clicking the ‘I accept’ icon was part of 
the formation of a ‘layered contract’; note the dissenting opinion of Sanders J, and also the majority of the members of the Supreme Court of Kansas also disagreed with the analysis, for which see Wachter Manufacturing Company v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747 
(Kans. 2006), although note the dissenting opinion of Luckert, J).
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software agreements,5 in the formation of employment contracts,6 in respect of requiring children to upload written work to identify plagiarism,7 where a child 
5 Federal: Treiber & Straub, Inc., d/b/a Treiber & Straub Jewelers v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
474 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2007).10th Circuit: Hancock v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Inc., 701 F.3d 
1248 (2012), 90 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 103.California: Hotmail Corporation v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., 1998 WL 388389, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020; Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 1165 (N.D.Cal. 2002).Carolina: Bergenstock v. Legalzoon.com, Inc., 2015 WL 3866703Colombia: Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002).Florida: Siedle v. National Association of Securities Dealers, 248 F.Supp.2d 1140 
(M.D.Fla. 2002); Salco Distributors, LLC v. iCode, Inc., 2006 WL 449156 (M.D.Fla.).Illinois: Mudd-Lyman Sales and Service Corporation v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 236 
F.Supp.2d 907.Indiana: Adsit Company, Inc., v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind.App. 2007); Appliance 
Zone, LLC v. Nextag, Inc., 2009 WL 5200572 (S.D.Ind.), 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 1540.Kansas: Mortgage Plus, Inc., v. DocMagic, Inc., d/b/a Document Systems, Inc., 2004 WL 
2331918 (D.Kan.), 55 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 58.Maine: Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133 (Me. 2005).Maryland: Blue Bird, LLC v. Nolan, No. 302920-V (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 23, 2008).Massachusetts: I.Lan Systems, Inc., v. Netscout Service Level Corp., 183 F.Supp.2d 328 
(D.Mass. 2002) (Young CJ, indicated at 338 ‘The only issue before the Court is whether click wrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts, and the Court 
holds that they are.’); Hughes v. McMenamon, 204 F.Supp.2d 178 (D.Mass. 2002).Missouri: Davidson & Associates, Inc., v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.Supp.2d 1164 (E.D.Mo. 
2004); Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., 2009 WL 586513 (E.D.Mo.).New Jersey: Bergraft v. e-Bay, Inc., (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2003) the Order is available 
online from the website of Professor Eric Goldman (http://eric_goldman.tripod.com/
caselaw/begraftvebay.pdf).
New York: Moore v. Microsoft Corporation, 293 A.D.2d 587, 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 48 UCC 
Rep.Serv.2d; Person v. Google Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Universal Grading 
Service v. eBay, Inc., 2009 WL 2029796 (E.D.N.Y.); Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 684 
F.Supp.2d 313; 5381 Partners, LLC v. Sharesale.com, Inc., 2013 WL 5328324; Nicosia v. 
Amazon, Inc., 84 F.Supp.3d 142 (2015); Whitt v. Prosper Funding LLC, 2015 WL 4254062.Pennsylvania: Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Pa. 2007); 
Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 229 (E.D.Pa. 2007); Novak d/b/a Petswarehouse.
Com v. Tucows, Inc., 2007 WL 922306 (E.D.N.Y.).Rhode Island: Groff v. America Online, Inc., 1998 WL 307001 (R.I.Super.) (this is an 
unpublished opinion); Bar-Ayal v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2006 WL 2990032 (S.D.N.Y.).Texas: Recursion Software, Inc., v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 756 
(N.D.Tex. 2006); RealPage, Inc., v. EPS, Inc., 560 F.Supp.2d 539, 545 (E.D.Tex. 2007); In 
re Online Travel Company Hotel Booking Antitrust Litigation, 953 F.Supp.2d 713 (2013), 
2013-1 Trade Cases P 78,428.Washington: Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 125 Wash.App. 929, 106 P.3d 841 (Wash.App. Div. 3 
2005), affirmed 160 Wash.2d 826, 161 P.3d 1016; Riensche v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 2006 
WL 3827477 (W.D.Wash.).6 Ohio: Bell v. Hollywood Entertainment Corporation, 2006 WL 2192053 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.).Pennsylvania: Verizon Communications, Inc., v. Pizzirani, 462 F.Supp.2d 648 (E.D.Pa. 
2006).7 Virginia: A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C., 544 F.Supp.2d 473 (E.D. Va. Mar. 11, 
2008) (reversed in part on other grounds in A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C., 562 
F.3d 630 (4th Cir 2009)).
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continues to use a website after initiating legal action against the website,8 where a player agrees to waive the right to take legal action against an athletic league,9 and where an agent clicks to accept the terms,10 although breaching the terms of use of a website does not necessarily mean the person breaking the terms has committed a crime under the provisions of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
18 U.S.C. §1030.11
8.2 The Texas case of Via Viente Taiwan, L.P. v. United Parcel Service, Inc.12 is 
an example of how judges in the US tend to approach the matter. In this case, the defendant entered into a contract to ship the beverages made by the plaintiff to 
Taiwan. For UPS to do this effectively, it was necessary to upload the relevant UPS 
software to the plaintiff ’s network, which included a software license agreement. The hearing before Schell DJ had to determine whether the parties entered into a valid binding contract, and if so, whether the forum selection clause was 
valid. The plaintiffs argued that the license agreement was not valid. Schell DJ 
disagreed. He pointed out that the actions of the employees of the plaintiff belied 
their argument, in that, first, the Carrier Agreement required the plaintiffs to use the UPS online software program, and that the relevant software had to be installed by a UPS representative, which incorporated a set-up process which 
included terms of service that had to be agreed with the click of an icon. None of this could be achieved without the agreement of employees of the plaintiff, and 
the judge indicated that it would be difficult to believe that the plaintiff would permit a UPS technician to have unsupervised access to the computers to install 
the program. The judge said that ‘Not only would such a sequence of events be 
difficult to believe, but it runs contrary to the Defendant’s ordinary procedures.’13 
In this instance, the judge roundly rejected the arguments of the plaintiff. In taking 
a robust approach to the fact that technology was now a significant part of office 
life, the judge reached the conclusion that a ‘click wrap’ agreement was perfectly 
in keeping with the times.14 In Scarcella v. America Online, on an application by America Online to dismiss the claim of the plaintiff in a small claims action 
because of lack of jurisdiction, the judge at first instance outlined the process 
8 Illinois: E.K.D., by her next friend v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F.Supp.2d 894 (2012)9 Stephenson v. Food Bank for New York City, 21 Misc.3d 1132 (A), 875 N.Y.S.2d 824, 2008 WL 
4934625 (N.Y.Sup.), 2008 N.Y. Sip Op. 52322(U).10 Siebert v. Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 1033 (D.Minn. 
2006).11 United States of America v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (the accused, with others, set up a fictitious 
profile of a male in a social networking website; then they contacted Megan Meier (aged 
13 years) under the pseudonym ‘Josh Evans’. They flirted with her over a number of days 
before sending a message that ‘the world would be a better place without her in it.’ Megan 
subsequently killed herself.12 2009 WL 3908729 (E.D. Tex.).13 2009 WL 3908729 (E.D. Tex.) at 2.14 798 N.Y.S.2d 348, 2004 WL 2093429 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 2004) affirmed 11 Misc.3d 19, 811 
N.Y.S.2d 858 (2005).
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by which customers agreed the terms of a Member Agreement. Neither court commented on the validity or otherwise of the enforceability of the action of 
clicking the ‘I Agree’ icon, but interestingly America Online stated on the website 
‘if you are eager to just go and explore the service … That’s OK’. The claimant argued that by enabling a potential customer to bypass the action of agreeing the 
terms, this was deceptive.
8.3 For a ‘click wrap’ contract to be enforceable, it is necessary that the party 
to whom the contract is directed is notified that a contract exists, and that it is 
intended to apply to them. In the 9th circuit case of Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio, 
Inc.,15 Mr Knutson, in purchasing a motor vehicle from Toyota, was not aware that 
a trial subscription to Sirius XM satellite radio that accompanied the purchase of the vehicle also meant that Sirius intended him to be bound by the terms of a 
contract that he was not aware existed.
8.4 In England and Wales, the Law Commission has suggested that this form of signature is the technological equivalent of a manuscript signature using a 
cross.16 It is suggested that this analysis is sound. This analysis is also in keeping with the decisions made by judges over the past two hundred years regarding 
the form that a manuscript signature may take. In English law, the validity of the signature depends on the function it performs, not necessarily the form a 
signature takes. Even if the act of clicking on an icon to order goods or services is deemed to be less secure than that provided by a manuscript signature, it 
does not follow that the reliability of the signature will affect its validity. Should a dispute occur between a buyer and a seller where one of the issues relates to the pressing of the icon, and the parties fail to resolve the matter, they will 
have to contemplate taking legal action. Before the matter reaches a court, both parties will have to pay particular attention to the quantity and quality of the 
evidence available to them. In all probability, the reliability of the signature will 
depend on the ability of one or both of the parties to adduce sufficient forensic evidence of a high enough quality to demonstrate whether the icon was clicked 
or not. Even if the relying party can prove that the icon was clicked, it will not 
follow that the purported buyer clicked it. The nexus between the action of clicking the icon and the identity of the person who purported to order the 
items may be difficult to resolve, bearing in mind the security risks associated 
with using the internet.
8.5 The first instance decision in the case of Bassano v. Toft17 is an example 
where the use of the ‘I accept’ icon was upheld in England under the provisions 
of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. It was argued by counsel for Mrs Bassano that the loan agreement was not executed by her in a manner that complied with the 
Act. The judge disagreed, indicating, at [43], that:
15 771 F.3d 559, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 12,769, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,058.16 Law Commission, ‘Electronic commerce: formal requirements in commercial transactions 
advice from the Law Commission’ (2001), 3.37; see also 3.36 and 3.38.17 [2014] EWHC 377 (QB), [2014] Bus LR D9.
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s61 of the Act requires the agreement to be signed in the prescribed form, and the form prescribed at the time was that required by 
The Consumer Credit (Agreements) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010 
No 1014). The only relevant prescription was in regulation 
4(3)(a), which provides that the signature must be in a space 
indicated in the document for that purpose and dated. Regulation 
4(5) recognises that a regulated agreement may be concluded 
electronically by regulation 4(5), and that the document may 
contain ‘information about the process or means of providing, communicating or verifying the signature to be made by the 
debtor.’ There was therefore nothing in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to suggest that regulated agreements were capable of being 
signed by an electronic signature.
8.6 This type of conflicting evidence, coupled with a denial that the email 
communications were sent by the sender, occurred in Germany in the three 
cases of OLG Köln, 19 U 16/02; LG Konstanz, 2 O 141/01 A; AG Erfurt, 28 C 
2354/01.18 The three individual defendants were asked to pay for items bought 
in internet auctions. The winning bids were sent from email accounts where the 
user can write the email on the website of the provider of the address. Each of the defendants had access to the address by means of a password, but denied 
taking part in the bidding process. All three cases were dismissed, because the relying party failed to prove to the satisfaction of the courts that the defendants sent the declarations, which meant the plaintiff failed to prove that a contract 
had been concluded. By the same token, exactly the same problem may occur 
with the use of digital signatures. Whether a user denies clicking on an icon or using their private key to sign a document or message, the problem will be the 
same: proving that the sending party carried out the action. In this respect, the 
difference between a digital signature and clicking an icon is a narrow one.
8.7 Proof is central to the question. In the US case of Kerr v. Dillard Stores 
Services, Inc.,19 the issue was whether an employee had clicked the ‘I accept’ icon 
in respect of an arbitration agreement. In this instance, the employer required employees to consent to arbitration by executing the arbitration agreement by 
way of an intranet computer system. For months, the employee had made it clear 
that they did not wish to sign the arbitration agreement, and refused to do so. Evidence was given to demonstrate how easy it was for a supervisor to reset an 
employee’s password: indeed, this is just what a supervisor did in front of the 
plaintiff when the plaintiff had failed to log on to find out when she was next 
on duty. On the same day that the supervisor logged on to change the plaintiff ’s password, the computer system sent an internal email to the plaintiff, indicating 
18 M. Knopp, Case Note, OLG Köln, Ur19 U 16/02; LG Konstanz, 2 O 141/01 A; AG Erfurt, 28 C 2354/01, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 2 (2005), pp. 105–6; for 
a translation of Ur19 U 16/02, see H. Picot and M. Kast, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 108–9.19 2008 WL 2152046 (D. Kan.), 2009 WL 2525582 (D.Kan.); 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792.
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that the agreement had been ‘signed’. The employee was adamant that they had not executed the agreement, and Vratil J concluded that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would not have spontaneously reversed her decision in front of the 
supervisor, and that the supervisor could have clicked on the ‘I accept’ icon as 
the plaintiff watched. The judge set out the problem:20
The problem with Dillard’s position is that it did not have adequate procedures to maintain the security of intranet passwords, to restrict authorized access to the screen which permitted electronic execution of the arbitration agreement, to determine whether electronic signatures were genuine or to determine who opened 
individual emails. While the record establishes that Champlin and plaintiff were at the kiosk on April 28, it does not show that 
they were there at precisely 3:26:20 p.m. Therefore, it is not 
inconceivable Champlin or a supervisor logged on to plaintiff ’s 
account and executed the agreement. The Court recognizes that 
defendants’ burden of proof is not absolute certainty, but merely a 
preponderance of the evidence. At the same time, Dillard’s has not 
demonstrated the efficacy of its security procedures with regard 
to electronic signatures. Therefore, its version of events is no more 
likely true than plaintiff ’s. For these reasons, this case basically 
turns on the burden of proof. Dillard’s has the burden of proof and its evidence that plaintiff executed the arbitration agreement 
is not persuasive. On this record, the Court cannot find that it is more likely than not true that plaintiff executed the electronic 
agreement to arbitrate.
8.8 This case illustrates how important proof is in the context of digital 
evidence.21
8.9 In passing, Professor Preston notes that ‘wrap’ contracts are now considered to be enforceable without further inquiry, and the trend among 
judges in the US demonstrates a ‘circularity of judicial review: one court finds a new kind of contract enforceable, and other courts then assume enforceability 
because “everyone is doing it” without performing a thorough analysis of the 
20 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11792.21 See California: Martin v. Snappel Beverage Corp., 2005 WL 1580398; New York: Zaltz v. 
Jdate, 952 F.Supp.2d 439 (2013).Massachusetts: Ajemian, coadministrator, v. YAHOO!, Inc,. 987 N.E.2d 604 (Yahoo could 
not provide any evidence that the ‘accept’ icon was clicked when opening an account).
New York: Novak d/b/a Petswarehouse.Com v. Tucows, Inc 2007 WL 922306 (E.D.N.Y.) and The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Dukoff and Estate of Shari Dukoff, 674 
F.Supp.2d 401; Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2016), 2016 WL 552058 (where a third-party electronic signature service was used to gather digital data to demonstrate 
the clicking on the agreement to agree the terms).Washington: Kwan v. Clearwire Corporation, 2012 WL 32380.
8. The ‘I accept’ and ‘wrap’ methods 211
earlier opinions and distinguishing the facts’,22 and cites Matheson, CJ in the case of Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Inc.,23 where the judge 
states, at 1255, that ‘Clickwrap agreements are increasingly common and “have 
routinely been upheld.”’ New terms to describe the methods devised to enforce 
contract terms on websites include ‘sign-in-wraps’ and ‘scrollwrap’.24
8.10 In the Queensland case of Harding v. Brisbane City Council,25 the applicant 
used an online facility to appeal against a planning application. The person 
submitting the request was required to include details of a form of ‘identification’ 
as part of the submission process. Mr Harding typed in the number of his driving 
licence, but he made an error, and one of the numbers he typed in was incorrect. 
His application was rejected. At the appeal, the judge was required to determine, amongst other things, whether the input of an incorrect number merited the 
rejection of the submission. It did not. Robin QC DCJ held at [18] that:I think a common sense approach should be taken by which 
erroneous reproduction of more than a couple of digits (in the absence of special circumstances, such as the same number 
(exclusively) repeated – which may indicate some hardware or 
software malfunction) might be seen as creating some concern as 
to the signature, having regard to s 14(a) & (b) of the Act; on a commonsense approach in the present context, one wrong digit 
does not create any real concern.
8.11 This discrepancy did not vitiate the submission as a properly made one. 
Robin QC DCJ was not correct in concluding that the driving licence constituted 
a ‘signature’. The signature comprised the act of clicking of the ‘accept’ icon, 
and not the submission of the numbers identifying the driving licence.26 The numbers identifying the driving licence acted as an additional item of evidence to demonstrate to the Council that the person making the submission was who 
they claimed to be, which is a different issue entirely.
Browse wrap
8.12 There is a category in the United States of America commonly called 
‘browse wrap’ agreements, although there is some controversy with how judges 
22 C. B. Preston, ‘“Please note: you have waived everything’: can notice redeem online 
contracts?’, American University Law Review, 64 (2015), pp. 535–90, at p. 543, including 
the further citations noted in the article.23 701 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2012).24 New York: Berkson v. Gogo, LLC, 97 F.Supp.3d 359 (2015).25 [2008] QPEC 75 (16 October 2008).26 The ‘I accept’ icon was accepted in eBay International AG v. Creative Festival Entertainment 
Pty Ltd (ACN 098 183 281) [2006] FCA 1768.
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apply the distinction between ‘click wrap’ and ‘browse wrap’ in case law.27 Judges 
have also had to deal with cases that look like ‘browse wrap’, but are ‘click wrap’,28 and what can be described as hybrid cases,29 as described by Holwell, J at 838 in the case of Fjeja v. Facebook, Inc.:30
Facebook’s Terms of Use are somewhat like a browsewrap agreement in that the terms are only visible via a hyperlink, but also somewhat like a clickwrap agreement in that the user must 
do something else—click “Sign Up”—to assent to the hyperlinked 
terms. Yet, unlike some clickwrap agreements, the user can click to 
assent whether or not the user has been presented with the terms.
8.13 In this case, the judge held that the user was bound by the terms and conditions, and said, at 839–40:The mechanics of the internet surely remain unfamiliar, even 
obtuse to many people. But it is not too much to expect that an 
internet user whose social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly caused him mental anguish would 
understand that the hyperlinked phrase “Terms of Use” is really a 
sign that says “Click Here for Terms of Use.” So understood, at least for those to whom the internet is in an indispensable part of daily life, clicking the hyperlinked phrase is the 21st-century equivalent 
of turning over the cruise ticket. In both cases, the consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that are located somewhere 
else. Whether or not the consumer bothers to look is irrelevant.…Here, Fteja was informed of the consequences of his assenting click and he was shown, immediately below, where to click to 
understand those consequences. That was enough.
27 For which see Preston, ‘“Please note: you have waived everything”’; M. A. Lemley, ‘Terms 
of use’, Minnesota Law Review, 91 (2006), pp. 459–83. For the position in Canada, see 
S. Sigel, T. Ling and J. Izenberg, ‘1998 electronic commerce: the validity of webwrap 
contracts’, Uniform Law Conference of Canada, http://www.ulcc.ca/en/1998-halifax-
ns/395-civil-section-documents/1660-validity-of-webwrap-contracts-1999; I. Gupta, 
‘Are websites adequately communicating terms and conditions link in a browse-wrap 
agreement?’, European Journal of Law and Technology, 3 (2012), http://ejlt.org/article/
view/47/239.28  California: Savetsky v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., d/b/a LegalShield, 2015 WL 4593744 
(previous hearing reported at 2015 WL 604767.29 The Court of Appeals of Texas concluded the facts in Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 
147, 195 S.W.3d 147 (2006) illustrated a similar hybrid approach. In this case, the terms did not apply to the main plaintiff because of entering a contract over the telephone, but 
the terms applied to those plaintiffs that had used the website.30 841 F.Supp.2d 829 (2012).
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8.14 ‘Browse wrap’ agreements are where one party aims to impose terms of use or sale on another party where a visitor demonstrates assent by using the 
website. The potential customer is not required to indicate acceptance of any terms by any positive action, but the user must have had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the terms and conditions for them to be effective.31 This form of electronic signature comprises the process of using the website, thereby indicating knowledge of the relevant terms,32 although for such terms to be effective, or for constructive notice to apply, they must be conspicuous,33 intend to apply,34 and the party with the burden of proof must demonstrate how a visitor 
31 Or the product if in Illinois: Schafer v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc., 2005 WL 850459 
(S.D.Ill.).32 California: Cairo, Inc., v. CrossMedia Services, Inc., 2005 WL 756610 (N.D.Cal.); Fagerstrom 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 WL 6393948 (an appeal was filed on 23 November 2015).Florida: Brueggemann v. NCOA Select, Inc., 2009 WL 1873651 (S.D.Fla.).Missouri: Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227 (2009)
New York: Druyan v. Jagger, 508 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).New Mexico: Fiser v. Dell Computer Corporation, a/k/a Dell, Inc., 142 N.M. 331, 165 
P.3d 328, 63 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 449, 2007 -NMCA- 087Texas: American Airlines, Inc., v. Farechase, Inc., Case No. 067-194022-02 (Texas, 67th 
Dist., Mar. 8, 2003).33 Federal: Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation, 150 F.Supp.2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) affirmed 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002); Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobel, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 
(9th Cir. 2014), 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9479, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,191.California: Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F.Supp.2d 974 (E.D.Cal. 2000); Be In, Inc., v. 
Google Inc., 2013 WL 5568706; Friedman v. Guthy-Renler LLC, 2015 WL 857800; Tompkins 
v. 23andMe, Inc., 2014 WL 2903752; Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 245 Cal.App.4th 855 
(2016), 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 16 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2897, 2016 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2630.Illinois: Hubbert v. Dell Corporation, 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2005); PDC 
Laboratories, Inc., v. Hach Company, 2009 WL 2605270 (C.D.Ill.); Hussein v. Coinabul, 
LLC, 2014 WL 7261240; Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 2015 WL 507584 (where it was 
determined that the agreement was neither a click wrap nor a browse wrap agreement).Massachusetts: Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 99 F.Supp.3d 190 (2015), 
114 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321.Nevada: In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 893 F.Supp.2d 
1058 (2012), 95 A.L.R.6th 721.New Jersey: Syndicate 1245 at Lloyd’s v. Walnut Advisory Corporation, 2011 WL 5825979; Liberty Syndicates at Lloyd’s v. Walnut Advisory Corporation, 2011 WL 5825777; 
Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Management, LLC, 18 A.3d 210, 84 A.L.R.6th 763.
New York: Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F.Supp.2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
affirmed, 380 F.App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); Register.com, Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) affirmed, 356 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2004).Rhode Island: DeFontes v. Dell Computers Corporation, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I.Super.) 
(this is an unpublished opinion) affirmed DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061; Hodosh, 
Lyon & Hammer, Ltd., v. Barracuda Networks, Inc., 2016 WL 705272.Texas: Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F.Supp.2d 435 (N.D.Tex. 2004); 
Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., 2007 WL 4823761 (N.D. Tex.).Virginia: Cvent, Inc., v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F.Supp.2d 927, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1798.34 Pennsylvania: Collegesource, Inc., v. Academyone, Inc., 2012 WL 5269213, 2012-2 Trade 
Cases P 78,129.
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is made aware of the terms.35 A party might fail because they cannot demonstrate a number of issues of relevance, such as that the agreement actually existed on its website at the material time; that any agreement applied to the actual product in 
dispute, or that the defendants agreed to its terms.36
35 New York: Edme v. Internet Brands, Inc., 968 F.Supp.2d 519 (2013), 41 Media L. Rep. 2696.36 Florida: IT Strategies Group, Inc., v. The Allday Consulting Group, L.L.C., 975 F.Supp.2d 1267 
(2013).
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 9, ‘Personal Identification Number (PIN) and password’, pp. 215–24.
9
Personal Identification Number (PIN) and password
9.1 The PIN1 is possibly the oldest form of electronic signature, and has become a very widely used form of authentication,2 especially to obtain access to a 
bank account through the use of an ATM (automated teller machine or automatic 
teller machine or automated banking machine or cash machine), or to confirm a 
transaction with a credit card or debit card.3 Invariably, a claim by the user that they did not authorize one or more transactions conducted on the account will require the relying party – that is, the bank, with the burden of proof – to prove 
the account holder authorized the transaction. The fact a withdrawal or other form of transaction took place may not be in issue, and in any event, the bank can 
adduce the evidence under the relevant business records or the Bankers’ Books 
exemptions. The burden remains the same, whatever the technology used.4 
Cormac Herley, P.C. van Oorschot and Andrew S. Patrick report that:5
In the UK ‘chip and PIN’ initiative, signatures authorizing financial 
transactions are replaced by consumer entry of a 4-digit PIN. The 
vendor motivation for adopting the new system is an offloading of 
liability. Users become responsible for all approved transactions 
1 In United States of America v. Miller, 70 F.3d 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995), Karen LeCraft Henderson 
J referred to the PIN at 1355 as acting ‘as a sort of electronic signature authorizing an ATM 
to release available funds’.2 In United States v. Lawrence, 557 Fed.Appx. 520 (2014), 113 A.F.T.R.2d 2014-1138, 2014-1 USTC P 50,195, a PIN is used by the Internal Revenue Service as a form of electronic 
signature, which can also be affixed by an agent.3 For instance, the use of PIN was explicitly recognized as a type of electronic signature by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in its ruling in the case of Ž.Š. 
v. AB Lietuva taupomasis bankas, civil case no. 3K-3-390/2002; for a case note, see S. 
Trofimovs, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 143–5, and 
for a translation, see S. Trofimovs, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 
(2009), pp. 255–62.
4 See also M. Silalahi Nuth, ‘Unauthorized use of bank cards with or without the PIN: a lost 
case for the customer?’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012), 
pp. 95–101; case translation: Norway, Journal number 04-016794TVI-TRON, Bernt Petter 
Jørgensen v DnB NOR Bank ASA by the Chairman of the Board (Trondheim District Court, 
24 September 2004), Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012), 
pp. 117–23; case translation: Republic of Turkey, Case number: 2009/11485, judgment 
number: 2011/4033, by Av. Burcu Orhan Holmgren, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review, 9 (2012), pp. 124–7.
5 C. Herley, P.C. van Oorschot and A.S. Patrick, ‘Passwords: if we’re so smart, why are we still 
using them?’, in R. Dingledine and P. Golle (eds.), Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 
13th International Conference, FC 2009, Accra Beach, Barbados, February 23–26, 2009 
(Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), pre-publication version available online at http://
research.microsoft.com/pubs/80199/fc09.pdf.
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where authorization relied on a correct PIN, whereas for traditional magnetic-stripe technology with signatures, users are liable for losses in disputed transactions only if they are shown to be 
negligent or involved in fraud. (From a legal perspective in countries like the UK, liability related to signature forgery falls on the relying 
party. PIN-authorized transactions apparently fall outside the scope of such statutory protection, and banks assert that use of a PIN 
implies cardholder negligence.) Consumers may be particularly unhappy to learn this detail of the new technology in light of prior 
demonstrations that chip and PIN readers can leak user PINs.
9.2 The statement ‘users become responsible for all approved transactions 
where authorization relied on a correct PIN’ is incorrect. Whatever the form 
of technology that is used, the relying party has the burden of proof. The bank must prove that it had the mandate of the customer to undertake an action 
on the account, regardless of the nature of the technology. A PIN is merely one form of electronic signature, and the law has not changed because of the 
nature of the technology used by the banks. The participants at this conference will possibly not have understood the nuances of the legal process and the 
difficulty that a customer might have in challenging the evidence produced by the bank to prove that the customer caused the PIN to be entered into an ATM, 
for instance. Judges tend to refrain from ordering banks to adduce additional evidence in banking cases, and an added problem is that there is a presumption 
in England and Wales that ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the courts 
will presume that mechanical instruments were in order at the material time’, 
formulated by the Law Commission in 1997.6 Judges have implied that the words 
‘mechanical instruments’ include computers and computer-like devices, even 
though computers and computer-like devices are not mechanical instruments. 
Judges have also, although not exclusively, used the term ‘reliable’ in relation 
to computers. With such a presumption in place, a customer taking legal action 
against a bank for the recovery of money stolen by a thief will have a significant 
problem in persuading a judge that the bank should adduce sufficient evidence 
to prove the customer used the PIN.7
9.3 The central concern is usually whether it was the customer or somebody 
else that was responsible for withdrawals made from the customer’s account 
6 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics (1997), 
13.13; for the United States of America, see C.M. Barger, ‘Challenging judicial notice of 
facts on the internet under Federal Rule of Evidence 201’, University of San Francisco Law 
Review, 48 (2013), pp. 43–70.
7 S. Mason, When Bank Systems Fail – Debit cards, credit cards, ATMs, mobile and online 
banking: your rights and what to do when things go wrong (2nd edn., St Albans: PP 
Publishing, 2014); S. Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence (3rd edn., London: LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2012), ch. 5, ‘Mechanical instruments: the presumption of being in order’; 
S. Mason, ‘Electronic evidence: a proposal to reform the presumption of reliability and 
hearsay’, Computer Law & Security Review, 30 (2014), pp. 80–4.
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using the correct PIN or password. The United States case of Judd v. Citibank8 
illustrates the nature of the problem. In 1980, Dorothy Judd discovered two withdrawals were made from her account by use of a cash card and PIN in the 
sum of US$800 when she was at work. Marmarellis J indicated that the case 
turned on issues of evidence, burden and credibility. He determined the issue by considering whether the plaintiff had proven her case by a fair preponderance 
of the credible evidence. In this instance, the issue was whether to believe 
the person or the printout of the transactions from the machine. The judge 
determined that the plaintiff had proved her case ‘by a fair preponderance of 
the credible evidence’ and judgment was awarded in the amount of the loss plus 
interest and disbursements.
9.4 Further cases followed in 1981. In Feldman v. Citibank, N.A.; Pickman v. 
Citibank, N.A.9 (two cases brought into one hearing), Ms Pickman discovered 
debits recorded against her account on various occasions: US$150.00 on 6 
February 1981; US$150.00 on 3 May; two amounts of US$150.00 each on 9 
May; US$150.00 and an additional US$20.00 on 10 May 1981. In each instance, the records of the bank indicated that the money was withdrawn by the use 
of a card issued to her. The record of the judgment is not abundantly clear in 
respect of the evidence Ms Pickman gave to the court. It is recorded at 44 that 
Ms Pickman did not notice the first unauthorized withdrawal that took place on 6 February 1981, and only discovered it after a cheque was returned because of 
insufficient funds in the account in May, thereby alerting her to the withdrawals 
that were recorded by the bank in May. However, at 45 [3], it is noted that Ms Pickman actually noticed the unauthorized transaction when she received her bank statement for February, but did not pursue her claims until she noticed the 
additional withdrawals in May, which in turn alerted her to the February loss. 
The judge based his judgment on this second description. LeVine J referred to the 
Final Report (1977) of the National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, in particular the recommendation that where a customer fails to notify the bank of a disputed transaction, the customer will be liable for any subsequent unauthorized use that could have been prevented, had the customer alerted 
the bank to the problem in a timely manner. The judge decided to apply the recommendation of the Commission, and determined that because Ms Pickman did not contact the bank within 30 days of receiving her bank statement for February to dispute the unauthorized transaction, she could only recover for the 
first unauthorized withdrawal, but not subsequent unauthorized withdrawals, 
because of her failure to inform the bank of the first unauthorized withdrawal, and her inaction precluded the bank from discovering a weakness in its security 
system.
9.5 In the case of Mr Feldman, the court took judicial notice of news reports in the media of a number of methods used by thieves to steal money from ATMs, including where money was stolen by deceiving the customer into cooperating 
8 N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 435 N.Y.S.2d 210.
9 N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 443 N.Y.S.2d 43.
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with the thief. The scheme operated as follows: it appears that two ATMs would be placed by the bank in a vestibule, and a telephone would be located between the machines – the telephone was put in place for the use of the customer to 
communicate with employees of the bank. A customer enters the area where 
the ATMs are located, where they might see a person (the perpetrator of the 
deception) using the telephone, ostensibly speaking to an employee of the 
bank to inform them that one of the machines (the machine they appear to 
be complaining about, and which they appear to be using) was not working. The customer would not, naturally, give much attention to the person speaking 
over the telephone. The thief observes the customer enter their PIN into the 
machine. At this moment, the thief distracts the customer by telling him that the other machine is not functioning properly, but the bank employee has advised the perpetrator to enter another card into the machine to resolve the 
problem. The customer unwittingly accedes to the request, and inserts his card 
into the second machine. This action enables the thief to insert the customer’s 
PIN into the machine and effect a withdrawal on the customer’s account. It was 
Mr Feldman’s evidence that there was no other person in the area at the time 
he withdrew money from the ATM, but the records indicated that US$20.00 
was withdrawn on machine number 1 at 7:31:11 (the withdrawal he made), 
and a further US$200.00 was withdrawn on machine number 2 at 7:31:48. Astonishingly, despite the evidence of the plaintiff, the judge accepted the evidence of the security provisions described by the Operational Supervisor from the bank, and determined that Mr Feldman was liable for the unauthorized 
ATM transaction because he had ‘unwittingly’ allowed a thief to withdraw from 
his account.
9.6 It is of interest to compare the liability of Feldman (decided on 16 
September 1981) to the case of Ognibene v. Citibank, N.A.10 (decided on 9 
December 1981) where the same method of theft was used as in Feldman. Three 
withdrawals were made on 16 August 1981 from two adjacent ATMs, the first, 
by the plaintiff at 5:41 for US$20.00, then two further withdrawals at 5:42 for 
US$200.00 and 5:43 for US$200.00. Thorpe J described it at 846 as ‘a scam which 
[the] defendant has been aware of for some time’. In this case, the judge indicated that the rights, liabilities and responsibilities of the banks were set out in federal 
legislation contained in 15 U.S.C. 1693, commonly called the Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act. At the time of this litigation, New York had not enacted legislation 
which governed such disputes, so the federal law applied. Under the legislation, the burden was on the customer to show a transaction was not authorized, and 
the bank had the burden of proving that the transfer was authorized. The judge 
concluded that Mr Ognibene met his burden of proof. In essence, the bank argued that although the customer was deceived, the evidence of the customer that he 
had permitted the card to be used met the banks’ burden of proof in relation to 
authorization. This argument was roundly and rightly rejected, partly because the customer did not furnish the PIN to the thief, but because the thief observed 
10 N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 446 N.Y.S.2d 845.
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the customer key in the PIN on a machine in the premises of the bank, and 
obtained his card by deception. The judge indicated, at 848, that:On the contrary, the unauthorized person was able to obtain the 
code because of the bank’s own negligence. Since the bank had 
knowledge of the scam and its operational details (including the 
central role of the customer service telephone), it was negligent in 
failing to provide plaintiff-customer with information sufficient to alert him to the danger when he found himself in the position of a 
potential victim.
9.7 In June 1981, after the method had come to the attention of the bank, 
Citibank had cause to place signs in areas where ATMs were located. The signs were approximately two and a half inches in diameter, containing a circle in 
red, upon which was written the words ‘Do Not Let Your Citicard Be Used For 
Any Transaction But Your Own’. Thorpe J indicated that this was not adequate, 
because it failed to give the reason behind the warning. As a footnote, the problem of thefts from ATMs and bank accounts became such a problem, that 
in the following year, the Attorney General of New York initiated legal action 
against Citibank, seeking relief for ‘repeated or persistent fraud or illegality in 
transaction of business’ by the bank.11
9.8 In England and Wales, PC John Munden was charged with attempting to obtain money by deception after he complained that he was not responsible for making six transactions from ATM machines, all of which appeared on his 
statement in September 1992. He was subsequently prosecuted at Mildenhall 
Magistrates’ Court in Suffolk in February 1994 and convicted. He appealed against his conviction before Turner J, sitting with two magistrates at Bury St Edmunds 
Crown Court. It appears that the defence attempted to obtain information about the computer systems, records and operational procedures of Halifax Building Society, but the Halifax apparently refused to provide such evidence, except in 
the form of a report by a third party. In these circumstances, the court decided 
that PC Munden’s conviction could not stand, and he was acquitted. In Germany, 
an appeal from a civil action was brought before the Bundesgerichtshof (the 
Federal Supreme Court) in 2004.12 In this instance, the plaintiff ’s purse was 
stolen. It contained her cash card, and an hour or so later, cash was withdrawn 
at two different ATMs using the correct PIN.13 The plaintiff took action against 
11 State of New York, by Abrams v. Citibank, N.A., 537 F.Supp. 1192 (1982); in Porter v. Citibank, 
N.A., 123 Misc.2d 28, 472 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1984), where the customer used 
their card, but no money was dispensed, employees of the bank testified that on average 
cash machines were out of balance once or twice a week.12 5 October 2004, XI ZR 210/03, published BGHZ 160, 308-321 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal 
Court of Justice); for a translation and commentaries by M. Eßer and T. Kritter, see Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6(2009), pp. 248–54.13 It has since been demonstrated that any PIN can be used to obtain money from an ATM, 
with no need for the thief to have the correct PIN, for which see S.J. Murdoch, S. Drimer, 
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her bank to recover the money, and the bank refused to reimburse the customer, 
because, it was alleged, of her negligence, which excluded the bank’s liability 
under its general terms and conditions for the issue of cash cards. The court of 
first instance found for the plaintiff, and a regional court reversed the decision 
on appeal. The plaintiff appealed to the Federal Supreme court on a point of law. 
The only issue before the Federal Supreme Court concerned the burden of proof. 
The decision of the regional court was confirmed. It was held that the rules on 
prima facie evidence applied. This was because the facts proved in the matter 
(the withdrawal of cash in conjunction with a stolen bank card and the use of the 
correct PIN) characteristically resulted from a different set of facts (the storage 
of the PIN with the card). The court also held that in order to prove her case, the plaintiff had to show that the same result could occur in another way, in order to 
rebut the prima facie evidence.
9.9 In comparison, two judges in separate jurisdictions have reached different 
conclusions on similar facts. In the Greek case of 5526/1999,14 the claimant’s 
bank cash card was stolen from his car, amongst other items. Although the claimant immediately informed the police and the bank, the bank failed to put a stop on the account in time, and funds were subsequently debited from his 
account. The bank sought to enforce the terms and conditions that applied to the issuance of the card, relying on the strict liability of the customer where the 
card was used without authority. In this instance, the term was considered unfair, 
because it was contrary to the main principle of the allocation of fault in Greek 
law, and second, because such terms are contrary to good faith. The customer 
was not held to be at fault.
9.10 Compare this decision to the South African case of Diners Club SA (Pty) 
Ltd v. Singh15 where Levinsohn J held, at 659, that a contract term by which the customer was liable, irrespective of who used the PIN, was not against public 
policy. This is a very wide and sweeping decision that cannot be maintained in the light of the relative ease by which a PIN can be obtained without the consent 
or authority of the cardholder. In the Papua New Guinea District Court, Seneka 
J found for Mathew Roni against the Bank of South Pacific.16 Mr Roni discovered the loss of his Save Card, and informed the bank immediately he knew of the 
loss. It was not in dispute that the bank put a stop to all withdrawals, but it subsequently transpired that a number of transactions occurred after the time the bank put a stop on the account, some of the transaction took place almost at 
R. Anderson and M. Bond, ‘Chip and PIN is broken’, 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy (this was awarded the Best Practical Paper) available online at http://www.
cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/oakland10chipbroken.pdf.14 Court of First Instance of Athens constituted by one judge 5526/1999; for a translation 
into English see A. Fylla, Case note – Greece, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 4 (2007), pp. 89–90.15 2004 (3) SA 630 (D).16 Roni v. Kagure [2004] PGDC 1; DC84 (1 January 2004).
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almost the same time in separate geographical locations using the correct PIN. 
The judge reached the conclusion that the bank was negligent.
9.11 In situations such as those illustrated above, the nature of the evidence and the methods that third parties can use to obtain the correct PIN will be highly 
relevant in reaching a decision between two conflicting claims. However, not 
every dispute is about unauthorized transactions. Transactions can occur with the authority of the user, but the user may dispute the amount they authorized, 
as in the Danish case of U.2000.1853V, where, at a restaurant with late-night opening hours, A authorized two Dankort card payments as he swiped his debit 
card through one of N’s card terminals, entered his PIN, and agreed the amount 
that appeared on the display. The court was satisfied that one of the payments 
was erroneously accepted in the sum of DKK 10,500 instead of DKK 105. N was 
therefore ordered to pay back the difference. The court accepted, as a starting point, that when the appellant entered his PIN and approved an amount in the 
sum of DKK 10,500, the appellant made a binding payment to the respondent. However, that action did not rule out that it could be proved that payment of a 
higher amount was made by mistake.17
9.12 It might also be usefully observed that where legislation requires a 
document to be signed in a specific manner, the use of a PIN will not be accepted 
as a substitute manuscript signature.18
9.13 In respect of the use of passwords as a form of electronic signature, the 
Canada Business Corporations Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 was amended to permit 
some transactions to occur in electronic form. In Re Newbridge Networks Corp.,19 the applicant corporation applied for an order approving an electronic voting procedure for approximately 4,300 option-holders throughout Canada and the 
world. The decision was issued before the Electronic Commerce Act, S.O. 2000, 
c. 17 came into force in Ontario, but Farley J considered actual and proposed 
amendments to the relevant federal and provincial statutes. The judge found those amendments overly restrictive and too focused on the present state of 
technology. Instead, he looked behind the mechanics of the procedure to the underlying requirements of reliability, safeguarding and notice, and observed 
that statutory provisions should retain the flexibility to accommodate future 
technological change. In the particular circumstances, the electronic notice and voting procedures were the functional equivalent of receiving notice and being 
able to vote by postal mail. Farley J observed, at 6, that ‘on balance the electronic procedure envisaged is a safer and more reliable system than is that which relies 
on the mails or other delivery systems’ with built-in password integrity and 
instantaneous delivery. The court equated the use of a password signifying the 
user’s choice with the traditional form of signing a paper proxy vote.
17 For a full report of this case, see Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 
(2007), p. 98.18 Charles Parsons (Vic) Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs [1995] AATA 171; (1995) 37 ALD 
779 (28 June 1995).19 (2000), 48 O.R. (3d) 47, [2000] O.J. No. 1346 (QL) (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
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9.14 Of interest is a decision that accepts the proposition that the unique 
number issued by a bank can be a signature. In the New Jersey case of Spevack, 
Cameron & Boyd v. National Community Bank of New Jersey,20 the unique account number assigned by a bank to a depositor was determined to be as complete 
a signature as the depositor’s written or printed name. Bilder (retired and 
temporarily assigned on recall) observed, at 1169, that a signature may take many forms, and there was no reason why a bank account number could not be one of them:
In this computer age the use of numbers as a means of identification 
has become pervasive. Indeed, numbers are more readily 
recognized and handled than signatures. The ‘signature’ used by Homequity was its account number at Midlantic, the bank in which 
it deposited the check. That ‘signature’ accurately identified the 
payee and the funds were properly credited to the payee’s account. In fact, had Homequity written a name without the account number, the bank would have had to look up the number that corresponded 
with the same. In keeping with the electronic age, it is the numbers 
which have the primary significance.
9.15 The problems with the PIN and banking applications represents an ever-changing struggle between clever thieves who implement new strategies to steal, 
and the banks in overcoming the threats as they are discovered.21 Arguably, one of the problems that employees of banks face when trying to persuade directors to 
spend money on security is the collective lack of understanding of the problem.22
20 677 A.2d 1168 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1996), 291 N.J.Super. 577. Note the 1844 New York case of 
Brown v. The Butchers & Drovers’ Bank, 6 Hill 443, 41 Am.Dec. 755 where a person writing 
‘1. 2. 8.’ on the back of a bill of exchange as a substitute for his name served to endorse the 
bill.21 S. Mason and T.S. Reiniger, ‘“Trust” between machines? Establishing identity between 
humans and software code, or whether you know it is a dog, and if so, which dog?’, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 21 (2015), pp. 135–48; Mason, When 
Bank Systems Fail; S. Mason, ‘Electronic banking and how courts approach the evidence’, 
Computer Law & Security Review, 29 (2013), pp. 144–51; R. Porkess and S. Mason, ‘Looking 
at debit and credit card fraud’, Teaching Statistics, 34 (2012), pp. 87–91 (also in German: 
‘Betrug mit Kundenkarten und Kreditkarten’, Stochastik in der Schule, 34 (2014), s. 15–
18); S. Mason, ‘Debit cards, ATMs and negligence of the bank and customer’, Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 27 (2012), pp. 163–73; S. Mason, ‘UK 
credit card fraud: the scale of the problem’, e-Finance & Payments Law & Policy, 6 (2012), 
pp. 14–1622 M. Arnold, ‘Bank directors lack technology know-how’, Gulf News, 2 Nov. 2015, B6.
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 10, ‘Typing a name into an electronic document’, pp. 223–56.
10Typing a name into an electronic document
10.1 The use of electronic signatures pre-dates any form of legislation, and in the latter decade of the 20th century, adjudicators found themselves applying well-established legal principles to new technologies when presented in the form of electronic signatures, just as judges in the 19th century were confronted with the increasing use of printing, typewriting and telegrams: all, it must be 
said, without the need for special legislation to be enacted. Case law applying electronic signature statutes in the United States of America indicates that the act of typing a name into a document on screen was considered just as acceptable a method of proving intent as any other form of signature,1 although this form of electronic signature is not uniformly accepted in all jurisdictions 
for all purposes.2 However, reports of cases dealing with electronic signatures sometimes indicate that the lawyers and judges do not appear to be familiar 
with signatures.3 In Wright v. Direct Capital Securities, Inc.,4 the plaintiff typed his name into an agreement, knowing he was typing his name into the form as 
an electronic signature. The defendants wanted to enforce the provisions of the 
agreement by compelling the plaintiff to deal with the matter by arbitration. At a 
hearing before the trial judge to compel arbitration, it is reported (at 2) that the 
trial judge concluded ‘there was no legal precedent allowing it to rely upon such 
a “signature” as evidence of intent to arbitrate’. No relevant case law or electronic signature legislation appeared to have been referred to or cited, and although the members of the Court of Appeal appeared to accept the typed signature as a form of electronic signature by inference, there is no explicit discussion of the case law 
or legal principles.
10.2 Lawyers and judges are beginning to accept that typing a name into a document such as an email is a valid method of signing a document, as in Orton v. 
1 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, s 2(8) definition of electronic signature, Official Comment 7; in Buckles Management, LLC, v. Investordigs, LLC, 728 F.Supp.2d 1145 (D.Colo. 
2010) Babcock J held that the signature in an email was not valid where the party charged 
was not the signatory, and the party charged did not adopt the signature.
2 For instance, see the following case translations from Denmark: U.2001.252Ø (Request for 
dissolution; Bankruptcy Court; signature; sufficiency of electronic signature with name 
typed on document) and U.2001.1980/1H (Request for dissolution; Bankruptcy Court; 
requirement for manuscript signature; sufficiency of electronic signature with name 
typed on document), Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), pp. 
232–4.3 In the Australian case of Philip Laming v. TicketXpress Pty Ltd PR941462 [2003] AIRC 1503 
(3 December 2003), Hamilton, Deputy President of the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission indicated, incorrectly, at [2] that ‘Emails do not contain signatures, even 
electronic signatures, and the only readily identifiable marking may be the email address’.
4 2010 WL 659073 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.) (this case is noted as Nonpublished/Noncitable).
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Collins,5 where the word ‘Putsmans’ was deliberately typed in an email after the 
customary salutation ‘Yours faithfully’). Mr Peter Prescott QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, said, at [21]:I have no doubt that its purpose would be recognized throughout 
the profession. Anyone would think: ‘Putsmans are signing off on 
this document’. It was intended to signify that document was being 
sent out with the authority of the defendants’ legal representative.
10.3 The main area of contention is to argue whether an email or series of 
emails constitutes the necessary evidence that an agreement has been reached.
Acts by lawyer as agent 
10.4 With the appropriate authority, an agent is capable of binding their 
principal in the electronic world as in the physical world. That this applies to attorneys is illustrated in the Tennessee case of Waddle v. Elrod,6 where the Supreme Court determined that the emails exchanged between counsel with 
their name typed at the bottom of the email satisfied the signature requirement 
of the Statute of Frauds. The position is the same in New Zealand,7 and in the United States: Michigan,8 New York9 and Texas.10 
Interest in real property
Australia
10.5 The Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in Australia had cause to 
consider the effectiveness of an electronic signature under Australia’s electronic transactions legislation in an action for an adjustment of property interests 
under Division 3 of Part 2 of the De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT). In Faulks 
5 [2007] 3 All ER 863, [2007] 1 WLR 2953, [2007] EWHC 803 (Ch); Green (Liquidator of 
Stealth Construction Ltd) v. Ireland [2011] EWHC 1305 (Ch) [2011] BPIR 1173 where it 
was accepted that typing a name into an email is sufficient for the purposes of s2 Law 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989; Lindsay v. O’Loughnane [2012] BCC 153, 
[2010] EWHC 529 (QB).
6 367 S.W.3d 217 (2012).7 Cox v. Coughlan [2014] NZHC 164 (14 February 2014).8 Wessel v. Wessel, 2014 WL 325237, unpublished opinion.9 Williamson v. Delsener, 59 A.D.3d 291 (2009), 874 N.Y.S.2d 41, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 01333; 
Jackson v. New York City Department of Education, 2012 WL 1986593; Forcelli v. Gelco 
Corporation, 109 A.D.3d 244 (2013), 972 N.Y.S.2d 570, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 05437; Maria 
McBridge Productions, Inc., v. Badger, 46 Misc.3d 1221(A) (2015), 46 Misc.3d 1221(A) 
(2015) Unreported Disposition.10 Williamson v. The Bank of New York Mellon, 947 F.Supp.2d 704 (2013).
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v. Cameron,11 the parties lived together in a relationship for some two years 
before they separated. In 2003, the plaintiff informed her former partner that 
she was in the process of preparing a separation statement. The defendant had, by this time, moved out of the country, and the only means of communication the plaintiff had with her former partner was by email, because he did not 
provide a postal address. One of the issues in this case was whether a separation 
agreement between two partners had been formed for the purposes of the Act. 
Section 45(2) of the Act provides that where the court is satisfied that there is a separation agreement between the partners, is in writing and signed by the other partner, the court may make an order under Division 3 or 5 of Part 2, but may 
not make an order that is inconsistent with the terms of the agreement. In her application, the plaintiff submitted that the email correspondence constituted a separation agreement, or in the alternative, if the court did not consider the email correspondence constituted a separation agreement, regard should be given to 
what was agreed by this form of correspondence. First, the judge reached the conclusion that, even though the evidence was not overwhelming, there was an agreement between the former partners, and that it was enforceable at common 
law. The second issue was whether the email correspondence had been signed. 
The defendant typed his name at the bottom of the text ‘Regards, Angus,’ and in 
applying the provisions of s9 of the Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) 
Act 2000 (NT) to the name typed at the bottom of the email, Acting Master Young concluded, at 64:
I am satisfied that the printed signature on the defendant’s emails 
identifies him and indicates his approval of the information communicated, that the method was as reliable as was appropriate 
and that the plaintiff consented to the method. I am satisfied that 
the agreement is ‘signed’ for the purposes of s45(2).
10.6 The case of Kavia Holdings Pty Limited v. Suntrack Holdings Pty Limited12 was an action for the option to renew a lease before the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales. Pembroke J determined that the text of the relevant email did not 
amount to a notice within the meaning of clause 7 of the lease. In relation to the 
formality of a signature, he said, in passing at [33], the following:
In my view the inclusion of the sender’s name on the email 
amounted to ‘signing’ for the purpose of the clause. The requirement for signing is intended to identify the sender and 
authenticate the communication. That is sufficiently achieved in 
an email by the setting out of the sender’s name together with the 
email address from which the email is dispatched. The name of the 
sender and his email address are readily and rapidly verifiable. Any 
11 [2004] 32 Fam LR 417; [2004] NTSC 61.12 [2011] NSWSC 716.
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other conclusion would produce a capricious and commercially inconvenient result that might have wide-reaching and unintended 
consequences in modern-day trade and commerce.
Canada
10.7 The exchange of emails regarding the offer and acceptable of buying a property was considered by Rideout J in Girouard v. Druet.13 The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick reversed the decision on appeal14 because, the court concluded, the parties did not have the requisite intention to enter into a binding 
contract for the purchase and sale of the condominium unit. The signature issue was not determined because it not necessary to reach a conclusion in this matter, although Robertson and Richard JJA entered into a rambling discussion about 
electronic signatures at [24] to [30]. One highly respected Canadian commentator 
noted of this discussion: ‘I wonder if all the verbiage of the CA was necessary’.15
United States of America
10.8 In 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that the typed signatures in an exchange of email communications constituted signatures for the purpose 
of terminating a lease.16 In a case before Foster J in the Massachusetts Land Court, 
St. John’s Holdings, LLC v. Two Electronics, LLC,17 the parties negotiated over a 
contract for the sale of land. St John’s Holdings took legal action to enforce its 
rights as a buyer of a property pursuant to a binding letter of intent to purchase. Part of the evidence was an exchange of emails and text messages between the 
parties’ real estate brokers. The plaintiff argued that these exchanges constituted 
an agreement on all essential terms that satisfied the Statute of Frauds. Foster J, 
at 8, considered that the ‘way in which the parties handled the transaction was 
sufficient for them to appreciate that the text message would memorialize the 
contractual offer and acceptance’. The judge then inferred that the name ‘Tim’ added to the end of a text message in the context of the exchanges between the parties was intended to be authenticated by the sender as a deliberate choice to 
type his name at the conclusion of his text message.
13 2011 NBQB 204 (in French on CanLII), the English text is at [2011] N.B.J. No. 260, and 
[2011] A.N.-B.no 260.14 Druet v. Girouard 2012 NBCA 40.15 J. Gregory, ‘Email transactions in land – in New Brunswick’, 30 April 2012, http://www.
slaw.ca/2012/04/30/email-transactions-in-land-in-new-brunswick/.16 Crestwood Shops, L.L.C., v. Hilkene, 197 S.W.3d 641 (Mo.App. WD. 2006).17 2016 WL 1460477.
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Loan of money
Australia
10.9 In the case of Stuart v. Hishon,18 Ms Hishon loaned money to Mr Stuart 
and subsequently initiated proceedings to recover A$28,216.17 plus interest, being the outstanding and unpaid balance of monies owing to her pursuant 
to a loan of A$83,760.87 made by Ms Hishon to him in July 1996. Prior to the litigation, a series of email correspondence occurred between the parties 
regarding the payment of the loan, and Mr Stuart ended each email with ‘Tom’. Counsel for Mr Stuart argued that it was necessary to provide evidence to establish that Mr Stuart placed the printed name on his email intending it to 
be an acknowledgment of the debt, and that no such evidence existed. Harrison 
J did not accept this argument, stating, at [34], that ‘Mr Stuart typed his name 
on the foot of the email. He signed it by doing so. It would be an almost lethal 
assault on common sense to take any other view’.
China
10.10 In China, the court of first instance case of Yang Chunning v. Han Ying,19 
Mr Yang claimed that the defendant Miss Han asked to borrow RMB 11,000 from 
him. Yang agreed to lend the money to Miss Han, but Miss Han failed to return 
the money. As evidence, Mr Yang exhibited several text messages sent from Miss 
Han’s mobile telephone about the loan. It was confirmed that the messages were 
transmitted from Miss Han’s mobile telephone number. In this case, the judge 
supported the plaintiff ’s claim based on the evidence of the mobile telephone 
message between the parties. The court judged that these messages, as a form of electronic text according to the Electronic Signature Law, could serve as evidence 
to support Mr Yang’s claim.
United States of America
10.11 In the Texas case of Parks v. Seybold20 before the Court of Appeals, the Gaming Management Corporation executed a note payable to Scott Seybold in the amount 
of US$10,000, plus 15 per cent interest. Clyde Parks wrote the note by hand, and he 
signed it in his capacity as vice-president of the corporation. The corporation ceased 
to exist, and Mr Seybold sought full payment on the note. The parties subsequently exchanged a number of emails, and the court agreed with the trial judge that the 
emails constituted writing, and the inclusion of the words ‘Thank you, Clyde’ above 
an automatic signature block served to demonstrated that he signed the emails.
18 [2013] NSWSC 766.19 (2005) hai min chu zi NO.4670, Beijing Hai Dian District People’s Court; for a translation of this case, see Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 103–5.20 2015 WL 4481768.
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Employment
England and Wales
10.12 In England and Wales, the first case of this nature occurred in the Industrial Tribunal case of Hall v. Cognos Limited.21 Cognos employed Mr Hall as a sales executive under the terms of the Standard Employment Agreement 
used by Cognos. He was provided with a motor car for business and personal 
use. Mr Hall was reimbursed for all reasonable expenses incurred for travel, accommodation and other costs in accordance with the relevant policy, which 
the chairman determined was incorporated into the contract. The policy stated 
that all expenses over six months old would not be paid. Mr Hall failed to submit 
any travel expenses between 1 December 1995 and 3 June 1996. By January 
1997 Mr Hall wanted his expenses to be paid. A series of emails was exchanged 
on 15 January between Mr Hall, Sarah McGoun (of HR) and Keith Schroeder, Mr 
Hall’s line manager. Mr Hall asked if he could submit a late expenses claim to 
Ms McGoun. Ms McGoun in turn referred Mr Hall to Keith Schroeder, and Mr 
Schroeder, in response to the question as to ‘whether [the late submission] is OK 
with you?’ replied, ‘Yes, it is OK.’ Mr Hall subsequently submitted his expenses, 
although he did not provide all the necessary forms immediately. He also inflated 
his claims. His employers refused to make any payment and dismissed him.
10.13 Counsel for Cognos argued that because an email was not in writing and signed, the exchange of emails did not have any effect on the terms of the 
employment agreement. Mr C. T. Grazin, the chairman sitting on his own, declined 
to accept this proposition, attractive as it appeared to him. He held that the emails 
were in writing and signed once they were printed out. Despite there being no 
reference or discussion to any relevant case law or the statutory definitions of 
‘writing’ and ‘document,’ the chairman concluded at 5:
I am satisfied that an email is ‘in writing and signed by the parties’ 
once it is printed out. The position might (it is not necessary to 
make any finding on this point) be different if the email was only 
retained temporarily on the computer’s hard disk storage system. The documents that were, however, produced from the computer 
are clearly in writing and bear the signatures of both ‘Sarah’ and 
‘Keith’. The fact that those signatures are printed, rather than hand-
written, is not in my view material. For those reasons, I reject Mr 
Pym’s submission that the relevant email messages are incapable, 
as a matter of law, of having any modifying effect on the specific 
contract between the parties.
10.14 A further argument put forward on behalf of Cognos was that Mr Schroeder 
did not have the authority to respond to Mr Hall’s request, nor was he authorized 
to agree to it. This was rejected on the basis that as Mr Hall’s line manager, Mr 
21 Industrial Tribunal Case No 1803325/97.
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Schroeder was vested with the appropriate authority to deal with such a request, 
and as a result, Mr Hall could rely on Mr Schroeder’s response. This meant Mr 
Schroeder’s response acted to bind Cognos. As a result, the exchange of emails between Mr Hall and his line manager acted to vary the policy, and Cognos was 
obliged to pay Mr Hall his reasonable expenses.
United States of America
10.15 Organizations are increasingly requiring potential employees to apply for jobs electronically, and sometimes by way of a third party company that operates 
an online service. The procedures and technology are not always perfect, despite 
assertions to the contrary by those that create and operate such systems. An example is that of the Californian case of Adams v. Quiksilver, Inc.,22 where Lynn Adams, when applying for a job with her former employer, was requested to type 
her name into an electronic form for the purpose of a background check. The employer relied on her signature to enforce an arbitration agreement, which was also included in the form, although the employee was not aware the form 
contained such an agreement. The employee gave evidence to the effect that she did not type her name into the form, partly because she did not complete the form, and partly because her name was already typed in the form before she 
received it as an attachment to an email. The employer had engaged a third party 
to provide a service to deal with the entire recruitment process online. The third party company asserted that it was impossible for the form to be sent to the applicant, because the entire process was meant to be online, and only available 
through their website. The employer filed a motion to compel arbitration. Wilkinson J heard the application, and also had a brief evidentiary hearing to 
establish whether the employee had made the electronic signature, as asserted. The judge determined the electronic signature had been added and granted 
the motion. The employee appealed the decision. The members of the Court of Appeal agreed that there was no evidence to indicate that the employee had 
typed in her electronic signature to the form. It was for the employer, relying on 
the signature, to prove that the employee had filled in her name on the form. The evidence from the employer in contradiction of the evidence from the employee 
was far from sufficient to prove their case. This is an important case, because it illustrates the weakness of the evidence that was submitted by the employer 
to prove its case.23 For this reason, it is difficult to understand why the report is 
marked ‘nonpublished/noncitable’.
22 2010 WL 602515 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.).23 For a discussion of authenticating evidence in legal proceedings in the United States of 
America, see K. Chasse, ‘The admissibility of electronic business records’, Canadian Journal of 
Law and Technology, 18 (2011), pp. 105–91; B.W. Esler and J.J. Schwerha IV, ‘United States of 
America’, in S. Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence (3rd edn., London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2012); G.L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence (n.p.: American Bar Association, 2008); for a general discussion on the authentication of electronic evidence and the presumption that 
machines are working properly, see Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence, chs. 4 and 5.
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Contract
England and Wales
10.16 The members of the Court of Appeal Civil Division in Nicholas Prestige 
Homes v. Neal24 did not concern themselves with the question of the signature 
in emails in this particular case. It was concluded that a contract was formed 
with the exchange of emails regarding the commission on a sale of property. By 
implication, the names typed at the end of the email, ‘Marc Taylor’ and ‘Sally’ 
were construed as valid signatures.25
Israel
10.17 Whether a signature contained in an email constitutes a valid contract 
in Israel was considered by Noa Grossman J in Computer Sky Edv v. Prime 
Medical Company Ltd.26 It was held that a contract that was signed through email 
correspondence is valid. In essence, the reasoning of the decision was as follows: 
negotiations are also carried out today through electronic communications. An offer, a request for an offer and the reception of an offer can all be performed via 
email correspondence. The correspondence as a whole is what creates the actual 
agreement. Unlike a printed contract that incorporates the parties’ will into one document, a contract reached by way of reciprocating electronic communications 
is a mosaic of all the parties’ communications.
Lithuania
10.18 Two rulings of the Lithuanian courts, in the Court of Appeal27 and in the Supreme Court of Lithuania28 accept email communications (typed by the name) as evidence in civil proceedings, although it is not certain whether names written 
in the emails will be accepted as a form of electronic signature.
Scotland
10.19 The nature of the electronic signature was not specifically at issue in Baillie 
Estates Ltd v. Du Pont (UK) Ltd,29 where Hodge L concluded that an exchange of emails constituted a valid contract, notwithstanding the apparent informality 
24 [2010] EWCA Civ 1552; [2010] All ER (D) 22 (Dec).25 An exchange of emails constituted an agreement in Bieber v. Teathers Ltd (In Liquidation) 
[2014] EWHC 4205 (Ch), 2014 WL 6862668, and as with Nicholas Prestige Homes v. Neal 
2010] EWCA Civ 1552; [2010] All ER (D) 22 (Dec), the nature of the signatures was not 
considered.26 Tel Aviv Peace Court Civil Case 29488/04, (4 August 2005, unpublished decision).27 10 April 2006, case No. 2A– 95/2006.28 6 March 2006, case No. 3K-3-169/2006.29 2009 GWD 25-399, [2009] ScotCS CSOH_95, [2009] CSOH 95.
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of the content of the emails exchanged, because the exchange demonstrated an 
agreement to enter into a contract. By inference, it is possible to observe that the 
named typed at the bottom of each email constituted an electronic signature.
South Africa
10.20 A contract can be varied by an exchange of emails that includes the name of the person sending the email where their name appears in the email, as in the case of Spring Forest Trading v. Wilberry,30 where the parties agreed to cancel a 
contract by exchange of emails. Wilberry argued, among other things, that the form of the electronic signature was relevant in establishing the an agreement was not reached to cancel the contract because it was necessary to use an 
advanced electronic signature, as contemplated in s 13(1) of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. In delivering the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Cachalia JA rejected this argument on the basis that this was a misreading of the legislation, and that the section did not 
apply in this case. The judge said, at [28]:The typewritten names of the parties at the foot of the emails, which 
were used to identify the users, constitute ‘data’ that is logically associated with the data in the body of the emails, as envisaged 
in the definition of an ‘electronic signature’. They therefore satisfy the requirement of a signature and had the effect of authenticating 
the information contained in the emails.
10.21 This finding is also consistent with the approach taken by the courts in 
South Africa, as noted by the judge at [26]:The approach of the courts to signatures has therefore been 
pragmatic, not formalistic. They look to whether the method of the 
signature used fulfils the function of a signature – to authenticate the identity of the signatory – rather than insist on the form of the 
signature used.
United States of America
10.22 Under the hearsay provisions for evidence in the United States of America, 
a third party statement is not admissible into evidence. The advent of email as a method of communication has led to some new and interesting challenges, 
as exemplified in the federal 9th circuit case of Sea-Land Service, Inc., v. Lozen 
International, LLC.31 Sea-Land agreed to transport containers of grapes from 
Mexico to England. The containers were to travel for part of the journey by rail. 
Sea-Land’s railroad agent placed the containers on the wrong train, and the 
30 (725/13) [2014] ZASCA 178; 2015 (2) SA 118 (SCA) (21 November 2014).31 285 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2002).
Electronic signatures in law232
grapes did not arrive at the port in sufficient time for the sailing of the vessel 
they were due to be transported in. Sea-Land began the action to recover the full amount of its contract with Lozen, and Lozen counterclaimed for breach of contract and for loss of cargo, because it had to sell the grapes domestically at a 
lower price. At the hearing for summary judgment, the judge excluded an internal email written by an employee of Sea-Land and forwarded to Lozen by another 
employee of Sea-Land. On appeal, it was held that the email was not hearsay as 
an admission of a party opponent. Graber CJ indicated the position at 821:The original email, an internal company memorandum, closes with 
a electronic ‘signature’ attesting that the message was authored 
by ‘Mike Jacques’, Sea-Land’s ‘Rail Reefer Services Coordinator’ 
at the time the email was written. Jacques is listed as one of Sea-
Land’s employees in Exhibit 9, a letter from Sea-Land to Lozen that the district court did admit into evidence. The original email 
also appears to concern a matter within the scope of Jacques’ 
employment.
More importantly, however, Jacques’ original email was forwarded 
to Lozen by Laurie Martines, a second Sea-Land employee. She 
copied the entire body of Jacques’ internal memorandum into her 
email and prefaced it with the statement ‘Yikes, Pls note the rail 
screwed us up ….’, Martinez thereby incorporated and adopted 
the contents of Jacques’ original message, because of her remark 
‘manifested an adoption or belief in [the] truth’ on the information 
contained in the original email.
10.23 The name typed into a medical insurance form for a patient was accepted as an electronic signature where the patient reviewed and approved the information, and authorized the signature to be typed on the form;32 the exchange of emails with 
names typed in the body of the emails served to amend a real estate contract.33 There are occasions when a document is intended to be signed, but for some 
reason the contract is performed without a relevant signature. This occurred in 
Brighton Investment Limited v. Har-Zvi,34 where Brighton was not able to produce 
an executed copy of a Memorandum of Understanding. Discussions between the 
parties had been conducted by email. In giving judgment, Garry J indicated the nature of the email exchange that took place between the parties, at 1223:In their email communications, Levy and defendant discussed multiple business deals using a telegraphic style and irregular syntax that cannot readily be understood without explanatory 
extrinsic information.
32 Long v. Time Insurance Co., 572 F.Supp.2d 907 (S.D.Ohio 2008).33 Sims v. Stapleton Realty, Ltd., 305 Wis.2d 655, 2007 WL 2386494 (Wis.App.).34 88 A.D.3d 1220 (2011), 932 N.Y.S.2d 214, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 07555.
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…
Given this lack of clarity in the parties’ written communications, their intent must be determined by assessing whether the totality of the circumstances, including their course of conduct after June 2005, consistently indicated their mutual belief that an agreement 
had been reached.
10.24 In this instance, the objective evidence established that the parties 
intended to be bound. The evidence comprised the exchange of emails and the 
subsequent course of conduct of both parties.
Guarantees and debt
Australia
10.25 That email correspondence is used extensively for business has become 
a fact that judges now take for granted. Users intend that email correspondence be effective, and although lawyers will be instructed to argue the contrary, courts 
will continue to find, providing the evidence makes it clear, that the parties intend 
their email correspondence to be acted upon and to be bound by what is written. Such a case occurred before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in Austral-
Asia Freight Pty Ltd v. Turner.35 An exchange of emails occurred in respect of a 
debt claimed in two amounts, one of A$33,884.02 and the other of A$2,859.14, 
in respect of two different companies. Hartnett J concluded, at [30], that there was an objectively manifested intention to be legally bound, it was conveyed 
in sufficient writing, and the name typed at the end of the emails constituted a 
signature for the purposes of s 126 of the Instruments Act 1958 (Vic).
New Zealand
10.26 In Sanson v. Parval Marketing Limited,36 upheld on appeal under Gachot 
v. Sanson,37 it was accepted that the first name of a person typed into an email is capable of forming part of the evidence to demonstrate the assignment of a 
guarantee. Asher J commented at [42]:I do not consider that the Parkers, in particular Mr Len Parker, would have been content with a guarantee from HMM, a company 
registered in the British Virgin Islands and of no established worth. 
Mr Gachot, on the other hand, was at the helm of a successful international brand and was clearly a man of some substance, 
35 [2013] FCCA 298 (2013), 2013 WL 2253153.36 HC AK CIV 2006-404-7231 [2008] NZHC 87 (11 February 2008).37 [2009] NZCA (CA95/2008) 86.
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living in a Commonwealth jurisdiction. I have no doubt, viewing 
the exchange objectively, that the guarantee was from Mr Gachot 
personally and not from his company HMM. The relevant emails 
in June and September 2006 were exchanged with Mr Gachot 
personally, being addressed to ‘Bertrand Gachot’ at b@hype.com. 
In his 20 June 2006 email, Mr Gachot signed himself ‘Bertrand 
Gachot, CEO HMM Int’, but the 2 September 2006 email that he 
sent is worded in the first person and signed ‘Bertrand’ without 
reference to his company.
Insurance
United States of America
10.27 The first two cases of names typed into a digital document that appeared to have reached the courts in the United States are from the insurance sector, illustrating, perhaps, that this particular sector, in seeking to extend the use the 
new technology, was the first to be caught up in spurious claims relating to the application of the law to the technology: many people may have forgotten or not even been aware of the history of judicial decision making in respect of emerging 
technologies during the 19th century. In 1990, insurance agents brought an action against an insurer in the case of Wilkens v. Iowa Insurance Commissioner,38 
alleging that the insurer failed to comply with section 515.52 of the Iowa Code, in that an agent, Larry Hertel, countersigned insurance policies by typing his name 
into the document on the computer. The Insurance Commissioner considered that signatures generated on a computer met the requirements of the statute, 
and the members of the Court of Appeals of Iowa agreed. Section 4.1(7) of the 1989 Iowa Code provided, at the material time, the following:
Written – in writing – signature. The words “written” and “in 
writing” may include any mode of representing words or letters in 
general use. A signature, when required by law, must be made by 
the writing or markings of the person whose signature is required. If a person is unable due to a physical handicap to make a written 
signature of mark, that person may [make substitutions] in lieu of 
a signature required by law ….
10.28 Sackett J giving the judgment of the court indicated, at 3, that the sole issue was proving intent, not the method or technology used to effect the signature:
We find the fact that the signature is computer-generated rather 
than hand-signed does not defeat the purpose of the act. The 
38 457 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa App. 1990).
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issue is not how the name is placed on a sheet of paper; rather the 
issue is whether the person whose name is affixed intends to be 
bound. No one argues that the agent whose name was affixed did 
not intend to be bound. We find the signature requirements of the 
statute were met.
10.29 This litigation was followed in 1993 with the South Carolina case of Cylburn 
v. Allstate Insurance Company.39 In this instance, the plaintiff took legal action 
against his insurer for breach of contract. The plaintiff ’s house burned down 
approximately two years after he stopped paying insurance premium payments. The plaintiff claimed that the policy had not been legally cancelled, which meant 
he had been denied insurance cover. The arguments in the case primarily focused 
on the interpretation of the South Carolina Code, in particular § 38-75-730(b), where cancellation arises when premiums are not paid – the cancellation is not effective unless the insured is provided with written notice of cancellation not 
fewer than ten days before the proposed effective date of cancellation. At the trial, the members of the jury concluded that the defendant had sent notice of 
cancellation of the policy to the plaintiff for failing to pay the premium. However, the jury were also asked to decide whether the insurance company had sent a 
written notice to their insurance agent, indicating the policy was cancelled. It appears that the insurance company sent computer disks to its agents to bring them up-to-date with changes, and the members of the jury decided that this 
method of providing written notice was not sufficient. On appeal, it was decided, after a brief indication that other forms of technology, such as videotapes and 
tape recordings were considered as ‘writings,’ that the computer disk sent by 
postal mail to the agent was equally as acceptable. Blatt SDJ indicated, at 956–7, that the form of technology was hardly a problem in reaching a decision based on sound legal principles:The storage of information on tape recordings and videotapes 
is not that much different from that on floppy diskettes for computers, but rather is more a difference in the devices used to 
read the information. The information can be retrieved and printed 
as ‘hardcopy’ on paper. In today’s ‘paperless’ society of computer-generated information, the court is not prepared, in the absence 
of some legislative provision or otherwise, to find that a computer 
floppy diskette would not constitute a ‘writing’ within the meaning 
of [S.C.Code 1976] § 38-75-730.
10.30 The nature of the evidence in such cases is important, and any organization relying on any form of technology, including specialized electronic 
signature software, will need to gather sufficient evidence of the signing process, as illustrated in the Louisiana case of Bonck v. White and Progressive Security 
39 826 F.Supp. 955 (D.S.C. 1993).
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Insurance Company,40 where the evidence of the electronic signature of Wendi 
Bonck was insufficient to grant summary judgment.
Public administration, judiciary and the police
England and Wales
10.31 In Badre v. Court of Florence, Italy,41 an extradition order was made 
in enforcement of a European Arrest Warrant. The electronic signature on 
the certificate issued by the Serious Organised Crime Agency was challenged, because, it was argued, it was not subscribed with a physical signature in ink, but 
with an electronic signature in the form of letters and a number: ‘GW (200820)’. 
There was no other dispute about the content of the certificate. It was accepted 
that in all other respects the document produced was a proper certificate. The 
certificate was issued under the provisions of s2(7) and (8) of the Extradition Act 
2003. The purpose of the certificate is to assert the authority to issue an arrest 
warrant under the Act. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the provision 
of a proper certificate under s2 of the Act is a precursor to the validity of the 
warrant and the subsequent jurisdiction of the court. When a certificate is issued, 
the requested person may be lawfully arrested. The powers of the court follow on 
from such an arrest. If the arrest cannot be shown to be lawful, the court has no 
jurisdiction. Mr Summers argued that a machine purported to issue the certificate 
in this case. McCombe LJ rejected this argument, indicating that it seemed clear 
that the designated authority provided the certificate. The official causing the 
certificate to be issued used their initials GW and an identifying code as a means 
of authentication. The electronic form of the signature on the certificate did not 
act to detract from the validity of it. The judge then went on to observe, at [16], that a manuscript signature would be preferable:It is perhaps unfortunate that the electronic age has produced more haste and less speed, because it has thrown up this 
technical argument where none existed before. It must surely be the easiest task in the world to produce a signature in ink, or at least the full name and designation of the individual certifying 
and perhaps an official stamp or rubric confirming that that individual does indeed certify the contents of the document to 
lend some additional force of authority to the certificate that is 
being produced. I would hope that SOCA would consider either 
reverting to the old practice of producing these certificates, properly signed by a real person, in the form that was actually used 
40 115 So.3d 651 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2013); see also California: Coffey v. Beverages & More, Inc., 2014 WL 1691552; Mississippi: Buckhalter v. Penney Corporation, Inc., 2012 WL 4468455.41 [2014] EWHC 614 (Admin), [2014] A.C.D. 93.
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in an earlier warrant in this case (subsequently withdrawn); or at 
least better identifying the individual making the certification on 
the face of the document.
10.32 An identical point was taken in The Queen on the Application of Neculai 
Jugan v. Deta Court of First Instance, Romania,42 where a certificate was issued 
pursuant to s2(7) of the Extradition Act 2003. It was dated 28 May 2013, and 
below the date were the words ‘Signed LT’ in type, and underneath that ‘#101782’. The appellant contended that this was not a valid signature, which meant that 
an essential procedural requirement had not been made out. This argument 
was rejected on the basis that a witness gave written evidence confirming the 
signature and the authenticity of the certificate.
Scotland
10.33 Many police forces in the United Kingdom now use digital systems to implement and record decisions, as in the case of HM Advocate v. Purves,43 as 
explained by Maciver S at [7]:I found from that evidence that the procedure within Lothian 
and Borders Police is that the applications from various officers for directed surveillance are dealt with by a secure online system 
which meets that Force’s requirements in respect of security and 
accessibility. A password system is used which means that only selected and appropriate individuals can access the system and once authorization has been given by a detective superintendent 
the authorization cannot be altered. The applying officer makes his application by typing the grounds for his request in his online application and that is read on screen by a detective superintendent or superior rank who, having considered the application, either 
grants or refuses authorization. If authorization is granted as in this case, the reasons for authorization are typed personally by the 
superintendent and thus entered into the secure system.
10.34 In this instance, the solicitor advocate for the first accused argued that the authorization for directed surveillance granted by the police superintendent in 
terms of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 was not in writing until it was printed off, and it could not therefore be a valid authorization until that time, and that when it was printed off, it did not have the signature 
of the authorizing superintendent and was also defective on that account.44 The 
42 [2014] EWHC 460 (Admin), 2014 WL 640434.43 2009 GWD 30-479, [2009] HCJ 2, 2009 SLT 969, [2009] ScotHC HCJ_2, 2010 SCL 88.44 Interestingly, there was no mention in the judgment of the content of the chapter written 
by Iain G. Mitchell QC, ‘Scotland’, in Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence – the first edition was 
published in 2007.
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Sheriff rejected both arguments. As a matter of general principle, he dismissed 
the first argument at [11]:I found on a simple basis of commonsense and reality, that it must be accepted and understood that in every phase of life, society 
has moved forward, and specifically in this connection has moved on from only producing documents in pen and ink, and that 
the development is normal and acceptable. I did not find it an acceptable or reasonable argument that an online document which had not yet been printed off but which had been typed and was 
viewable on a screen was not to be regarded as being ‘in writing’. I came to the view that such a document, having been prepared in this case by Detective Superintendent Doneghan personally by depressing the keys on his personal computer and by the use of a secure system, was in fact a written document and was preserved 
for future use within Lothian and Borders Police online system. I 
consider it to be a flawed argument to suggest that that document could not be regarded as a written document until it was actually 
printed off and could be held in the hand for reading purposes.
10.35 Regarding the issue of whether the authorization was signed, there is no requirement for the document to be signed under the provisions of the statute, 
which follows that the authorization was valid.
United States of America
10.36 Challenges involving the name typed into an email began to occur in 1997. 
The first challenge appears to be the Massachusetts case of Doherty v. Registry of 
Motor Vehicles,45 relating to public documents and concerning the interpretation of revisions to the relevant code. The plaintiff ’s driving license was suspended by the Massachusetts State Police following his arrest for operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and for refusing to take a 
breathalyser test. The police officer submitted his report to the Registry of Motor 
Vehicles in the form of an email. When submitting a report, an officer is required 
to make such reports under the penalties of perjury. The plaintiff contended 
that because the email did not contain the officer’s manuscript signature, the 
Registrar of Motor Vehicles could not act on the content of the email. The relevant text is taken from the memorandum of decision as follows:
The report is not signed by anyone. At the bottom of the report, there are statements indicating the identity of various state police 
45 No 97/CV0050 (Suffolk, SS Massachusetts District Court, May 28, 1997), available online 
at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Doherty_v_RMV.html; electronic signatures are used 
routinely in traffic offences, for which see the Canadian cases of R v. Eged, 2009 BCPC 180 
(CanLII) and City of London v. Caza, 2010 ONSC 1548 (CanLII) by way of example.
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troopers and their functions. The report states that ‘Thomas Kelley’ 
is the officer before whom the refusal was made and that ‘Tpr. Kevin 
Hogaboom’ is the other person who witnessed the refusal. At the 
bottom of the report there is the following statement: ‘This is the 
report of TROOPER THOMAS KELLEY and was made by TROOPER 
THOMAS KELLEY under the penalties of perjury. Data entry and 
transmission were done by KELLY, THOMAS by or at the direction 
of TROOPER THOMAS KELLEY’.
10.37 Agnes J held that the email was signed where the statement was made under the penalties of perjury, even where the report did not contain a manuscript signature:
I conclude that a police officer who files or transmits (or who has 
another file or transmit) a report that is required by law to be made to the Registry of Motor Vehicles or to some other agency or individual by means of Email or some other electronic method 
in which there is a statement that identifies the officer making 
the report and a statement that it is ‘made under the penalties of 
perjury’ has ‘signed’ the document and is subject to a prosecution for perjury if the report is wilfully false in a material manner even 
though the report does not contain a handwritten signature.
10.38 In reaching his decision, he considered the effect of the legislation, which 
was amended in 1995, and relevant case law. Amongst other conclusions, he 
noted that the legislature removed the requirement that the police officer’s report had to be in writing; that the format of the report may be approved by the registrar, and the legislature inserted a new phrase to permit the mode of 
communication to include electronic means of transmission. In essence, the 
changes were meant to give effect to the use of email in such circumstances. A 
similar case was brought before the court in New York in relation to the pre-
programmed insertion of the electronic signature of the issuing officer regarding 
a simplified traffic information charging a person for driving while intoxicated.46 The defendant claimed that the charging documents failed to comply with the 
requirements of New York State Criminal Procedure Law, s100.40 ‘Local criminal 
court accusatory instruments; sufficiency on face’ in that the signature was not properly validated because no signature was actually made and there was no 
evidence of any other acknowledgement or affirmation by the officer in relation 
to the authentication of the information. The judge, Fryer J, indicated that the 
officer met all the requirements by personally preparing the information, served 
it on the defendant, and provided a verified supporting deposition.
10.39 Lawyers and members of the judiciary use electronic signatures. This is demonstrated in the Florida case of Florida Department of Agriculture and 
46 People of the State of New York v. Patanian, 20 Misc.3d 298, 857 N.Y.S.2d 482.
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Consumer Services v. Haire,47 in which it was decided that a judge might affix an 
electronic signature to a warrant. Warner J observed, at 1059–60:When a judge issuing a warrant directs the use of an electronic signature, it is clear that the judge is attesting to the act of issuing 
the warrant. Accordingly, we find no prohibition to the use of an electronic signature, so long as it is the judge who authorizes and 
is in control of its use.The record here, however, discloses that in one instance an issuing 
magistrate authorized the Department to affix his signature to 
search warrants. We disapprove of a procedure which would permit the Department itself to prepare and electrically sign 
warrants with the judge’s signature. However, technologically there is no reason why the Department could not provide the judge with software, expertise, and assistance to issue such warrants without the judge actually permitting the Department to electronically sign 
the warrants on the judge’s behalf.
10.40 The Supreme Court of Arizona reached a similar conclusion that the name of a judge typed in a judgment constitutes a signature in the case of Haywood 
Securities, Inc., v. Ehrlich,48 in which Ryan J indicated that nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure or case law prohibited judgments from being signed electronically, 
and commented at 741 that ‘the defining characteristic of the requirement that 
a judgment be “signed” is that the document has affixed to it in some form the name of the judge that evidences an intention of authentication’ (italics in the 
original). In the case of Kloian, d/b/a Arbor Management Company v. Domino’s 
Pizza, L.L.C.,49 the Supreme Court of Michigan also considered the names of attorneys typed at the bottom of emails constituted electronic signatures, and upheld an initial settlement agreement negotiated between the parties and 
agreed through their lawyers by exchange of emails.
Statute of Frauds
10.41 Email is a particularly useful means of communicating and negotiating 
the terms of contracts. Aside from the question as to whether the content of an 
exchange of emails is sufficient to demonstrate the formation of a contract, one of the issues is whether the exchange of electronic communications were signed,50 
47 836 So.2d 1040 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2003), rehearing denied Haire v. Florida Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services, 870 So.2d 774 (2004), 29 Fla. L. Weekly S67.48 149 P.3d 738 (Ariz. 2007).49 733 N.W.2d 766 (Mich.App. 2006).50 Kentucky: Commonwealth Aluminum Corporation v. Stanley Metal Associates, 186 F.Supp.2d 
770 (W.D.Ky. 2001) (correspondence between a manufacturer and supplier comprising a 
series of letters, facsimile transmissions and emails, held to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
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and if so, whether the emails were sufficiently signed under the relevant Statute of Frauds, or whether the signatures in an exchange of emails between the parties 
clearly identified the parties.51 Of interest is where some judges do not indicate 
what form of signature is referred to in a judgment. In the Wisconsin case of Alliance 
Laundry Systems, LLC v. Thyssenkrupp Materials, NA,52 an exchange of emails took 
place that may have been deemed to constitute sufficient to form a contract with 
a value greater than US$500, which therefore required the agreement to be in 
writing, in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code. In a hearing where the buyer applied for summary judgment, Lynn Adelman J indicated that an electronic signature constituted a signature under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. In this instance, it is presumed that the electronic signature was in the form 
of names typed into the respective emails that were exchanged.
Canada
10.42 In Canada, an electronic signature in an email was held to constitute a 
signature under the Statute of Frauds 1677.53
England and Wales
10.43 In England and Wales, Clarke J indicated in Golden Ocean Group Limited 
v. Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd at 10354 that ‘an email, the text of which 
begins “Paul/Peter”, may be regarded as signed by Peter because by that form of 
wording Peter signifies that he is addressing Paul and authenticates the content 
of the whole of what follows’. On appeal,55 it was common ground between Clarke 
By implication, the signatures on the emails must have been acceptable to the court).
New York: Page v. Muze, Inc., 270 A.D.2d 401; 705 N.Y.S.2d 383; 2000 N.Y. Slip Op. 
02646 (an unsigned email made an equivocal reference to terms and was not shown to 
have satisfied the subscription requirement); Sel-Lab Marketing, Inc., v. Dial Corp., 48 UCC 
Rep.Serv.2d 482, 2002 WL 1974056 (S.D.N.Y.) (an exchange of emails did not conform to the Statue of Frauds partly on the grounds that only one of the emails was signed, but not 
by the party to be charged. The judge did not appear to consider whether the name in the 
email address could be an electronic signature); Al-Bawaba.com, Inc., v. Nstein Technologies 
Corp., 19 Misc.3d 1125(A), 2008 WL 1869751 (N.Y.Sup.), 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50853(U) (the 
first name of the sender typed into the bottom of an email provided evidence of the intent 
to authenticate the email).51 In the Californian case of Carimati di Carimate v. GinsGlobal Index Funds, 2009 WL 
3233538 (C.D.Cal.), Matz J indicated that the signatures in an exchange of emails between 
the parties clearly identified the parties. Although this was a motion by the defendants to dismiss the causes of action, which the judge denied, the judge felt the need to indicate 
that this was the correct position under the Delaware statute.52 570 F.Supp.2d 1061, 66 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 427.53 Leoppky v. Meston, 2008 ABQB 45 (CanLII).54 [2011] EWHC 56 (Comm).55 Golden Ocean Group Ltd v. Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 542, 
[2012] 3 All ER 842, [2012] EWCA Civ 265, [2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 978, [2012] 1 WLR 
3674, [2012] 1 CLC 497, [2012] WLR(D) 70.
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J and the members of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal that an electronic 
signature is sufficient and that a first name, initials56 or a nickname will suffice. 
It was argued by Mr Kendrick on behalf of Golden Ocean that the affixing of the 
first name ‘Guy’ to an email was not done in a manner that indicated that it was 
intended to authenticate the document. On this point, Tomlinson LJ said, at [32]:
I do not accept Mr Kendrick’s first argument. Chartering brokers may communicate with one another in a familiar manner but that does not detract from the seriousness of the business they are 
conducting. In my judgment Mr Hindley put his name, Guy, on the email so as to indicate that it came with his authority and that he 
took responsibility for the contents. It is an assent to its terms. I 
have no doubt that that is a sufficient authentication.
United States of America
10.44 Two federal cases were decided in 2002 and 2005 respectively. The 
facts pre-date the passing of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001–7003. In the seventh circuit case of Cloud 
Corporation v. Hasbro, Inc.,57 in an action for breach of contract, the contract 
was modified by an exchange of email communications during 1996 between 
employees of each company, in which it was decided that the sender’s name in 
an email satisfied the requirements of the Illinois Statute of Frauds. The report 
of this case is inconclusive respecting the form in which the signature took. 
Posner CJ for the court stated, at 296, that ‘… we conclude without having to rely 
on the Federal Act that the sender’s name on an email satisfies the signature 
requirements of the statute of frauds’, but it is not clear whether the judge refers to the name of the employee typed in the body of the text, possibly at the end of 
the email, or whether it is a reference to the name contained in the email address. In reaching this conclusion, Posner CJ considered the federal eighth circuit case of Toghiyany d/b/a First Class Refurbishing v. Amerigas Propane, Inc.,58 in which it 
was concluded that emails did not include a signature. The report of this case is 
ambiguous, and Posner CJ commented on this at 296 ‘… it is unclear whether the court thought the absence of a signature fatal or thought that it was that absence combined with the absence of an essential term – the duration of the contract – 
that triggered the statute of frauds’.
56 Regions Bank v. Cabinett Works L.L.C., 92 So.3d 945 (2012), 11-748 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/10/12) 
concerned an agreement to settle a dispute by way of an exchange of emails. The Court of 
Appeal of Louisiana concluded that the initials of a lawyer ‘DCM’ at the end of an email 
did not establish an indication that the initials and names on the emails that the bank’s 
counsel sent to the guarantor’s counsel were adopted as electronic signatures.57 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).58 309 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2002).
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10.45 The second federal case is Lamle v. Mattle, Inc.,59 in which the name of an employee added to an email sent in 1997 was held to be a valid writing and 
signature to satisfy California’s Statute of Frauds. It was observed that if the email had been sent after 1 January 2000, there would have been no question of 
its sufficiency under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 
1633.7. The case was therefore decided on the basis of Californian common law, 
and Dyk CJ observed at 1362 that ‘We can see no meaningful difference between 
a typewritten signature on a telegram and an email’. This observation must be 
right.
10.46 Prior to the federal court cases noted above, the case of Shattuck v. 
Klotzbach60 came before the Superior Court at Plymouth in Massachusetts. The 
parties discussed the sale of a property by an exchange of emails. In an action 
to enforce the contract, it was held that the emails contained sufficient terms 
concerning the purchase and sale of the property to form an agreement.61 In addition, it was also held that the names of the parties typed at the end of each email was a signature, and where the husband signed on behalf of his wife where both husband and wife were aware of the negotiations, his signature was valid 
for his wife. Murphy J indicated, at 361, that ‘Taken as a whole, a reasonable trier 
of fact could conclude that the emails sent by the defendant were “signed” with 
the intent to authenticate the information contained therein as his act’.62 This 
was followed by the New York case of On Line Power Technologies, Inc., v. Square 
D Company,63 where it was held that an exchange of emails provided sufficient evidence to suggest the parties intended to enter into an agreement for the payment of commissions, and it was made clear that the emails contained valid 
electronic signatures under N.Y. State Technology Law § 104 (2003) and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7001 (2003). The form of the signature is not clear. The description given is that 
the name ‘Steven J. Maling, NE Regional Service Sales Manager for Square D’ was included in the relevant emails, and the emails originated from the email address 
of the company. There are three possibilities: the name was typed at the end of the email, or it was included in the email address or it was both typed at the end 
of the email and included as part of the email address. Another New York case was also heard in the same year, that of Rosenfeld v. Zerneck,64 where it was held 
that the content of an exchange of emails was not sufficient to create a binding 
59 394 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).60 14 Mass. L. Rptr 360; 2001 WL 1839720 (Mass. Super.).61 The Court of Appeals of Texas agreed with the trial court that the description of a property 
contained in three emails, with typed signatures, satisfied the Statute of Frauds in Dittman 
v. Cerone, 2013 WL 5970356.62 For a contrary view, see Vista Developers Corp., v. VFP Realty LLC, 17 Misc.3d 914, 2007 
N.Y. Slip Op. 27418 in that electronic signatures were not held to constitute a writing for the purposes of contracts concerning conveyances of real estate, which are dealt with 
separately and exclusively in the General Obligations Law, § 5-703.63 2004 WL 1171405 (S.D.N.Y.).64 776 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. 2004).
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agreement to buy and sell property, but Kramer J recognized that a name typed at 
the end of an email constitutes an electronic signature and satisfies the Statute of 
Frauds. The further New York case of Bazak International Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel 
Group65 concerned allegations of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, in 
which it was confirmed that where the name of the sender is typed at the bottom 
of an email and typed on the company’s letterhead, the signature satisfies the 
requirements of the statute.
10.47 There will be occasions when an exchange of emails is capable of 
confirming the existence of an oral contract, thus bringing it within the Statute of Frauds in some jurisdictions, as in the Illinois case of Polyad Company v. Indopco 
Inc.,66 where an exchange of emails with the sender’s name in the email was held 
to constitute an electronic signature.
Wills
10.48 There are circumstances when a will has been considered for probate as a result of being written on a computer, and it is conceivable that a court may be required to consider the content of an email that is clearly testamentary in character – perhaps an email sent by a service man or woman while on active 
duty.67 One state in the United States of America has enacted legislation to enable 
an electronic will.68
Australia
10.49 There have been a number of cases in Australia where wills have only 
been made in electronic format. Aside from deciding whether the electronic will is valid, the judges have also had to decide whether a will is signed where the 
deceased typed their name into the document. In the case of In the will of Mark 
Edwin Trethewey,69 Beach J concluded that typing their name at the foot of the 
document was the equivalent of a signature in the circumstances of the case.70
65 378 F.Supp.2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).66 2007 WL 2893638 (N.D. Ill.).67 Jeremy Malcolm, a lawyer in Australia signed his will using digital signatures; see Angus 
Kidman, ‘Australian makes digital will’, ZDNet Australia, 20 Jan. 2004, available online 
at http://www.zdnet.com/article/australian-makes-digital-will/; Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 1 (2004), p. 90; M.C. Wood-Bodley, ‘Wills, data messages, 
and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act’, The South African Law Journal, 
21 (2004), pp. 526–8; a paper by W.H. Hurlburt QC, ‘Electronic wills and powers of 
attorney: has their day come?’ (Alberta Law Reform Institute) no longer appears to be 
available online.68 Nevada: NRS 133.085 Electronic will.69 [2002] VSC 83 (14 March 2002).70 In Mahlo v. Hehir [2011] QSC 243 (19 August 2011), McMurdo J concluded that he was 
not satisfied that Dr Mahlo intended that an electronic document should form her will, 
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10.50 The late Daniel Yazbek prepared a Microsoft Word document, entitled 
‘Will.doc’ on his computer between 11 and 14 July 2009. The police later found 
it on his computer. Acob Yazbek, one of Daniel’s brothers, claimed that this 
document was an informal testamentary document that formed Daniel’s will. 
The defendants, Daniel’s parents, say their son died intestate. The primary issue 
in dispute was whether the electronic document, ‘Will.doc’, or a printed out 
paper copy of Will.doc, satisfied the requirements of s8 of the Succession Act 
2006 (NSW) sufficiently for the court to declare either to be Daniel’s last will.71 The judge, Slattery J, determined that the document was probably created by Mr 
Yazbek, as set out at [26]:
The name ‘Daniel Yazbek’ at the end of Will.doc was not in the 
form of an electronic signature, reproducing his handwriting. The 
words of his name were typed like the rest of Will.doc. The internal 
evidence of Will.doc strongly supports the inference that Daniel 
created it. Daniel’s password could have been discovered by other 
users by trial and error methods. But there was no suggestion in the evidence that any other individual was either in a position to 
access Daniel’s laptop or had any motive to create documents such 
as Will.doc on Daniel’s laptop.
10.51 It was not in contest that Will.doc was not executed or witnessed in 
conformity with the formal requirements of s6(1) of the Succession Act, although 
Mr and Mrs Yazbek did not concede that the printed out document may not 
have been executed in accordance with s6(1). The judge determined that the document, whether in electronic format or in paper format was a document, 
and therefore came within the provisions of s8 of the Succession Act; that Will.
doc purported to state Daniel’s testamentary intention, and that it was intended 
to be his will.72 Although the printed version of the document was not signed 
with a manuscript signature, nevertheless the judge concluded, at [116], that the act of typing his name on the second page of the electronic document after the 
final salutation represented a degree of adoption of Will.doc as operative and 
therefore valid.
Canada
10.52 An early example of a will prepared in digital format is the Quebec case of 
Rioux v. Coulombe,73 where the police found a note after the testatrix committed suicide on 4 May 1996 that led to the discovery of a diskette, with the following 
because she knew that in writing a new will, she had to do more than type or modify a 
document upon her computer. She understood that she had to sign it.71 Alan Yazbek v. Ghosn Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594 (1 June 2012).72 Alan Yazbek v. Ghosn Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594 at [79]–[81]; [82]–[90]; [113]–[120].73 (1996), E.T.R. (2d) 201 (Qc. Sup. Ct.).
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text written by hand on the label: ‘Cecu est mon testament/Jacqueline Rioux/1er 
février 1996’ (‘This is my will/Jacqueline Rioux/1 February 1996’). A single 
electronic file was stored on the disk, comprising directions of a testamentary 
nature. There was no signature in the document. The file had been last saved 
on 16 April 1996 at 10:25 am. On the same day, the testator wrote in her diary 
that she had made a will on her computer, bearing the date 1 February 1996. 
Michaud, greffier (master) of the Quebec Superior Court, decided that the 
text did not meet the requirements of article 726 of the Code civil du Québec, 
requiring a holograph testament.74 However, he found the electronic will to be 
valid under the dispensing power of Quebec. In so doing, he failed to address any 
of the evidential issues that arose out of the circumstances.75 
10.53 In the case of Buckmeyer Estate (Re),76 the executor proffered three documents for admission to probate: a will dated 5 May 2007, an email dated 
23 August 2007, and an amendment to the will dated 27 August 2007. The will 
was properly proven. The issue to be determined was whether the email and the amendment were testamentary documents and whether s37 of The Wills 
Act, 1996, S.S. 1996 c. W-14.1 applied. The email was from the deceased, John 
Buckmeyer to the executor (johnbuckmeyer@hotmail.com to dave.gibson@
sasktel.net). The subject was ‘John’s arrangements’. The email consisted of two 
pages. It was accepted that he wrote the email, and that it contained his electronic 
signature. The content indicated that he was very sick and in his last days, and stated that he wanted to give the executor more information and express his 
wishes clearly before he died. The deceased listed his credit accounts, gave a direction with respect to his cremation, where his ashes were to be sent and 
directions with respect to funeral services. Ottenbreit J considered the provisions 
of the Electronic Information and Documents Act 2000, S.S. 2000 c. E-7.22 in 
respect of the electronic signature in the email. The judge, it is respectfully suggested, correctly indicated that the issue was whether the content of the 
email complied with the provisions of the Wills Act. The issue was whether the content of the email constituted a disposition intended to take effect on death, 
reflecting testamentary intention, and an essential element for a clause to be 
considered testamentary is the disposal of property. In this instance, Ottenbreit J decided that the purpose of the email was to provide additional information to 
the executor in carrying out his duties. It was not a testamentary document and 
therefore not admitted to probate.
74 Brown J considered the meaning of the word ‘holograph’ in detail in the case of In the 
Matter of the Estate of Reed v. Buckley, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983) at 831–2, and reached the 
logical conclusion that a tape recording could not be considered to be in writing. It follows 
that a will drafted using digital data cannot be a holographic will.75 N. Kasirer, ‘From written record to memory in the law of wills’, Ottawa Law Review, 29 
(1997–8), pp. 39–61, suggested, at p. 44, that the Master was somewhat perfunctory in deciding that the diskette and the text recorded did not constitute a holographic will, missing the opportunity of testing the elasticity of the ordinary rules of form, and he went 
on to discuss the evidential problems that were not addressed (pp. 44–8).76 2008 SKQB 260 (CanLII).
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South Africa
10.54 Such matters were covered in the South African case of Macdonald v. The 
Master,77 where the deceased committed suicide on or about 14 December 2000 and left in his own handwriting four notes dated 13 December 2000 on a bedside 
table next to the bed on which he was lying. One of the notes read as follows:I, Malcom Scott MacDonald, ID 5609065240106, do hereby declare that my last will and testament can be found on my PC at IBM under 
directory C:/WINDOWS/MYSTUFF/MYWILL/PERSONAL.
10.55 The deceased was employed as a senior IT specialist with IBM Global 
Services. The evidence before the court was that the personal computer allocated 
to the deceased was controlled by a password that only the deceased knew. Each employee with a personal computer at IBM was required to change their password every month, to record the password on a piece of paper, seal it in an envelope, and hand it over to an employee whose job was to safeguard the passwords by 
keeping them in a locked facility. Only three senior members of staff had the right 
to request the password. On 14 December 2000, Mr Dimmick, the Professional Development Manager with a right to obtain the password, obtained access to 
the computer and printed the contents on to paper. The document purported 
to be his last will and testament. It was handed to his widow. The file was then 
deleted. The document had the following heading: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
FROM MALCOLM SCOTT MACDONALD. The first paragraph read:
I, the undersigned, Malcolm Scott Macdonald (ID 5609065240106), divorced, do hereby revoke all wills, codicils and other testamentary acts heretofore made by me and declare the following to be my last 
will and testament.
10.56 The document then appointed an executor and set out the disposition of the 
deceased’s property, but it was neither dated nor signed by any witnesses or the 
deceased. The Master refused to accept the will, because it failed to comply with 
the provisions of s2(1)(a), in that it is necessary for a will to be in writing, signed, 
attested by two competent witnesses, and the testator must initial every page. 
Hattingh J set out the requirements necessary for the will to be accepted at 70 F-G:In order to be successful with their application under this section, the applicants must, on a balance of probabilities, establish:
(a) the documents, annexures A and F were drafted by the deceased;
(b) that the deceased had died since the drafting of the documents; and
77 2002 (5) SA 64; S. Snail and N. Hall, ‘Electronic wills in South Africa’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), pp. 67–70.
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(c) the documents were intended by the deceased to be his will.
10.57 It was necessary to decide whether the requirements of section 2(3) had 
been satisfied, which reads:
If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a document drafted or executed by a person who has died since the drafting or execution thereof, was intended to be his will or an amendment of his will, the court shall order the Master to accept that document, or that document as amended, for the purpose of 
the Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965), as a will, although it does not comply with all the formalities for the 
execution or amendment of wills referred to in subsection (1).
10.58 Hattingh J commented that the legislature introduced s2(3) with the intention of eliminating injustice and inequity where a person failed to comply 
with the formalities set out in s2(1). It was necessary to determine whether the 
deceased drafted the documents. Of the two approaches that could be adopted 
(the document must be drafted in the deceased’s handwriting, or the document 
may be typed by the deceased or even dictated by the deceased), the judge adopted the liberal approach, commenting at 71A-B that:
The retention of the formal requirements of s2(1) and the peremptory 
nature of s2(3) do not justify a strict interpretation of s2(3). Not only 
is this inconsistent with the very purpose of s2(3), namely to prevent 
the last wishes of a testator from being nullified by a non-compliance with technical formalities, but it also does not take cognizance of the 
realities of the technological world we live in.78
10.59 The second point, that the deceased had died since the drafting of the documents, was accepted, as was the third point, that the testator intended the 
draft will to be his last will and testament. Hattingh J usefully set out the factors 
at 72C-G that were of importance in reaching his decision:
(a) the documents are a clear indication of the deceased’s intention that they should be regarded as his will and testament;
(b) the documents are not preliminary sketches or notes for discussion with an attorney or anybody else to draft a will, but his 
final wishes;
(c) there is no element of suspicion of fraud attached to the documents and their reproduction;
(d) there is no suspicion that there could have been any tampering with the computer or the documents;
78 Hattingh J gave detailed reasons for trusting the digital data and the surrounding 
circumstances at 71G-J.
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(e) not only did the documents exist on the computer, but there was 
indeed clear reference by the testator to these specific documents in his notes;
(f) there was a clear indication by the deceased where this document could be found on his computer;
(g) only the deceased had access, by way of secret password, to put the documents on the computer;
(h) only the deceased could have typed the said documents;
(i) they could only be extracted upon the instructions of the 
deceased in his own handwriting and only with the deceased’s 
own secret code.
10.60 In this case, Hattingh J concluded, at 72I-J, that s2(3) called ‘for an 
approach which promotes an extensive or flexible interpretation. This is also in 
accordance with the spirit of the technological age …’. Although the testator did not sign his name in the document, it could be argued that the password served 
a similar function.
United States of America
10.61 The Tennessee case of Taylor v. Holt79 also serves to illustrate the fluid notion of an electronic signature, and the circumstances surrounding the 
making of a purported electronic will. Steve Godfrey prepared his last will and 
testament on his computer and affixed his computer-generated signature at the 
end, described in the report as his ‘stylized cursive signature’. Two neighbours witnessed the will by each signing their name below the signature applied by 
Mr Godfrey, and dated the document next to their respective signatures. He died 
approximately one week later. Doris Holt, Mr Godfrey’s girlfriend, submitted the 
will for probate. Mr Godfrey’s sister filed a complaint alleging, in part, that the 
will was not signed and claiming that Mr Godfrey had died intestate. Doris Holt was granted summary judgment on the basis that there were no undisputed material facts and that all the legal requirements concerning the execution and 
witnessing of the will had been met. This decision was upheld on appeal. Swiney J, delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, noted, at 833:In the case at hand, Deceased did make a mark that was intended 
to operate as his signature. Deceased made a mark by using his 
computer to affix his computer-generated signature, and, as 
indicated by the affidavits of both witnesses, this was done in the 
presence of the witnesses. The computer-generated signature 
made by Deceased falls into the category of ‘any other symbol or methodology executed or adopted by a party with intention to 
authenticate a writing or record’, and, if made in the presence of two 
79 134 S.W.3d 830 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003).
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attesting witnesses, as it was in this case, is sufficient to constitute 
proper execution of a will. Further, we note that Deceased simply used a computer rather than an ink pen as the tool to make his 
signature, and, therefore, complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-
104 by signing the will himself.
10.62 The phrase ‘stylized cursive signature’ could mean that it was a biodynamic 
version of a manuscript signature; alternatively, he could have inserted a file with his scanned signature; and as a further alternative, he could have typed his name 
using the keyboard, then altered the font to change the look of the signature. The report also does not indicate the form of signature used by the witnesses, but it is probable that they merely typed their names into the document, using the 
keyboard. If this was the case, and if it becomes generally acceptable to sign a will using an electronic signature, it is possible to foresee that it will be necessary 
to consider what evidence there is to confirm the witnesses whose names were 
placed on the will actually attended the signing of the will and affixed their 
electronic signatures to the document. If such a state of affairs becomes the norm, it is probable that in proving probate, the witnesses will have to give evidence, 
which may serve to defeat the witnessing of the will.
10.63 In reaching its decision, the members of the court considered the formalities for the execution and witnessing of a will in Tennessee, as provided for in the Tennessee Code § 32-1-104, which states:
32-1-104. Will other than holographic or nuncupative. —The execution of a will, other than a holographic or nuncupative 
will, must be by the signature of the testator and of at least two (2) witnesses as follows:
(1) The testator shall signify to the attesting witnesses that the 
instrument is the testator’s will and either:
(A) The testator sign;
(B) Acknowledge the testator’s signature already made; or
(C) At the testator’s direction and in the testator’s presence 
have someone else sign the testator’s name; and
(D) In any of the above cases the act must be done in the 
presence of two (2) or more attesting witnesses.
(2) The attesting witnesses must sign:
(A) In the presence of the testator; and
(B) In the presence of each other.
10.64 On the face of these provisions, it seems possible to sign a will with an 
electronic signature, and the members of the court prayed in aid the definition 
of a signature under § 1-3-105(27) as it then was of the Tennessee Code. One 
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commentator80 has argued that this decision is correct, because of the definition 
of ‘signature’ in the Tennessee Code permits all forms of signature, including electronic signatures:
1-3-105. Definition of terms used in code.
(31) “Signature” or “signed” includes a mark, the name being written near the mark and witnessed, or any other symbol or methodology executed or adopted by a party with intention to authenticate a writing or record, regardless of being witnessed;
10.65 The rational is that because the Tennessee statute of wills does not alter the meaning of these words, the electronic signature is acceptable in this 
instance. However, this decision was reached in 2003, after the passing of Senate 
Bill No. 376.81 The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, § 47-10-103 limits the 
scope of the use of electronic signatures, and specifically excludes wills:
47-10-103. SCOPE.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this act applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a 
transaction.
(b) This act does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is governed by:
(1) A law governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
10.66 It appears that the members of the court interpreted some of the legislation, but failed to consider all of the relevant legislation, which means this 
decision cannot be very persuasive.82
80 C.M. Ross, ‘Probate – Taylor v. Holt: the Tennessee Court of Appeals allows a computer 
generated signature to validate a testamentary will’, The University of Memphis Law 
Review, 35 (2005), pp. 603–18, at p. 613.81 Public Acts, 2001, Chapter No. 72 Senate Bill No. 376, passed on 9 April 2001 and approved 
on 11 April 2001; Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-10-101 to 
47-10-123.82 In 2007, the Borgarting lagmannsrett (Court of Appeal for the region near Oslo) in Norway was required to determine whether an electronic copy of a testament that was lost could 
be admitted into probate in the case of LB-2006-27667, for which see J. Bing, translation and commentary, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 134–
40.
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Constitution of legal entity
Australia
10.67 In Islamic Council of South Australia Inc v. Australian Federation of Islamic 
Councils Inc,83 Brereton J observed at [22] that the constitution of the organization 
did not explicitly require that a request be signed, but went on to observe that ‘if 
it were necessary that it be formally signed, the word “Ramzi” was subscribed to the email with the intent of authenticating the communications, and constitutes a signature notwithstanding that it appears in typewritten and not handwritten 
form’.
Amending boilerplate contractual terms
10.68 The findings in the above cases, especially those cases that revolve around 
the exchange of emails, are significant. Even if the Industrial Tribunal decision of Hall v. Cognos Limited from England and Wales is not binding on any court, 
it remains a good decision. This is partly because the format of the document is 
irrelevant. First, the effect the case law should have on the advice that a lawyer gives their clients is highly pertinent, whether dealing with commercial contracts, employment contracts or any other form of relationship that is possible to create 
or vary in writing. Consider, by way of example, a standard clause added to most contracts in the following terms:The contract shall not be altered unless done so in writing and 
signed by both parties.
10.69 If the words ‘in writing and signed’ remain as a standard element in such a clause, it will leave open the probability that contracts, no matter how long they have taken to negotiate, or their apparent length, are susceptible to being varied by an exchange of emails, perhaps between two fairly junior employees, 
or a person posing as an employee using the company email address.84 This may well occur because most organizations have now lost control of their means of communication, because all, or virtually all, employees in some sectors have the ability to communicate with the outside world by means of email and other forms 
of technology, contrary to the position before the introduction of such facilities. This problem will be mitigated to a certain extent in contracts which provide 
83 [2009] NSWSC 211.84 As occurred in CSX Transportation, Inc., v. Recovery Express, Inc., 415 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.Mass. 
2006); D. Fosbrook and A.C. Laing, The A-Z of Contract Clauses (5th edn., London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2010) have prepared a number of boilerplate clauses at A.541 to A.572, but with 
the exception of A.568, all the combinations are written in such a way that the contract might be altered by an exchange of emails, although some of the examples will require one 
or more signatures of authorized representatives.
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a list of nominated personnel within each organization who have the authority 
to agree alterations and variations. In such circumstances, if a junior employee agrees an alteration without reference to those who are authorized to agree such changes, any dispute will centre on what, if any, authority was vested in the junior 
employee, and whether their actions acted to bind the organization. From the point of view of the organization, it is imperative to ensure that its employees are 
made aware of the effect that a promise can have if made by exchange of email. To mitigate this problem, it may be wise to establish whether the parties are content for a contract to be altered by exchange of emails, and if not, to include an amended version of the standard clause, such as, by way of example:The contract shall not be altered unless done so in writing on 
paper and signed with the manuscript signature of both parties.
10.70 The Hall v. Cognos Limited case illustrates the ease by which a contract can be varied, as does C&S Associates UK Ltd v. Enterprise Insurance Company 
Plc,85 the Ohio case of In re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Amedisys, 
Inc., v. JP Morgan Chase Manhattan Bank, as Trustees,86 and New York case of 
Stevens v. Publicis, S.A..87 In the Amedisys case, a regular exchange of emails took place between employees of Amedisys and National Century over the amount of 
funding Amedisys would need from week to week. It was held that the exchange 
of email messages were sufficient to satisfy a clause in an agreement between 
the parties specifying that its terms could be modified only in writing. The clause read:
Section 10.6 Amendments; Waivers; Consents
No modification, amendment or waiver of, or with respect to, any provision of this Agreement, and all other agreements, instruments and documents thereto, nor consent to any departure by the Seller or the Subservicer from any of the terms or conditions thereof, shall be effective unless it shall be in writing and signed by each 
of the parties hereto. Any waiver or consent shall be effective only 
in the specific instance and for the purpose for which it is given ….
10.71 After a brief discussion on the meaning of what constituted ‘writing,’ the Calkoun BJ stated the decision of the court at 596:In this case, Amedisys sent a weekly email to NCFE to notify how 
much funding Amedisys wanted for that week. Further, Amedisys was provided, on a weekly basis, with reconciliation reports 
showing its requested funding amounts. The Court finds that 
85 [2015] EWHC 3757 (Comm).86 310 B.R. 580 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio 2004).87 50 A.D.3d 253, 854 N.T.S.2d 690, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 02880.
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these weekly emails and reconciliation reports satisfy the writing 
and signature requirements of the Sale Agreement. Further, the 
Court finds that these emails modified the Sale Agreement where Amedisys received funds from the sale of the accounts receivable on its terms when it so directed the NCFE Defendants instead of receiving funds automatically upon the sale of the accounts 
receivable.
10.72 A further point centres on whether the use of email is appropriate and 
reasonable in the circumstances. Whether the use of email is a reasonable means of communication between two parties, or any number of parties, will depend on arrange of factors, as indicated by Marrero DJ in Bazak International Corp. v. 
Tarrant Apparel Group, where he commented, at 387–8:Nonetheless, whether email is an appropriate and reasonably expected form of communication between the two particular 
parties before the court is a question of fact. Here, the issue’s resolution requires a factual inquiry into trade usage and course of dealing … Neither party directly addresses whether email is an appropriate method of communication in the re-sale trade 
generally or in Tarrant and Bazak’s particular relationship. Yet 
later email correspondence from Tarrant to Bazak (the ‘GMAC 
email’) provides evidence in light of which a reasonable jury could 
find that the parties did accept email as an appropriate form of 
communication.
10.73 This view corresponds with that expounded in Campbell v. General 
Dynamics Government Systems Corporation,88 although this issue was never debated with other forms of communication, such as the use of telegrams or 
telex.89
88 321 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.Mass. 2004), affirmed 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005).89 The position is reinforced in the case of Basis Technology Corporation v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
71 Mass.App.Ct. 29; 878 N.E.2d 952 (Mass.App.Ct. 2008).
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 11, ‘The name in an email address’, pp. 255–87.
11The name in an email address
11.1 The name in an email address is capable of identifying a person, especially where an email address in an organization, whether public or private, is allocated by setting out the name of the person followed by the domain name of the 
organization. There are other variations that can be used, such as when an email 
address describes the office or function of the person, rather than their name. However, even this, if allocated to a single person, can also function to identify 
an individual. The link between the prefix of the email address and the person responsible for sending the email can be problematic: for instance, the sender 
may be able to choose the first part, and may decide to adopt letters or numbers 
or a combination of letters and numbers with a view to obfuscating their identity. 
Further, the sender might hide the true email address. If it was not obvious who the sender was, and if correspondence ensues and a dispute occurs, it will be a matter of establishing what, if any, evidence there is pertaining to the source 
of the relevant emails as a preliminary point. It has been held in a number of jurisdictions that the name in an email address, or the combination of the name 
and the domain name in an email address can be a form of electronic signature.
Limitation Act
11.2 The case of McGuren v. Simpson1 raised the issue as to whether correspondence by email was capable of constituting an acknowledgement that 
was in writing and signed for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). Mr 
Simpson and Ms McGuren were in a relationship between 1992 and 2000. Mr 
Simpson received a cheque for A$23,000 when he was in prison in November 1993 in respect of a claim for damages for personal injuries he suffered in a 
motor vehicle accident. He endorsed the cheque in favour of Ms McGuren’s 
sister to enable her to bank the cheque in her account on behalf of Ms McGuren 
(Ms McGuren did not want to pay the cheque into her own account, otherwise 
it would have affected the state benefits she was receiving at the time). Mr Simpson claimed that the defendant used the money almost entirely for her own 
purposes and he sought recovery of the money from Ms McGuren. Ms McGuren asserted that she used the money in accordance with his instructions and with 
his approval. Mr Simpson’s main item of evidence was in the form of an email 
sent to him by Ms McGuren. It read in part:
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1999 14 16.20+1000
To: “Rob – yahoo”<Robert-john-simpson@yahoo.com.au>
1 [2004] NSWSC 35.
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From: “McGuren, Kim” Kim.Mcguran@air.gov.auI am going to try and book a cab for 6pm at childcare does that suit 
you?
It probably won’t turn up but I may as well book it. So, what do you want to do: split up, – go to counselling or – just blame each other for every thing since everything is obviously the other 
persons fault, for the rest of our lives? Yes, I spent the money and 
I shouldn’t have and yes, you have been violent and you shouldn’t 
have so what now??
11.3 Master Harrison dealt with an appeal from a Local Court Magistrate, and 
the main issue to determine was whether Mr Simpson’s cause of action was 
statute barred under s14 of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW). The time limit is extended under the provisions of s54 where the person against whom the cause 
of action lies confirms the cause of action by acknowledging it to the person who holds the action, providing the acknowledgment is in writing and signed by 
the maker. Mr Simpson’s case was that Ms McGuren acknowledged the cause of 
action in the email she sent when she wrote the words ‘Yes, I spent the money 
and I shouldn’t have’. The Magistrate previously determined that the email was 
an electronic communication within the meaning of s9(1) of the Electronic 
Transaction Act 2000 (NSW). However, the Act was not in force at the time the email was sent, which meant the provisions of the Act did not apply to the email, 
hence the Magistrate’s decision was incorrect. Master Harrison dealt with the 
problem in the context of the common law. First, he concluded that the email 
constituted a written document. In so doing, he noted the expansive approach 
taken in other jurisdictions [at 20], and decided to construe the Act to take into 
account the changes in technology [at 21], a view taken by judges in England and 
Wales and the USA in the 19th century: ‘It is my view that ….. s 54 of the Act ought to be read to accommodate technological change and that, accordingly, the email 
sent by the plaintiff constitutes a written document’. Second, he agreed with the decision of the Magistrate, that the email address was a signature for the purpose 
of s54(4) of the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), at [22]:
As Ms McGuren’s name appears in the email and she expressly acknowledges in the email as an authenticated expression of a prior agreement, the email is recognisable as a note of a 
concluded agreement. Accordingly, the Magistrate was correct at 
law to conclude that Ms McGuren signed the email and that the 
requirements of s 54(4) of the Act were met. It was open to the 
Magistrate to find that Ms McGuren acknowledged the claim and she has admitted her legal liability to pay Mr Simpson that which 
he seeks to recover.
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Statute of Frauds
11.4 The question arose in the English case of J Pereira Fernandes SA v. Mehta2 whether the name forming part of an email address could be construed as a 
signature. J Pereira Fernandes SA is a Portuguese company that supplied bedding 
products in July 2002 to Bedcare (UK) Limited, a company of which Mr Mehta 
was a director. Bedcare failed to pay for the products it had received, and was wound up on a Petition by J Pereira Fernandes SA by an Order made on 7 March 
2005. The cause of the appeal before HH Judge Pelling QC, sitting as a judge of the Chancery Division, related to the presentation of a winding up petition by J Pereira Fernandes SA on 12 January 2005. On 20 February 2005, an email was 
sent from the email address ‘Nelmehta@aol.com’ to Ian Simpson & Co, solicitors 
acting for J Pereira Fernandes SA.3 Mr Mehta’s name was not typed at the end of 
the email. On 9 November 2005, District Judge Harrison gave summary judgment 
to J Pereira Fernandes SA in the sum of £24,985.53 and ordered Mr Mehta to pay 
the costs of the claim, which were summarily assessed in the sum of £1,080.00. Mr Mehta was subsequently given permission to appeal by Holman J on 20 
February 2006. The email contained the following text:
… I would be grateful if you could kindly consider the following.If the hearing of the Petition can be adjourned for a period of 7 days subject to the following:
a. A Personal Guarantee to be given in the amount of £25,000 in favour of your client – together with a list of my personal assets provided to you by my solicitor
b. A repayment schedule to be redrawn over a period of six months 
with a payment of £5,000.00 drawn from my personal funds to be made before the adjourned hearingI am also prepared to give a company undertaking not to sell market or dispose of any company assets without prior consent 
from your client pending the signing of the Personal Guarantee.
11.5 The email address that appeared on this particular email also appeared 
on other emails sent to Ian Simpson & Co by Mr Mehta, which included his name 
typed at the end of the email. There were two matters of relevance to consider: 
2 [2006] 1 WLR 1543; [2006] 2 All ER 891; [2006] 1 All ER (Comm) 885; [2006] All ER (D) 
264 (Apr); [2006] IP & T 546; The Times 16 May 2006; [2006] EWHC 813 (Ch).Note: the case is cited as Mehta v J Pereira Fernandes SA on the British and Irish Legal Information Institute website, but J Pereira Fernandes SA v. Mehta in the All England Law Reports. The 
citation from the All England Law Reports has been adopted.3 In the reports, it is said that Mr Mehta caused one of his members of staff to send the 
email. The email was sent on Tuesday 20 February 2005 at 20:30. It was subsequently 
confirmed in May 2006 to Ian Simpson & Co by the Insolvency Service in Manchester that 
no employee or salary records were recorded as being delivered up for Bedcare (UK) 
Limited (information provided by Ian Simpson & Co to the author).
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whether the e-mail could be considered a sufficient note or memorandum, and if so, whether it was signed by the party charged, that is, by him, or by somebody 
else on his behalf. The email was a rare example of a document that is brought 
into the purview of s4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677.4 This is because s4 now only applies to contracts of guarantee, and the content of this email provided a guarantee, in that Mr Mehta offered to personally cover debts owed by the 
company. Section 4 reads:5Noe action shall be brought … whereby to charge the defendant upon any speciall promise to answere for the debt default or miscarriages of another person … unlesse the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writeing and signed by the partie to be charged therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully 
authorized.
11.6 Harrison DJ, in giving summary judgment, considered that the email did amount to a note or memorandum of guarantee, although he did not explicitly 
comment on whether the names in the email address could amount to a signature. 
Judge Pelling QC agreed with Harrison DJ on this point, and also held the email to 
be a note or memorandum that brought it within s4 of the statute. He commented 
on the purpose of the statute as follows at [16]:6The purpose of the statute of frauds is to protect people from being held liable on informal communications because they may be 
made without sufficient consideration or expressed ambiguously or because such a communication might be fraudulently alleged 
against the party to be charged. That being so, the logic underlying the authorities I have referred to would appear to be that 
where (as in this case) there is an offer in writing made by the 
4 For a history of the Statute, see W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law Volume VI 
(London: Methuen & Co, 1924), pp. 379–97. Holdsworth considered the Statute was out 
of date when he wrote this text, at 396: ‘… the prevailing feeling both in the legal and the commercial world is, and has for a long time been, that these clauses have outlived their usefulness, and are quite out of place amid the changed legal and commercial conditions 
of to-day.’; see also E. Rabel, ‘The Statute of Frauds and comparative legal history’, Law 
Quarterly Review, 63 (1947), pp. 174–7, in which he concluded, at 187, ‘The case against the Statute of Frauds has been proved time and again by outstanding authorities, even before the Sixth Interim Report of the English Law Revision Committee of 1937 solemnly 
pronounced sentence for repeal. An examination of the historical background on which the Statute arose can but support the views expressed by the Revision Committee and the conclusion that the Statute essentially belongs to distant times, far removed from the 
conditions of modern life’.5 Halsbury’s Statutes of England and Wales Volume 11(1) (4th edn., 2010 reissue), 7; 
Chronological Table of the Statutes Part 1 (HMSO).
6 [2006] 2 All ER 891 at 16.
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party to be bound which contains the essential terms of what is offered and the party to be bound accepts that his offer has been 
accepted unconditionally, albeit orally, there is a sufficient note or 
memorandum to satisfy s 4.
11.7 The second question to consider was whether the email had been signed. Solicitors for J Pereira Fernandes SA already had a number of emails from Mr 
Mehta in which he included his name typed at the bottom of the text. In this respect, the evidence of a number of communications from the same address 
demonstrated that they were authentic. Mr Mehta did not dispute the email was 
sent.
11.8 The evidence upon which a decision could be made in Fernandes was more substantial than the evidence that Prakash J dealt with in SM Integrated 
Transware Ltd v. Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd.7 In this instance, Judge Pelling QC took the view that the email address was similar to an automatically generated name and facsimile number of the sender of a facsimile transmission, although 
his comments, at [19], noted that a human being had to type the data into the software:As is well known to anyone who uses email on a regular basis, what is relied upon is not inserted by the sender of the email in 
any active sense. It is inserted automatically. My knowledge of the 
technicalities of email is not sufficiently detailed to enable me to know whether it is inserted by the ISP with whom the sender or 
the recipient has his email account. However, I accept Mr Aslett’s submission that as a matter of obvious inference, if it is inserted by the latter it can only be from information supplied by the 
former. Mr Mehta suggested that the address was inserted by his 
employee. I do not see how this could be so and certainly Mr Mehta was not able to give me a coherent explanation of how that might 
be so. It is possible that Mr Mehta’s employee was authorized to 
use Mr Mehta’s e mail account remotely but, even if that is so, I do not see how that can impact on any of the issues I have to resolve since it is not in dispute that the email was sent on the instructions of Mr Mehta and the method by which the sender address came 
to be inserted would not be affected even if that was the position.
11.9 That such information is considered in judgments to be ‘automatic’ 
illustrates a misunderstanding. A human being has to put the information into 
the machine. The facsimile number of the sender is put into the machine by a 
person, as is the name in an email address or the ‘signature block’ of an email.8
7 [2005] 2 SLR 651, [2005] SGHC 58.
8 Considered in the New York case of Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc., v. Estate of Fred 
Short, d/b/a Sime Construction Co., 155 Misc.2d 950, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Supp. 1992), 
motion for summary judgment affirmed, 209 A.D.2d 495, 619 N.Y.S.2d 628 reversed 663 
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11.10 Counsel for J Pereira Fernandes SA submitted that the intent to sign was not relevant, and mentioned Elpis Maritime Co. Ltd. v. Marti Chartering Co. 
Inc.,9 which had different facts to the case in point, and also emphasised the decision in Evans v. Hoare,10 where the name and address were relied upon to 
serve as a signature. However, the judge pointed out that in Evans v. Hoare, Cave J 
considered, at 597, that the place of the signature was not relevant: ‘Whether the name occurs in the body of the memorandum, or at the beginning, or at the end, if it is intended for a signature there is a memorandum of the agreement within 
the meaning of the statute’. Judge Pelling QC then went on to indicate that the 
name of the party to be bound must be intended for a signature. In reaching this 
conclusion, the judge did not refer to the comments made by Cave J (at 597–8) 
after the text he quoted, which are highly significant:In the present case it is true that the name of the defendants occurs in the agreement; but it is suggested on behalf of the defendants that it was only put in to shew who the persons were to whom 
the letter was addressed. The answer is that there is the name, 
and it was inserted by the defendants’ agent in a contract which was undoubtedly intended by the defendants to be binding on the plaintiff; and, therefore, the fact that it is only in the form of 
an address is immaterial. A case was referred to in the argument, 
Schneider v. Norris, in which a printed bill-head was held to amount 
to a signature within the meaning of the statute. That is a stronger 
case than the present. The printed heading there was not put into the document for the purpose of constituting a memorandum of the contract; but it was so used with the assent of the party sought to be charged, and it therefore was held to have the effect of a 
signature. This shews that it is unimportant how the name came to 
be inserted in the document. (reference omitted)
11.11 The judge considered that the approach he took was supported by the decision in Caton v. Caton,11 where Richard Bewley Caton, aged 78 in 1852, a clergyman of the Church of England, proposed marriage to Mrs Harriet Henley, 
a widow of about 60 years of age. Both parties owned property, and Mr Emmet, a solicitor, was requested to draw up the settlement upon the basis of a draft 
written by the Reverend Caton. After the settlement was prepared, the Reverend 
Caton first suggested to Mrs Henley it was too long, and later suggested they 
could save expense by not executing the settlement at all. Mrs Henley agreed 
N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. 1996), 640 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Ct.App. 1996), 87 N.Y.2D 524; see also the New 
Zealand case of Welsch v. Gatchell [2007] NZHC 1898; [2009] 1 NZLR 241; (2007) 8 NZCPR 
708; (2007) 5 NZ ConvC 194,549 (21 June 2007).
9 [1992] 1 AC 21, HL.10 [1892] 1 QB 593; (1892) 66 LTRep NS 345.11 (1867) LR 2 HL 127.
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not to execute the settlement on his promise that he would strictly and faithfully carry out the terms of the memorandum, and leave certain property to her in 
his will. Despite the remonstrations of Mr Emmet that Mrs Henley ought to insist upon entering the settlement before marriage, Mrs Henley married the 
Reverend on 7 February 1853. The Reverend Caton took possession of Mrs 
Henley’s property and paid her £80 a year. Mrs Henley’s fortune was estimated 
to be about £14,904. At the time of their marriage, the Reverend showed Mrs 
Henley a will that appeared to be in conformity with the promise he made. It 
was duly executed. He died on 24 January 1864, when it then transpired that he had made a new will, without the knowledge of Mrs Caton, revoking all others, 
leaving her with less than she otherwise expected. Mrs Caton took legal action 
to enforce the marriage settlement. The agreement began with the introductory 
words ‘in the event of a marriage between the under-named parties’ and the initials of the Reverend Caton appeared four times with reference to particular 
instructions. Stuart VC found for Mrs Caton at first instance, a decision that 
was reversed on appeal by Cranworth LC. Upon further appeal to the House 
of Lords, the appeal was dismissed. The sole question was whether, where 
the Reverend’s initials appeared on the document, they served to apply to 
the entire document. It was determined that the document was a mere draft 
of proposal for a settlement, and there was insufficient evidence to show the 
initials of the Reverend applied to the entire document. On the position of the initials, Lord Chelmsford LC said at 139:The cases on this point cited in the course of the argument establish that the mere circumstances of the name of a party being written by himself in the body of a memorandum of agreement 
will not of itself constitute a signature. It must be inserted in the 
writing in such a manner as to have the effect of ‘authenticating 
the instrument’, or ‘so as to govern the whole instrument’, to use the words of Sir William Grant, in the case of Ogilvie v. Foljambe 
[(1817) 3 Mer 53; 36 ER 21], or in the language of Mr. Justice 
Coleridge, in Lobb and Knight v. Stanley [(1844) 5 QB 574; 114 ER 
1366], ‘so as to govern what follows’. Now I cannot think that the 
occurrence of Mr. Caton’s name in the manner in which it appears can possibly be taken to govern the entire memorandum, although 
the whole of it is in his handwriting. (Italics in the original)
11.12 He continued at 139–40:The name of the party, and its application to the whole of the 
instrument, can alone satisfy the requisites of a signature. In 
the memorandum in question, Mr. Caton’s name is incidentally introduced with reference to a particular purpose, or as matter of description, and as this mention of his name would clearly be 
insufficient in itself, it cannot have any new effect given to it by the 
introductory words of the memorandum.
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11.13 Lord Westbury indicated, at 143 that what is alleged to constitute the signature must:
... be so placed as to shew that it was intended to relate and refer to, and that in fact it does relate and refer to, every part of 
the instrument. ... it must govern every part of the instrument. It must shew that every part of the instrument emanates from the individual so signing, and that the signature was intended to have 
that effect. It follows, therefore, that if a signature be found in an instrument incidentally only, or having relation and reference only to a portion of the instrument, the signature cannot have legal effect and force which it must have in order to comply with the 
statute, and to give authenticity to the whole of the memorandum.
11.14 This case might be compared to the decision in the case decided by the Master of the Rolls, De Biel v. Thomson12 and subsequently affirmed by the Lord 
Chancellor and reaffirmed upon further appeal, Hammersley v. De Biel, an infant, 
by Blake,13 where an extremely vague promise, the evidence of which was very 
tenuous, was upheld under the Statute of Frauds.
11.15 Earlier cases on the physical position of the signature also emphasizes the need to consider the intent behind the signature, as commented on by the Lord Chief Baron in Stokes v. Moore,14 where the defendant prepared instructions for the renewal of a lease, written in his own hand and with his name appearing 
in the body of the draft. It was held, first, not to be a sufficient memorandum of 
agreement, and second, not considered signed by the defendant. The Lord Chief Baron discussed this at 222:The purport of the statute is manifest, to avoid all parol agreements, and that none should have effect, but those signed in the manner 
therein specified. It is argued that the name being inserted in 
any part of the writing is a sufficient signature. The meaning of the statute is, that is should amount to an acknowledgment by the 
party that it is his agreement, and if the name does not give such authenticity to the instrument, it does not amount to what the 
statute requires. (Italics in the original)
11.16 Eyre B also commented at 223:The signature is to have the effect of giving authenticity to the whole instrument, and if the name is inserted so as to have that effect, I 
do not think it signifies much, in what part of the instrument it 
is to be found: it is perhaps difficult, except in the case of a letter 
with a postscript, to find an instance where a name inserted in the 
12 3 Beav. 469.13 [1845] 12 Clark & Finnelly 45; 8 ER 1312.14 (1786) 1 Cox 219; 29 ER 1137.
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middle of a writing can well have that effect; and there the name being generally found in a particular place by the common usage of mankind, it may very probably have the effect of a legal signature, and the extend to the whole; but I do not understand how a name inserted in the body of an instrument and applicable to particular 
purposes, can amount to such an authentication as is required by 
the statute …. (Italics in the original)
11.17 In Ogilvie v. Foljambe,15 a letter written by the plaintiff relating to the 
sale of a lease situated in Grosvenor Place began ‘Mr Ogilvie has the pleasure to 
acquaint Mr Foljambe ….’ In this instance, Sir William Grant MR held the name 
governed all that followed in the letter. His comments are noted at 62:Another question is, whether, taking the agreement to be 
sufficiently explicit in terms, it has the signature which is required 
by the statute. It is admitted that, provided the name be inserted in such manner as to have the effect of authenticating the instrument, the provision of the act is complied with, and it does not much 
signify in what part of the instrument the name is to be found.
11.18 In Holmes v. Mackrell,16 a promissory note written in the hand of the defendant with his name written on top, but not signed at the end, was held to 
be a sufficient signature for the document. One submission argued by S. Temple 
QC for the defendant was that the signature must be at the foot of the document, 
to which Crowder J responded, at 792 ‘Is it the less the signature of the party, 
because he writes his name at the top of it?’. Counsel in turn responded to this 
question ‘In the case of a will, it is true, the signature under Car. 2, c. 3, s.5, might be in any part of it: but, even there, it must have been made with the design of 
authenticating the instrument.’ In his judgment at 796, Crowder J intimated why this issue was of some importance:In the case of a note written in the third person, the name at the commencement serves to authenticate the document just as well as 
a formal signature at the foot of it. If, then, the signature is sufficient, 
what does the defendant say here? In effect he says, – ‘I have given two promissory notes for 510l., and I am now liable upon them’. That is a plain and deliberate and unconditional acknowledgment of a debt, and it is clear from the case of Tanner v. Smart, 6 B. & C. 
603, 9 D. R. 549, and the authorities which have followed it, that, where there is an absolute and unconditional acknowledgment of 
an existing debt, a promise to pay is to be inferred. It seems to me that the acknowledgment here is one from which a promise to pay 
must necessarily be inferred.
15 (1817) 3 Mer 53; 36 ER 21.16 (1858) 3 C.B. (N.S.) 789; 140 ER 953.
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11.19 It appears that judges, when dealing with cases where a promise was made that affected an innocent party, and the person making the promise subsequently sought to avoid being held to their promise by arguing a technical point that the promise was not signed, thus making it unenforceable, were, generally, not 
willing to allow the person making the promise to succeed on such a technicality. Two of the most notable English cases, Lobb and Knight v. Stanley17 and Tourret 
v. Cripps,18 neither of which was cited or discussed in Fernandes, illustrates that similar situations had arisen in the past, and lawyers and judges have previously been required to deal with similar factual situations as in Fernandes. In Lobb, 
Stanley, a certified bankrupt, gave a written promise signed by him after his 
bankruptcy. Three undated letters were produced, one of which read ‘Mr Stanley 
begs to inform Mr Lobb …’. It was considered sufficient that he began the text 
with his name, and his name governed the promise that followed.19 In Tourret 
v. Cripps,20 Mr R. L. Cripps wrote in his own hand on a sheet of memorandum 
paper an offer to lease parts of 14 and 15 Mortimer Street, Cavendish Square. The memorandum was not signed by him, but contained, at its head, the words 
‘From Richd. L Cripps’ and his address. Tourret, who initiated an action against 
Cripps for specific performance, accepted the offer. His printed name served as a 
signature to hold him to the promise he made.
11.20 In Orton v. Collins,21 Peter Prescott QC sitting as a Deputy Judge made the following observations in relation to Mehta v. J Pereira Fernandes S.A. at [21]:
Mr Zelin doubted whether simply typing ‘Putsmans’ on the email amounted to a signature that complied with the Practice Direction, citing Nilesh Mehta v. J Pereira Fernandes S.A. [2006] EWHC 813 
(Ch), but wisely he did not waste much time on the point. In that case the signature was alleged to be constituted by the words 
‘From: Nelmehta@aol.com’ appearing in the email header. It was 
a mere statement of the sender’s email address and it would have 
been generated automatically after the message was transmitted. It 
was not put there by the sender with the intention of authenticating 
the document. In contrast, in our case the word ‘Putsmans’ was 
deliberately typed in (what is more, after the customary salutation 
‘Yours faithfully’). I have no doubt that its purpose would be 
recognised throughout the profession. Anyone would think: 
‘Putsmans are signing off on this document’. It was intended to 
17 (1844) 5 QB 574; 114 ER 1366.18 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567; 27 WR 706.19 This case was specifically mentioned by Phipson that a ‘signature under the Statute of 
Frauds may be by surname only’ (S.L. Phipson, The Law of Evidence (6th edn, London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1921), p. 516).20 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567; 27 WR 706. These cases were reviewed by Buckley J in Hucklesby v. 
Hook 82 LT 117.21 [2007] EWHC 803 (Ch), [2007] 1 WLR 2953.
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signify that document was being sent out with the authority of the 
defendants’ legal representative.’ (Emphasis added). 
11.21 However, the judge seems to have taken it as granted that the word 
‘Putsmans’ was deliberately typed in without any evidence on the point. The 
word, together with ‘Yours faithfully’ could have been part of the email template 
that was automatically generated when the email was created.
11.22 The position of a name in a document has also exercised the judicial 
mind in the United States of America.22 For instance, in Illinois, a warrant of attorney was held to be executed even when the defendants failed to sign a retail 
instalment contract on the reverse side, because a signature had been affixed to the face of the document,23 and a number of cases have been taken under 
the Statute of Frauds.24 The inclusion of a name in a document can serve two purposes: to establish that the person has signed the document, and as a means 
of identifying a party. For instance, Lord Millett commented, at [176] in “Starsin”, 
Owners of cargo & Ors v. “Starsin”, Owners and/or demise charterers of: 25Where a contract is contained in a signed and written document, the process of ascertaining the identity of the parties and the capacity in which they entered into the contract must begin with the signatures and any accompanying statement which describes the capacity in which the persons who appended their signatures 
did so. This may require interpretation, and to this extent the process may without inaccuracy be described as a process of 
construction. But it is not of the same order as the process of 
construing the detailed terms and conditions of the contract. These describe the incidents of the contract and the nature and 
extent of the parties’ obligations to each other. But the identity of 
22 For further cases relating to individual States, see R.A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, vol. 10 
(4th edn., n.p.: Thompson West, 1990), ch. 29, 29:35 note 30.23 The First National Bank of Elgin v. Husted, 205 N.E.2d 780 1965.24 Federal (1828): Barry v. Coombe, 26 U.S. 640, 1 Pet. 640, 1828 WL 2995 (U.S.Dist.Col.), 
7 L.Ed. 295 (statement of account written by Robert Barry, with his name at the top and 
signed by Griffith Coombe and the bottom, held to be sufficient particulars of the property 
to be sold and signed by both parties).
California (1897): California Canneries Company v. Scatena, 117 Cal. 447, 49 P. 462, 49 
A.Jur. 380, 112 A.L.R. 937 (the place of signature was irrelevant).Illinois: McConnell v. Brillhart, 17 Ill. 354, 1856 WL 5329 (Ill.), 65 Am.Dec. 661, 7 Peck 
(IL) 354.
Massachusetts (1896): New England Dressed Meat & Wool Co., v. Standard Worsted Co., 
165 Mass. 328, 43 N.E. 112, 52 Am.St.Rep. 516.
New York: JSO Associates, Inc., v. Price, 2008 WL 904703 (N.Y. Sup.), 239 N.Y.L.J. 72, 
2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30862 (U).25 [2003] UKHL 12 (13 March 2003), [2003] 1 CLC 921, [2003] UKHL 12, 2003 AMC 913, 
[2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 571, [2003] 2 WLR 711, [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 625, [2004] 1 AC 
715, [2003] 2 All ER 785, [2003] 1 LLR 571.
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the parties themselves is not an incident of the contract. Where a signature is accompanied by a description of the capacity in which the signatory has appended his signature the description is not a 
term or condition of the contract. It is part of the signature and so part of the factual evidence of the identity of the party which is 
undertaking contractual liabilities under the contract.
11.23 This point is further illustrated in the 1916 case from Virginia of 
Sutherland v. Munsey.26 The facts are that Lafayette Sutherland and his wife 
Mary intended to sell their property in the county of Russell in Virginia to J. G. 
Muncy and H. Hardway of Russell & Wise Co. The buyers prepared an agreement for the sale and purchase of the real estate, continuing the name of the parties as follows:This agreement made and entered into this the 18 day of August, 
1910, by and between Lafayette Sutherland, Virginia, and Mary G. Sutherland, his wife of the county of Russell and State of Virginia, 
parties of the first part, and J. G. Muncy and H. Hardway of Russell 
& Wise Co., Va. as parties of the second part.
11.24 Mr and Mrs Sutherland signed the document at the end by means of their 
respective marks. The buyers refused to complete, and Mr and Mrs Sutherland 
took action for specific performance. In an appeal from the Circuit Court, Russell County, it was held that the writing of the names at the beginning of the document 
were there for the purposes of identification, not as a signature. Harrison J provided the opinion of the court at 884:It is, we think, clear that the names of the appellees, in the 
connection in which we find them, were not designed as signatures, nor written there for the purpose of authenticating the instrument, but were written in that connection for an entirely 
different purpose – that of identification. The language is in the usual form of introduction to such an instrument, and the entire instrument, including the location of the names of all the parties, is in the usual form – the form that would have been used if the 
paper been drawn tentatively without the intention of signing it. It was necessary to identify the parties to this instrument, and the names of the appellees appear with the names of all the parties, in that portion of the instrument where the names of the parties are 
usually mentioned for the purpose of identification.
11.25 In comparison, Judge Pelling QC sought to distinguish the case of an email. 
His view is set out at [28] and [29]:
26 119 Va. 791, 89 S.E. 882.
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However, that is not the issue in this case. Here the issue is 
whether the automatic insertion of a person’s email address after the document has been transmitted by either the sending and/or 
receiving ISP constitutes a signature for the purposes of s 4.
29. In my judgment the inclusion of an email address in such circumstances is a clear example of the inclusion of a name which is 
incidental in the sense identified by Lord Westbury in the absence 
of evidence of a contrary intention. Its appearance divorced from the main body of the text of the message emphasizes this to be 
so. Absent evidence to the contrary, in my view it is not possible to hold that the automatic insertion of an e mail address is, to use 
Cave J’s language, ‘intended for a signature’. To conclude that the automatic insertion of an email address in the circumstances I have described constituted a signature for the purposes of s 4 would I think undermine or potentially undermine what I understand to 
be the Act’s purpose, would be contrary to the underlying principle to be derived from the cases to which I have referred and would have widespread and wholly unintended legal and commercial 
effects. In those circumstances, I conclude that the e mail referred 
to at [3] above did not bear a signature sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of s 4. (Italics in the original)
11.26 In this particular instance, the judge made observations about the technicalities of email in the absence of expert evidence, as did Lyberopoulos 
J, the President of the court in the Greek case 1327/2001 – Payment Order.27 It seems that the judge assumed that the ISP adds the email address to the 
document.28 He then concluded, in the absence of any relevant technical evidence, 
that the email address could not, therefore, be intended as a signature. It is 
suggested that this approach is arguable. It is possible to distinguish the decision by Hall VC in Tourret v. Cripps29 on the basis that Cripps wrote the content by 
hand. The decision must be correct, taking into account the handwritten text, 
the printed words ‘From Richd. L Cripps’, and the address printed on the paper. Hall VC might have speculated as to the purpose of having stationery printed, and whether each time a letter or note is sent, the use of the information printed 
on the letter was sufficient evidence to demonstrate an intent to sign. In this instance, as in other cases, the judge looked to the entire document for evidence 
27 English translation by M.G. Rachavelias, ‘Case translation – Greece’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006), pp. 104–7; G. Skouma, ‘Case note’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 1 (2004), pp. 83–6.28 In Golden Ocean Group Limited v. Salgaocar Mining Industries PVT Ltd [2011] EWHC 56 
(Comm), Mr Justice Christopher Clarke indicated, at 103, that ‘There is authority that the 
insertion of a person’s email address by an internet service provider after the document 
has been transmitted is, absent evidence to the contrary, incidental’.29 (1879) 48 L J Ch 567; 27 WR 706. These cases were reviewed by Buckley J in Hucklesby v. 
Hook 82 LT 117.
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to indicate intent, and taking into account the message written on the letter, together with the name printed on the top of the stationery, Hall VC considered 
that this was sufficient to hold the man to his promise. However, to distinguish 
Tourret from Fernandes in this way is far from satisfactory. This is because the facts in Tourret comprised a mix of text written by hand with pre-printed text. 
With networked communications, such a mix is impossible. The very nature of networked communications means that content must be typed – or cut and pasted – so to argue that the decision in Tourret is significantly different because 
of the additional of text written by hand cannot be right.
11.27 Also, Judge Pelling QC did not consider the email as a complete document. 
The problem with this analysis is that the information contained in the ‘From’, 
‘To’, ‘Sent’ and ‘Subject’ part of the email cannot be disconnected from the body. The information is neither separate when presented visually on a screen, nor 
when printed out on paper. In addition, the source code (usually hidden) is also an integral part of the email, and this set of metadata is of considerable evidential value, as argued by the applicant in the pleadings in the case of Tribunale 
Mondovì, 7 giugno 2004, n. 375 (decr.), Giur. It. 2005, 1026.30 Further, should the method used to cause an email address to be attached to a particular email be of relevance, then other factors ought to be considered, including the mechanism by which the application software brings the disparate objects together to permit the user to view the email on screen, because each object will be in a different 
storage location on the computer.
11.28 A similar issue relating to email correspondence confronted Phelan J in the Canadian case of Dursol-Fabrik Otto Durst GmbH & Co. c. Dursol North America 
Inc.,31 decided after the decision by Judge Pelling QC, in proceedings for contempt of court where the defendant and his company were the subject of a number of orders 
prohibiting the marketing and selling of goods. One of the issues to determine was whether the defendant, Robert Scott, used email correspondence to market and 
sell products. In his evidence, he claimed he was ignorant of two email addresses 
in issue and how the signature that appeared at the end of emails worked. The 
evidence indicated he sent out emails that identified him in his corporate capacity. In this case, the court heard appropriate technical evidence as well as the evidence 
from the defendant. The judge did not believe the defendant because his evidence 
was both contradictory and inconsistent. In reaching his decision, the judge made some interesting and highly pertinent remarks at 56 about the use of email and the practical aspects of using email that bear repeating:
Even if one accepted Scott’s explanation, which I do not, he was a 
business man who used computers constantly to transact business. 
He took no steps to deal with his address and signature. In today’s world such ignorance, or, more importantly, the refusal to secure 
30 For a translation of the pleadings, see G.P. Coppola, ‘Case note’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007), pp. 86–8.31 2006 FC 1115.
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the technical assistance to deal with these types of matters, is not 
acceptable. Scott exhibited recklessness and a complete disregard 
for the obligations he had under this Court’s Orders.
11.29 The technical evidence demonstrated that, contrary to the defendant’s assertions, he could see the default signature he set up, thus contradicting his 
claim that he was not aware his signature appeared at the end of the email. Further, it was also established that the defendant had a number of different email addresses, and had the option of using whichever address he chose when 
sending and responding to correspondence. The judge rejected the contention 
that the defendant’s claimed lack of knowledge of email addresses and signatures 
was a mitigating factor in disobeying a court order.
11.30 One further point might be usefully considered, and that is the purpose of 
the email address, which is of the utmost significance. The address acts to ensure the communication reaches the person it is addressed to, otherwise, an email 
address, even if different by one letter, number or dot is unforgiving. It will not reach its destination, unlike a letter sent by way of post, where a human being can extract information from the envelope and use their knowledge to effect 
delivery of an envelope incorrectly addressed. It is also suggested that the ‘From’ 
address is also used with the intent to identify the sender (it being the function 
of the ‘Reply-to’ address to indicate where, by default, a reply will be sent). If 
it follows that the ‘From’ line of an email acts to designate the sender, then the 
act of signature is the irrevocable despatch of the email. Additional technical evidence may be adduced to demonstrate a connection to the person that sent, or caused to be sent, a document in electronic format, taking into account all of the data associated with the document, including the metadata, client software, and any other technical information that may not be obvious on the face of the document as presented on the screen to a recipient without further exploration 
of the technical attributes of the software. In this respect, it is difficult to see how the email address can be considered to have merely appeared or is incidental: it 
is a crucial element of the document. This, it is suggested, also corresponds to the advice offered by the Law Commission:32
3.37 We do not believe that there is any doubt that clicking on a 
website button to confirm an order demonstrates the intent to 
enter into that contract. That will satisfy the principal function of 
a signature: namely, demonstrating an authenticating intention. We suggest that the click can reasonably be regarded as the 
technological equivalent of a manuscript ‘X’ signature. In our view, clicking is therefore capable of satisfying a statutory signature 
requirement (in those rare cases in which such a requirement is 
imposed in the contract formation context).
32 Law Commission, ‘Electronic commerce: formal requirements in commercial transactions 
advice from the Law Commission’ (2001).
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3.38 It might be said that the click differs from other accepted 
forms of signature in that it does not produce a visible signature. However:-
(1) The general trend in English law is that the validity of a signature depends on its satisfying the function of a signature, not on its being a form of signature already 
recognised by the law.
(2) In combination with the information which will be 
available as to the email address of the ‘clicker’, a click is capable of satisfying the second and third functions 
identified in paragraph 2.6. The combination could be 
regarded as analogous to signing by way of a stamp.
(3) Some old authorities did suggest that a signature 
was required to be a ‘mark’ which would, by definition, 
be visible. We believe it is unlikely that the courts would 
regard such authorities as binding in modern conditions.
(4) On most websites the purchaser’s details will 
appear on screen (whether entered by the purchaser on that occasion, or automatically as a result of previous 
transactions). Sometimes this will involve the use of an 
individual password. The combination of the details, any password, and the click could be regarded as analogous to a 
manuscript signature or a typed signature.
(5) The vendor’s system may display or record the click in 
a visible form.
(6) The click may generate writing; the record of the 
transaction in the vendor’s system and any confirmatory 
response to the purchaser.
(7) Even if a click is less secure than a manuscript signature, 
reliability is not essential to validity.Conclusions on signatures
3.39 Digital signatures, scanned manuscript signatures, typing 
one’s name (or initials) and clicking on a website button are, in our view, all methods of signature which are generally capable of 
satisfying a statutory signature requirement. We say that on the basis that it is function, rather than form, which is determinative of 
the validity of a signature.
11.31 It is the action of clicking the ‘send’ icon, or causing an agent to click the 
‘send’ icon, that is the act of authentication. This view accords with the comments offered in the Law Commission Report, where it is suggested that the clicking of an icon probably constitutes the technological equivalent of signing with mark, 
and is therefore a signature. Further, the action of clicking the ‘send’ icon tends to 
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be the irrevocable dispatch of the communication (although if the person is quick enough, they may, depending on the software, stop the software from sending the 
email), and can be similar to, or the equivalent of, the act of writing a manuscript 
signature or affixing a stamp to a document. In this respect, the information contained in the email address serves the same function as the use of headed notepaper in Tourret v. Cripps. Cripps took a sheet of headed notepaper and 
wrote a promise on the paper. In this instance, Mehta either himself or through 
an agent, caused an email to be written (or cut and paste content) containing a 
promise. Instead of taking out a physical piece of notepaper and writing on it, 
he or his agent used a machine, namely a computer. The information contained in the email address served the same purpose as the name and address on the 
notepaper used by Cripps. Conceptually, there is no difference between the two: the cases are merely separated by time and the technology – that is, Mehta did 
not add any content by writing by hand. Prakash J gave her reasons for accepting the name in an email address based upon the same principle in SM Integrated 
Transware Ltd v. Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd33 at 92:There is no doubt that at the time he sent them out, he intended the recipients of the various messages to know that they had come 
from him. Despite that, he did not find it necessary to identify himself as the sender by appending his name at the end of any of the emails whether the messages were sent to his colleagues or to 
third parties like Mr Heng. I can only infer that his omission to type in his name was due to his knowledge that his name appeared at the head of every message next to his email address so clearly that 
there could be no doubt that he was intended to be identified as 
the sender of such message.
11.32 In analysing this case, Professor Ter Kah Lang indicated that the judge 
only addressed the identification function of the email address, not the intent 
to authenticate. Had the judge considered authentication, Professor Ter Kah 
Lang suggests that the conclusion might have been different.34 Simon Blount also 
agrees with this analysis. However, he suggests that if Tan was saying that he did not need to sign his emails because he knew his name was already part of the email address, the decision may be correct, although in such case the author is 
then intended to be bound by every word sent in the email.35
11.33 In the later New York case of JSO Associates, Inc., v. Price,36 Bucaria J 
reached the same decision. In this instance the name of Edward Price appeared 
33 [2005] 2 SLR 651, [2005] SGHC 58.34 T.K. Lang, ‘Have you signed your electronic contract?’, Computer Law & Security Review, 27 
(2011), pp. 75–82 at p. 77.35 S. Blount, Electronic Contracts (2nd edn., Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2015), p. 35.36 2008 WL 904703 (N.Y. Sup.), 239 N.Y.L.J. 72, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30862 (U).
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in the email address at the top, but he did not type his name at the bottom of the 
text. The judge took the view that it was necessary to be assured that the email was sent by the person that purported to send it, or at least it was sent with their 
authority. Bucaria J then went on to refer to the Court of Appeal case of Morris 
Cohon & Co. v. Russell,37 quoting the following text from 574, and indicating that although the technology had changed, the rationale had not:The Statute of Frauds was designed to guard against the peril of perjury; to prevent the enforcement of unfounded fraudulent 
claims. But … the Statute of Frauds was not enacted to afford persons a means of evading just obligations; nor was it intended to supply a cloak of immunity to hedging litigants lacking integrity; nor was it adopted to enable defendants to interpose the Statute 
as a bar to a contract fairly, and admittedly made.
11.34 The source and authenticity of the email were not questioned, and thus it was determined that the email had been signed – the name appeared as the sender of the email, and half an hour later, the sender sent a further email in 
which the name was typed into the bottom of the text.38
11.35 Judge Pelling QC mentioned the Electronic Communications Act 2000, but no consideration was given to the provisions of s7,39 or whether s7 applied 
to the facts of this case. Arguably, an email address is brought within the ambit 
of the Act as a form of electronic signature. First, the question is whether the email address can be considered a signature for the purposes of the Act, and the 
provisions of s7(2)(a) have to be considered. Section 7(2) provides:
(2) For the purposes of this section an electronic signature is so much of anything in electronic form as-
(a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically associated with any electronic communication or electronic data; and
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated for the purpose of being used in establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the communication 
or data, or both.
37 23 N.Y.2d 569.38 Although the nature of the electronic signature was not in issue in Lindsay v. O’Loughnane [2012] 
BCC 153, [2010] EWHC 529 (QB), nevertheless Mr Justice Flaux assessed all the evidence in 
relation to relevant emails to determine that emails were sent and signed at [54–9].39 The judge stated, at [30], that it was his understanding that the Electronic Communications Act 2000 was enacted to give effect to Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on electronic commerce) (OJ L 187/1, 17.7.2000). The aim of the Act was to implement the provisions of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 
13, 19.01.2000, p.12, as set out in Note 19 of the Explanatory Notes to the Act.
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11.36 As discussed above, an email will not arrive at its destination without a correct address, and if a person sending an email wishes the person receiving 
the email to reply, they must also use an accurate ‘reply-to’ email address, 
otherwise the recipient will not be able to respond. It is suggested above that 
there is a purpose for including a name or other form of description (such as 
the use of a title in lieu of a name) in the address of an email: to identify the 
sender. Also, technically, an email includes the various addresses in the email. Without an address, there would be no purpose in sending or receiving email 
correspondence. If the email address is not logically incorporated into the body 
of the text to be sent, the content will not be sent or received. To relate the email 
address to the provisions of s 7(2), it is necessary to consider the elements of an 
electronic signature.So much of anything in electronic form: This is such a wide-ranging provision that the address associated with an email must come with the term, just as the hidden metadata must also come within 
the term. Without the email address, the email could not be sent 
and received.Incorporation or logical association for the purpose of establishing authenticity or integrity: The thing in electronic form must be incorporated or logically associated with the communication or data for the purpose of being used to establish the authenticity or 
the integrity of the communication or data, or both. For the thing 
to be an electronic signature, it must be affixed to the data for a purpose: that is, to authenticate the communication or data or 
provide for the identity of the communication or data.
11.37 An email address clearly comes within the requirements of this provision: it is in electronic form, and the name included in the email address is included 
for the purpose of establishing the authenticity of the content. If the name were a nickname or pseudonym, rather than a proper name or part of a proper name, the same conclusion would apply, based on the previous decisions at common 
law. If it is accepted that the email address, or the name of the person in an email address can be considered an electronic signature, it can be admitted into 
evidence under the provisions of s7(1).40
11.38 Finally, the Law Commission considered the nature of the evidence 
required to demonstrate the intent to authenticate. An objective test was proposed:
3.29 Because signatures affect many areas of personal and commercial life, it is essential that the courts develop a straight-
forward approach. We believe this should be by way of a purely 
40 Judge Pelling QC expressed the view, at [30], that typing a name into the main body of an 
email can constitute an electronic signature, which is correct.
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objective test: namely, would the conduct of the signatory indicate 
an authenticating intention to a reasonable person? This approach 
is consistent with the authorities, flexible and would, over time, 
produce the greatest certainty.
11.39 It is suggested that this is test cannot be right, because an objective test would need to be based on an analysis of the surrounding circumstances, including the technology, and the average person using the technology probably varies widely in terms of their technical understanding and ability, partly because 
the technology changes so rapidly. It is suggested that a subjective test is more 
appropriate.41 This is the view taken by Flemming DJP in Chisnall and Chisnall 
v. Sturgeon and Sturgeon,42 where he held that the signing of a contract for the sale of an erf was achieved by a mark or marks with the function of making the document an act of the signer, and of signifying assent to the content of the 
document. He indicated at 645F, that ‘An enquiry concerning assent must, of course, not be into what the signatory subjectively planned but what his acts 
signify to the other party’. This is what the English authorities have also held up 
to this point. A subjective test will allow a judge to consider both the surrounding circumstances and what was in the mind of the sender at the moment they are 
deemed to sign. If the facts of J Pereira Fernandes SA v. Mehta are considered 
in this light, the conclusion must that the email in question was signed. The surrounding circumstances in this case, as in SM Integrated Transware Ltd v. 
Schenker Singapore (Pte) Ltd, were as follows:
(i) The email was from Mr Mehta.
(ii) Mr Mehta knew that his email address would appear in the email, which went to show that it came from him; it also enabled the recipient to respond; as a result, the email address was his 
unique mark.
(iii) There was a course of correspondence between the parties 
by email.
(iv) The email contained a promise made by Mr Mehta or under 
his authority.
(v) Mr Mehta admitted the email was sent, which indicated that he 
adopted the content of the email.
11.40 In summary, it is suggested that the requirement for a signature is not dependent and should not be limited by technology, and this is borne out by the 
case law from the past.43 Lawyers and judges have been required to consider how 
41 The subjective test is proposed by Mr Pépin Aslett, counsel for J Pereira Fernandes SA, 
Nicholas Bohm and the author.42 1993 (2) SA 642 (W).43 In R Mercury Tax Group Ltd, R (on the application of) v. HM Commissioners of Revenue 
& Customs [2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin) the signature pages of a trust deed, an option 
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new technologies effect the underlying legal principles. The decisions reached in the past remain relevant: the conclusion was, and remains, that any form of mark, whatever the technology used, has the capacity to demonstrate intent, and 
this should be no different when considering electronic signatures. Taking this 
into account, the decision by Judge Pelling QC is open to question. In addition, the judge suggested, in reaching this decision, that to conclude otherwise would lead 
to ‘widespread and wholly unintended legal and commercial effects’. Arguably, this decision has led to the opposite: there is now uncertainty, especially amongst lay people, who cannot be expected to understand that this decision 
only refers to s4 of the Statute of Frauds, and only to guarantees. This decision is incompatible with the previous decisions on identical facts, albeit in applying the legal principles to different technologies, and sends a signal out that implies that a person may no longer be held to their promise for the lack of typing 
their name into the body of an email.44 Notwithstanding this observation, this decision is generally accepted as being correct, sometimes with no discussion,45 and sometimes with some discussion, but without covering much of the case 
law discussed above.46 Professor Ter Kah Lang set out the issue at 79: that there is a fundamental distinction between identifying the sender by means of the pre-printed letterhead, and the intent of the signatory to adopt the name 
as authenticating the document. Miller J commented on this point in Welsh 
agreement and a sale/purchase agreement were signed some time before the final versions were complete, and were then attached, without the consent of those who signed 
the pages, to final versions that were different to the draft versions. This case caused the Law Society Company Law Committee, the City of London Law Society Company and 
Financial Law Sub-Committees to form a Joint Working Party and draft ‘Guidance on 
execution of documents at a virtual signing or closing’; see also E. Walton, ‘Guidance on 
the execution of documents at “virtual” signings following the Mercury case’, Butterworths 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 24 (2009), pp. 327–9.44 Judges in both the High Court and Court of Appeal (Civil Division) took a different view where it appears there was no signature at all in the case of Decouvreur v. Jordan, The 
Times 25 May 1987 (or 27 May 1987) CA, 1987 WL 493255; an appeal was dismissed before a court comprising Fox and Nourse LJJ and Sir Denys Buckley, where judgment for the plaintiff had been given by Mr Justice Farquharson in the sum of £15,000 on a claim 
against the second defendant under a contract of guarantee. The report states that ‘Any 
writing by which the guarantor of a debt could be identified in a memorandum of the 
guarantee and which showed an intention to adopt the guarantee sufficed as a signature 
for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds 1677’. See C. Freedman and J. Hardy, ‘J Pereira 
Fernandes SA v. Mehta: a 21st-century email meets a 17th century statute’, Computer Law 
& Security Report, 21 (2007), pp. 77–81. In Kloian, d/b/a Arbor Management Company 
v. Domino’s Pizza, L.L.C., 733 N.W.2d 766 (Mich.App. 2006) the members of the Court of Appeal in Michigan declined to accept that a name typed at the top in the heading of an email acted as a means of signature in circumstance where the statute required a 
subscription – that is, a signature at the bottom of the document.45 L. Brazell, Electronic Signatures and Identities Law and Regulation (2nd edn., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), 2-027; G. Andrews and R. Millett, Law of Guarantees (6th edn., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), p. 82; H. MacQueen and C. Garland, ‘Signatures in Scots 
law: form, effect, and burden of proof’, Juridical Review (2015), pp. 107–34.46 Lang, ‘Have you signed your electronic contract?’; Blount, Electronic Contracts.
Electronic signatures in law276
v. Gatchell47 at [75], although arguments could abound if one party specifies a particular type of electronic signature is required:An electronic signature will not prove adequate unless the Court is 
satisfied that its insertion was intended to signify adoption of the electronic note or memorandum of which it forms part or with which 
it is otherwise associated. That suggests that it would be prudent for those who wish to rely on an electronic writing and signature to warn the party to be charged that the writing is a contract that will bind that party when he or she attaches an electronic signature to it, 
and to specify what form of electronic signature is required.
11.41 Whether the name typed into an email can satisfy the provisions of s4 
of the Statute of Frauds is open to debate. What is disappointing is the lack of consideration of the decisions by senior judges from the 19th century when faced 
with identical facts in slightly different formats. The common law is supposed to be based on precedent, yet pertinent decisions by senior judges have either been 
missed or ignored in this debate.
Civil Procedure
11.42 In the Greek case of 1327/2001 – Payment Order,48 a Greek company entered an oral agreement with a Czech company situated in Prague, by which 
the Czech company agreed to provide lodging arrangements for groups of Greek 
tourists sent by the Greek company. The invoice of the Greek company was 
not paid on time. There was an exchange of emails between employees of the companies, and the Czech company recognized the debt in an email dated 27 July 2000, sending a further email on 12 September 2000 in which it was made clear that the company intended to pay the invoice and reiterated the promises made 
in the earlier email. For the emails to be admissible in evidence, they had to come 
within the meaning of a ‘private document’ as defined in articles 443 and 444 of 
the Greek Civil Procedure Code:
Article 443 Civil Procedure Code: Elements of private documents. A private document has conclusive power only when it has the manuscript signature of its editor or, instead of a signature, a mark 
that he (the editor) drew on the document and is verified by a 
notary or any other public authority, which confirms that the mark is placed instead of the signature and that the editor declared that 
he cannot sign.
47 [2007] NZHC 1898; [2009] 1 NZLR 241; (2007) 8 NZCPR 708; (2007) 5 NZ ConvC 194,549 
(21 June 2007).48 English translation by M.G. Rachavelias, ‘Case translation – Greece’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006), pp. 104–7; G. Skouma, ‘Case note’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 1 (2004), pp. 83–6.
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Article 444 Civil Procedure Code: Official books of merchants 
and other professionals. The definition of private documents also contains
(1) the books that merchants and professionals are obliged to keep under commercial law or other statutes
(2) the books that lawyers, notaries, doctors, pharmacists and nurses are obliged to keep under current statutes
(3) photographic and cinematic representations, recordings and 
any other mechanical representation.
11.43  The President of the Court, Lyberopoulos J, identified a number of criteria 
that were specific to email that might lend the email to being defined as a private 
document: first, the method by which a user authenticated themselves to an Internet Service Provider in the process of setting up an email account, leading to the conclusion that the account holder had access to the account; second, the 
use of a unique email address, and finally the form or layout of the content of 
the document. The judge concluded that the email address constituted proof of the identity of the sender, which meant an email could be considered a private 
document under the provisions of the Code. The comments of the judge, as translated, indicated his line of thinking:… each user electronic address is unique, in that it is chosen by the sender himself, and has the characteristic of a manuscript signature, even though it does not have the traditional form of a 
signature. The above-mentioned are valid regardless of where the 
sender’s electronic address appears in relation to the text that it accompanies when it appears on the screen of the computer, or its mechanical representation on paper; this follows because it is necessary to take into consideration that the authentication of the sender and the binding to his will of the content that is included in the electronic message…49
11.44 The judge was also satisfied that the email was authentic and the evidence demonstrated that it was sent by the person whose name was in the email address, thus complying with the provisions of article 445 of the Civil Procedure 
Code. With respect to the status of the email correspondence, it was held that the 
original copies of the communication were the files as stored in the hard disk of 
the computer, and the emails were capable of being printed on paper and ratified 
by an attorney at law. These conclusions do not answer all of the legal issues relating to this form of evidence, because it appears the judge made a number of assumptions about the veracity of the technology and how it works that cannot 
be reconciled with the reality, and in the absence of appropriate expert evidence. The applicant applied to the court to order the defendant to pay the sums due by 
49 Rachavelias, Case Translation – Greece, p. 105.
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way of special proceedings of a payment order, which is subject to articles 623-
34 of the Civil Procedure Code. A party to whom a debt is owed can make the application, on the condition that the obligation of payment and the amount is 
proved. In this case, Lyberopoulos J held that the email address was a signature 
under the provisions of articles 443 and 444(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. 
Another court reached the same conclusion in 2013.50
11.45 In comparison, the members of the Court of Appeal in Michigan declined to accept that a name typed at the top in the heading of an email acted as an electronic signature in the case of Kloian, d/b/a Arbor Management Company v. 
Domino’s Pizza,51 under Rule 2.507(G) (as it now is: at the time of the case, it was 
Rule 2.507(H)) of the Michigan Court Rules of 1985, Chapter 2 Civil Procedure 
(updated 11 January 2011)). The Rule provides as follows:
Agreements to be in writing. An agreement or consent between the parties or their attorneys respecting the proceedings in an action, subsequently denied by either party, is not binding unless it was made in open court, or unless evidence of the agreement is in writing, subscribed by the party against whom the agreement is 
offered or by that party’s attorney.
11.46 The members of the court distinguished between the phrase ‘in writing 
and signed’ and ‘writing, subscribed’. The meaning of ‘subscribed’ in Webster’s 
College Dictionary (2001) was referred to at 773: ‘“Subscribe” means “to append, 
as one’s signature, at the bottom of a document or the like; sign.”’ (Italics in the 
original). This meant that the email agreeing to a modified settlement did not 
satisfy the requirement that it had been subscribed. The first two meanings given 
to the work ‘subscribe’ in the Oxford English Dictionary are both considered rare:52
1.1 trans. To write (one’s name or mark) on, orig. at the bottom of, 
a document, esp. as a witness or consenting party; to sign (one’s 
name) to. Now rare.
b.1.b To write, set down, or inscribe below or at the conclusion of 
something. Now rare.
11.47 The editors of the Oxford English Dictionary may consider the meaning as determined by the members of the Court of Appeal in Michigan to be rare, but 
the rarity of the meaning of ‘subscribe’ is arguably irrelevant if the meaning is 
clear and appropriate for the purpose. In this respect, lawyers might like to take note of this decision, although the comments by Bucaria J in JSO Associates, Inc., v. 
50 M.G. Rachavelias, ‘Case translation: Greece, Payment Order 5845/2013’, Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014), pp. 177–9.51 L.L.C., 733 N.W.2d 766 (Mich.App. 2006).52 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition on CD-ROM (v. 4.0).
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Price53 bear consideration from the point of view of the technology under debate, 
in that the judge might have reached a different conclusion, given identical facts. In this instance, the judge was discussing the need for a signature to be placed at 
the end of a memorandum. In reference to the decision in Steinberg v. Universal 
Machinenfabrik GMBH,54 in which an indecipherable scrawl at the top of the 
memorandum was held not to be sufficient to satisfy the writing to be at the end of the document, Bucaria J commented at 27:However, Steinberg was decided in a different technological era, when email and home computers had not even entered the public 
imagination. Moreover, the requirement of a signature at the bottom was to minimize the opportunity for fraudulent additions to the memorandum, a practice which is not feasible with electronic 
communication.
Legal fees arrangement
11.48 In Israel, Hagai Brenner J determined, in a claim for legal fees in the case of Atias v. Salfan Ltd,55 that there was no basis for the defendant’s claim that a 
legal fees agreement between her and the plaintiff was not signed. The plaintiff sent an email to the defendant in which he summarized their joint understanding 
of the legal fees. The defendant confirmed that understating in a reply message, 
and used an expression that literally translates to ‘No problem’. A legal fees 
agreement is not required to be in writing (although recommended) and the 
email correspondence between the two parties was determined to be sufficient 
proof of the existence of the agreement. In the absence of any other information, such as whether the defendant also signed her name in the reply email, it may be inferred that Hagai Brenner J reached the decision based on the email address of 
the defendant.
Summary proceedings
11.49 In Italy, in the case of Tribunale Mondovì, 7 giugno 2004, n. 375 (decr.), 
Giur. It. 2005, 1026, a lawyer sought payment of fees in the sum of €3,304.80 in respect of assistance provided to a client in criminal proceedings before the 
Mondovì Criminal Court. The defendant acknowledged the debt in an email dated 29 April 2004, and promised that payment would occur by no later than 
1 May 2004. Having failed to make the payment, the lawyer took action to 
recover the debt. In his pleadings, the lawyer set out the arguments to show that 
the email was a document in writing and signed with an electronic signature. To demonstrate the email was a document, he prayed in aid the provisions of 
53 2008 WL 904703 (N.Y. Sup.), 239 N.Y.L.J. 72, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30862 (U).54 24 A.D.2d 886, 264 N.Y.S.2d 757.55 Tel Aviv Peace Court Civil Case 24210/06 (5 July 2006, unpublished decision).
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article 1(1)(b), of Presidential Decree 445/2000, that an electronic document is 
‘an electronic representation of legally relevant acts, facts or data’, and article 8, 
which provides for the validity of such a document, providing that ‘the electronic document, whoever made it, the registration on electronic support and the transmission with electronic instruments, are valid and relevant for any legal 
effect, if they conform to the provisions of this Decree’. To demonstrate the email was signed with an electronic signature, the lawyer pointed to the address of the sender, which goes to show that person who wrote the email must have inserted 
a username and a password. He then turned his attention to the provisions of 
article 10(2) of the Decree, which provides that ‘The electronic document, signed 
with an electronic signature, satisfies the legal requirement of written form’, and 
then questioned whether the email was signed. Article 1(1)(cc) of the Decree 
specifies that an electronic signature is ‘a set of data in an electronic form, which is attached or logically connected to other electronic data, used as a method of 
authentication’. The argument thus ran:
To say that an email has been signed with an ‘electronic signature’ 
(a ‘simple’ one, as opposed to a ‘digital’ signature, which is a 
particular type of qualified electronic signature, which guarantees 
a higher authenticity and, consequently, is a certified private 
document under Article 1, first Paragraph, sub-section n and 
10, Paragraph 3 of the Decree) it shall contain a set of data in electronic form which may be connected with other data used as 
a method of authentication (the law refers to an undersigning, but 
this is a judicial fiction, as electronic data cannot be signed: the 
same applies to digital signatures and other electronic signatures).
11.50 The judge upheld the motion and issued a summary judgment, as 
requested. In issuing the summary judgment, it is implied that the judge 
accepted the email address as an electronic signature. The use of a password and username suggested that the person that sent the email had authenticated 
himself or herself sufficiently accurately with the Internet Service Provider. This evidence emphasises a degree of authentication that serves to provide for the authenticity of the email, although it does not seem to have been questioned in 
this case.56
Civil Law Act
11.51 In Singapore, whether the name in an email address could be an electronic signature was raised in the case of SM Integrated Transware Ltd v. Schenker 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd.57 In this instance, Prakash J determined that it was possible 
56 For a translation of the pleadings, see G.P. Coppola, ‘Case note’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007), pp. 86–8.57 [2005] 2 SLR 651, [2005] SGHC 58; T.K. Leng, ‘Concluding leases by email’, Computer Law 
& Security Report, 21 (2005), pp. 423–6.
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for an email address to be a form of electronic signature for the purposes of 
s6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1994 Rev Ed). In this case, SM Integrated entered into negotiations to provide warehousing space and logistics services 
to Schenker. Schenker intended to enter a contract with a third party to handle dangerous goods, which in turn meant Schenker needed more storage facilities 
than it actually had. SM Integrated and Schenker prepared a draft agreement by way of meetings and the exchange of email correspondence, the content of which 
included reference to the transaction and the terms of the draft agreement. The 
agreement was never signed. Schenker subsequently failed to enter a contract with the third party, and because it no longer required the additional storage 
space, it declined to sign the draft agreement. SM Integrated initiated an action for damages suffered as a result of the alleged repudiation of the proposed lease, claiming that a combination of the draft agreement and the correspondence by email relating to the terms of the agreement demonstrated that an agreement 
had been formed. Schenker took the view that there was no contract, because 
the negotiations failed to produce a final agreement, but even if a valid contract existed, it did not satisfy the requirements of Electronic Transactions Act 1998 
(Cap 88 of 1999), in that is was neither in writing nor signed.
11.52 The arguments put forward by Schenker were not accepted. It was held that all the essential terms had been agreed, which meant an agreement for the lease did exist, and that if any conditions precedent of relevance existed, they will 
have been satisfied but the repudiation of the lease by Schenker. In her reasons for judgment, Prakash J gave careful consideration to the issue of whether or not the correspondence by email that passed between the parties was capable 
of satisfying the statute of frauds requirements of the s6(d) of the Civil Law Act 
(Cap 43, 1994 Rev Ed), which states: Contracts which must be evidenced in writing
6. No action shall be brought against –
(d) any person upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such property;unless the promise or agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other person 
lawfully authorised by him.
11.53 Counsel for Schenker argued that the signature and writing requirements 
regarding this particular type of contract were not capable of being satisfied 
electronically because of the provisions of s4(1)(d) of the Electronic Transactions 
Act 1998 (as it was then), which stated that the Act does not apply to ‘any contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such 
property’. This argument was rejected. It was held that the provisions of the Act required judges to construe its terms in accordance with the terms set out in 
section 3, particularly s3(b):
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Purposes and construction
3. This Act shall be construed consistently with what is commercially reasonable under the circumstances and to give effect to the following purposes:
(a) to facilitate electronic communications by means of reliable electronic records;
(b) to facilitate electronic commerce, eliminate barriers to electronic commerce resulting from uncertainties over writing and signature requirements, and to promote the development of the legal and business infrastructure necessary to implement secure electronic commerce;
11.54 In reaching a decision on this matter, it was reasonable to consider the 
position at common law and by construing the provisions of s6(d) Civil Law Act 
1994, not by ‘blindly relying on s4(1)(d) of the ETA’.58 It was also held that the 
communications exchanged by email were in writing.59 Apart from the legal basis 
of the decision that the emails were in writing, Prakash J, at [81], took a realistic and sound approach by making it clear that, despite the claim that the emails did not constitute writing, the facts did not correspond to such a contention:
81. In this case, the parties readily admitted that they had sent and 
received each other’s email messages. No one argued or testified that the printed copies of the emails that appeared in the bundle of documents were not true copies of the emails that they had 
seen on screen and responded to electronically. Neither Mr Tan nor Mr Luth objected to the contents of the printed copies of their 
respective email messages. In fact, they confirmed that they had sent out those various messages and attached the printouts as 
exhibits to their respective affidavits. Mr Tan did not resile from 
any of his emails. He did not deny receiving the email messages 
and attachments sent by Mr Tan and Ms Yong (in particular he did 
not deny receiving Ms Yong’s email of 27 January 2003 and the 
draft LSA that was an attachment to that email). He specifically 
confirmed he had sent out his response in the email of 4 February 
2003 and commented in court on the contents of that email.
11.55 Arguments that email and other documents created in digital format 
do not constitute ‘writing’ are disingenuous. The law is often derided for not responding to the development of new technologies, yet the comments made by judges in the 19th century indicated they were perfectly willing and able to apply 
legal principles to new forms of technology. It is widely recognized that digital data is the mainstay of many businesses and government across the world, and 
58 [2005] 2 SLR 651, paragraph 76.59 [2005] 2 SLR 651, paragraphs 77–85.
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to suggest that evidence from such sources is not admissible because it is not a 
‘writing’ is bordering on the preposterous.
11.56 Mr Tan did not append his name at the bottom of the email, so the only 
evidence of a signature comprised the content of the heading: ‘From “Tan 
Tian Tye”<tian-tye.tan@schenker.com.>’ The name in the email address was considered a signature, and in reaching this conclusion, Prakash J referred to the Massachusetts case of Shattuck v. Klotzbach,60 and the seventh circuit case of Cloud Corporation v. Hasbro, Inc.61 In her judgment, Prakash J provided a clear exposition of the underlying principles that were established in the English and American courts in the 19th century:
91. I am satisfied that the common law does not require handwritten signatures for the purpose of satisfying the signature 
requirements of s 6(d) of the CLA. A typewritten or printed form 
is sufficient. In my view, no real distinction can be drawn between a typewritten form and a signature that has been typed onto an email and forwarded with the email to the intended recipient of 
that message.
92. One minor difficulty in this case is that Mr Tan did not append 
his name at the bottom of any of his email messages. All his email messages, however, including the message dated 4 February 2003 
and sent to Ms Yong, had, near the start thereof, a line reading “From: 
“Tan Tian Tye” <tian-tye.tan @schenker.com>”. Mr Tan confirmed 
in court that he had sent out those messages. There is no doubt that at the time he sent them out, he intended the recipients of the 
various messages to know that they had come from him. Despite 
that, he did not find it necessary to identify himself as the sender by appending his name at the end of any of the emails whether the messages were sent to his colleagues or to third parties like Mr 
Heng. I can only infer that his omission to type in his name was due to his knowledge that his name appeared at the head of every message next to his email address so clearly that there could be no 
doubt that he was intended to be identified as the sender of such 
message. Therefore, I hold that the signature requirement of s6(d) 
is satisfied by the inscription of Mr Tan’s name next to his email 
address at the top of the email of 4 February 2003.
93. I recognize that one person’s email facility can, in some cases, be accessed by a third party who can then send out messages which purport to be authentic messages from the owner of that 
email address. If that happened, the owner of the address would be entitled to dispute the authenticity of the messages purportedly 
60 14 Mass. L. Rptr 360; 2001 WL 1839720 (Mass. Super.).61 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002).
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sent by him. That is not the case here. Further, such dispute would be as to the person who initiated the message and would not be 
decided on the basis of whether the message bore a signature.
11.57 In the same year, Lai Kew Chai J referred to the decision of Judith Prakash J in the bankruptcy proceedings of Wee Soon Kim Anthony v. Lim Chor Pee.62 Although the judge did not have to consider the email correspondence in this case, having determined that the exchange did not form a valid agreement 
because there was no meeting of the minds, nevertheless he commented, at [39], that he considered the exchange of email correspondence was likely to satisfy the written record and signature requirements of s111 of the Legal Profession Act 
(Cap 161, 2001 Rev Ed).63
Means of authentication
11.58 It was held in the United States of America in the federal eleventh circuit criminal case of United States of America v. Siddiqui,64 that an email was correctly 
authenticated under the requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 901(a), because a number of internal factors supported the authenticity of the email, 
including the email address: ‘msiddiquo@jajuar1.usouthal.edu’, the use of 
a nickname of the sender, ‘Mo,’ written at the end of the email, and pertinent 
content.65 With respect to the content of an email address, Wilson DJ observed by in footnote 4 in the case of Poly USA, Inc., v. Trex Company, Inc.:66In its initial supporting brief, Poly claimed that when Beladakis signed the May 28, 2004, emailed document that it became 
binding on both parties because Trex ‘signed’ the document with an electronic signature by sending it through a Trex email 
account. See 15 U.S.C. § 7006 (‘The term “electronic signature” means an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed 
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.’). Poly 
62 [2005] 4 SLR 367, [2005] SGHC 159.63 Note also Singh Chiranjeev v. Joseph Mathew [2008] SGHC 222, [2009] 2 SLR 73.64 235 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000).65 See also: Missouri: International Casings Group, Inc., v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc., 358 
F.Supp.2d 863 (W.D.Mo. 2005), 2005 WL 486784.
New York: Medical Self Care, Inc., v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 2003 
WL 1622181 (S.D.N.Y.) in a Memorandum Opinion, Swain J determined that an email 
containing the text ‘ConAgra is OK’ constituted written consent authorizing SelfCare to 
assign its remaining advertising time to ConAgra. It is not clear if the person sending the 
email typed their name at the bottom of the email. If not, the judge implied acceptance of the authenticity of the email from the email address alone; JSO Associates, Inc., v. Price, 
2008 WL 904703 (N.Y. Sup.), 239 N.Y.L.J. 72, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30862 (U) (email address 
accepted as a signature).66 W.D. Va. No. 5:05-CV-0031 (March 1, 2006).
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did not pursue this argument at the hearing nor in its additional 
briefing. Nevertheless, the court finds the use of a Trex email account to send an email does not necessarily constitute an 
electronic signature under 15 U.S.C. § 7006 and, moreover, that Trex did not intend to electronically sign the emailed document 
by sending it from a Trex email account. Thus, the May 28 emailed 
document was not binding.
11.59 In commenting upon the suggestion that an email address can demonstrate proof of intent, although rejecting that it could in this particular case, the judge made the pertinent observation that the use of the email address does not 
necessarily constitute an electronic signature where there is no intention to sign. This must be correct, and whether an email address is capable of constituting a 
form of electronic signature will depend on the facts of each case.
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12A manuscript signature that has been scanned
12.1 A variation of the biodynamic version of a manuscript signature is where a manuscript signature is scanned from the paper carrier and transformed into digital format, which makes it very easy to use by the recipient for the purposes 
of forgery.1 The files containing the representation of the signature can then be 
attached to a document. This version of a signature is used widely in commerce, especially when marketing materials are sent through the postal system and 
addressed to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of addresses. It could be argued that when sending a document by facsimile transmission, that the recipient of the document has in their possession this version of the manuscript signature: the entire document is scanned and transmitted, together with the 
content. Arguably, this is the form of signature that was discussed in the case of 
Re a debtor (No 2021 of 1995), Ex p, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. The debtor; 
Re a debtor (No 2022 of 1995), Ex, Inland Revenue Commissioners v. The debtor2 
where a completed form of proxy was sent by facsimile transmission. Although the report does not clearly state the proxy form, as transmitted, contained the 
manuscript signature of the relevant official from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, it can be inferred that a manuscript signature had been appended to the 
original form of proxy that was sent by facsimile transmission. Laddie J offered an opinion in relation to this point at 351f-g:For example, it is possible to instruct a printing machine to print a 
signature by electronic signal sent over a network or via a modem. Similarly, it is now possible with standard personal computer equipment and readily available popular word processing software to compose, say, a letter on a computer screen, incorporate 
within it the author’s signature which has been scanned into the computer and is stored in electronic form, and to send the whole 
document including the signature by fax modem to a remote fax. The fax received at the remote station may well be the only hard 
copy of the document. It seems to me that such a document has 
been ‘signed’ by the author.
12.2 This observation must be correct. Providing the sending party intended the recipient to accept such a signature as a method of authentication and to act upon the content of the document transmitted, the method used to transmit the signature remains merely a method by which the document or 
message is communicated. The means of communication used should not 
1 See chapter 6 for examples of forged electronic signatures.
2 [1996] 2 All ER 345, Ch D.
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affect the legal consequences that follow the delivery and subsequent receipt 
of the document.3
Mortgage redemption
12.3 In 2006, a registration judge in Denmark refused to cancel a mortgage 
because the signatures were not added by means of a manuscript signature. 
The Danish Western High Court upheld this decision in case U.2006.1341V. The facts were that a mortgage bank N delivered a mortgage for the purpose of 
cancellation. The scanned signatures of A and B were affixed to the cancellation 
endorsement. By a notice circulated to all judicial districts, N had authorized A and 
B to jointly endorse the mortgage by means of scanned manuscript signatures. 
The endorsements were added or attached to the original mortgage. The registration judge refused to cancel the mortgage because the signatures were 
not added by means of a manuscript signature in accordance with s9(1) of the 
Danish Registration of Property Act. The Danish Western High Court upheld this 
decision, and took the view that under s261(2) of the Danish Administration of Justice Act, the endorsement must be signed, and in accordance with established case law, pleadings must be available in their original form, and photocopies or 
facsimiles are therefore not sufficient. In addition, the registry took the view that, on grounds of due process, manuscript signatures are still required on 
documents to be registered (or cancelled), and that any change of this state of 
the law should, if necessary, be clarified by the legislature in the same way as the 
provisions on digital signatures.4
Writing
12.4 In a case before the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), 
file number XI ZB 40/06, NJW 2006, 3784 regarding Sec. 130 ZPO: (10.10.2006), 
it was held that scanned manuscript signature is not sufficient to be qualified as 
‘in writing’ under s130(6) ZPO if the signature is printed on a document and then 
sent by facsimile transmission. This ruling appears to prevent the admission into 
evidence of a document twice removed from the source. First, the signature is scanned and then printed on the document, then the document is sent on by 
means of facsimile transmission. As an item of evidence, such a document might be highly suspect in the absence of a clear acknowledgment by the person whose signature it is that they were entirely responsible for the entire process or they authorized another person to produce the document and transmit it, and they 
adopted the content of the document as their own.
3 For a discussion of cases involving scanned images of manuscript signatures in Belgium, 
see J. Vandendriessche, ‘An overview of some recent case law in Belgium in relation to 
electronic signature’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), pp. 
90–100.4 For a case report, see Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007), p. 99.
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Employment
12.5 In France, the case of Cour de Cassation, soc., 17 mai 2006, 04-467065 also 
considered the legal effect of a scanned signature. In this instance, an employee of the Association of the La Réunion Marine Park was dismissed on 27 January 
2002. A claim for unfair dismissal was issued. The only relevant issue for present purposes was that the dismissal letter had not been signed, but took the form of 
a letter bearing a signature that had been scanned. On 25 May 2004, the Court of Appeal of Saint-Denis de la Réunion held that a scanned manuscript signature 
did not constitute an electronic signature, as defined by article 1316 – 4 of the French Civil Code, but nevertheless considered that the dismissal letter had been 
validly signed. Upon appeal to the Cour de Cassation, the supreme French civil court, the employee argued that the Court of Appeal should have decided that the dismissal letter was not admissible, as the Court of Appeal had found the 
signature had been rendered into digital format earlier. On this point, the Cour de Cassation held that the fact that the signature had been put into digital format on the dismissal letter might affect the formal process of the dismissal procedure, 
but it did not in itself deprive the dismissal of substantive justifiable grounds. The Cour de Cassation appeared to leave open the question of whether or not 
the electronic signature did affect the dismissal procedure. In this instance, the 
Cour de Cassation held that there were justifiable substantive grounds for the 
dismissal.
5 The decision in French is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
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13Biodynamic version of a manuscript signature
13.1 There are products available that permit a person to produce a biodynamic 
version of their manuscript signature. For instance, some delivery companies use hand-held devices that require the recipient of an item of post or parcel to sign on a screen acknowledging receipt of the mail – the electronic signature recorded on this particular device has been the subject of a data protection application in 
Canada, for which see the relevant chapter in this text.
13.2 Another method of obtaining a digital version of a manuscript signature is where a person can write their manuscript signature by using a special pen 
and pad. The signature is reproduced on the computer screen, and a series of 
measurements record the behaviour of the person as they perform the action. The measurements include the speed, rhythm, pattern, habit, stroke sequence and dynamics that are unique to the individual at the time they write their 
signature.1 The subsequent electronic file can then be attached to any document in electronic format to provide a measurement of a signature represented in 
graphic form on the screen. While it appears that this concept might be usefully 
applied in the electronic environment, the drawbacks are as significant as for any other form of generating electronic signatures, including linking the evidence in a coherent fashion to prove a person signed a particular document,2 and problems 
relating to the protection of personal data.3
Electoral register
13.3 In Australia, the Electoral Commissioner rejected the biodynamic version 
1 Such a device seems to be used by the Queensland Police Services, for which see Bismark v. 
Queensland Police Service District Court of Queensland [2014] QDC 152 2014, WL 8104519 
in which such a device is used by the appellant.2 The nature of the evidence was discussed by Chin DJ in Labajo v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 478 
F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) at 530, although this report was in respect of a motion for judgment on the pleadings and before discovery, so the defendants would have had the 
opportunity of obtaining more coherent evidence for the trial; F. Luan, S. Ma, K. Cheng and 
X. Dong, ‘On-line handwritten signature verification algorithm based on time sequence’, 
International Journal of Information and Systems Sciences, 1 (2005), pp. 229–36; R.P. 
Gonçalves, A.B. Augusto and M.E. Correia, ‘Time/space based biometric handwritten 
signature verification’, 10th Iberian Conference on Information Systems and Technologies 
(CISTI), 2015 (n.p.: IEEE, 2015), pp. 743–8.3 The data protection issues relating to such products are dealt with elsewhere in this 
text. See R.J. Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed 
Systems (2nd edn, Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2008), 15.9 for an indication about what can 
go wrong with biometric systems, and J. Grijpink, ‘Privacy law: biometrics and privacy’, 
Computer Law & Security Review, 17 (2001), pp. 154–60.
Electronic signatures in law292
of a manuscript signature (biodynamic signature) in the case of Getup Ltd v. 
Electoral Commissioner4 prior to the Australian election in August 2010. Ms Trevitt used her biodynamic signature to enrol as a voter over the internet before 
the election took place. Lawyers for the Commissioner wrote to Ms Trevitt, 
indicating ‘that the electronic signature on the claim form was not sufficient’.5 Her 
attempt to register her vote was rejected. The main point at issue was whether the form of signature used was appropriate, in accordance with the provisions 
of s10(1)(b) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth). Perram J considered 
s10(1)(a) and (b), and whether this Act applied to the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918 (Cth). Section 10(1) provides as follows:
(1) If, under a law of the Commonwealth, the signature of a person is required, that requirement is taken to have been met in relation to an electronic communication if:
(a) in all cases – a method is used to identify the person 
and to indicate the person’s approval of the information communicated; and
(b) in all cases – having regard to all the relevant circumstances at the time the method was used, the method was as reliable as was appropriate for the purposes for which the information was communicated; 
13.4 Ms Trevitt affixed her electronic signature to the form with a biodynamic 
signature. It was argued by counsel for the Commissioner that it was for the Commissioner to form an opinion about the reliability of the method in 
accordance with the purpose. The judge did not agree with this argument. He set out his reasoning at 14–15:
The provision does not mention anyone forming an opinion. 
In particular, because s 10(1)(b) is pitched at a very high level of generality it understandably eschews identifying any of the 
parties to the communication at all. Even assuming the provision should be read as requiring someone to hold an opinion it is silent as to whether it is to be held by the sender or the recipient 
or both. Further, as Mr Kirk, who appeared with Ms Rao for the applicants, pointed out, the breadth of the requirement that the issue be considered in light of all of the relevant circumstances bespoke the possibility that not all of the circumstances might 
be known to the participants to the communication. Such a view of the provision counted against it being read as requiring the formation of an opinion by one or other of the persons involved 
in its application.
4 [2010] FCA 869 (13 August 2010).
5 [2010] FCA 869 (13 August 2010) [8].
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15. I do not see a way around those concerns. To accede to the 
notion that s 10(1)(b) required the Commissioner to form an opinion would involve, so it seems to me, an intolerably strained 
construction of its plain words. Further, it would be a construction 
which necessarily identified the recipient as the person whose 
opinion mattered. That reading of s 10(1)(b) might have very serious consequences in a range of cases yet to come and about 
which nothing can be known. In those circumstances, I do not read 
s 10(1)(b) in a manner for which the Commissioner contends. This has the consequence that the provision sets a standard which, in 
this instance, is to be ascertained and applied by the Court.
13.5 Perram J then considered the nature of the evidence, the possibility of forgery and the fact that the Commissioner accepted other forms of signature 
(whether they are sent by facsimile transmission and scanned versions of 
manuscript signatures), and concluded, at 17 that:In that circumstance, I cannot accept the slightly pixilated 
nature of Ms Trevitt’s signature rendered it unreliable for the 
Commissioner’s purposes, not at least while he continues to accept 
faxed or emailed claim forms.
13.6 This particular point was raised in a previous edition of this text in 
relation to article 9(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, and the abstract reliability test is 
discussed elsewhere in this text.
Contract formation
13.7 At issue in the US case of American Family Life Assurance Company of 
Columbus v. Biles6 was whether the signature of the late David Biles was a forgery. The method used by Mr Biles to apply his signature to a life insurance policy was by way of a proprietary biodynamic version of his manuscript signature, using 
a pad and computer. Of interest was the approach taken by the two document 
examiners in the case. Robert G. Foley gave evidence for the plaintiff,7 and William 
J. Flynn gave evidence for the defendant.8 Mr Foley compared the photocopies 
presented to him by the plaintiff of the images of two signatures affixed to the 
document. Mr Flynn, in contrast, examined the data files used to create the 
6 2011 WL 4014463 2011 (S.D.Miss.) and 2011 WL 5325622 (S.D.Miss.).7 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Biles, 2011 WL 5835356 (S.D.Miss.) 
(affidavit of Robert G. Foley); American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Biles, 
2011 WL 7909386 (S.D.Miss.) (supplemental affidavit of Robert G. Foley).8 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Biles, 2011 WL 5835357 (S.D.Miss.) 
(affidavit of William J. Flynn).
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images representing the electronic signature. One of the reasons for the hearings 
was an application to strike the affidavit of Robert G. Foley on the basis that his examination was not appropriate, given that he ought to have examined the 
data files. Lee DJ ordered a Daubert9 hearing to determine whether to agree 
to exclude Mr Foley’s evidence.10 At the subsequent hearing, the defendants 
sought to exclude the evidence of Mr Flynn. After hearing the evidence, the judge 
concluded that the challenge to Mr Foley’s reliability was well taken, because his 
opinion was not based on the examination of the best evidence available.11 The implication is that when electronic signatures of this nature are challenged, it is important to ensure the adjudicator is aware of the need for the examination of the digital data, and that a comparison of the images produced by the digital data 
is not appropriate.12
9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).10 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Biles, 2011 WL 4014463 2011 
(S.D.Miss.).11 American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Biles, 2011 WL 5325622 
(S.D.Miss.); American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Glenda C. Biles, 
Individually, Natural Mother of David Biles, Deceased, and Administratrix of Estate of David 
Biles, Deceased, 714 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 2013) (appeal on the enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement).12 H.H. Harralson, ‘Forensic document examination of electronically captured signatures’, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 9 (2012), pp. 67–73.
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14Digital signatures
Technical overview of digital signatures
14.1 Cryptography is the method of hiding the contents of a message, used 
from ancient times to the present. Encryption (or enciphering) is the process 
by which a plaintext (or cleartext) message is disguised sufficiently to hide the 
substance of the content. As well as ordinary text, a plaintext message can be 
a stream of binary digits, a text file, a bitmap, a recording of sound in digital 
format, audio images of a video or film and any other information formed into 
digital bits. When a message has been encrypted, it is known as ciphertext or 
a cryptogram. The opposite procedure, that of turning the ciphertext back into 
plaintext, is called decryption (or deciphering).1 In essence, contemporary 
cryptographic systems change one set of symbols that have meaning (binary 
data) into a second set of symbols that has no meaning, by means of a 
mathematical process. Cryptography is usually required to undertake a number 
of functions, the most important of which is authenticity, rather than secrecy. 
These functions are discussed below.
(i) Authenticity: When sending or receiving information or placing an order, both parties need to have assurance of the origin of the 
message. The aim is to corroborate the identity of the software 
that sent the data. The identity of a person cannot be corroborated, because a person is not part of the communications process – the 
process only involves communications between software.
(ii) Integrity: It is helpful to demonstrate the integrity of the message, because it is important to know if the content of the 
message has been tampered with.
(iii) Honesty: To provide an assurance, to the extent that is technically possible, that demonstrates that the software emanates from a known source, such that the purported sender has been 
honest about the actions that have been caused to be undertaken. 
The purpose is an attempt to bind human users to specific actions in such a way that if they deny taking the action, they either demonstrate an intention to deceive, or they have been negligent 
in failing to secure the use of their private key adequately. This 
is called ‘non-repudiation’ in the security industry. There are different types of non-repudiation: non-repudiation of origin, 
1 Encipher and decipher are terms used in the ISO 7498-2 standard.
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which prevents the entity that sent the message or document from denying that they sent it, and non-repudiation of receipt, where 
an entity cannot deny have not received a message or document. Other types of non-repudiation include non-repudiation of creation, non-repudiation of delivery and non-repudiation of 
approval.2 This topic is dealt with at greater length in the chapter 
on evidence.
(iv) Confidentiality: Another purpose is to provide for the 
confidentiality of a document. In the digital environment, cryptography is used as a substitute for a manuscript signature, 
and is often described as a digital signature. To understand how a document can be signed with a digital signature, it is necessary to be aware of how cryptography works, for which see the discussion 
below.
Algorithms and keys
14.2 The plaintext of a message is encrypted and decrypted by the use of a 
cryptographic algorithm (also called a cipher). There tend to be two related 
functions, one for encryption and another for decryption. In most instances, the secrecy of the algorithm will not matter, because modern cryptography uses a 
key. However, it is possible to have what is called a restricted algorithm, because the security of the algorithm is based on ensuring the way it works is kept a 
secret. There are drawbacks to the use of restricted algorithms. If a user leaves the group that share the algorithm, or should the secret be revealed for any 
reason, then the algorithm must be changed. Further, there is no quality control 
or standardization, which means the algorithms can be easy to break. By using a key, a strong algorithm does not need to be secret and can be used by millions of 
users. As a result, there is no need to constantly develop new algorithms. A key 
can comprise a number of values. This range of values is called a keyspace. A key can be used to encrypt and decrypt a message, or there can be two separate keys, 
one to encrypt a message and another for decrypting the message. To complete the picture, a cryptosystem comprises an algorithm, all possible messages, all 
possible cryptograms and all possible keys.
Control of the key
14.3 To decrypt the ciphertext, the recipient needs to know both the decryption 
algorithm and the decryption key. The way a key is controlled, managed and 
distributed is crucial. This is why the principle laid down by Auguste Kerckhoffs von Niuewenhof remains a fundamental rule of cryptanalysis: the security of a 
2 C. Adams and S. Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and Deployment 
Considerations (2nd edn., Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2002), p. 51.
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cryptosystem must depend on keeping the key secret.3 This issue is discussed 
more fully when considering the weaknesses relating to cryptosystems.
Disguising the message
14.4 There are two types of mathematical families that permit the message to be disguised: symmetric cryptographic systems and asymmetric cryptographic 
systems.
Conventional or symmetric cryptographic systems
14.5 As the name infers, the encryption key can be computed from the 
decryption key, and the decryption key can be computed from the encryption key. 
In practice, these two keys are often identical when used in symmetric systems. The symmetric system is also referred to as secret-key algorithms, single-key 
algorithms, one-key algorithms or shared key ciphers. Two people can use the 
same system to send and receive encrypted messages to each other. Both the 
sender and the receiver must agree on the key before they can communicate. 
This system can have very long keys, which means a message can be very secure. The effectiveness of this system depends on the key, and is suitable for closed user groups where there is a strong element of mutual trust between the users, 
such as banks, the military, and intelligence agencies. However, a disadvantage 
is that the key must be kept secure and secret. Two people must have the key 
to communicate. If encrypted messages are to pass between large numbers of 
people, a large number of keys will have to be distributed. The security of the system depends on those people with access to the keys to ensure they are kept 
secure and secret. Also, from the point of view of managing the keys, it is important for pairs of users to have different keys to reduce the risks of compromise when 
large numbers of people share a key. Some symmetric algorithms work on the 
plaintext, one digit at a time. These are called stream ciphers. Others work in 
groups of digits on the plaintext. The groups of digits are called blocks, and the 
algorithms are called block algorithms or block ciphers. How an algorithm and 
the cipher work is important, because of their strengths and weaknesses. If an algorithm or cipher is easy to attack, then an application should not use it, and if losses occur because of the failure of either, then a successful legal action may be possible because it could be argued that the system was designed and possibly 
implemented negligently.
14.6 Sending a message that has been encrypted only provides for the security 
of the content. It does not attribute the message to the source from which the 
message was sent. It is possible for an interceptor to intercept the message and 
send a substitute message in place of the original message. If a forger sends the message, the recipient will not be aware that the sender of the message has used 
3 A. Kerckhoffs, ‘La Cryptographie militaire’, Journal des Sciences Militaires, 9 (1883), pp. 
5–38, although this principle applied to a time when all systems were symmetric.
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the key improperly. Authentication seeks to corroborate the integrity of the 
message and authenticity of the sender. There are two types of authentication.
(i) One-way authentication is where one party is authenticated to another party, such as a person using an ATM when they wish to 
withdraw cash or make a deposit. The user identifies themselves 
by using their PIN, and the card is authenticated cryptographically.
(ii) Two-way authentication, where both parties to a message seek to verify the attribution of data that purports to identify each other 
or the message or both, such as virtual private networks.
14.7 The process of authentication also uses a secret key. This is called the 
message authentication code or data authentication code. This mechanism can 
provide authentication without the need for secrecy. In symmetric cryptographic systems, the aim is for the originator and the legitimate recipient to be the only 
two entities that can create or check the message authentication code. This is an example of how the message authentication code can work:4
Alice sends a message in plaintext to Bob. The software on the computer that Alice uses encrypts the message by using a block 
algorithm or cipher. All of the ciphertext blocks are then discarded 
with the exception of the last block. The last block is the message 
authentication code. (Note: If Alice wants to provide for both the integrity and the privacy of the message, the message can also be 
encrypted again.)
Bob receives the message. The software on his computer computes 
what the message authentication code should have been. If Eve intercepted and altered the message, Bob will realise this, because the incorrect plaintext is re-encrypted, producing an incorrect 
message authentication code. If the plaintext has been altered, the ciphertext blocks will be different, especially the last ciphertext 
block. If the plaintext has not been altered, the re-encrypted plaintext will not have changed, and Bob can be sure that Alice has 
sent the plaintext message.
14.8 However, this does not prevent Eve from listening in to Alice when she 
sends the message to Bob. Eve can then record every message, together with the 
message authentication code. Alternatively, she can delete the message sent by 
Alice, repeat old messages or change the order in which the messages are sent. Thus the message authentication code needs to include a scheme by which each 
message is numbered sequentially.
4 Alice, Bob, Carol, Dave and interloper Eve are used widely in cryptology. See ‘The Alice 
and Bob after dinner speech’ given at the Zürich Seminar, April 1984 by John Gordon by 
invitation of Professor John Massey, available online at http://web.mit.edu/jemorris/
humor/alice-and-bob.
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Asymmetric cryptographic systems (Public key)
14.9 Using a symmetric cryptographic system with large numbers of users is 
difficult. Keys cannot be distributed over the open communications network, so 
they have to be distributed in other ways. When a member leaves the group, all 
the other members have to redistribute new keys. Thus, assuming a separate key is used for each pair in a group, and if there are 10 people members of the 
group, 45 different keys will be required. The development of the asymmetric cryptographic system, or public key,5 helps to resolve this problem. With this 
system, keys only have one purpose: one key to encrypt and one key to decrypt. 
Given a large enough key, the decryption key cannot be calculated from the 
encryption key within a useful length of time (perhaps several centuries). The 
algorithms used in the system are commonly called ‘public key’ because the 
encryption key is usually made public. Anybody can use the encryption key to encrypt a plaintext message, but only the person with the decryption key that 
corresponds to the encryption key can decrypt the message. The encryption key is called the public key or public encryption key, and the decryption key is called 
the private key, secret key or private decryption key. The system can work in two 
ways.
An individual creates and controls their own public key
14.10 The user can generate a pair of keys using what is called a trapdoor one-
way function, containing the mathematical equivalent of a secret trapdoor. For the purposes of understanding the concept, this algorithm is easy to compute in 
one direction and difficult to compute in the opposite direction, unless you know 
the secret.6
14.11 Sending a message using public key cryptography:
Alice and Bob decide to exchange messages that are encrypted.Alice generates her own public and private keys using the software 
on her computer. Although she keeps the private key secret, she 
gives Bob her public key.
Bob writes his message and encrypts it using Alice’s public key. He 
sends it to Alice.
Alice decrypts Bob’s message using her private key.
5 The concept of public key cryptography was invented twice during the 20th century. 
By James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks and Malcolm J. Williamson at British Intelligence 
GCHQ, whose work remained classified until December 1997. Then two researchers at 
Stanford University, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, proposed the concept in 1976. 
Development of the principles can also be attributed to R. C. Merkle, R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir 
and L. A. Adleman.
6 It has yet to be proven that a mathematical function can have a one-way function (see 
F. Piper, S. Blake-Wilson and J. Mitchell, Digital Signatures: Security & Controls (Rolling 
Meadows, IL: Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation, 1999), p. 16).
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14.12 This method of encrypting and decrypting messages means the private 
keys do not have to be distributed securely. In addition, it is possible for Alice to 
place her public key in a public database. The protocol then looks like this:
Bob goes to the database and obtains Alice’s public key.Bob writes Alice a message and uses her public key to encrypt the 
message. Bob then sends the message to her.
Alice decrypts the message using her private key upon receipt.
14.13 There are problems in relation to the methods by which an individual 
creates and controls their own keys.7 An interceptor may intend to disrupt 
Alice’s life by interrupting her ability to receive and send encrypted messages. It is possible for an interceptor to intercept, modify, delete and substitute a false 
message between the parties. Such an attack cannot be solved by the use of 
cryptography. This is how such an attack can work:
Alice sends her public key to Bob. Eve intercepts this key. Eve then 
sends her key to Bob.
Bob sends his public key to Alice. Again, Eve intercepts this key and 
sends her key to Alice.When Alice sends a message to Bob, she encrypts it using what 
she thinks is Bob’s public key. Eve intercepts this message and 
decrypts it with her private key. Having carried out whatever action she intends with the message, she then re-encrypts it with 
Bob’s public key and sends it on to Bob.
The same process occurs when Bob sends a message to Alice.
Authenticating a signature using public key cryptography
14.14 The underlying rationale of public key cryptography is that a message can 
be attributed to a particular entity. First, Alice can use a key generation algorithm 
to generate a key pair: a private signing key and the public signature verification 
key, or she can use her existing key pair. She then publishes her public key on a 
database. Thereafter the example continues:Alice writes a message and wants to send it to Bob with her digital 
signature. The software on her computer computes a digital 
signature from her private key and the content of the message.
Alice sends her message and the digital signature to Bob. The signature may be, but does not need to be, separate from the 
7 In Maughan v. Wilmot [2016] EWHC 29 (Fam), 2016 WL 2394, the husband created his 
own digital signature to attach to emails.
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message.8 The signature operates in the same way as a message 
authentication code.
Upon receipt of the message, Bob uses Alice’s public key to verify 
that the corresponding private key signed the message.
14.15 However, given this scenario, it is generally noted in the technical literature that Bob cannot be sure that the public key in the database is that of 
Alice. This means this mechanism does not resolve the issue of identifying the 
sender of the message. A person could generate their own public and private 
keys, post the public key on a database and claim it belongs to Alice. Bob might think he is sending messages to Alice, but in fact his message might posted to an 
interceptor. In addition, the interceptor could use their own private key to send 
messages to Bob, which he would assume came from Alice. There is further a problem with this method of adding a signature to a message, which in turn is inherent in any system that uses cryptography in the electronic environment to 
create a signature. The signature is not computed by Alice, but by the software 
on her computer. Thus there is no direct evidence to show Alice appended the 
signature to the message. This is, naturally, an identical problem with all forms of electronic signature and communication over networked communications – for 
instance, the same point can be made about the origin of an email. The recipient cannot be certain that an email comes from the purported source, yet the vast 
majority of emails that are sent and received are trusted. This is because the correspondents either know each other in the physical world, or even if they have not met, then they become familiar with each other in the virtual world by way of an exchange of correspondence and other signs, such as looking at websites and asking others that are trusted to indicate whether the person they 
have yet to meet is indeed the person they claim to be.
Public key infrastructure
14.16 The concept of the public key infrastructure tries to resolve the problem 
by linking a public key to a named individual or legal entity.9 The notion behind a public key infrastructure is to have organizations called trusted intermediaries, 
trusted third parties, trust service providers or certification authorities 
(‘Certificate Authority’), that act to certify the connection between a person and 
8 This can be important, for which see N. Bohm, ‘Watch what you sign!’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006), pp. 45–9.
9 R.J. Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems 
(2nd edn, Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2008), at 21.4.5.7 notes there is some confusion 
between ‘public (key infrastructure)’ and ‘(public key) infrastructure’. He defines the first as an open system where the infrastructure can be used by any new application that is 
subsequently developed. He calls this open public key infrastructure. New applications 
cannot be used in the second, which he calls a closed public key infrastructure. For the 
flaws in PKI, see C. Ellison, ‘Improvements on conventional PKI wisdom’, Proceedings of 
the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop (Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2002), available online at 
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/.
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their public key. In theory, the trusted third party guarantees the authenticity of 
the public key by issuing an individual identity certificate (usually abbreviated 
to ‘certificate’), which binds a name string to a public key. This in turn seeks to create a link between the provision of a key and the identity of the natural person 
or legal entity to which the key has been issued. It should be emphasized that users, when using a public key infrastructure, should aim to continue to generate 
their own key pairs. Where a third party generates the key pair on behalf of a 
user, the degree of security exercised over the key pair is reduced.
14.17 The certification authority issues an individual identity certificate, which 
includes the following characteristics: data identifying the certification authority; 
data identifying the subscriber that includes the subscriber’s public key, and it 
is signed with the Certification Authority’s private key. The individual identity 
certificate may also contain other information, such as the level of inquiry carried 
out before issuing the certificate.
14.18 To acquire such a certificate, Alice will provide the certification authority 
with a copy of her public key and proof of her identity. The degree of proof of 
identity will differ, depending on the level of liability Alice wants to cover. When 
Alice sends a message to Bob, she also sends him a copy of her certificate. 
Alternatively, when she publishes her verification key, she publishes the 
certificate. The software on Bob’s computer will decrypt the message according 
to the key he has been given. It will then be for Bob in most circumstances to 
undertake his own due diligence, perhaps by checking the certificate revocation list to ensure the public key has not been revoked or has expired, or sending 
an email to Alice (or contacting her by telephone) to confirm that she sent the 
communication. If Bob does not act to verify the information contained in the 
certificate, but contacts Alice directly, his due diligence will not involve the 
organization that issues the certificate.
Difficulties with public key infrastructure
14.19 The purported advantage to the relying party of using the ‘standard 
model’ public key infrastructure digital signature is not that the signature provides greater security, but arises from persuading the subscribing party that because it is apparently more secure, the user takes responsibility for every use 
of the private key, by whomsoever made. It must be emphasized that the greater security of the mechanism does not necessarily offer the subscribing party any 
protection against attacks. The key might be stolen, or the software might sign 
something other than what is presented on the screen. The industry implies that 
the system has a ‘non-repudiation’ property, and it is this property that justifies 
the imposition of a non-repudiation term on the subscribing party. This cannot be right, because if the system genuinely possessed a non-repudiation property, 
it would not be necessary to impose such a term. Given that digital signatures in a public key infrastructure do not possess such a property, and the inability 
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to create false digital signatures is based on complex theoretic assumptions,10 the acceptance of such a term invariably involves an acceptance of risk by the 
user. However, the nature and extent of the risk is not made clear, and it is highly improbable that ordinary users will have the knowledge, skills and resources to 
manage such a risk.11
Authenticating the sender
14.20 There are various methods of obtaining sufficient evidence to demonstrate, with a degree of probability, that an electronic signature came from the person 
it purports to have been sent by. The aim is to gather sufficient evidence to be 
assured that the person sending the signature is the person they claim. Attempts are made, using various mechanisms, to obtain information from a combination of the following:12
Proof by knowledge: what the person knows.
Proof by possession: what the person owns.
Proof by characteristics: what the person is.
14.21 When combined, the techniques relating to authentication can provide 
a higher level of authentication than a single method. In many instances, the method by which a person seeks to authenticate themselves is by a combination 
of hardware and software. A software component can retrieve and verify 
passwords. A token, such as a smart card, can be placed in a slot in a computer or 
in a separate ‘reader’. Stewart Brymer and James Ness have reassured solicitors in Scotland about the trust to be put into such readers:13
Can I trust it?
Linked to the move from a ‘wet signature’ is the issue of trust. How 
can I trust or interrogate the authenticity of a digital signature? 
10 B. Pfitzmann, ‘Fail-stop signatures: principles and applications’, in Proceedings of the 
Eighth World Conference on Computer Security, Audit and Control (New York: Elsevier, 
1991), pp. 125–34; B. Pfitzmann, Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail-
Stop Signatures (Berlin: Springer, 1996).11 A. Jøsang and B. AlFayyadh, ‘Robust WYSIWYS: a method for ensuring that what you see 
is what you sign’, in L. Brankovic and M. Miller (eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth Australasian 
Conference on Information security – Volume 81 (Australian Computer Society, 2008), 
pp. 53–8; Bohm, ‘Watch what you sign!’; D. Davis, ‘Compliance defects in public-key 
cryptography’, Proceedings of the Sixth USENIX UNIX Security Symposium (San Jose, CA, 
1996).12 For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each, see R.E. Smith, Authentication 
From Passwords to Public Keys (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2002), 1.6.13 S. Brymer and J. Ness, ‘Using your secure digital signature’, The Journal of the Law 
Society of Scotland, 14 March 2016, online at http://www.journalonline.co.uk/
Magazine/61-3/1021468.aspx.
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The real question is – on what basis have you been trusting or 
interrogating the authenticity of wet signatures? The reality is that 
rarely are wet signatures verified in any meaningful way.We trust them because they are presented to us in a context that causes us to believe that they are what they are, set against the background of spending three months negotiating terms we agreed 
on the telephone, confirmed by email and followed up with a paper 
document which reflects those terms. Naturally, we are reasonably 
entitled to trust that the document bears appropriate wet signatures.
The same is true of the Society’s digital signature, but in this case, provided you have the software and card reader installed, 
the signature will automatically declare itself ‘valid’ and you can 
further interrogate the signature by double-clicking it.
14.22 Both are vulnerable to attacks.14
14.23 Identification can also be achieved by using a biometric measurement.
The ideal attributes of a signature in electronic form
14.24 Whether a signature is in manuscript form or electronic form, the purpose 
for affixing the signature will not alter. However, when a signature is in electronic 
format, more considerations will apply to the signature. Whilst it is abundantly clear that a manuscript signature can be forged, or can be transferred from one piece of paper to another,15 or that documents can be altered after they have been 
signed, digital signatures can help to resist attacks of these kinds. The attributes below set out the requirements of a digital signature:
(i) The signature must be authentic. In this respect the method ought, ideally, to provide for the authentication of the origin of the 
data and the integrity of the message.
(ii) Ideally, there ought to be a technical method in place that prevents the person appending the signature to the document from 
14 S. Drimer, S.J. Murdoch and R. Anderson, ‘Optimised to fail: card readers for online 
banking’, in R. Dingledine and P. Golle (eds.), Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 
13th International Conference, FC 2009, Accra Beach, Barbados, February 23–26, 2009 
(Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2009), pp. 184–200; N. Bohm and S. Mason, ‘Identity and its 
verification’ Computer Law & Security Review, 26 (2010), pp. 43–51.15 For examples where the cutting and pasting of manuscript signatures have been upheld in the United States of America, see: Iowa: Ferguson v. Stilwill, 224 N.W.2d 11 (the signature 
of the Illinois Secretary of State, cut from an instrument and attached to a certificate of 
conviction was sufficient in the absence of evidence to show the act of pasting was not 
authorized) (1974); Maine: Richardson v. Bachelder, 19 Me. 82, 1841 WL 932 (Me.), 1 
App. 82 (an attorney affixed the signature of the magistrate, which was physically on a slip of paper, to the writ, the writ was held to be properly issued, the magistrate having 
recognized and adopted it).
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claiming later that they did not sign it. This is virtually impossible 
to achieve in the electronic environment. Care must be taken to distinguish between the degree of probability that a system can be designed to prevent a person from making such a claim, and any suggestion of a presumption that purports to bind the user to a 
signature that is verified.16
(iii) The signature should not be capable of being forged, in that 
the private key is secure.
(iv) Where a signature is added to a message that comprises a legal act, the signature and its link to the relevant document should 
remain verifiable for as long as it is of legal importance.
(v) The signature cannot be re-used.
(vi) The document that has been signed cannot be altered without 
rendering the signature unverifiable.17
14.25 In the digital environment, it is considered technically possible to achieve all of these attributes – in theory,18 but it must be emphasized that the connection between the human and the machine cannot be bridged, and the technology is 
fallible.19 Practical problems, which are discussed below, continue to exist with 
the implementation of a digital signature. However, the essential functions set out above can, largely, be met by the application of cryptography to the formation 
of a digital signature. As with manuscript signatures, there are always risks attached to the use of any form of electronic signature, and the user, whether a sending party or a receiving party, should make themselves aware of the risks 
before using any form of electronic signature for high value transactions.
14.26 There is one further meaning that an electronic signature cannot, 
without education and training, provide. This is the addition of what is termed 
‘social meaning’, or what can also be described as the ‘significance of the act’. A 
ceremony is attached to the signing of a document, and when a person affixes their manuscript signature to a document, the importance of the act is reinforced 
by the physical nature of the act, because ‘People intuitively understand that they 
are legally responsible for the documents to which they attach their autographs’.20 
16 For an analysis of the means by which a computer can be affected by malicious software, 
see D. Bilar, ‘Known knowns, known unknowns and unknown unknowns: anti-virus issues, 
malicious software and internet attacks for non-technical audiences’, Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), pp. 123–31.17 J. Dumortier, P. Van Eecke and I. Anné, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures (Leuven: 
Interdisciplinary Centre for Law & Information Technology, 1998), Report I Part III B, 59; 
B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography (2nd edition, Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 1996), 2.6.18 J. Lopez, R. Oppliger and G. Pernu, ‘Why have public key infrastructures failed so far?’, 
Internet Research, 15 (2005), pp. 544–56.19 A.L. Young and M. Yung, Malicious Cryptography: Exposing Cryptovirology (Indianapolis, 
IN: Wiley, 2004).20 Dumortier, Van Eecke and Anné, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures, p. 77.
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The function of attaching an electronic signature to a document or message is not understood in the same way as the use of manuscript signatures, partly because the signature can be applied to the document without any action by the 
individual to whom the signature is attributed, or without their knowledge.21
Methods of authentication
Authentication using secret codes
14.27 Secret codes or passwords have been used for some time, especially in 
banking. The code usually consists of a combination of digits or characters or 
both. The principle is based on ensuring the code is unique and only known to 
the user and the issuer. There is a shared secret between the two parties. The 
user identifies themselves by using the code, and the issuer, if the code is correct, assumes the person entering a transaction is the person to whom the code is 
assigned.22 Secret codes tend to be most appropriate when used in a closed community, as opposed to the open structure of the internet, because a secret code 
cannot guarantee the identity of the person using the code. However, it should 
be noted that the evidence of a shared secret will not necessarily be sufficient 
to satisfy the relying party that an authorized user used the code. Evidence of 
the procedures and systems used by the relying party will not be sufficient to 
prove to a third party, such as a court, that it was the user that added the code. It is posited that a secret code cannot be considered strictly as a signature, because the use of the code tends only to be used for the single characteristic of authenticating the user,23 but two courts have decided otherwise, with respect, 
correctly, given the facts.24 However, secret codes can be used as additional tools 
in a protocol, such as the generation of a key. The aim in generating a key is to be as unpredictable as possible, and one method of initiating the generation process 
is to use a secret key, such as a password. Another way of generating a key would 
be to use a pseudo-random number generator.
21 E.Y. Chou, ‘Paperless and soulless: e-signatures diminish the signer’s presence and 
decrease acceptance’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6 (2015), pp. 343–51.22 Thieves have successfully infiltrated a number of banks across the world to steal significant 
sums of money, for which see ‘SWIFT attackers’ malware linked to more financial attacks’, 
Symantec Security Response, 26 May 2016 at http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/
swift-attackers-malware-linked-more-financial-attacks; one legal action has already been 
initiated before the United States District Court, Southern District of New York: Banco del 
Austro, S.A., v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Case No. 1:16-cv-00628 (LAK).23 Anderson, Security Engineering, 10.4 for a study of the problems relating to ATMs; Dumortier, Van Eecke and Anné, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures, pp. 60–3.24 Standard Bank London Ltd v. Bank of Tokyo Ltd [1995] CLC 496; [1996] 1 C.T.L.R. T-17 and Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v. Banco Ambrosiano Veneto SpA [2003] 1 SLR 
221, where a message using an authentication code sent through the SWIFT (Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system has the legal effect of binding the sender bank according to its contents, and where a recipient bank undertakes further 
checks on credit standing or other aspects, it does not detract from this proposition.
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Authentication using biometric measurements
14.28 Using a biometric measurement is the method by which it is possible to 
authenticate an individual through the measurement of physical characteristics. A biometric measurement has the ability to identify a person because the image is 
reduced to digital format. Such a measurement represents a unique characteristic 
of that individual, but it cannot be a secret. Human characteristics comprise a number of attributes, some of which lend themselves to being measured:
(i) Appearance, such as height, weight, colour of skin, hair and eyes, 
visible physical markings, gender, facial hair, wearing of spectacles.
(ii) Social behavioural traits, including voice recognition, style of 
speech, visible handicaps.
(iii) Natural physiography, such as iris patterns, retinal scan, 
fingerprint or thumbprint verification, capillary patterns in earlobes, two or three dimensional facial recognition, vein check 
and hand geometry, DNA patterns.
(iv) Bio-dynamics, such as signature verification and the dynamics 
when using the keys on a keyboard.25
14.29 There are significant difficulties with the use of biometric measurements, including the range of tolerances to reduce false negatives and increase false 
positives, or vice versa. The manufacturer of the device usually sets the tolerances, 
and a great many devices do not work as claimed.26 The most prominent biometric system presently used to authenticate an individual is the recognition of their 
fingerprints, although voice recognition and facial recognition systems are in use 
– such as in passports in airports. To offer an outline of some of the issues, if a 
face recognition system is installed, the purpose of the installation is important. If it is to help recognise terrorists in airports, then biometric measurements need 
to be obtained of those terrorists that the authorities wish to identify. Unless a photograph exists of the person, then one must call into question the expense 
of installing such a system. A further problem relates to the accuracy of the 
software. In the unlikely event that the software is accurate to 90 per cent, one in 
ten people will be identified incorrectly as a terrorist.
14.30 Fingerprints Most fingerprint systems use optical or capacitive sensors 
for capturing the details of a fingerprint, such as branching and end points of 
the ridges. An optical sensor detects differences in reflection, whilst capacitive 
sensors detect differences in capacitance. Other systems use thermal sensors 
and ultrasound sensors. The process can be described thus: the image of the 
fingerprint is captured, features are then extracted from the image, and they are 
stored as templates on a database. Some systems encrypt templates and only 
25 Anderson, Security Engineering, ch. 15.26 Anderson, Security Engineering, ch. 15.
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manage the compressed images. Although widely used, there are problems 
associated with fingerprint scanners. Such systems can be undermined in a number of ways:
(i) A person can be forced to press their finger against a scanner 
by a criminal.
(ii) An impostor can use their own fingerprint and challenge the 
false rejection rate and false acceptance rate. Fingerprints tend 
to be categorized as ‘loops’, ‘whorls’ and ‘arches’, amongst other 
descriptions. If the impostor knows the category of the registered 
fingerprint and has a pattern similar to that of the registered one, there is a possibility that the scanner may not reject the false 
fingerprint.
(iii) A person may have their finger cut off, so a criminal can use 
the severed finger to defeat the scanning device.27 This can be 
avoided where a device also gauges the temperature of the finger.
(iv) The use of an artificial clone of the original fingerprint, 
where a fingerprint is copied by making a mould of the registered 
fingerprint, which is cheap to replicate and seems to be effective 
against many fingerprint devices.28
(v) Other attacks will work, depending on the nature of the 
fingerprint system, such as making a noise or flashing a light 
against the scanner. Other techniques that can cause the scanner to stop working within the tolerances to the environment include heating up, cooling down, changing the humidity, and hitting or 
causing the scanner to vibrate.
14.31 Regardless of how easy it may be to defeat fingerprint reading systems, they seem to be most effective when used as a deterrence factor, especially in 
27 Biometric ATMs are now widespread in India: thumbprints are scanned to enable a 
customer to obtain access to their account. Whether customers have had their thumbs cut 
off by thieves is not known: J. Leahy, ‘Citigroup gives Indian poor a hand with thumbprint 
ATMs,’ Financial Times, 2–3 December, 2006, p. 15. See the example of Mr Kumaran, who 
had the tip of his index finger chopped off by thieves because the security system installed 
in his S-Class Mercedes Benz utilized the measurements of both the index fingers and 
thumbs of the owner. The immobiliser system caused the engine in the vehicle to cut out 
after a few minutes unless the owner pressed their finger or thumb on to the sensor (J. 
Kent, ‘Malaysia car thieves steal finger’, BBC News Kuala Lumpur, 31 March 2005, available 
online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4396831.stm).28 T. Matsumoto, H. Matsumoto, K. Yamada and S. Hoshino, ‘Impact of artificial “gummy” 
fingers on fingerprint systems’, paper prepared for Proceedings of SPIE Vol 4677 Optical Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques IV, 24–25 January 2002, available online 
at http://cryptome.org/gummy.htm; note the comments on tests run by others as a result of this research in Anderson, Security Engineering, 15.5; see also D. Chek Ling Ngo, A. Beng 
Jin Teoh and J. Hu (eds.), Biometric Security (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2015).
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reducing false claims by people on state benefits.29
14.32 In summary, it is possible to use a measurement of a biometric characteristic to authenticate an individual, but the use of such a measurement can only be used 
effectively in a closed system. There are many problems associated with the use 
of biometric measurements in an open system that have yet to be resolved. For instance, where a document is authenticated using a biometric measurement, the person relying on the measurement to authenticate the document will 
need to check the data against a database of biometric measurements. Unless there was such a depository in an open user community, the relying party will 
not be able to verify the source of the biometric measurement. Further, where human characteristics are reduced to digital form by a biometric system, the 
system becomes susceptible to being deceived by the ‘replay’ of the relevant numerical information, even without the presence of the individual, unless 
the system as a whole can successfully be made secure against such an attack. 
Securing a database of biometric measurements is difficult to achieve in practice 
in distributed systems. A significant disadvantage of biometric measurements is the ease by which the measurement can be replicated by third parties for ulterior 
motives. Thus if biometric measurements are to be used, they can only be used 
effectively if they can prove two things: first, that the measurement actually was 
taken from the identified person at the time the measurement was taken, and 
second, that the measurement matches the data stored in the database.
Types of infrastructure for asymmetric cryptographic 
systems
14.33 There are, in broad terms, two types of infrastructure that provide for 
the signing of electronic documents by means of a digital signature: Pretty Good 
Privacy (PGP) software, and public key cryptography. The discussion in this chapter will focus on the issues relating to the provision of key pairs that are 
provided and maintained by commercial organizations. However, it is to be noted 
that key pairs generated and used by individuals using PGP will also be subject to 
many of the issues discussed in this chapter.
14.34 The type of structure will affect the nature and extent of the legal liability 
that participants are exposed to. This in turn will determine how participants 
manage their legal liability. The two categories are:
(i) A closed environment, where there is only one domain for all 
communications. This domain can be located in a single place for a single enterprise, or comprise a collection of enterprises, each of which operate under the same set of technical and operational 
procedures. One example may be a multi-national company that operates in several jurisdictions and maintains an intra-company 
domain across the world. Another example may be a group of end 
29 Anderson, Security Engineering, 15.9.
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users (both sending and receiving parties) that enter a network 
with one or more certification authorities by which liability is allocated according to agreed contractual terms between the 
parties. IdenTrust and Bolero are examples.30
(ii) An open environment, where a sender enters into an agreement 
with a certification authority to provide a certificate for a 
verification key, and where the receiving parties are not known by 
either the sending party or certification authority in advance. The 
role of trusted third parties, also called certification authorities, 
is to provide certificates that link the identity of the owner to 
the public key. These bodies can be public or private, licensed or 
unlicensed. Whether a certification authority is in the hands of a public or private body, and whether is it licensed or unlicensed, it 
must be trustworthy.
Management of the key and certificate
14.35 The foundation of the public key infrastructure rests on asymmetric 
cryptography, with a public and private key pair. The public key is usually 
distributed in the form of a certificate, whilst the private key is a separate item with its own distinct structure that should be protected from being disclosed 
to unauthorized third parties when in it is transported, used and stored. Once a person subscribes to a digital signature, a range of issues that are referred to 
as life-cycle management, amongst other terms, must be addressed. Regardless of the name given to the process, procedures and processes must be in place to 
create the certificate and key pair, verify the identity of the applicant, distribute 
the certificate and cancel the certificate at the end of its period of validity or 
before, should it be compromised. The quality of software, design of the network 
and management of the security system all affect the way the keys and certificate 
are managed and stored. This is important, because a digital signature is not 
computed by the user, but by software. The software on a computer will carry out the task on the instructions of a user, but the software is not in a position to identify whether the instructions come from a legitimate user or the signals from unauthorized malicious software that has successfully embedded itself in 
the user’s computer.
Identifying an applicant
14.36 It should be recalled that an individual could generate their own public 
and private key pair, using software on their computer. The individual then 
provides the certification authority with evidence of their identity. The type of evidence and degree of proof will depend on the nature of the type of certifying 
certificate required. In any event, the identity of the person or entity must be 
30 IdenTrust: http://www.identrust.com, Bolero: http://www.bolero.net.
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bound to the public key. When confirming the identity of a person or legal entity, 
a certification authority will tend to be expected to comply with the requirements 
from a recognized body.31
The certificate
14.37 When the certification authority has verified the identity of the individual 
or entity to their satisfaction, they will issue a certificate. This is a software record 
that affirms the connection of a public key to an identified person or corporate 
entity. It does not follow that a certification authority will undertake this task. 
There are a number of reasons for this. First, the cost of developing a suitable 
administrative infrastructure with the relevant expertise will be expensive. It may 
not, therefore, be possible to justify the cost in commercial terms. Second, there are a number of organizations that already have the relevant expertise, such as banks 
and credit reference agencies. Whilst the database these organizations use may be imperfect, nevertheless it makes sound economic sense not to replicate a service 
that already exists. This usually means there is an added layer of contact where a 
certification authority issues a certificate. First, the registration authority will take 
steps to verify the identity of the person or legal entity seeking a certificate. Upon 
confirmation of identity by the registration authority, the certification authority 
will then issue a certificate. Thus an additional layer of complexity is added to the 
mix surrounding the link between the person or legal entity seeking a certificate 
and the subsequent granting of the certificate. The next point to ponder is the entity 
that generates the registration authority’s key. Whoever generates the registration 
authority’s key will also be involved in the contractual matrix. In all probability, 
a contractual relationship will exist between the certification authority and the registration authority, and the contract will provide for the liability and warranties 
between each entity. Where liability will fall in the event of a dispute will depend 
on the particular circumstances of the case.
The generation of the key pair belonging to the subscribing party
14.38 It is good practice for the subscribing party to generate their own key pair. Where the subscribing party generates a key pair, there is, theoretically, less of 
a risk of the private key being compromised. However, many subscribing parties 
will not have the software to generate their own key pair. This means a third party 
will be requested to generate a key pair on their behalf. There are two aspects to 
this that demonstrate a level of vulnerability that may be undesirable. The party generating the key pair will have to be trusted not to compromise the key, and the key pair will be vulnerable to attack or compromise when transported to the 
user.32
31 For an overview, see Piper, Blake-Wilson and Mitchell, Digital Signatures, ch. 5 and Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Part II.32 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, pp. 92–4; F. Piper and S. Murphy, Cryptography: 
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 109–10.
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Validating the public key
14.39 Either the certification authority or the registration authority should carry out checks that the public key is actually that of the applicant, and that the 
applicant has the corresponding private key. The check is simple: it needs to be 
determined whether the subscriber can make a signature that can be verified by 
the public key. If carried out, such a check can protect both the subscribing party and the authority that undertakes the task, because it can ensure the subscribing party has submitted the correct key and the authority can demonstrate it undertook care to investigate and verify for itself that the public key was that of 
the applicant, thus making sure it did not certify an incorrect or invalid key.
Distributing the certificate
14.40 Once the certification authority has created a certificate, it is important for both the authority and the subscribing party to ensure the content of the 
certificate is accurate and relates to the correct entity. The certificate is usually 
sent electronically, which can present difficulties:
(i) Where the subscribing party signs to acknowledge receipt of 
the certificate, they will not necessarily agree its content. Where 
a certificate has been created by an impostor, evidence of receipt 
will be just that: evidence that the certificate was received. In an ideal world, the subscribing party should be required to indicate 
they received and accept the content of the certificate by using 
another certified signing key.
(ii) Before the certificate is issued, the certificate authority must decide whether to wait until it has received acceptance from the subscribing party by which the subscribing party acknowledges 
receipt of the certificate before it is delivered, or to issue the 
certificate and ask for a receipt. If the subscribing party does not 
send a receipt to the certification authority, then the certificate 
may have to be revoked immediately.33
14.41 It becomes clear that certification authorities must produce security 
policies that deal with some, if not all, of these issues. They should be made publicly available, and may well be incorporated into any contract that is formed between 
the certification authority and the subscribing party. Two types of document are 
often created: a certificate policy and a certificate practice statement. The names of these documents will differ between authorities, as will the division between them 
of their subject matter. Audit trails are also important to check that the methods 
and procedures that control the process function correctly. Such audit trails must 
be secure and, ideally, be capable of being verified by an independent third party.34
33 Piper, Blake-Wilson and Mitchell, Digital Signatures, pp. 36–7.34 Piper, Blake-Wilson and Mitchell, Digital Signatures, pp. 36–7; Adams and Lloyd, 
Understanding PKI Concepts, p. 96.
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Distributing certification authority keys
14.42 Individuals or entities wishing to use the public keys of different 
organizations or individuals may well have to visit each certificate authority to 
obtain the relevant public key. To help reduce the effort that is required to do 
this, certificate authorities may cross-certify the public keys of other certification 
authorities. There are two types of cross-certification:
(i) Where two certification authorities are part of the same domain. 
For instance, there are two levels within a given certification 
authority – the higher level may certify the lower level. This is 
called intradomain cross-certification.
(ii) Where certification authorities are different entities, the 
process is called interdomain cross-certification.
14.43 Cross-certification can occur in two ways. One certification authority can 
cross-certify another unilaterally. Alternatively, two certification authorities can 
undertake a mutual cross-certification exercise. A cross-certificate can be issued 
to a certification authority, or a certification authority can issue it. The process 
of cross-certification is where a certificate authority gives copies of its keys to 
another certification authority. This is achieved either by handing over the key 
or by issuing special ‘authority certificates’, the purpose of which is to bind each 
certificate authority to its public key.
14.44 A further mechanism is to have a hierarchy of certification authorities, 
where higher-level authorities certify low-level authorities. In this case, the 
prospective user needs to verify the highest level certificate first, usually called a 
root certification authority, then to check the trail and validity of every authority 
certificate that leads to the certificate the user wants to trust or use.35 On a final note, when a person buys a computer with software already installed, there are 
a number of certificates already installed in their browsers. As a result, the user, 
without realising it, ‘trusts’ whoever uploaded the software to the computer to 
include appropriate authorities’ certificates.36 The certificates can be deleted, 
and new ones added if the user knows how to do this. If the user does not update 
their browser, the certificates will eventually expire and produce sometimes 
rather obscure error messages when signatures are verified. In addition, unless 
the user is aware of the complexities of the hierarchy of certification authorities, 
it is possible for a malicious party to insert a fraudulent certificate into chain of 
certificates, and appear to be trusted.37
35 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, pp. 132–45 for a detailed discussion; Piper, Blake-Wilson and Mitchell, Digital Signatures, pp. 37–8.36 S. Mason and T.S. Reiniger, ‘“Trust” between machines? Establishing identity between 
humans and software code, or whether you know it is a dog, and if so, which dog?’, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 21 (2015), pp. 135–48.37 N. Ferguson, B. Schneier and T. Kohno, Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and 
Practical Applications (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2010), 18.3.1 for an example of where a software fault had the capacity to undermine the security of an entire system; for 
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Revocation of a certificate
14.45 The certificate is used to bind the name of a person or entity with their 
public key. However, just as with physical seals, there may be many reasons for 
revoking a certificate (or seal) before the expiry date. In the past, the owner of the seal would put notices up in such public places as churches and markets, warning 
people not to reply on the seal.38 In the digital age, such notices are placed over 
the internet. The reasons for revoking a certificate include, but are not limited to:
(i) The user is aware that the private key corresponding to the 
certificate has been lost or compromised.
(ii) The certificate holder asks for the certificate to be revoked.
(iii) The certification authority revokes a certificate where the 
holder breaches a term of the agreement.
(iv) Where the certificate was issued in error.
14.46 There are a range of technical solutions to providing public knowledge of 
certificates that have been revoked, but the most well-known is the certificate 
revocation list.39 A certification revocation list is a signed data structure that 
contains a list of those certificates that have been revoked. Where a list exists, there are a number of important issues that must be addressed:
(i) The difference in time between the command to revoke the 
certificate and the last time the certificate was used.
(ii) The reliability of the revocation procedure; in other words, 
whether it can be relied upon to provide a definitive answer that can 
be trusted (in addition, the accuracy of the clocks that determine 
the time the revocation was actually uploaded to the certification 
revocation list – whether it was the certification authority time or the relying party time, and at whose risk – consider the possibility that the relying party deliberately sets their clock at a different 
time, for instance to Greenwich Mean Time or British Standard 
Time, to confuse the evidence).
(iii) The number of revocation commands that the revocation 
system can handle at any one time.40
examples, especially Secure Socket Lawyer (SSL) certificates, see http://wiki.cacert.org/Risk/History; Carbanak APT: The Great Bank Robbery (v 2.1, Kaspersky, 2015), online 
at http://25zbkz3k00wn2tp5092n6di7b5k.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/files/2015/02/
Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf.38 As described by Wills J in The Staple of England v. The Governor and Company of the Bank 
of England (1888) 21 QBD 160 at 167.39 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, pp. 107–26.40 Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno, Cryptography Engineering, 19.8.
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14.47 If a certification authority does not have a revocation list, the person 
seeking to determine whether to rely on a certificate needs to know how they 
can establish whether a key has been revoked or compromised.
Expiry of keys
14.48 Certificates have a fixed period of validity, in the same way that a royal 
seal matrix had, and they expire in due course. One technical question relates 
to how the life of the key is computed. Ellison and Schneier contend that the 
key has a ‘theft lifetime’ as a function of the vulnerability of the sub-system that 
stores the key. Other factors that also should be taken into account include the threat of physical and network exposure to attacks and how attractive the key is 
to an attacker.41 There are three options available when a certificate expires: (i) 
no action is taken; (ii) the certificate is renewed and the same public key is placed 
into a new certificate with a new period of validity, (iii) a new pair of public and 
private keys are generated and a new certificate is generated to provide for a 
certificate update.42
The duties of a user 
14.49 There are a number of points that people or organizations that use private 
keys should be aware of, as set out below.
14.50 Management of private keys The user must manage their private keys effectively and take measures that are appropriate to prevent the unauthorized use of the keys, and to protect them securely against any other form of attack, such as theft or misuse by a third party that gains access to the system by way 
of malicious software or other method. This duty is often included in electronic 
signature legislation.
14.51 Storage of private keys after expiry When deciding whether to use private keys, their use should be carefully monitored, because different types 
of algorithm are used for different purposes. Thus in the United Kingdom, consideration must be given to the possibility that a private key may be the subject of a s49 notice under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
and the safe storage of keys that have expired.
14.52 Disposal of equipment with private keys Particular care should 
be taken when disposing of the hardware that contains the private keys. For instance, in the European Union, the Directive on waste electrical and electronic 
41 C. Ellison and B. Schneier, ‘Ten risks of PKI: what you’re not being told about public key 
infrastructure’, Computer Security Journal, 16 (2006), p. 6, available at https://www.
schneier.com/cryptography/paperfiles/paper-pki.pdf.42 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, pp. 101–2. 
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equipment requires all electrical and electronic equipment to be reused, recycled 
and subject to any other form of recovery to reduce the disposal of waste.43
Internal management
14.53 The internal management of a certification authority, which the individual 
user may not be familiar with, can affect the trust to be placed in the certificates 
issued. Such issues include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) The level and extent of the checks made on employees.
(ii) How to verify the identity of the employees that control the 
keys.
(iii) Policies on how keys are stored.
(iv) The mechanisms in place to verify that the relevant policies 
are followed.
(v) Whether the internal management of the certificate system is 
properly carried out.
(vi) The level and extent of any insurance cover may also have a 
bearing on the suitability of different types of certificate issued.
Barriers to the use of the public key infrastructure
14.54 There are a variety of problems that affect those vendors that purvey 
digital signature services. For an industry in its infancy, perhaps this is 
to be expected. However, given the extent to which government and non-governmental agencies attempt to reach universal standards of various kinds, 
it does seem somewhat bizarre that some of the problems even exist. For instance:
(i) There is no standard in the industry relating to the provision 
of a directory service. A number of models exist and competing standards are under consideration, as well as the development of 
proprietary solutions.
(ii) Vendors do not implement some functions, and when they are implemented, they may be implemented in a different manner 
43 Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 
on waste electrical and electronic equipment OJ L 37 13.3.2003, p. 24; Directive 2003/108/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 December 2003 amending Directive 
2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), OJ L345, 31.12.2003, 
p. 106–107; Directive 2008/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 amending Directive 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE), as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission, 
OJ L81, 20.3.2008, pp. 65–6.
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to another vendor. This leads to problems with interoperability 
between the systems of different vendors.44
(iii) The performance of the repository service where the certificate 
revocation lists is held may be a problem. At present there are a limited number of vendors that operate a public key infrastructure, and the numbers of people using those that are available are in the 
minority. Whether the systems in place are capable of expanding 
with greater use in the future is open to debate.
(iv) The number of people that have any knowledge of public key 
cryptography is small. The numbers of personnel required are not limited to administrative personnel, but include people in senior positions that can develop the relevant policy documents, such as 
certification practice statements and interdomain interoperability 
agreements. The public key infrastructure strategy must also be 
considered and documented.45
14.55 In addition, there are weaknesses that can affect the use of the signature, 
such as that the data to be signed can be modified; a personal identity number 
can be obtained; the person affixing a signature might sign different data than intended, and an attacker can interfere with the software code as it communicated between component parts: in essence, the signatory has to trust the writer of the 
software that it will work as intended.46
What a public key infrastructure can and cannot do
14.56 Depending on how it is used, a public key infrastructure has its uses.47 However, it is very important to be clear about what a digital signature can and 
cannot do.
What a digital signature is capable of doing
14.57 The uses to which cryptography can be put within a public key infrastructure include demonstrating the integrity of the message and providing 
for the confidentiality of a document, although using digital signatures within 
44 P. Krawczyk, ‘When the EU qualified electronic signature becomes an information services 
preventer’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), pp. 7–18.45 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, ch. 25.46 A. Spalka, A.B. Cremers and H. Langweg, ‘Trojan horse attacks on software for electronic 
signatures’, Informatica, 26 (2002), pp. 191–204; H. Langweg, Malware Attacks 
on Electronic Signatures Revisited (2006) available at ftp://ftp.cryptopro.ru/pub/
TrustedPass/110519/Theory/_hanno_research_gi06p.pdf.47 Ferguson, Schneier and Kohno, Cryptography Engineering, at 19.9, ‘So what is a PKI good 
for?’, the authors conclude that ‘there are few advantages to PKIs’.
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a public key infrastructure will not act to correct human behaviour.48 At best, 
a public key infrastructure provides encryption, not the process of signing. A digital signature only authenticates that a certain private key was used to create 
the relevant digital signature.
What no form electronic signature is capable of doing
14.58 A digital signature can provide for the authenticity of information. It binds 
key pairs with names. The recipient of a message or document with which a digital 
signature is associated can confirm the binding of the verification key with the 
name of the person whose private key has been used. But the recipient cannot determine whether the sending party authorized the use of the digital signature: 
this is also true of any other form of electronic signature. The private key of a 
digital signature is protected by a password or passphrase. The most important point to be aware of is this: the private key of a digital signature is only as good as 
the password that protects it. This means that when the password is inserted into a computer to provide access to the private key of a digital signature, it proves any of the following:
(i) The person to whom the private key was issued might have been the person that inserted this information into the software, and therefore the recipient can infer that the private key of the digital signature is capable of proving that the person to whom the private key was issued was physically at the keyboard at the time of the session; or
(ii) a person (perhaps the owner of the private key or her secretary) instructed the software to retain the password information in the 
computer memory, so that any person (whether they were sitting 
in front of the computer or whether they obtained control of the 
computer remotely) that obtains access to the private key can use the password, which in turn does not prove that the person to whom the private key was issued is physically at the keyboard 
at the time of the session (the recipient of the correspondence is not to know whether it was the person whose key it was, or her 
secretary, or an impostor), although it can be concluded that the 
48 Davis, ‘Compliance defects in public-key cryptography’, paragraph 1; Adams and Lloyd, 
Understanding PKI Concepts, ch. 14 for a useful and more detailed discussion; B. Reynis 
and U. Bechini, ‘European civil law notaries ready to launch international digital deeds’, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007), pp. 14–18; J. Decker, ‘The 
e-notarization initiative, Pennsylvania, USA’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 5 (2008), pp. 73–7; T.S. Reiniger, ‘The proposed international e-identity assurance 
standard for electronic notarization’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 
5 (2008), pp. 78–80; this article is followed by the text of ‘The draft International Electronic 
Notarization Assurance Standard’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 
(2008), pp. 81–97.
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use of the password proved the computer stored this information; or
(iii) that a person (whoever they may be) who used the password, 
actually knew the password.
14.59 The recipient relies on one small item to persuade it that the sender is the person whom they claim to be: the password that enables the sender to 
cause a computer to affix the private key of a digital signature to the document. In reality, the reliance rests on the quality of the digital evidence49 that ties a presumed identity to a presumed act, and in turn the integrity of the password, the software code and the security in place to protect the password and private 
key. The problems with passwords are so well-known that Dan Geer merely stated the obvious in a talk at the UNC Charlotte Cyber Security Symposium in 2013:50 ‘Everyone in this room knows how and why passwords are a problem’.
14.60 It is generally recognized that the password is an exceedingly weak 
mechanism, as indicated by P. C. van Oorschot and Julie Thorpe:51
49 Bearing in mind that computers and networks are not secure, for which see in the legal 
context, R.R. Jueneman and R.J. Robertson, Jr., ‘Biometrics and digital signatures in 
electronic commerce’, Jurimetrics Journal, 38 (2008), pp. 427–57; note also the further 
technical problems in P. Švéda and V. Matyáš Jr., ‘Digital signatures and electronic 
documents: a cautionary tale revisited’, Upgrade, 5 (2004), pp. 35–45.50 D. Geer, ‘Tradeoffs in cyber security’, a talk at the UNC Charlotte Cyber Security Symposium 
(2013), 9 October 2013, available at http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt; see also J. 
Bonneau and E. Shutova, ‘Linguistic properties of multi-word passphrases’, in J. Blythe 
(ed.), Financial Cryptography and Data Security Volume 7398 (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 
2012), pp. 1–12; J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P.C. van Oorschot and F. Stajano, The quest to 
replace passwords: a framework for comparative evaluation of Web authentication schemes 
(University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory Technical Report 817, 2012), available at 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-817.pdf; D. Goodwin, ‘Anatomy of 
a hack: How crackers ransack passwords like “qeadzcwrsfxv1331”’, arstechnica, 21 May 
2013, at http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/05/how-crackers-make-minced-meat-
out-of-your-passwords/; A. Belenko and D. Sklyarov, ‘“Secure password managers” and 
“military-grade encryption” on smartphones: oh, really?’, (n.d.), available at http://www.
elcomsoft.co.uk/WP/BH-EU-2012-WP.pdf.51 P.C. van Oorschot and J. Thorpe, ‘On the security of graphical password schemes’, 
available online at https://scs.carleton.ca/sites/default/files/tr/TR-05-11.pdf. There is a considerable amount of material on this topic, together with the associated subject 
of memory and the human need to write down complex passwords (which could have a bearing on whether a human can be made liable for writing down passwords that the 
vendor or bank insists must be long and difficult to remember), for which see the following 
short list of more recent references, all of which in turn refer to other sources: K. Helkala 
and N. Kalstad Svendsen, ‘The security and memorability of passwords generated by 
using an association element and a personal factor’, in P. Laund (ed.), Information Security 
Technology for Application (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7161, Berlin/Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2012), pp. 114–30; J. Bonneau, Guessing human-chosen secrets (University of 
Cambridge Computer Laboratory Technical Report 819, 2012); J. Bonneau and S. Preibusch, 
‘The password thicket: technical and market failures in human authentication on the web’, 
Ninth Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2010), available from 
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The ubiquitous use of textual passwords for user authentication has a well-known weakness: users tend to choose passwords with predictable characteristics, related to how easy they are to 
remember. This often means passwords which have ‘meaning’ 
to the user. Unfortunately, many of these ‘higher probability’ 
passwords fall into a tiny subset of the full password space. 
Although its boundaries vary depending on its exact definition and the probabilities involved, we refer to this smaller subset as the 
probable password space.Ideally, users would choose passwords equi-probably from a large subset of the overall password space, to increase the cost 
of a dictionary attack, i.e., a brute-force guessing attack involving 
candidate guesses from a prioritized list of ‘likely passwords’. If 
a password scheme’s probability distribution is non-uniform, its 
entropy is reduced.
14.61 Given the willingness of people to use the same passwords for a variety of purposes52 and to purportedly share their passwords (or perhaps an imagined 
password) with strangers,53 or provide their password in return for a pen,54 a bar of chocolate,55 the chance to win tickets to the theatre,56 or the opportunity to win chocolate Easter eggs,57 it is to be wondered why the digital signature 
is considered to be so important by some legislators. The weaknesses are also 
http://www.jbonneau.com/publications.html and http://preibusch.de/publications/
password_market/; W. Moncur and G. Leplâtre, ‘PINs, passwords and human memory’, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), pp. 116–22; M.A. Conway 
and E.A. Holmes, Guidelines on Memory and the Law: Recommendations from the Scientific 
Study of Human Memory (The British Psychological Society Research Board, 2008), 
http://www.forcescience.org/articles/Memory&TheLaw.pdf; M. Geuss, ‘How a criminal 
ring defeated secure chip-and-PIN credit cards’, arstechnica, 20 October 2015, http://
arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2015/10/how-a-criminal-ring-defeated-the-secure-chip-
and-pin-credit-cards/; C. Herley, P.C. van Oorschot and A.S. Patrick, ‘Passwords: if we’re so 
smart, why are we still using them?, in Dingledine and Golle (eds.), Financial Cryptography 
and Data Security (the authors report that transactions by way of a PIN reverse the burden 
of proof, but this is not correct).52 For instance, see the UK Office of Communications (Ofcom) report dated 23 April 2013, 
available at http://media.ofcom.org.uk/news/2013/uk-adults-taking-online-password-
security-risks/.53 M. Kelly, ‘Chocolate the key to uncovering PC passwords,’ The Register, 17 April 2007.54 J. Leyden, ‘Office workers give away passwords for a cheap pen’, The Register, 18 April 
2003.55 ‘Passwords revealed by sweet deal,’ BBC News, 20 April 2004; J. Leyden, ‘Women love 
chocolate more than password security’, The Register, 16 April 2008.56 ‘How to sell your self for a song,’ BBC News, 24 March 2005.57 ‘Easter eggs bypass security,’ OUT-LAW News, 18 April 2006, available online at http://
www.out-law.com/page-6843.
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explored by Petr Petr Švéda and Václav Matyáš Jr.58 The authors illustrate, at paragraph 3, that when a person has the private key of a digital signature on 
their computer, the user or owner ‘cannot be sure that no further signature 
processes will be executed in the background when using his private key’, and 
they make the point in paragraph 4 that ‘It is very hard to build a system or an 
application that does not compromise its security. There are a lot of potential 
problems – e.g., it can be misused, one of the components can fail, as well as the 
signing application, keys stored on hard disk or in memory are vulnerable’. They 
go on to indicate, at 4.1:At the time of writing, we know of no technology that can make a hardware device fully resistant to penetration by a skilled and 
determined attacker from a powerful organization. A lot of experts 
believe that absolute protection will remain unattainable. So the total cost of breaking a hardware device has to be much more than 
the value of stored and protected information.
14.62 It is noted elsewhere that the ‘advanced electronic signature’, a creature of the previous EU Directive on electronic signatures, was predicated on the use of smart cards, yet the authors of this paper are clear in their own mind that the 
evidence demonstrates how vulnerable smart cards are, at 4.2:59
A smart card is a simple and inexpensive security module. It consists of multiple components combined with a single chip that 
uses external power supply and clock. When a card is used as a personalized trusted device it generates a key pair locally, stores the private key locally, and only publishes the corresponding 
public key. The biggest problem with smart cards is that they 
lack a direct communication channel to the user. None of current 
available smart cards has a really trustworthy user interface. The user is completely dependent on potentially untrusted devices to 
get some information about his transactions. For example if the personal computer to which the smart card has been connected is compromised, it might ask the smart card to sign a completely 
different message to that which the user sees.
58 Švéda and Matyáš Jr., ‘Digital signatures and electronic documents’; P.A. Loscocco, S.D. 
Smalley, P.A. Muckelbauer, R.C. Taylor, S.J. Turner and J.F. Farrell, ‘The inevitability of 
failure: the flawed assumption of security in modern computing environments’, in 21st 
National Information Systems Security Conference: building the information security bridge 
to the 21st century (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
1998), pp. 303–14, available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.319240839778
13;view=1up;seq=5 – the individual paper is available at https://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/
fluke/html/inevit-abs.html.59 K. Schmeh, Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure on the Internet (Indianapolis, IN: 
Wiley, 2001), has a different view, although acknowledges attacks are possible (15.2.3).
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Many successful attacks have occurred because smart cards were exposed to more sophisticated attackers than designers anticipated, where design principles for tamper resistant smart 
cards are also discussed. The smart card without trustworthy user 
interface is a typical example of an architectural error. Many attacks are also possible due to protocol and application programming 
interface failures. (reference omitted)
14.63 In summary, it is necessary to ensure the person receiving data signed with the private key of a digital signature understands the difference between 
trusting the signature and trusting the owner of the signature.
The weakest link
14.64 Although an emphasis has been made in this text upon the reliance placed 
upon the activities of certification authorities and other participants in the public 
key infrastructure (registration authorities, directory services listing public 
keys, certification revocation list services, time stamping, to name but a few), comparatively little discussion has been given to the weakest link in the chain of 
a digital signature. If Bob wants Alice to use a digital signature to authenticate her messages, he has to persuade Alice that it is essential that when he receives a message or document from her, he can be completely assured, whether he decides to become a verifying party or not, that it was Alice, and only Alice, 
that caused the digital signature to be affixed to the document or message. He therefore has to persuade Alice that she must take good care of her private key, such that she accepts the risk of being held responsible for unauthorised use of 
it by others. If Alice asks, not without reason, ‘What’s in it for me?’ there seems 
to be no answer. Whether Bob decides to undertake the sometimes gargantuan 
task of carrying out the verification procedure or not, if he cannot satisfy himself 
that Alice kept her private key absolutely safe, he cannot be sure that Alice affixed 
the digital signature to the message. So he will try to insist that Alice carries the 
blame anyway.
14.65 In any event, the recipient of a digital signature can be certain that:
The person (whomsoever they might be) that keyed in the password that protects the private key of the digital signature, knew the password.
14.66 Or in the alternative, the recipient of a digital signature can be certain that: The person that caused the private key to be attached to an email or document called up the private key and clicked on the 
‘password’ icon (they did not need to know the password) because 
the software was instructed to remember the password.
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14.67 There seems to be an unquestioning reliance on the use of digital signatures 
that has no bearing on the risks associated with the use of the technology. This reliance is also manifest in the assumption made that a digital signature proves the person whose signature it is, and was the person that caused the computer to 
affix the signature to the document, as in the Portuguese case of (Evora) Ac. RE 
13-12-2005 (R.982/2005), in which an email was sent with a digital signature 
attached. In this instance, it was determined that the digital signature served to authenticate the document, guaranteed the identity of the sender, and the 
integrity of the message. Whilst a digital signature is capable of identifying the 
sender, it cannot guarantee the sender caused the digital signature to be affixed 
to the message. Thus the most important point to be aware of is this: the private key of a digital signature is only as good as the password that protects it and any 
additional mechanism used to protect the private key, as Richard E. Smith has pointed out:60
Public key cryptography succeeds only as long as a private key’s owner can keep it under control – always available when needed 
but never disclosed to anyone else.
14.68 It will be argued by some that the private key to a digital signature can be secured by a combination of a password and the biometric measurement of 
a fingerprint, for instance. This ‘solution’ relies on the technology (secret) of the 
biometric scanner that is chosen to fulfil this role, and does not take into account 
the various methods by which the mechanism can be compromised.
The burden of managing the private key
14.69 The user of a digital signature is expected to keep their private key secure. Failure to do so will mean a mischievous member of staff or a malicious third party can append a digital signature to a document or message for nefarious 
purposes. The management of the private key acts to underpin the efficacy of a 
digital signature. Some of the issues to which a recipient must give consideration 
include those set out below.
Bypassing passwords
14.70 Depending on the nature of the application software on any given 
computer or system, where a user has set their security setting to ‘High’ they will have to enter their password every time they wish to enter their private key to 
affix the private key of a digital signature to a document or message. Where the 
security setting is set to the default, ‘Low’, the messages will be automatically 
signed without any further intervention by the user. Given this scenario, any person with access to a computer or device containing a digital signature in a 
60 R.E. Smith, Authentication: From Passwords to Public Keys (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
2002), p. 431.
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powered-up state will be able to send messages or documents with a digital 
signature affixed.
14.71 Another alternative is for the user to retain their private key in memory 
during the login session. A user must either enter their password every time they 
wish to use their private key to affix a digital signature to a document or message, 
or they retain their private key in memory during the login session. If a user 
keeps the private key in memory, it exposes the key to being stolen. Examples include leaving the computer unattended, thus permitting a third party to take 
sufficient action to steal the key. Alternately, if the private key is on a laptop computer and the laptop computer is stolen, it may be possible for the thief to 
obtain access to the private key. Further, malicious software has been developed 
to steal passwords and private keys.61 Finally, even if the private key is stored on an encrypted smart card, it must be used with a computer to sign a message or document, and the computer may have been maliciously programmed to sign a 
document or message other than the one the user intends to sign.62
14.72 Quality of password There are a number of issues surrounding the 
question of passwords, as noted above, and they are well documented. The entire 
edifice of the public key infrastructure and the security of the private key rests to a very large extent on the quality of the password used to protect it, and attempts 
are made to replace passwords.63 Most of us prefer to use passwords that are easy to remember, which in turn makes a password easy to guess and vulnerable 
to attack. If the user does not have an effective control over the quality of the passwords used,64 the system will be vulnerable to an offline guessing attack.65
14.73 If a recipient of a digital signature intends to rely on the purported authority of the signature, they have a range of options:
61 H. Shinotsuka, ‘How attackers steal private keys from digital certificates’, Symantec official blog, 22 February 2013, at http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-
steal-private-keys-digital-certificates.62 See Young and Yung, Malicious Cryptography for further examples of how the technology 
can be used for malicious purposes; note the discussion on this issue by M. Rückert and 
D. Schröder, ‘Security of verifiably encrypted signatures’, in Pairing-Based Cryptography 
– Pairing 2009 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 5671, Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 
2009), pp. 17–34.63 J. Bonneau, C. Herley, P. C. van Oorschot and F. Stajano, The Quest to Replace Passwords: 
A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes (University of 
Cambridge Computer Laboratory Technical Report 817, 2012), available at https://www.
cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-817.pdf.64 K. Solic, H. Ocevcic and D. Blazevic, ‘Survey on password quality and confidentiality’, 
Automatika, 56 (2015), pp. 69–75; I. Urbina, ‘The secret life of passwords’, The New York 
Times Magazine, 19 November 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/
magazine/the-secret-life-of-passwords.html?_r=1.65 Davis, ‘Compliance defects in public-key cryptography’; H. Roßnagel and J. Zibuschka, 
‘Integrating qualified electronic signatures with password legacy systems’, Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 (2007), pp. 7–13.
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(i) To rely on the signature without taking any affirmative action. In some jurisdictions, the electronic signature legislation lays down a duty on the recipient to verify the signature, although the 
duty is invariably set at a high level of generality. It is conceivable that judges will take into account the arrangements between the 
sender and recipient before reaching a conclusive judgment. For instance, if a recipient relied on a digital signature attached to a high-value contract, a court may well consider it is appropriate in the circumstances that a recipient takes reasonable steps to authenticate and verify the digital signature, and to ensure the 
sending party duly authorized it.
(ii) To rely on the signature after undertaking steps to verify 
and authenticate the various certificates in the chain (that is, assuming the recipient has a trusted copy of the public key of the 
Root Certification Authority), and checking the authenticity and 
reliability of any time stamps (the time the time stamp is generated should not be independent of the time the digital signature data 
is generated),66 thus becoming a verifying party. Should a dispute occur, one of the questions that will need to be addressed is to what extent the actions taken by the verifying party were adequate in the circumstances of the case, including their state of knowledge 
at the time.
(iii) Ignore the infrastructure surrounding the use of the digital 
signature, and require the sending party to confirm their 
intentions by an alternative method, or to confirm, using another 
medium (such as letter, facsimile transmission or telephone) that 
the communication was sent by them.
14.74 As a result of the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that public key cryptography is more suitable for server-to-server security, rather than for use 
on a desktop.
Case law relating to digital signatures
14.75 Below are cases dealing with digital signatures across a number of 
jurisdictions.
66 J. Stapleton, P. Doyle and S. Teppler, ‘The digital signature paradox’ (an updated version of a paper of the same name that was originally published in the Proceedings of the 2005 
IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security), available online at http://www.
proofspace.com/newsletter/articles/0807/pdf/0807_02.pdf.
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Judicial use
14.76 In the United States of America, judges may begin to use digital signatures 
to affix the judicial seal to digital data.67
Administrative proceedings
14.77 The determination to implement digital signatures in some jurisdictions is illustrated in the case of LJN: AW6886, Rechtbank Maastricht, 05/860 WSFBSF K168 from the Netherlands. The plaintiff, a student, applied for a student grant for 
students living away from home. The Informatie Beheer Groep (IGB), the Dutch institution responsible for the processing of the various grants, informed her that 
she would receive the higher grant from 1 March 2005. She was already in receipt of a grant for students living at home, which is lower than the amount received 
when living away from home. The plaintiff did not agree with this decision, having 
lived away from home since 1 January 2005, and had properly informed the IBG 
of this. She sent two emails to the IBG in which she explained her situation and 
set out her complaint, and objected to the decision of the IBG. The IBG rejected 
her notice of objection, and thereupon the plaintiff initiated legal action.
14.78 In reaching its decision, the court had to decide whether the email could 
be considered a proper notice of objection. Article 2:13 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act allows for notices of objection to be sent electronically, 
providing the provisions of part 2.3 of the General Administrative Law Act are 
taken into account. Article 6.5 of the Act states that a notice of objection has to be 
signed. Article 2.16 of part 2.3 of the Act states that this can be electronically if the method of authentication is trustworthy enough, having regard to the nature and the content of the electronic message and the purpose for which it is being 
used. The email was sent by way of a Hotmail account, which, it was held, failed to 
meet the requirements of the legislation. Even though the IBG considered emails sent by Hotmail as a proper notice of objection, the court held that they did not have the freedom to do so, since the requirements of the law were disregarded, although no reason is given as to why, taking into account the nature, content and 
purpose of the email, it was necessary to send the email with a digital signature.
Banking
14.79 In the Russian Federation, corporate customers who wish to undertake 
banking transactions online are required to accept the specific terms of a separate agreement in order to use such facilities, and the customer is required to have a 
67 T. Reiniger and J.R. Francoeur, ‘Justice and sheriff: practical and authoritative methods 
for the electronic issuance of officially certified documents in the United States’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), pp. 42–52; note fn. 21 and the 
relevant text.68 Available online at http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true& 
searchtype=kenmerken&vrije_tekst=AW6886.
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digital signature in order to operate an online bank account.69 There have been 
a number of examples where corporations have discovered that funds (in one 
case almost 63 million roubles) were transferred electronically without their knowledge, and the customer has initiated legal action to recover the funds from 
the bank. In each instance, the transfer was authorized by the use of the private key of the digital signature of the person nominated by the corporation to possess 
the signature. One such case is that of an appeal to the Federal Arbitration Court 
of Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 N КГ-А 40/8531-03-П.70 The plaintiff was Open Joint Stock Company of Intertoll and International Electric Communication 
‘Rostelecom’, and the defendant was the Joint Stock Commercial Savings Bank of 
the Russian Federation. In this instance, on 2 August 1999, 29,580,850 roubles 
were debited from the customer’s account by electronic payment order. The 
customer affirmed that they had not issued instructions to the bank to debit the 
amount. The appeal court rejected the plaintiff ’s claim. Taking into account the expert opinion, the appeal court indicated that the 
lower courts reasonably concluded that the evidence testified to the fact that there were signs of the electronic payment order 
transfer, and the electronic digital signature affixed to the disputed payment order was correct and belonged to the vice general 
director of the plaintiff. The examination also indicated that the system in place did not permit the communication session to begin 
without producing the client’s main key, or to send documents from 
the client’s computer on behalf of the other client, or to process documents that were not signed with a duly registered electronic 
digital signature.71 
14.80 As pointed out by Olga I. Kudryavtseva in her discussion of this case, keeping the private key of an electronic digital signature secret is demanding, and 
there has been an increase in litigation over this issue in the Russian Federation.
Submission of electronic applications to court
14.81 In some jurisdictions, such as many states in the United States of America, courts have accepted the submission of documents electronically for some time, 
while other jurisdictions are just beginning to make suitable arrangements. 
69 For background information and additional case law, see O.I. Kudryavtseva, ‘Russia’ in S. 
Mason (ed.), International Electronic Evidence (London: British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, 2008); O.I. Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of electronic digital signatures 
in banking relationships in the Russian Federation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 51–7; A. Dolzhich, ‘Digital evidence and e-signature in 
the Russian Federation: a change in trend’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 6 (2009), pp. 181–3.70 The facts are set out and the case discussed by O.I. Kudryavtseva in ‘Case note: Russian 
Federation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 149–51.71 Kudryavtseva, ‘Case note: Russian Federation’, p. 150.
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Once legislation was passed to enable the use of electronic signatures in some jurisdictions, various attempts were made to submit applications and other 
responses to courts electronically, not always with success.72 An interesting aspect of using digital signatures arises with respect to the monetary value of 
the certificates that accompany the signature. The Certification Authorities issue 
certificates linked to a monetary value to limit liability on the certificate. When submitting documents to a court, it would hardly seem necessary to link the digital 
signature to the monetary value placed on the certificate, because the content of the document is the item of value, and the court does not rely on the monetary 
value of the certificate to accept documents electronically. However, this issue 
arose in the German case of FG Münster 11 K 990/05 F (Electronically signed 
statement of claim – On the interpretation of the term ‘monetary limitation’) 
before the Finance Court of Münster in Westphalia on 23 March 2006. Counsel 
for the plaintiff filed a statement of claim together with other documents by 
way of an email with a qualified electronic signature in accordance with the 
German Signature Act (Signaturgesetz). The corresponding signature certificate 
contained a monetary limitation of €100. The court dismissed the case, because 
the procedural rules required the claim to be filed with a valid qualified electronic signature, and an electronic signature containing a monetary limitation was not a 
qualified electronic signature under the signature act that was capable of replacing 
a manuscript signature on a written statement of claim. The plaintiff argued 
that the monetary limitation corresponding to the certificate only applied to the conclusion of contracts and not to other declarations signed with the corresponding 
qualified electronic signature. However, it was held that the term ‘monetary 
limitation’ implies a mechanism designed to protect the user against any financial consequences, and not just the conclusion of contracts exceeding the amount for 
which the certificate was covered. As a result, and because the minimum legal 
court fees before the financial courts exceed €100, a qualified electronic signature 
limited to €100 could not be used to file a statement of claim by way of -mail. This 
decision caused some consternation in Germany, as pointed out by Martin Eßer:73This decision may not only cause confusion and uncertainty for 
lawyers using qualified electronic signatures with monetary limitations, but may also increase scepticism towards electronic 
signatures with the public. The opinion of the members of the 
72 A. Nordén, ‘Case note: Sweden Case no 2572-2573-2002’, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review, 1 (2004), p. 80; P. Bazin, ‘Case notes: Élections municipales de la 
Commune d’Entre-Deux-Monts, Case No 235784, Conseil d’Etat, 28 December 2001 and 
Société Chalets Boisson v. M. X., Case No 00-46467, Cour de Cassation, chambre civile 2, 
30 April 2003’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 1 (2004), pp. 81–2; 
C.A. Rohrmann, ‘Case note – Brazil’ and ‘Comments about the Brazilian Supreme Court 
electronic signature case law’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 
(2006), pp. 98–100.73 M. Eßer, ‘Case note – Germany’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 
(2006), pp. 111–12.
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Financial Court may not convince the members of the Appeal Court, because the court disregarded two persuasive and systematic arguments:
First, the purpose of the signature is to ensure the originator’s 
identity and the integrity of the signed and submitted document. A monetary limitation is not necessary to put this characteristic of 
the signature into question. Even though the signature contains a monetary limitation, this does not have any effect on the integrity 
and authenticity, as both can still be verified by the recipient.
Secondly, the monetary limitation has to be legally qualified as a 
declaration of will of the originator. As such it has to be interpreted 
by the recipient – the court – like every other declaration of will. The court has to examine in good faith the objective intention of the originator pursuant to the general principles emanating from 
sections 133 and 157 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch – BGB). According to these principles, the court should have come to the conclusion that a monetary limitation only 
applies to financial transactions, and not to the transmission of a 
statement of claim to a court. The transmission of a statement of 
claim is not a financial transaction and the plaintiff ’s lawyer does 
not intend to conclude any contract with the court. Therefore any monetary limitation should not have been taken into consideration 
by the court.
14.82 The Federal Finance Court (Bundesfinanzhof) subsequently heard the appeal to this decision,74 and it was held that if such a signature contained a monetary restriction that restricts the kind of transactions it can be used for, the restriction does not impair the validity of the signature for the purposes of legal 
appeals.
14.83 Other cases relating to electronic filing into court include the Brazilian 
case of Apelação Cívil (Civil Appeal) N. 2006.01.99.025080-7/GO of 19 September 
2006, the Tribunal Regional Federal – 1a. Região (Federal Appeal Court of the 
1st Region) in which it was decided that litigation relating to tax should not be 
dismissed because a digital signature was used to send documents electronically. The members of the court accepted that the digital signature was valid, following 
the Medida Provisória Nº 2.200-2. In Hungary, the decision in case number 
BH2006/324, which was a libel case (press rectification lawsuit), held that documents in electronic format can be considered as drawn up in writing and 
capable of generating legal effects only if they are furnished with an identifiable signature pursuant to the applicable legal provisions, that is, with an advanced 
electronic signature. This finding was extended to contracts.
74 File number XI R 22/06; BB 2007, 92 (leading record only, otherwise not published at the 
time of this revision); M. Eßer, ‘Case note Germany, 19 February 2009, IV R 97/06’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), p. 278.
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14.84 In Colombia, during 2002, Mr Samper was subject to unsolicited bulk email sent for marketing purposes by a company owned by Mr Tapias, and after failing to stop the unwanted emails from being sent, he eventually took legal 
action against those responsible. The writ was served on the defendants by 
email. The proceedings were assigned to the Municipal Court of Rovira, Tolima.75 The case of Juan Carlos Samper Posada v. Jaime Tapias, Hector Cediel and others76 
is of interest for two reasons. First, the defendant argued that the court was not competent to hear the case because the court was located in Rovira, and the facts 
occurred in the city of Bogotá, and that the parties lived in Bogotá. Alexander 
Díaz García J dealt with this objection swiftly:77The court however considered that the defendant has not understood that all behaviour based on information technology has a virtual component, and may not be uniquely limited to the 
material venue. The court expressed its surprise that a person somewhat familiar with the new technologies should argue that the venue may only be determined by the territorial element, taking 
into consideration the virtual element of information technologies.
14.85 In reaching his decision on this point, the judge took the view that the characteristics of the new technology and the services offered are not limited 
to a physical and formal venue. In addition, s95 of the Colombian Statute of the 
Administration of Justice (Law 270 of 1996) contemplated the use of the new technologies in the service of justice:
Los juzgados, tribunales y corporaciones judiciales podrán 
utilizar cualesquier medios técnicos, electrónicos, informáticos 
y telemáticos para el cumplimiento de sus funciones. Los documentos emitidos por los citados medios, cualquiera que sea su 
soporte, gozarán de la validez y eficacia de un documento original siempre que quede garantizada su autenticidad, integridad y el 
cumplimiento de los requisitos exigidos por las leyes procesales. 
Los procesos que se tramitan con soporte informático garantizarán 
la identificación y el ejercicio de la función jurisdiccional por el 
órgano que la ejerce, así como la confidencialidad, privacidad, y 
seguridad de los datos de carácter personal que contengan en los 
términos que establezca la ley.Judges, courts and other judicial corporations are allowed to use any technical, electronic and telematic means in order to 
accomplish their duties. Every document issued by the mentioned 
75 Rovira is a town in the region of Tolima, and the events took place in Bogotá.76 Decisión 73-624-40-89-002-2003-053-00.77 V. Frigeri and M.F. Quinche, ‘Case note’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 2 (2005), pp. 65–72, at p. 66.
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means, whatever its support should be, will be considered as valid as an original document, as long as its authenticity, integrity and 
the fulfilment of procedural law’s requirements are guaranteed. Every procedure handled with technical supports, will guarantee 
the identification and the authorities’ jurisdictional duty, as the 
confidentiality, privacy and security of the personal data included, 
according to the terms set forth by the law.
14.86 The further point was observed that documents issued by such methods 
are as valid and efficient as an original document as long as the originality, authenticity and integrity of the document are guaranteed, and the procedural 
requirements set forth by the applicable regulations are met. The judge concluded 
the matter by observing that ‘The venue for Constitutional Judges comprises all 
the national territory and the applicable regulation does not exclude this court’s venue in the cyberspace, taking into account the facts under discussion took 
place in cyberspace’.78 The defendant also argued that the documents sent by the 
court required a digital signature. However, this was also dismissed, based on the provisions of article 6 of Law 527 of 1999 regarding the validity of an email, which provides:
Artículo 6°. Escrito. Cuando cualquier norma requiera que la 
información conste por escrito, ese requisito quedará satisfecho con un mensaje de datos, si la información que éste contiene es 
accesible para su posterior consulta.
Lo dispuesto en este artículo se aplicará tanto si el requisito establecido en cualquier norma constituye una obligación, como si las normas prevén consecuencias en el caso de que la información 
no conste por escrito.
Article 6th. Written. Whenever any regulation requires the 
information to be in writing, such requirement will be satisfied by a data message; if the information such message contains is 
accessible for its later consultation.The provisions in this article will apply both, if the requirement established in any regulation constitutes an obligation, and if the regulations anticipate consequences in case the information is not 
in writing.
14.87 Where the regulation requires that the information be sent in writing, 
an email will suffice, providing the email is available to the parties for further 
consultation. In this instance, the emails were available to both parties. Furthermore, it was observed that the law only requires the use of digital signatures in certain circumstances, and where a digital signature was not 
78 Frigeri and Quinche, ‘Case note’, p. 67.
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used, the law provided the requirements to assure the content of the message 
is original. It was held that the absence of a digital signature did not affect the 
correspondence sent by the court, and in any event, the court could not affix a 
digital signature to an email, because it did not have the facilities.
14.88 In the Czech Republic, the Constitutional Court had cause to determine the 
validity of papers sent to the court electronically in case number IV. ÚS 319/05, 
issued on 24 April 2006. By way of introduction,79 an application to a civil court in the Czech Republic can be submitted in writing, orally in the form of a deposition, 
in electronic form, by way of telegraph or by facsimile transmission. Where an application is submitted by facsimile transmission or in electronic form, the application must be supplemented by presenting the original application within 
a fixed period of time, or an application must be completed in writing which has the same wording as the application previously submitted in the electronic form 
or facsimile transmission. An application that has not been supplemented in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code will not be taken into consideration by 
the court. In this case, the members of the court upheld the ability to use a digital signature in respect of section 11 of the Electronic Signatures Act for the purposes 
of the signing of applications sent to the courts. The Constitutional Court, in considering the historical and systematic interpretation of the Civil Procedure Code, together with the comparative interpretation of other codes such as the Criminal Procedure Code and the Administrative Procedure Code, reached the conclusion that an application may be submitted to the court in electronic form without any original supplements if it is accompanied by an advanced electronic 
signature and qualified certificate issued by an accredited certification service 
provider in accordance with section 11 of the Electronic Signatures Act. It also held valid that applications submitted in electronic form without such a signature 
must be supplemented by presenting the original of application within a fixed 
period of time. The decision reflected the intended purpose of the legislation to 
make it easier to send applications to the court in electronic form. This decision was followed by a decision of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, case number 5 Tdo 1059/2006, issued on 20 September 2006, in which it was held that applications to the court relating to criminal procedure that are submitted in electronic form, cannot be taken into consideration unless provided with a recognized electronic signature in accordance with section 11 of the Electronic 
Signatures Act.
14.89 In 2003, an appeal in the case of AS Valga Külmutusvagunite Depoo (in 
bankruptcy)80 was head before the Administrative Chamber of Tallinn Circuit 
Court in Estonia, regarding the ruling filed by AS Valga Külmutusvagunite Depoo 
(in bankruptcy)81 against a Tallinn Administrative Court Ruling of 17 March 2003. 
79 For more information, see J. Matejka and P. Kuhn, ‘Czech Republic’, in S. Mason (ed.), 
International Electronic Evidence (London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2008).80 Administrative matter no 2-3/466/03.81 Administrative matter no 3-366/2002.
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The appellant submitted a response to the court by email on 27 February 2003. 
The email was signed with a digital signature, in compliance with clause 3(1) of 
the Digital Signatures Act (Digitaalallkirja seadus Vastu võetud 8. märtsil 2000. 
a. (RT I 2000, 26, 150)):Digitaalallkirjal on samad õiguslikud tagajärjed nagu omakäelisel 
allkirjal, kui seadusega ei ole neid tagajärgi piiratud ning on 
tõendatud allkirja vastavus käesoleva seaduse § 2 lõike 3 nõuetele.A digital signature has the same legal consequences as a handwritten signature if law does not restrict these consequences and if the compliance of the signature with the requirements of 
subsection 2 (3) of this Act is proved.
14.90 The court refused to acknowledge that the submission had been made, because it was not in the form required by the rules of procedure, and it required the appellant to submit a properly compiled and signed response on paper with 
a manuscript signature. This decision was the subject of the appeal. In reversing the decision of the lower court, the members of the Administrative Chamber of Tallinn Circuit Court considered the legal effect of a digital signature was the 
equivalent of a manuscript signature, as provided by clause 3(1) of the Digital Signatures Act, and there was no reason why the information sent by email could 
not be accepted. The Tallinn Administrative Court ruling of 17 March 2003 in administrative matter no 3-366/2002 was annulled, and the matter referred 
back to the court of first instance in order to continue the performance of the 
acts set out in article 33 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure.82
14.91 One case from Germany has already been mentioned above. There have 
been a number of cases in different jurisdictions in Germany relating to the filing of applications and appeals to court by email, and they have all concluded that 
the law requires the application to be submitted with a digital signature. The cases cover a range of courts:
Federal Finance Court (BFH – Bundesfinanzhof), file number 
VII B 138/05; BFH/NV 2006, 104 regarding new Sec. 52a FGO: 
(14.09.2005). For an appeal to be submitted in due form it must 
contain a qualified electronic signature if submitted electronically, 
otherwise it is inadmissible. In this case the appeal was submitted 
by an ordinary, signed, email and was thus held to be inadmissible.
Higher Administrative Court Rheinland-Pfalz (OVG Rheinland-
Pfalz – Oberverwaltungsgericht), file number 10 A 11741/05, 
NVwZ-RR 2006, 519 re new Sec. 55a VwGO: (21.04.2006). An electronically submitted document had no legal effect and is not suited to meet a procedural deadline if it is not provided with a 
82 V. Näslund, ‘Case report’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 1 (2004), 
pp. 75–9.
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qualified electronic signature. In this case, the deadline for appeal 
was not met for that reason.
Higher Administrative Court Bavaria (Bayerischer VGH – 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof), unpublished, file number 12 ZB 05.2821 
regarding old Sec. 86a VwGO: (08.11.2005) Old Sec. 86a VwGO also 
required a qualified electronic signature for an appeal submitted 
in electronic form to be admissible. In this case the appellant submitted an appeal by ordinary, signed, email which was not 
sufficient. The appeal did not qualify as ‘in writing’ under Sec. 152 
VwGO. See also Higher Administrative Court Hesse (Hessischer 
VGH – Verwaltungsgerichtshof), file number 1 TG 1668/05, DÖV 
2006, 438 regarding old Sec. 86a VwGO: (03.11.2005), reaching 
the same conclusion as the previous case.
Administrative Court Sigmaringen (VG Sigmaringen – 
Verwaltungsgericht), VBlBW 2005, 154, file number 5 K 1313/05 
regarding old Sec. 86a VwGO: (27.12.2004). If submitted in electronic form, an objection against an administrative decision 
must be provided with a qualified electronic signature to be 
admissible, otherwise it is not qualified as ‘in writing’ under Sec. 
70 VwGO. In this case the objection sent by ordinary email was not 
sufficient.
14.92 The reasoning behind this line of cases is demonstrated by the case of 10 A 11741/05, a decision of the Higher Administrative Court of Rhineland-
Palatinate (OVG Rheinland-Pfalz) dated 21 April 2006, where a claim by a soldier 
in a dispute over service hours was not accepted by a lower administrative court. 
In this instance, the soldier filed an appeal through his lawyer to the Higher 
Administrative Court. The document setting out the grounds of appeal was sent 
as an attachment to an email without a qualified electronic signature, as defined 
by s3(3) of SigG (Signaturgesetz, German Signature Act), and as required by the 
procedural rule of s55(a)(1)(3) VWGO. The appeal was rejected because the 
document sent to the court did not have a qualified electronic signature. The court indicated that the history of the legislative process demonstrated the need 
for a qualified electronic signature. Section 55a VwGO replaced the old Section 
86a VwGO on 1 April 2005, and under the provisions of the amended section 86a 
VwGO, the use of a qualified electronic signature was not an imperative formality, 
but a procedural rule. However, the wording of the new section 55a VwGO meant 
the court had to conclude that the use of a qualified electronic signature was a 
mandatory formal requirement. The decisions reached by judges in Germany are startling, as any lawyer from a common law background will acknowledge, but the conclusions judges are required to reach because of the law also concern 
many German lawyers.83
83 M. Eßer, ‘Case note – Germany’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 4 
(2007), pp. 91–2.
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14.93 In the past in Switzerland, the Federal Court has decided that a complaint sent by facsimile transmission would not meet the required formality of writing 
set forth by law and was therefore not accepted (BGE 121 II 252; 112 Ia 173); it also reached the same conclusion in connection with complaints handed in by 
email (1P.254/2005 of 30 August 2005). These decisions may now be treated 
differently as a result of the provisions of article 42(4) BGG (Bundesgerichtsgesetz; Federal Act of the Swiss Supreme Court of 17 June 2005, into force 1 January 
2007). This article allows the electronic filing of briefs with the Swiss Supreme 
Court if a certified digital signature is used.84
Contract
14.94 The legislation in Argentina follows the functional equivalent concept, 
and the legislation itself is discussed in more detail elsewhere. Two cases have 
occurred that illustrate the way the law has been interpreted and applied. In the case of Huberman Fernando Pablo c/Industrias Audiovisuales Argentinas SA s/
despido,85 it was decided that an email sent by an employee did not constitute an acceptable method of a resignation without the inclusion of a digital signature, and in Cooperativa de Vivienda Crédito y Consumo Fiduciaria LTDA c/Becerra 
Leguizamón Hugo Ramón s/incidente de apelación,86 it was decided that an email without a digital signature attached is not recognized as a document signed by 
the parties under the terms of Law 25.506. The decisions in both cases reflect the fact that only digital signatures are recognized as an equivalent to a manuscript signature in the absence of an agreement between the parties that another form 
of electronic signature is acceptable.
14.95 In France, it appears that a digital signature was affixed to a contract for 
a subscription to a telephone line formed over the internet. The contract was 
enforceable.87
Signing health records
14.96 The practical problems of ensuring that when a digital signature is used, the person whose signature it is was the person that has used the signature 
is clearly highlighted in the case of Conseil d’Etat, 26 Mars 2004, No. 255265, 
Fédération Nationale des Infirmiers. Although the word ‘digital signature’ is not 
84 C. Gasser and S. Peters, ‘Submission of evidence through digital documents in Swiss civil 
litigation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006), pp. 84–8; C. 
Gasser, ‘Digital evidence in the new Swiss Federal Code of Civil Procedure’, Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 6 (2009), pp. 195–6.85 29884/02 S. 56885 – CNTRAB – SALA VI – Buenos Aires, 23 de febrero de 2004 (published 
in http://www.elDial.com.ar (subscription required)).86 CNCOM – SALA A 16645/2006 – Buenos Aires Junio 27 de 2006 (Published in http://
www.elDial.com.ar (subscription required)).87 L. Ramkhalawan, ‘Case translation: France, jugement du 19 décembre 2014’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 12 (2015), pp. 71–5.
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used in the outline of this case, it is highly probable that the signature referred to is a digital signature, because they are placed on cards, and the insertion of two cards simultaneously helps to ensure that the holder of the digital signature is 
the person who ‘signs’ with the signature. In this instance, the National Union of 
Nurses (the Fédération Nationale des Infirmiers) sought a ruling that guidelines 
(a circulaire) dated 26 January 2003 of the National Health Insurance Body (La 
Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie) concerning the electronic transmission of healthcare forms by nurses and midwives for the reimbursement or payment 
of nursing services were null and void. Arguments were submitted concerning 
the extent of the power of the Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie to issue 
the guidelines. In terms of an electronic signature, the practical problem at issue was that, according to the guidelines, the signature of the healthcare form 
affixed in an electronic form should occur by the simultaneous reading of the 
patient’s individual electronic card and that of the health professional. It appears that the National Union of Nurses issued the challenge on the ground that it is not always possible for the two cards to be inserted at the same time, and therefore in practice, the signature would not comply with article R 161-43 of 
the Social Security Code. A subsequent decree was introduced on 28 April 2003, which permitted the reading of the individual electronic card and the medical 
professional card to take place at separate times. However, the decree was introduced subsequent to the guidelines and therefore this raised the question 
of the legality of the guidelines. The Conseil d’Etat declared the guidelines of 20 
January 2003 null and void.
European Patent Office
14.97 The European Patent Office sets out the rules regarding electronic signatures and authentication in Decision of the President of the EPO dated 26 
February 2009 concerning the electronic filing of documents.88 In ERICSSON/
Electronic filing of appeals T1427/09,89 an electronic signature was affixed 
to the electronic filing of an appeal, but not in the correct name. This was an application for an appeal against the decision of the examining division, sent on 
9 March 2009, refusing European patent application 01962282.8. The notice of appeal and the statement setting out the grounds of appeal in this case were 
filed electronically on 11 May 2009 and 17 June 2009 respectively. The notice of 
appeal dated 11 May 2009 included the name of Mr Friedrich Kühn, a European 
Patent Attorney. There was no manuscript signature. The electronic filing of this 
document was certified by a signature authentication showing that both the 
sender certificate and the signer certificate underlying the filing were issued 
to I. Elfving. Mr Kühn provided a manuscript signature to the statement setting 
out the grounds of appeal dated 17 June 2009. However, the electronic filing of 
this statement was certified by a signature authentication showing that both the 
88 [2009] OJ EPO 182.89 [2010] E.P.O.R. 22.
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sender certificate and the signer certificate underlying the filing were issued to 
R. Ahlund. The reference to a ‘sender certificate’ and a ‘signer certificate’ appears 
to indicate that a digital signature was affixed to the notice. 
14.98 In Decision of the President of the EPO dated 26 February 2009 concerning 
the electronic filing of documents,90 article 8(2) provides that the authenticity 
of documents filed in appeal proceedings are to be confirmed by the use of an enhanced electronic signature of a person authorized to act in the proceedings 
in question. Neither I. Elfving nor R. Ahlund were authorized to act in the 
proceedings. As a result, the notice of appeal and the statement setting out the 
grounds of appeal were deemed not to be signed. The appellant was therefore 
invited to file signed copies of the documents within two months in accordance 
with Rule 50(3) of the European Patent Convention.
90 [2009] OJ EPO 182.

S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 15, ‘Liability’, pp. 339–51.
15Liability
15.1 The number of possible parties linked to an electronic signature will 
differ, depending on the type of signature used. The number of links in the chain, and how secure those links are, will give rise to different levels and types of liability, although some of the parties may be considered to be too far removed from the creation of the signature to incur any liability, whether contractual or 
non-contractual.1
Liability: links in the chain
15.2 There are a number of ways in which liability may arise, and the following 
discussion serves to illustrate some of the problems that could occur.
A biodynamic version of a manuscript signature
15.3 A biodynamic version of a manuscript signature is created using a proprietary pad that measures the various dynamics of the signature as it is 
written. Thus the reliability of the software, how secure it is, how it interacts 
with the software on the user’s computer and what methods are used to provide 
for the security of the measurements are open to scrutiny. The person or organization using such technology will then have to consider the security of the biodynamic measurements, including how they are to be stored, how they are to 
be destroyed, who has access to the measurements and how they are used. Once the measurements are attached to a document or message, the recipient may use 
the measurements as they see fit.
A scanned manuscript signature
15.4 A manuscript signature that has been scanned represents a considerable 
risk if the original document is not properly protected, and when the file of the 
signature is attached to a document, enabling a third party to use it improperly.2 It must be emphasised that this risk is manifest for every document in existence 
that has an original manuscript signature affixed to it, but the potential for misuse 
is probably low in comparison to other methods of forgery used by criminals. 
1 Whether a party has a contractual or non-contractual claim (or both) will depend on the facts of a case, and this chapter does not deal with the law relating to contractual or non-
contractual claims.2 By way of example, see Djordje Mitic v. Eco Pro Australia Pty Ltd [2009] AIRC 503 (26 May 
2009) where one of the parties appeared to have used the scanned signature of another 
party, apparently as part of a forgery of a letter.
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One further risk relating to this form of signature was the subject of research at 
the University of Derby in England. A study conducted by Nazia Mehrban and Ian James Turner at the Faculty of Education, Health and Science looked at a number 
of manuscript signatures and scanned versions of the same signatures. They 
compared the two for some of the features that make a signature unique. It was 
found that there were up to ten differences between the two signatures. It was 
observed that many features that make manuscript signatures difficult to forge 
(stroke order, pooling of ink, stroke direction) are not present in the scanned 
version of a signature. This means that somebody intent on forging a signature can more easily copy from a scanned version of a signature and more easily pass the manuscript signature of another as their own if the only reference material 
available to the person relying on the signature is a scanned signature. It was 
also found that the type of pen used also appears to have an influence on the 
number of differences observed. Ballpoint pens proved to be the best, followed 
by fountain pens. Apparently roller ball pens were the worst.3
A typed name
15.5 Typing a name on an electronic document represents the easiest way 
of authenticating a message, whilst also providing for the weakest evidence. Clearly, anybody can type the name of another person or organization into an electronic document with the intention of causing the recipient to believe the message originates from a person or entity other than the person that originated 
the document or message. Such an action may intend to deceive or misrepresent 
some fact.
Participants in the public key infrastructure
15.6 A number of people or organizations that use the public key infrastructure 
are likely to find themselves liable in one way or another. Those most at risk are:
(i) The sender of a signed message, where an individual or legal 
entity obtains an individual identity certificate in which their identity will be associated to the value of a public key, which in 
turn is linked to the value of a private key under their control.
(ii) The certification authority that issues the individual identity 
certificate. It must be emphasized that there will probably be more 
than one certification authority involved in any one transaction.
(iii) The registration authority (where used by a certification 
authority), which undertakes to confirm the identity of an 
individual or legal entity.
3 N. Mehrban and I.J. Turner, ‘A comparison of the identifying features in original signatures 
and electronically scanned signatures’, Journal of the American Society of Questioned 
Document Examiners, 11 (2008), pp. 1–7.
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(iv) A receiving party, where they receive an electronic communication that has been signed electronically, and act in 
reliance on a relevant individual identity certificate by using the 
public key affirmed in the certificate and associated with the identity of the sender, thus verifying that the communication was signed using the corresponding private key, which in turn implies 
that the communication originated from the sender.
Digital signatures – public key infrastructure
15.7 Applying a signature using public key cryptography can involve a number 
of parties. For instance, a key pair may be issued by one party and an individual 
identity certificate by another. Even where the same authority issues both, checking the identity of the person or organization that applied for a digital 
signature may be undertaken by yet another organization, a registration authority. Thereafter, the subscribing party retains the private key, whilst the public key is 
held in a public depositary by the certification authority. The subscribing party 
has the duty of securing the private key, whilst the terms of Certificate Practice Statements attempt to require the recipient to undertake due diligence before 
relying upon the sender’s digital signature. Potential liability lies with the 
certification authority for not keeping the certificate revocation list up-to-date, with the registration authority for not checking the identity of a subscribing party properly, and with the subscribing party for not securing their private key 
properly. Note also that certificates are packaged with wrappers. For example, 
PKCS #12 wrapping (PKCS stands for Public Key Cryptography Standards) is a standard that supports the direct transfer of personal information, enabling the 
user to move the certificate and corresponding private keys from one computer 
to another.4 Other certificates have different types of wrappers, and a further 
complication is that the industry standard X.509 certificate is available in 
different formats, including RSA and DSA variants.5
How liability can be incurred
15.8 Electronic signatures are difficult to secure (for instance, the act of typing a name into a document is not necessarily, in the absence of corroborating evidence, the best evidence that the person caused their name to be typed into 
the document or email), and digital signatures expose the participants to a range 
of acts and omissions. The following list serves to indicate the main areas where 
liability may arise (it is not meant to be exhaustive):
4 RFC 2986, available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986.
5 See R. Green, ‘Certificates’, for an interesting discussion about some of these issues, 
available from http://mindprod.com/jgloss/certificate.html.
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(i) The person whose signature is used may not have authorized 
the use of the signature. A number of cases are noted in chapter 6.
(ii) The private key of the digital signature of the signing party may have been compromised, permitting an unauthorised person to 
gain access to and use the key without authority.
(iii) A communication was sent with an electronic signature 
affixed, but the sender did not intend the communication to have 
any legal effect.
(iv) A communication was sent with the electronic signature affixed, but the sender was coerced into sending the communication with 
the electronic signature against their will.
(v) A communication was sent with the electronic signature 
affixed, but the sender revoked the certifying certificate.
(vi) A communication was sent with the electronic signature 
affixed, but when the sender realised they did not want to be 
bound by the promise, they revoked the certifying certificate of the 
digital signature immediately.
(vii) A certificate linked to the private key of a digital signature may have been issued to an impostor, or it may incorrectly link the identity of one person or legal entity with a public key that has 
been allotted to another.
(viii) Where a certification authority fails upon request to suspend or revoke a private key that has been compromised, or is dilatory 
in so doing.
(ix) Where the private key of the certification authority is 
compromised, leading to the creation of fraudulent certificates.
(x) A breach in security occurs that leads to the possibility that 
information can be stolen.
(xi) Where attribute certificates are incorrectly generated or 
allocated, or where a certificate is not issued or where there is a 
delay in issuing a certificate.
(xii) Where access to the certificate repository or certificate 
revocation list of the certification authority is interrupted or compromised, thereby preventing a recipient being able to verify 
whether a certificate has been revoked.
(xiii) Where a certificate has been suspended or revoked 
incorrectly.
(xiv) Where the certificate authority publishes erroneous 
information.
(xv) In the event a duplicate key is generated.
15. Liability 343
15.9 The most likely dispute arising from the use of key pairs within a public key infrastructure will probably be to do with the actual transaction itself, rather 
than any problems relating to the failing of the certification authority. Where 
there is a dispute about a failure of the certification authority, the amount of 
liability the certification authority impose contractually will probably be far less than the value of the underlying transaction, although this will not prevent a 
challenge on the basis that the limit is unreasonable.6
Types of loss
15.10 The following is merely a list of examples that could occur, all of which will 
have both criminal and civil ramifications.
(i) The relying party Alice claims for loss flowing from having acted in the belief that she contracted with Bob when Alice did not, in 
fact contract with Bob.
(ii) Alice claims for her loss flowing from being held liable for entering a contract with Bob, when Alice did not enter the contract 
but the revocation of Alice’s private key was published too late.
(iii) Alice tries, unsuccessfully, to enter a contract with Bob, but 
fails to do so successfully because the certification authority’s 
certificate failed correctly to embody Alice’s public key.
15.11 The first two claims depend on whether liability attaches to a subscriber 
for signatures made by others. This is a critical question that underlies most of the other examples, but depends on the resolution of issues on which the industry 
and government participants in the debate remain somewhat silent.
Assumptions in public key infrastructure
15.12 The rationale behind the public key infrastructure is this: when a 
certification authority issues a certificate, it bases the issuance of the certificate 
on its Certificate Practice Statement and terms of trade. A contractual relationship 
is formed between the certification authority and the customer who buys the 
certificate. While the certificate purports to verify the identity of an individual 
person or legal entity, it is the merchant or person receiving the certificate that 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the liability of certification services providers, see G. Dimitrov, Liability of Certification Service Providers: How the Providers of Certification 
Services Related to Electronic Signatures Could Manage their Liabilities (Saarbruecken: 
VDM Verlag, 2008).
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relies on the content of the certificate.7 The logic is as follows:8
(i) The individual or entity provides the certification authority 
with sufficient evidence acceptable to the certification authority or registration authority to demonstrate that they are who they 
say they are. Depending on the level of the certificate obtained, this information could be the name, address and the number 
of a driving licence. For certificates that will support high value 
transactions, the person or entity seeking a certificate may be required to provide more robust evidence, including physically 
appearing before a notary public.
(ii) The certification authority provides the user with a certificate.
(iii) The individual or entity is then given a keyholder’s name.
(iv) The keyholder is the person or entity that obtained the 
certificate.
(v) This is all the recipient needs to know.
15.13 There are a number of flaws with this logic. For instance, John Smith of 
York may wish to enter a contract with a company who is not aware of his identity. 
The company cannot distinguish, when it looks at the certificate, how many 
John Smiths live in York and whether this particular John Smith is the person 
identified with the certificate. Unless the certificate provides the company with a 
unique identifier identifying this particular John Smith (which they may or may 
not provide), and the company wishes to confirm John Smith’s identity, it must 
consider other ways of doing so. If a certification authority were to undertake to positively identify a subscribing party, the information that might be needed to satisfy the recipient may be so extensive that few individuals or legal entities 
would consider subscribing for such a certificate.9 In conclusion, a certification 
authority provides a very narrow promise when issuing a certifying certificate. It 
7 See T.J. Smedinghoff, Certification Authority Liability Analysis (Washington, DC: 
American Bankers Association, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602207 for a discussion of the issues relating to the liability of 
certification authorities in the North American context.
8 C. Ellison and B. Schneier, ‘Ten risks of PKI: what you’re not being told about public key 
infrastructure’, Computer Security Journal, 16 (2000); for two responses to this article, 
see B. Laurie, ‘Seven and a half non-risks of PKI: what you shouldn’t be told about 
public key infrastructure’, at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/jyu.ohjelmointi.
coderpunks/PtWHnFue9Zk and A. Pérez, ‘Ten risks of PKI’, available at https://sites.
google.com/site/aramperez/home/10-risks-of-pki; ‘PKI Assessment Guidelines’, C.4.2 
‘Attribution presumptions in digital signature statutes’.
9 For a useful discussion, see C. Ellison, ‘Improvements on conventional PKI wisdom’, 
Proceedings of the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop (Gaithersburg, MD: NIST, 2002), 
pp. 165–75, available online at http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/; N. Bohm and 
S. Mason, ‘Identity and its verification’, Computer Law & Security Review, 26 (2010), pp. 
43–51.
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does not appear that certification authorities seek first to establish the identity 
of a person and then go on to verify that identity. It is important to understand 
that verification is not the same as identification.10
15.14 The certification authority generally does not share a secret with the 
person to whom they provide a certificate. Many certification authorities use the information collected by a credit bureau to identify the identity of the 
applicant. This means the identification process is based on the accuracy of the data collected by the credit bureau and the effectiveness of the credit bureau in 
keeping the information up-to-date. Another issue is whether the recipient of the 
electronic signature trusts the originator’s certification authority.
Risks associated with the use of digital signatures11 
Issuing a certificate to an impostor
15.15 A number of certification authorities have issued false SSL (Secure Socket 
Layer) certificates that support the security of websites.12 The issuing of false 
certificates illustrates the weakness of how certificates are created and issued, 
and also how important the certificates are in relation to the operation of the 
internet. It is not known whether false certificates have been issued that are 
associated with digital signatures that are used by people or legal entities. The 
2001 example of VeriSign issuing two Class 3 Software Publisher certificates 
incorrectly has been cited in previous editions of this text by way of example.13 
A more significant incident occurred in 2011, when DigiNotar B.V., a Dutch 
certificate authority owned by VASCO Data Security International, Inc, was placed into voluntary bankruptcy as a result of the discovery that the company 
10 J. Grijpink and C. Prins, ‘Digital anonymity on the internet’, Computer Law & Security 
Report, 17 (2001), pp. 379–89, at p. 381(a).11 F. Piper, S. Blake-Wilson and John Mitchell, Digital Signatures: Security & Controls 
(Rolling Meadows, IL: Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation, 1999), ch. 4; 
N. Ferguson, B. Schneier and T. Kohno, Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and 
Practical Applications (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2010), ch. 19.12 See the CAcert Wiki for a list of fraudulent certificates that have been issued (the aim 
of this website is to maintain a list of attacks with reasonably authoritative references): 
http://wiki.cacert.org/Risk/History.13 The ‘VeriSign security alert fraud detected in Authenticode signing certificates’, 22 March 
200, is no longer available, nor is G.L. Guerin, ‘Microsoft, VeriSign, and certification 
revocation’; for the CERT Advisory, see http://www.lafn.org/faq/virus/fraud_certificate.
html; for the Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-017, see https://technet.microsoft.com/
library/security/ms01-017; U. S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory 
Capability, L-062: Erroneous Verisign-Issued Digital Certificates for Microsoft; F. Gomes, 
‘Security Alert: Fraudulent Digital Certificates’ (SANS Institute, 2003), available online at 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/certificates/security-alert-fraudulent-
digital-certificates_679.
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had issued several hundred fraudulent certificates.14 The company also issued 
certificates for the PKIoverheid program on behalf of the government in The 
Netherlands. A hacker obtained access to the DigiNotar computer systems and 
issued an unknown number of false certificates. On 2 September 2011, after being informed of the results of the investigation of the DigiNotar systems by 
Fox-IT, the Dutch government stopped trusting certificates issued by DigiNotar15 
and regained control over the company’s intermediate certificate to manage 
an orderly transition, replacing untrusted certificates with new ones from 
another provider.16 The fact that false certificates have been issued illustrates the weaknesses inherent in the trust placed in software code17 – because it is 
software code that controls the entire edifice of everything digital – and it is imperative for lawyers to more fully understand the technical issues by adopting 
a realistically sceptical approach to understanding the nature of software.18
Certificate revocation list
15.16 There are two technical issues that affect the ability to download a suitably 
recent certificate revocation list: how the certification authority tells you where 
to obtain the relevant certificate revocation list, and whether your computer 
carries out the functions you require. There are many different ways to obtain a 
certificate revocation list, and because there is no standard within the industry, 
no one method is mandatory.19 Regardless of the method used, the significant issues for every recipient, which they may not be aware of, are as follows:
(i) The certificate revocation list should be digitally signed by the 
certificate authority using its root certificate to prevent a certificate 
revocation list from being forged.
14 ‘VASCO announces bankruptcy filing by DigiNotar B.V.’ (n.d.), https://www.vasco.com/
about-vasco/press/2011/news_vasco_announces_bankruptcy_filing_by_diginotar_
bv.html.15 Factsheet: Fraudulently issued security certificate discovered, 5 September 2011, version 
2.2, https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/factsheets/factsheet-fraudulently-
issued-security-certificate-discovered.html; Black Tulip Report of the investigation into the 
DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach (Fox-IT BV, PR-110202, 13 August 2012, version 
1.0), available at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2012/08/13/
black-tulip-update.16 Overheid zegt vertrouwen in de certificaten van Diginotar op, Nieuwsbericht (3 September 
2011), at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2011/09/03/overheid-zegt-
vertrouwen-in-de-certificaten-van-diginotar-op.17 S. Mason and T.S. Reiniger, ‘“Trust” between machines? Establishing identity between 
humans and software code, or whether you know it is a dog, and if so, which dog?’, 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 21 (2015), pp. 135–48.18 Note the comments by N. van Eijk in ‘The DigiNotar case: internet security is no abstract 
matter’, Computers & Law, 23 (2013), pp. 21–2.19 C. Adams and S. Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and Deployment 
Considerations (2nd edn., Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2002), pp. 107–26.
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(ii) The certificate revocation list is dated by the certification 
authority, which means that every certificate revocation list 
expires.
(iii) Every certificate revocation list has a higher sequence than the 
one issued previously, to prevent forgery.
(iv) The person wishing to check a particular certificate must know 
where to find a suitably recent certificate revocation list.
(v) The certificate revocation list must actually be able to be 
obtained by a relying party.
(vi) The contents of the certificate revocation list must be 
authenticated.
15.17 Any duty that is to be imposed on a certification authority should take 
into account the complexity of these issues. If Microsoft designed the software 
to take a user to the address where the certificate revocation list existed only if 
the address was provided by the certification authority with the certificate, then establishing the responsibility for passing this knowledge on to a recipient will 
be a necessary perquisite to any possible defence by a certification authority. 
Apparently, VeriSign did not issue Class 3 Software Publisher certificates with 
an address for the certificate revocation list. This appears to mean that, at the time of the incident, the user of the relevant Microsoft software was not able to 
retrieve the certificate revocation list of a given certifying certificate issued by 
VeriSign. At the time of this incident, Guerin concluded that Microsoft did not 
have software that had a working revocation infrastructure. Microsoft did not agree with this analysis, and published a rebuttal that is no longer available,20 
to which Guerin rebutted the points raised by Microsoft in his article, which is 
no longer available. The report located on U.S. Department of Energy Computer 
Incident Advisory Capability website, referring to ‘L-062: Erroneous Verisign-
Issued Digital Certificates for Microsoft’ no longer appears to be available. However, if a vendor of software such as Microsoft did not have a working revocation infrastructure in place in the past, then it could be argued that past 
certificates can hardly be said to be reliable. This means the evidential weight 
to be given to a certificate must be considered against these practical problems, 
otherwise the evidence may be so poor as to make the concept of a certificate 
irrelevant. Arguably, a court should take such practical issues into account when 
deciding whether a duty of care should be imposed on a certification authority.21
Other risks
15.18 Other types of risk include, in no particular order:
20 However, Microsoft published ‘Response to inaccurate Crypto-Gram article on VeriSign 
certificates’ at https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc751324.aspx.21 See S. Mason (ed.), Electronic Evidence (3rd edn., London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2012), 
ch. 5 for a detailed consideration that machines are presumed to be working properly.
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1. The fraudulent substitution of a public key for that of a genuine user, where an impostor substitutes his or her own public key 
for that of the genuine user. There is no attempt to recreate the 
certificate of the genuine user. The attacker can sign a document 
with a false public key that identifies the genuine user incorrectly.22
2. The theft of keys, perhaps where a thief puts a website up and directs the subscriber to the website, and then asks them to give the relevant passwords, or where hackers break into the system and overcome the security system to replace crucial pieces of software with code in the browser or signing tools to enable them 
to use the certificate or private key of the digital signature.
3. The failure of security, where the extent of the security measures in place, either on the computer or the system upon which the 
certificate is located, is an important factor in evaluating the 
possibility that a system can be compromised.23
4. Side-channel attacks, where a hacker can, by carefully measuring the amount of time it takes the system to perform the operations 
of a private key, obtain the fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor 
RSA keys and break other cryptographic systems. Such an attack is possible because other variables relating to the performance of the hardware and software can be monitored by the hacker to exploit 
measurements in timing to find the entire key. Such an attack is 
computationally inexpensive against a vulnerable system.24 A hacker can also exploit the variation in voltage consumed in order 
to derive information about the private key number.25 For instance, some computational processes run so slowly that it is possible to 
see the mathematical functions performed by the software. Smart 
cards are also vulnerable to this type of attack. The card is plugged into a reader or encoder and the information contained on the 
memory is protected by secondary protection. Where the reader or encoder is powered by a battery that is running low in power, 
22 F. Piper and M. Robshaw, ‘Cryptography – a snapshot of where we stand’, Information 
Security Bulletin, June 2001, p. 21.23 One example of a virus and what it can do to a system is discussed by R. Perry, ‘The 
BadTrans virus and e-conveyancing’, Computers and Law, 12 (2002), pp. 8–9.24 P.C. Kocher, ‘Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other 
systems’, available at https://www.rambus.com/timing-attacks-on-implementations-of-
diffie-hellman-rsa-dss-and-other-systems/; E. Bangerter, D. Gullasch and S. Krenn, ‘Cache 
games – bringing access-based cache attacks on AES to practice’ (2010), available at 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/594.pdf.25 Piper and Robshaw, ‘Cryptography’, p. 22; J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner and C. Hall, 
‘Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers’, Journal of Computer Security, 8 (2000), pp. 
141–58 available online at https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-side-
channel2.pdf.
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it is possible to obtain access to the memory by bypassing the 
security mechanism on the card.
5. A certification revocation list that is not up-to-date or cannot 
be identified for the recipient of the digital signature to establish 
whether the data in the certificate has been modified.
6. Subverting the ‘root’ key – certification authorities use root 
public keys. Thus, if an attacker can add their own public key to 
the root key list, the attacker can issue its own certificates. These 
certificates will be treated exactly like legitimate certificates.
7. Obtaining access to the certification authority’s private key – 
the secret key of the certification authority is vulnerable to attack. If the private key is stolen, the thief can produce an unlimited 
number of ostensibly valid, but forged certificates.
15.19 From the available case law, it seems that litigation usually centres on 
whether a person used their electronic signature (such as the ATM PIN cases 
and digital signature cases from the Russian Federation), or whether a third 
party used the signature to steal money. The more complex methods outlined in this chapter will probably be rare events, if only because thieves tend to use the 
shortest and easiest methods to steal money or goods.

S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 16, ‘Evidence and digital signatures’, pp. 351–88.
16Evidence and digital signatures
16.1 In the event an electronic signature becomes the subject of a dispute, the normal considerations will apply regarding the submission of evidence into legal proceedings, including any rules relating to the authentication of the evidence, the weight to be given to the evidence and whether it is necessary to help the 
adjudicator in reaching a decision by providing for expert witnesses. This chapter aims to alert the reader to some of the issues that might arise in relation to digital 
signatures in particular.
The evidence forming a digital signature
16.2 A certificate is issued with a digital signature,1 which is a signed data 
structure that binds a public key to an identity. This certificate will purport 
to bind the public key to the information contained in the certificate. The subscribing party provides some of the information contained in the 
certificate, which may or may not be verified by the certification authority, 
and the certification authority is responsible for the remaining information. 
The subscriber will have a pair of keys, private and public. The key pairs may be generated by the keying material available to the subscribing party in their 
computer, by a registration authority, by the certification authority or by a 
trusted third party key generation facility.
16.3 Individuals can create their own private and public key pairs, or key 
generating organizations can undertake this task. The creation and certification 
processes are distinct. The same issues discussed in this chapter will apply to 
keys not certified by a third party, with the added complication that the level of authenticity may be lower because proving who the public key belonged to 
might be more difficult for any person wishing to rely on an uncertified key. How the key pair is generated may also be problematic if there is evidence that the 
software used to generate key pairs has flaws, such as being liable to generate 
weak keys.
Continuity of evidence forming a digital signature
16.4 The links in the continuity of evidence that bind a signature in digital 
format may be complex. The example of the digital signature illustrates the 
complexity of the process and the number of participants. With a digital signature the following set of links may not be unusual:
1 The use of the word ‘certificate’ is shorthand for an individual identity certificate.
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First link: A subscriber enters a contract with a trusted third 
party key generation facility to generate a key pair. This key pair must then be distributed safely: the private and public keys to the 
subscribing party, and the public key to the certification authority.
Second link: The certification authority creates the certificate. 
The subscribing party’s public key must be incorporated into 
the certificate. This is the act of binding the subject name (the 
subscribing party) with their public key. This certificate is then 
digitally signed with the private key of the certification authority 
that issues the certificate.
Third link: Once the certificate has been generated, it must be 
distributed. The methods used include physical delivery, posting 
the certificate in a public repository database to permit recipients 
to obtain access to the certificate over the internet, and distribution 
by means of email.
16.5 When a subscribing party uses their digital signature, a certification authority requires the receiving party to undertake a certain amount of due 
diligence to rely on the promise made in the certificate. Individual certification 
authorities attempt to impose a varying range of obligations on a recipient. In some jurisdictions, the law requires a recipient to undertake an exercise in due diligence, although where a law provides for such a requirement, it is usually 
drafted in general terms. By way of example, s24 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2006 of Antigua and Barbuda provides as follows:
24. A person relying on an electronic signature shall bear the legal consequences of his failure to—
(a) take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b) where an electronic signature is supported by a certificate, take reasonable steps to—
(i) verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the certificate; or
(ii) observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
16.6 For the purpose of this discussion, it will be useful to indicate the range of actions a recipient might be required to undertake if they were obliged to verify 
the certificate used by the sending party.
Verifying the integrity of a certificate
16.7 A recipient can go through a list of checks to assure themselves that the 
certificate links the sending party to the document or message that was signed.
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Verify the certificate path
16.8 To trust the certificate sent by Alice, Bob must check all of the certificates 
back to the root or foundation certificate. Only by checking back to the foundation 
certificate can Bob determine whether he can trust the public key in Alice’s 
certificate in relation to the purpose for which he will use it. The certificate attached to the message or document and the corresponding public key can only 
be trusted if every certificate and their corresponding keys in the path from the 
foundation key to Alice’s key can be trusted. There are two phases to this exercise:
(i) Constructing the path, which requires Bob to bring together 
all the relevant certificates to form a complete path. This process may be complicated and time-consuming, because there may be a 
number of certification authorities in the chain, all of which have 
cross-certified their respective certificates. The assumption is that 
Bob can retrieve all of the certificates he needs to scrutinize them 
and put the chain of certificates together in a logical sequence. Bob 
must also check the issuing certificate of each of the certification 
authorities in the chain against a certificate revocation list.2Validating the path, where Bob must decide whether the path 
between each certificate is valid. This involves undertaking the mathematical computation to verify each digital signature; 
checking the validity period of each certificate for date of expiry; 
making sure each certificate has not been revoked, by checking 
the relevant certification revocation list, and then considering 
other issues such as the policies that apply to the certificate, any restrictions on the use of the key and if there are any other 
constraints on the use of the certificate.3
2 Microsoft offer guidance on this point, but fail to illustrate the complexity of searching 
all of the certificates in a chain, and how to identify where the chain begins and ends. See 
‘How to tell if a digital signature is trustworthy’ online at https://support.office.com/en-us/article/How-to-tell-if-a-digital-signature-is-trustworthy-0464f8ab-fefa-4bc7-af0d-e0
7a12f7097e?CorrelationId=7de8c7fc-375e-4cd2-8f10-26d4824fa4b3&ui=en-US&rs=en-
US&ad=US; to understand the complexity of the task, see E. Barker, Recommendation 
for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications SP 800-89 (National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, November 2006), also M.H.M. Schellekens, Electronic 
Signatures Authentication Technology from a Legal Perspective (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2004), pp. 30–2, K. Schmeh, Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure on the 
Internet (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2001), 19.3.1–19.3.2, and D. Davis, ‘Compliance defects 
in public key cryptography’, Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security 
Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography – Volume 6 (San Jose, CA: Usenix 
Association, 1996), pp. 171–8, for a discussion of some of the defects of PKI, relevant now 
as they were in 1996, available online at http://world.std.com/~dtd/.
3 C. Adams and S. Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, Standards, and Deployment 
Considerations (2nd edn., Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2002), pp. 147–9.
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Other validation requirements
16.9 Once Bob has checked and validated the certificates and certificate path, he must then consider the following checks:
(i) Establish the integrity of the certificate by ensuring the digital 
signature on the certificate is properly verified.
(ii) The certificate validity period must be checked to ensure it is 
valid on the date and the time Bob intends to rely on it.
(iii) Check the certificate has not been revoked. There are various 
methods to implement a certificate revocation list. There are a 
number of variations, including, but not limited to, certificate 
revocation lists (which is a signed data structure that contain a 
list of revoked certificates); certification authority revocation lists, 
used to revoke the public key certificates of certification authorities 
and online certificate status protocol, which is a protocol that 
permits Bob to receive a response to his request for information.
(iv) Check Alice has used the certificate in accordance with 
the constraints set out in the certificate, including the relevant 
agreements and certification policies.
16.10 As a result, when determining the nature of the evidence, it is necessary to ascertain the source of the information and the uses to which the relevant 
document is put. It is worth recalling the nature of the promise made to a 
receiving party when a sending party affixes a digital signature to a document or message:
Bob receives a message digitally signed by Alice with Alice’s digital 
signature certificate attached. Alice’s public key is incorporated into 
the certificate. The certificate purports to bind Alice’s name with her 
public key, and in turn the certificate purports to assure Bob that 
the message was signed using a key verifiable by a key certified in a 
certificate issued to Alice.
16.11 The nature of this promise is well illustrated by the following comment from the Select Committee on Trade and Industry, Seventh Report, House of Commons Session 1998–99, paragraph 12:Written signatures are tightly associated with people and weakly associated with documents, whilst digital signatures are 
tightly bound to documents and weakly bound to individuals (or 
identities).
16.12 The crucial point to remember is that a digital signature does not, of itself, provide evidence that the sending party actually caused the private key of the 
digital signature to be affixed to the message or document. This proposition is 
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relevant in respect of any form of electronic signature. Where a certification authority is involved within the framework of a public key infrastructure, all 
the certification authority can do is give evidence about how the certificate was 
formed, where the information was obtained, and if they verified the information, 
what methods were used to verify the information. Thus a certification authority 
can give evidence as to the formation of the certificate, but the certificate cannot 
be adduced as evidence of the truth of the facts stated within it.
Assertions can differ
16.13 Much will depend on whether the recipient is taking legal action against 
the certification authority, or the purported signer. This, in turn, depends on 
what statement the purported signing party makes about the signature. For 
instance, the statement might be, ‘Yes, that was signed with my private key, 
but not by me or with my authority’. In which case, the certification authority 
is not involved, because there was nothing wrong with its certificate. However, 
it might be, ‘That was signed with a key having nothing to do with me’. In this 
case, the claim is against the certification authority that certified the verification 
key. If the certification authority admits it signed the relevant certificate, then it is irrelevant if the recipient becomes a verifying party and takes action to 
undertake due diligence. The issue is whether it is liable for any errors. If the 
certification authority denies signing the certificate, then the issue may depend 
on which certification authority cross-signed the relevant certificate. It will be 
difficult for a certification authority to admit it is their certificate, but claim that 
it should not be trusted because the verifying party (if the recipient chooses to 
become a verifying party) followed the chain of certificates. It cannot be for a 




16.14 By way of an introduction, there is a term, ‘non-repudiation’, that 
has become part of the vocabulary of digital signatures. This is a dangerous 
expression, and one that lawyers should take particular care in understanding. It does not mean the system for non-repudiation is perfect, although some 
technical authors (and lawyers and academics4) continue to assert that digital 
4 ‘Data encryption’ (The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, no. 270, October 
2006), incorrectly states on p. 2 that digital signatures ‘… can also be used for non-
repudiation: if a party digitally signs an electronic document, they cannot later deny this’; 
R. Low and E. Foo, ‘The susceptibility of digital signatures to fraud in the National Electronic 
Conveyancing System: an analysis’, Australian Property Law Journal, 17 (2009), pp. 303–25 
incorrectly comment, at p. 307, that ‘When the recipient receives the coded summary and 
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signatures are better than they actually are. By way of example, Klaus Schmeh states that:
The purpose of a digital signature is to ensure non-repudiation. This means that Alice cannot contest her completed signature 
in retrospect. When all is said and done, a digital signature is an 
excellent way of meeting this requirement.5
16.15 Francisco Jordan-Fernádez and Jordi Buch i Tarrats observe that:
The most important benefit electronic signatures brings to e-commerce and all electronic transactional systems is that they 
cannot be repudiated. This service provides evidentiary value that 
proves that the data has been created by a specific entity and has not been altered since the date of its creation, thereby guaranteeing 
its irrefutability.6
16.16 Professor Sorge states:The private key, which is to be kept secret, is used by the signatory 
to sign messages; signatures can be verified with the corresponding 
public key. Successful verification of a digital signature guarantees 
integrity and authenticity of the corresponding message. Non-
repudiation is also achieved, i.e. it can be proven that the message 
was signed by the signatory.7
the certificate, the recipient can use the CA’s public key to verify the CA’s signature on 
the certificate. If that is successful, the recipient can have confidence that the sender’s 
public key is what it purports to be, that is, the sender’s public key actually did come from 
the sender’; R. Wacks, Privacy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
incorrectly states at pp. 25–6 that ‘The advantage of a public key system is that if you are able to decrypt the message, you know that it could only have been created by the 
sender’; M. Bromby, ‘Identification, trust and privacy: how biometrics can aid certification of digital signatures, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 24 (2010), pp. 
133–41 incorrectly states ‘Parties involved in such an electronic communication cannot 
deny their involvement subsequently’ at p. 135; A. Tauber, P. Kustor and B. Karning, ‘Cross-
border certified electronic mailing: a European perspective’, Computer Law & Security 
Review, 29 (2013), pp. 28–39, in which the authors fail to indicate the issues relating to 
‘non-repudiation’.5 Schmeh, Cryptography, 16.1.1.
6 ‘Electronic signature today: a manufacturer’s viewpoint’, Upgrade, 5 (2004), pp. 23–7 at 
p. 24. See also an early paper by R. Clarke, ‘Conventional public key infrastructure: an 
artefact ill-fitted to the needs of the information society’, prepared for submission to the 
‘IS in the Information Society’ track of the European Conference on Information Systems 
(ECIS 2001), Bled, Slovenia, 27–29 June 2001, available at http://www.rogerclarke.com/
II/PKIMisFit.html.
7 C. Sorge, ‘The legal classification of identity-based signatures’, Computer Law & Security 
Review, 30 (2014), pp. 126–36, at p. 126.
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16.17 None of these statements are correct.
16.18 When engineers use the term non-repudiation in an engineering sense, they mean that there is a degree of probability or certainty that the protocol can demonstrate that one item of software communicated with another item of 
software, or to put it another way, ‘Nonrepudiation provides proof of the integrity 
and origin of data that can be verified by a third party’.8 Many technicians assert that non-repudiation is a fact: that is, once the software proves that a message or document was sent and received, it follows that a human being caused the 
message to be sent. Such an assertion is not logical, and is misleading. This reasoning is often extended from the engineering domain into the legal domain, by asserting that if the system can demonstrate that one item of software communicated with another item of software, that is, that digital data comprising a message or document was sent or received, it is for the purported sender to 
demonstrate that they caused it to be sent. The purpose of the concept is to bind 
users to specific actions in such a way that if they deny taking the action, they either demonstrate an intention to deceive, or they have been negligent in failing 
to secure the use of their private key adequately. The use of the term is inherently 
misleading. The logic is as follows:It is proven that certain items of software communicated, each 
with the other. (A message was sent from Alice’s computer 
to Bob’s computer, and Alice’s private key was affixed to the 
communication).It follows that the purported sender caused the software to 
communicate. (Ergo, Alice affixed the private key to the message).
16.19 The purpose of the term non-repudiation is to provide for causation, 
which it cannot. It is possible that Alice’s computer, from which the message was 
purported to have been sent, was located in San Antonio. At the material time, Alice might have been physically located in Irkutsh, and did not have access to the internet, ruling out that she could obtain access to her computer remotely to 
undertake the requisite action.
16.20 It is generally assumed that non-repudiation has a legal effect: that is, 
a person cannot deny causing the software to send a message or document. 
However, a signature can be challenged for a number of reasons. The most pertinent is where the purported sender claims that they did not cause the 
electronic signature to be affixed to the message or document, as in the case of 
Dara O’Reilly, whose digital signature was used on two occasions in India in a 
8 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, ‘Information security: 
advances and remaining challenges to adoption of public key infrastructure technology’, 
GAO-01-277 (2001), p. 18.
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complex property transaction. He denied using the digital signature.9 In effect, 
there is a claim that the signature is a forgery. In such circumstances, the fact 
that a message or document was sent might not be at issue. The dispute often 
turns on whether the sender caused the signature to be affixed to the message or 
document.10 In such instances, it is for the party relying on the signature to prove the message or document was sent, and that the purported sender caused their 
electronic signature to be affixed.
16.21 Other examples where the signature may be in dispute are where the sender accepts the message or document was sent with an electronic signature, but the signature was obtained as a result of unconscionable conduct by a party 
to a transaction, fraud instigated by a third party, or undue influence exerted by a 
third party, amongst other reasons recognised in law. It will be for the adjudicator 
to determine whether a particular argument is credible. That the sender caused 
the signature to be affixed to a message or document may not be in issue.
16.22 It is important to ensure the technical meaning does not override the 
need to restrain the meaning within a legal context. Where engineers use the term, it should not be mistaken that they are using it in a legal context, despite a general misunderstanding in the view of some engineers that the term should 
have a legal meaning. Even where the evidence demonstrates that a message or 
document was sent or received with an electronic signature affixed, it does not 
follow that the message was sent by the person whose username or password (or 
both username and password) was used at the material time, nor signed by them. 
Carl Ellison of Intel Laboratories in his paper ‘Improvements on conventional PKI 
wisdom’ has dismissed these arguments by technicians about non-repudiation.11 
The comments in paragraph 3.4.3 entitled ‘Not Achievable’ demonstrate the vacuity of the link between evidence that software has communicated with software, and the assertion that such evidence is therefore proof that a particular person caused a machine to undertake a particular action:The main problem with the theory of non-repudiation is that it is 
not technically achievable. That is, the intention is to bind a human 
being to a digitally signed document. With a holographic signature 
9 D. McDonald, ‘Sean Quinn aide at centre of mystery over $90m asset’, Irish Independent, 23 
August 2012, available at http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/sean-quinn-aide-
at-centre-of-mystery-over-90m-asset-26889961.html.10 For the cases where private keys were used without the authority or authorization of the person to whom the private key was linked, see the banking cases from the Russian 
Federation: O.I. Kudryavtseva, ‘Russia’, in S. Mason (ed.), International Electronic Evidence 
(London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008); O.I. Kudryavtseva, 
‘The use of electronic digital signatures in banking relationships in the Russian Federation’, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 51–7; Resolution of the 
Federal Arbitration Court of Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 N КГ-А 40/8531-03-П, 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), pp. 149–51.11 First Annual PKI Research Workshop – April 2002, available online at http://www.
cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/.
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on a paper document, the human’s hand came in contact with the 
paper of the document. With a digital signature there is machinery between the human and the signed document: at least a keyboard, 
software (to display the document and to drive the signature 
process) and a key storage and use facility (e.g., a smart card).No one has demonstrated, in the normal computer for home or 
office use, the prevention of introduction of hostile software. To the contrary, we have seen a steady increase in such incursions 
over the years.There are secure facilities for key storage and use, but no mechanism that an average home or small business user would 
choose to buy has been proved secure.Meanwhile, computers are not restricted to isolated rooms with 
card access entry, raised floors, guards outside the glass walls, etc., that they might have been in the 1970s when much of this thinking 
about public key cryptography had its nascence. Computers are not only everywhere; they are unprotected to a continually increasing 
degree. Therefore, even if the computer has no hostile software and its private key is kept in a truly secure facility, access to the 
keyboard of that computer is not limited to the person certified to 
be associated with that private key.What might make this process of non-repudiation work would be hardware that would serve as a witness to a signature, providing 
tamper-proof evidence of the actions of a human being (e.g., 
through videotape), of what that human was reading and of the 
human’s positive action to assent to the displayed document. Such a log of human behavior could then be presented in court to prove 
the claim of non-repudiation.Of course, if such hardware were available, then we would not need digital signatures, much less the assumption of non-repudiation 
on digital signatures.
16.23 This point is also considered in a slightly different way by Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier and Tadayoshi Kohno:12
In theory, a PKI should provide you with nonrepudiation. Once Alice has signed a message with her key, she should not be able to 
later deny that she signed the message. A key server system can never provide this; the central server has access to the same key that Alice uses and can therefore forge an arbitrary message to 
make it look as if Alice sent it. In real life, nonrepudiation doesn’t 
12 N. Ferguson, B. Schneier and T. Kohno, Cryptography Engineering: Design Principles and 
Practical Applications, (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 2010), 19.9 bullet point 3.
Electronic signatures in law360
work because people cannot store their secret keys sufficiently 
well. If Alice wants to deny that she signed a message, she is simply going to claim that a virus infected her machine and stole her 
private key.
16.24 In 2000, Carl Ellison and Bruce Schneier wrote on the same topic:13
Alice’s digital signature does not prove that Alice signed the 
message, only that her private key did. When writing about non-repudiation, cryptographic theorists often ignore a messy detail 
that lies between Alice and her key: her computer. If her computer were appropriately infected, the malicious code could use her key 
to sign documents without her knowledge or permission. Even 
if she needed to give explicit approval for each signature (for 
example, via a fingerprint scanner), the malicious code could wait until she approved a signature and sign its own message instead 
of hers. If the private key is not in tamper-resistant hardware, the 
malicious code can steal the key as soon as it’s used.
While it’s legitimate to ignore such details in cryptographic research literature, it is just plain wrong to assume that real 
computer systems implement the theoretical ideal. Our computers 
may contain viruses. They may be accessible to passers-by who could plant malicious code or manually sign messages with our 
keys. Should we then need to deny some signature, we would have 
the burden of proving the negative — that we didn’t make the 
signature in question against the presumption that we did.
16.25 Where the party whose private key is used denies they caused the private 
key to be affixed to the data, it is for the party relying on the signature to prove 
the signing party caused the private key to sign the data. The burden of proof will 
depend on the pleadings and what presumptions, if any, apply.
16.26 The term ‘cryptographic non-repudiation’ means being able to prove that 
where a digital signature verifies a public key, then the associated private key made that signature: it does not prove that the person whose private key is used 
caused the private key to make the signature.14 However, non-repudiation is of no 
benefit without a secure time stamping service to demonstrate that a particular 
event occurred at a given time and date, or that a specific item of data existed 
before a specific date. This technical meaning of the term has begun to be used in a legal sense by vendors of the public key infrastructure, which in turn has 
tended to confuse legislators.15
13 C. Ellison and B. Schneier, ‘Risks of PKI: e-commerce’, Communications of the ACM, 43 
(2000), p. 152.14 Adams and Lloyd, Understanding PKI Concepts, pp. 32–3, 51–3.15 B. Schneier, Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley, 
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Rejecting electronic signatures
16.27 A fundamental issue with respect to electronic signatures is the connection 
between the mental state of the person who may wish to be bound by the affixing 
of the electronic signature to a communication or document, and the act of affixing 
the electronic signature. The following issues are pertinent when establishing a nexus between the electronic communication and the electronic signature:Whether the genuine user intended to be bound by the contents of 
the electronic document.
If another person used the private key (or form of electronic 
signature) without authorization, how they obtained access to the 
key.
Who should bear responsibility for the unauthorized use.
16.28 The party challenging the admissibility of the electronic signature may be making either one or all of the following claims:
The security used by the sender was not sufficient to prevent a third party from gaining access to their computer or system and 
making improper use of their key or password.
The procedures and technical abilities (such as the means of 
producing, communicating or verifying the signature) of the 
trusted third party or card issuer were at fault.Another organization in the chain that links the sending of the 
certificate and its receipt by the relying party, other than the 
trusted third party, was at fault.
16.29 There is no doubt that the technology can, to a high degree of probability, 
prove that an electronic signature was affixed to a communication, but it cannot 
prove who made the signature. Given the state of the technology, it may be 
reasonable to infer that the holder named in the certificate (or the person whose 
name is typed at the bottom of an email) affixed the electronic signature to the 
communication. However, the inference is weaker where there is little or no 
security in place on the computer or system upon which the private key sits.16
Reliability of certifying certificates
16.30 Regardless of the technical meaning of the term ‘non-repudiation’, there are a number of problems that affect the reliability of systems that are used to 
affix digital signatures to an electronic communication:
2000), p. 235 and A. McCullagh and W. Caelli, ‘Non-repudiation in the digital environment’, 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/778/687.16 M. Sneddon, Legal liability and e-transactions (Canberra: National Office for the Information 
Economy, 2000), paragraph 3.2 (b)(i), available online at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan014676.pdf.
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(i) The confusing design on the screen, which can lead a user to 
activate the signing function without knowing the significance 
others attach to the signature.
(ii) The software application may be set to send a receipt, but the 
recipient may not know the original sender sent the receipt. This 
also raises the question as to whether the receipt is authentic.
(iii) A design flaw in the public key infrastructure.
(iv) The open nature of the internet, which means hackers could insert malicious software into computers that can be designed to steal private keys or relay the keystrokes of the user, thereby 
obtaining the passwords used to obtain access to a private key.
16.31 The general rule with respect to signed documents is this: a person is normally bound by their signature to a document, even if they fail to read and 
understand the content. Where a party relies on a signed document and wishes to enforce it against the signing party, the relying party must prove the signature 
is that of the signing party, or the signing party authorized the document. This is the case where the signing party claims they did not sign the document, or if they did sign the document, they signed the document under duress, or because 
of the fraud of a third party. It is not for the signing party to prove that they did 
not authorise the document or sign it.
16.32 A person has a defence where they have been misled into signing a document that is essentially different to that which they intended to sign, a state of affairs that has usually, but not always, been induced by a fraud perpetrated 
upon the party signing the document.17 However, this does not mean that a 
person should fail to exercise care when they affix their signature to a document 
in the absence of a fundamental mistake as to the content of the document. This occurred in Saunders v. Anglia Building Society,18 where Mrs Gallie signed what she understood was a deed of gift of her house to her nephew, but it was, in fact, 
a deed of assignment to a third party. Mrs Gallie raised the defence that she thought the effect of the document was to give her house to her nephew, but in 
fact it assigned her rights to a fraudulent third party. The members of the House of Lords agreed that the identity of the person to whom the house was assigned 
did not make the deed totally different in character to the document Mrs Gallie 
intended to sign, and her defence failed. Lord Hodson offered the following observations 1019E respecting the use of a signature:Want of care on the part of the person who signs a document 
which he afterwards seeks to disown is relevant. The burden of proving non est factum is on the party disowning his signature; 
17 In United Dominions Trust Ltd v. Western [1976] QB 513 a party signed a blank hire-
purchase proposal form, and the dealer inserted incorrect figures before sending it to the 
finance company.18 [1971] AC 1004; [1970] 3 WLR 1078; 114 SJ 885; [1970] 3 All ER 961.
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this includes proof that he or she took care. There is no burden on 
the opposite party to prove want of care. The word ‘negligence’ in this connection does not involve the proposition that want of 
care is irrelevant unless there can be found a specific duty to the 
opposite party to take care.
16.33 In his judgment, Viscount Dilhorne agreed with the comments made by 
Lord Hodson, and commented, at 1023(E):In every case the person who signs the document must exercise reasonable care, and what amounts to reasonable care will depend on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the document 
which it is thought is being signed. It is reasonable to expect that more care should be exercised if the document is thought to be of 
an important character than if it is not.
The burden of proof – UNCITRAL
16.34 It has been suggested that the technical meaning of ‘non-repudiation’ has the effect of either shifting the onus of proof from the recipient of the alleged 
electronic signature, or denying the right of the user of the certifying certificate 
to repudiate the certificate.19 Whilst it is clear that ‘non-repudiation’ has different meanings in the legal sense and the technical sense, there is a further difference 
between the two. That is, the technical meaning relates to events that have taken place after the signature has taken place, and has no relation to the actual 
mechanism of the affixing of the digital certificate.
16.35 The development of the two sets of uniform rules prepared by UNCITRAL, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures, have influenced the legislation relating to electronic signatures 
implemented by states.20 In particular, both Model laws provide for the duties of 
the participants when using electronic signatures.
Model Law on Electronic Commerce
16.36 Of relevance are the provisions of article 13 to the Model Law. Note 83 
to the Guide to Enactment indicates that article 13 originates in article 5 of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers. This defines the 
19 McCullagh and Caelli, ‘Non-repudiation in the digital environment’.20 The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was adopted by the Commission on 12 June 
1996, following its 605th meeting, which in turn was adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 51/162 at its 85th plenary meeting on 16 December 1996, and includes an additional article 5 bis as adopted by the Commission at its 31st meeting in June 1998. The Model Law on Electronic Signatures was adopted by the Commission at its 727th meeting 
on 5 July 2001.
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obligations of the sender of a payment order. Bearing in mind such a transfer would normally be subject to a contractual agreement between the parties, setting 
out the technical procedures agreed between each party (and any other parties 
in the chain) for such a transfer, it seems improbable that such a provision should 
affect a public key infrastructure which uses the open network of the internet. However, the text of article 13 is of interest, because the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was developed on the premise that it could have been incorporated 
into an extended version of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Article 13 provides for a presumption that presumably must be rebuttable relating to the originator of a data message:21
Article 13. Attribution of data messages
(1) A data message is that of the originator if it was sent by the 
originator itself.
(2) As between the originator and the addressee, a data message is deemed to be that of the originator if it was sent:
(a) by a person who had the authority to act on behalf of the originator in respect of that data message; or
(b) by an information system programmed by, or on behalf 
of, the originator to operate automatically.
(3) As between the originator and the addressee, an addressee is entitled to regard a data message as being that of the originator, and to act on that assumption, if:
(a) in order to ascertain whether the data message was that of the originator, the addressee properly applied a procedure previously agreed to by the originator for that purpose; or
(b) the data message as received by the addressee resulted from the actions of a person whose relationship with the originator or with any agent of the originator enabled that person to gain access to a method used by the originator to 
identify data messages as its own.…
(5) Where a data message is that of the originator or is deemed to be that of the originator, or the addressee is entitled to act on that assumption, then, as between the originator and the addressee, the addressee is entitled to regard the data message as received as being what the originator intended to send, and to act on that 
assumption. The addressee is not so entitled when it knew or should have known, had it exercised reasonable care or used any agreed procedure, that the transmission resulted in any error in 
the data message as received.
21 Guide to Enactment paragraph 65.
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16.37 It is pertinent to observe the points made in the notes to Enactment in 
relation to the provisions of article 13. Guidance note 83 states that it is not the purpose of article 13 to assign responsibility between the parties, rather the purpose of the Article is to deal… with attribution of data messages by establishing a presumption that under certain circumstances a data message would be considered as a message of the originator, and goes on to qualify that presumption in case the addressee knew or ought to have 
known that the data message was not that of the originator.
16.38 Earlier drafts of article 13 included, according to Guidance note 92, 
an additional paragraph, ‘… expressing the principle that the attribution of authorship of a data message to the originator should not interfere with the legal consequences of that message, which should be determined by other applicable 
rules of national law’. Whilst the article does not expressly make this point, 
nevertheless it seems clear from the provisions of article 13(1) that the onus of 
proof appears to alter between the parties. The logic can be described as follows:
If a user chooses to publish a verification key, it is assumed that 
when it is used, it will have been used by the user. It is presumed that the user, once they have a digital signature, will ensure that 
only they or a person authorized to use the signature will use it.Where a recipient wishes to rely upon the digital signature, provided they carry out adequate procedures to demonstrate 
the authenticity of the certifying certificate under article 13 (3)
(b) and (5)22 (i.e. undertake the verifying procedures set out for 
a digital signature), the recipient, thereupon becoming a verifying party, is permitted to assume the digital signature is that of the 
sender. In this instance, the recipient is under a duty to carry out 
such procedures. By undertaking such actions, the verifying party may be taken to have accepted there is a direct link between the 
certificate (if a digital signature is used) and the sender. It can be 
argued that the verifying party will be deemed to have satisfied themselves that they could rely on the relationship between the 
certificate and the affixing of the signature to the message, above 
and beyond the promise made by the certification authority, that 
can only promise that the message was signed using a certificate 
issued to the user.
16.39 However, should the sender dispute they sent the message with the electronic signature attached, it must be, in the ordinary course of events, for the 
recipient to prove the sender sent the message.
22 The provisions of Article 13(3)(a) will not apply unless the originating party agreed with the receiving party in advance what, if any, procedure the recipient should undertake 
before relying on the signature.
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Model Law on Electronic Signatures
16.40 Further guidance is also available from the Model Law on Electronic 
Signatures. The Model Law does not deal in detail about the issues of liability that may affect the participants of an electronic signature, but it does consider 
the relationship between signatory and the certification authority by outlining 
the expected conduct that each should undertake in their respective roles.23 The provisions of article 8 refer to the conduct of the signatory, as follows:Conduct of the signatory
1. Where signature creation data can be used to create a signature that has legal effect, each signatory shall:
(a) Exercise reasonable care to avoid unauthorized use of its signature creation data;
(b) Without undue delay, utilize means made available by 
the certification service provider pursuant to article 9 of this Law, or otherwise use reasonable efforts, to notify any person that may reasonably be expected by the signatory to rely on or to provide services in support of the electronic signature if:
(i) The signatory knows that the signature creation data have been compromised; or
(ii) The circumstances known to the signatory give rise to a substantial risk that the signature creation data may have been compromised;
(c) Where a certificate is used to support the electronic signature, exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and completeness of all material representations made by 
the signatory that are relevant to the certificate throughout 
its life cycle or that are to be included in the certificate.
2. A signatory shall bear the legal consequences of its failure to 
satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.
16.41 There is a requirement that where a party decides to use an electronic signature, especially when in digital format using the public key infrastructure, they are expected to take reasonable care to protect the signature creation data 
and prevent unauthorized use of the signature creation data. The aim in drafting 
the provisions of articles 8, 9 and 11 is to provide a minimal ‘code of conduct’ 
for the parties involved with the use of an electronic signature.24 Subparagraphs 
(a) and (c) apply to all forms of electronic signature, whilst subparagraph (c) 
23 Guide to Enactment paragraph 77 also states that the issues relating to liability are left to 
applicable law.24 Guide to Enactment paragraph 137.
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only applies to digital certificates supported by a certificate. The use of the 
word ‘reasonable’ in this article illustrates the need for individual states to 
define what will be considered reasonable in the light of a dispute occurring. The provision of paragraph 2 leaves it to a national court to determine what, if any, legal consequences will follow where a signing party fails to take care under 
the provisions of paragraph 1(a) or fails to inform receiving parties where their 
signature creation device has been used without authority or compromised.
16.42 A similar duty is held to be necessary for the relying party (a person only 
becomes a relying party if they decide to verify the signature and certificate) as set out in article 11:Conduct of the relying partyA relying party shall bear the legal consequences of its failure:
(a) To take reasonable steps to verify the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b) Where an electronic signature is supported by a 
certificate, to take reasonable steps:
(i) To verify the validity, suspension or revocation of the 
certificate; and
(ii) To observe any limitation with respect to the certificate.
16.43 Interestingly, article 2(f) of the Model Law does not distinguish between a recipient that relies on an electronic signature and a recipient that undertakes to 
verify the authenticity of an electronic signature. The meaning of a relying party 
is ‘a person that may act on the basis of a certificate or an electronic signature’. Thus a relying party may decide to act on the basis of an electronic signature, but 
is not required to undertake any verification procedures. Note 148 in the Guide to 
Enactment identifies and separates two issues: whether the electronic signature is valid, and whether it is reasonable for a recipient to rely on an electronic 
signature that does not reach the standard set out in article 6. The note indicates that the intention is for the recipient to bear in mind whether and to what extent 
they should rely on the signature. The validity of the signature should not depend 
on the conduct of the recipient, although it is debatable whether certification 
authorities, in drafting their terms of trade and certification practice statements, 
have fully grasped this point (or if they have, they ignore it). A close look at the provisions of article 6 will help to illuminate the underlying foundations relating to the validity of an electronic signature:Compliance with a requirement for a signature
1. Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if an electronic signature is used that is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the 
light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
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2. Paragraph 1 applies whether the requirement referred to therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides 
consequences for the absence of a signature.
3. An electronic signature is considered to be reliable for the purpose of satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1 if:
(a) The signature creation data are, within the context in which they are used, linked to the signatory and to no other person;
(b) The signature creation data were, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory and of no other person;
(c) Any alteration to the electronic signature, made after the time of signing, is detectable; and
(d) Where a purpose of the legal requirement for a signature is to provide assurance as to the integrity of the information to which it relates, any alteration made to that information 
after the time of signing is detectable.
4. Paragraph 3 does not limit the ability of any person:
(a) To establish in any other way, for the purpose of satisfying the requirement referred to in paragraph 1, the reliability of an electronic signature; or
(b) To adduce evidence of the non-reliability of an electronic 
signature.
16.44 The provisions of this article are considered central to the Model Law, and 
add to article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce. The intention is to 
offer guidance as to how the test of reliability in paragraph 1(b) of article 7 can be 
satisfied.25 Article 7 of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce reads as follows:
Article 7. Signature
(1) Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data message if:
(a) a method is used to identify that person and to indicate 
that person’s approval of the information contained in the data message; and
(b) that method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, 
including any relevant agreement.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides 
consequences for the absence of a signature.
25 Guide to Enactment paragraph 115.
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16.45 The intention behind the drafting of article 6 is to establish criteria that would apply to the technical form of an electronic signature that establishes 
certain legal effects. Legal effects would follow from electronic signature techniques that were recognized as reliable, and there would be no legal effect where an electronic signature technique was of lesser reliability than a 
reliable technique.26 The provision of article 7 paragraph 1(a) of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce will produce a legal effect, no matter what form the 
electronic signature takes. However, it follows that what will constitute a reliable method of signature in the light of the circumstances will depend on what the trier of a fact will determine after the signature was used – perhaps months, if 
not years after its use. As a result, the intention behind the drafting article 6(3) 
in the Model Law on Electronic Signatures is to create a benefit in favour of 
particular types of techniques for affixing electronic signatures to a document or 
message. Thus the intention is to provide for the legal effect of, primarily, a digital signature, although it is left to the individual state to establish the legal effects 
and whether a presumption should apply.27 The aim of article 6 is to provide for 
a presumption that the signatory, when they affix their electronic signature to a document or message, is presumed to have approved the linking of their identity 
with the data contained in the document or message.28 It is not a presumption 
that the person who has signed the data is in fact the signatory.29 Legal effects 
will only flow from the affixing of the signature if the nature of the document or message and surrounding circumstances indicate such an inference should be so 
drawn.30
16.46 The third party to a digital signature is the certification authority. The 
Model Law, in article 9, sets out the type of conduct expected of a certification 
authority.
Conduct of the certification service provider
1. Where a certification service provider provides services to support an electronic signature that may be used for legal effect as 
a signature, that certification service provider shall:
(a) Act in accordance with representations made by it with respect to its policies and practices;
(b) Exercise reasonable care to ensure the accuracy and 
26 Guide to Enactment paragraph 118.27 Guide to Enactment paragraph 119.28 This encompasses the use of corporate signature creation data, where several employees 
share the same method of creating a corporate signature. As a signature is created, so the data must be capable of identifying the particular individual that created the signature 
data (Guide to Enactment paragraph 121).29 This point is made in paragraph 78 to the Guide to Enactment, although the observation 
is made that ‘At best, the digital signature provides assurance that it is attributable to the 
signatory’.30 Guide to Enactment paragraph, 120.
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completeness of all material representations made by it 
that are relevant to the certificate throughout its life cycle 
or that are included in the certificate;
(c) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a 
relying party to ascertain from the certificate:
(i) The identity of the certification service provider;
(ii) That the signatory that is identified in the 
certificate had control of the signature creation data 
at the time when the certificate was issued;
(iii) That signature creation data were valid at or 
before the time when the certificate was issued;
(d) Provide reasonably accessible means that enable a relying party to ascertain, where relevant, from the 
certificate or otherwise:
(i) The method used to identify the signatory;
(ii) Any limitation on the purpose or value for which 
the signature creation data or the certificate may be used;
(iii) That the signature creation data are valid and have not been compromised;
(iv) Any limitation on the scope or extent of liability 
stipulated by the certification service provider;
(v) Whether means exist for the signatory to give 
notice pursuant to article 8, paragraph 1 (b), of this Law;
(vi) Whether a timely revocation service is offered;
(e) Where services under subparagraph (d) (v) are offered, provide a means for a signatory to give notice pursuant to 
article 8, paragraph 1 (b), of this Law and, where services 
under subparagraph (d) (vi) are offered, ensure the availability of a timely revocation service;
(f) Utilize trustworthy systems, procedures and human 
resources in performing its services.
2. A certification service provider shall bear the legal consequences 
of its failure to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1.
16.47 A certification authority is expected to undertake its obligations as 
described in its own terms and policies. Paragraph 1(c) sets out what is considered to be one of the essential contents of the Model Law, and in relation to digital signatures, it is necessary to be able to associate the signatory with the 
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public key as well as with the private key.31 Note 146 of the Guide to Enactment indicates that it was originally considered necessary to address the issues of 
liability, but it has now been left to individual states to determine.
The burden of proof
16.48 In the light of the guidance provided by the UNCITRAL Model Laws, it seems self-evident that there is a need to consider how to allocate liability for 
an electronic signature between the participating parties. A person has total control over the use of their manuscript signature, and the legal rules that 
apply to manuscript signatures reflect this physical reality. However, once the accepted format of the signature changes, so it may be considered appropriate, depending on the nature of the transaction, for the legal rules that apply to the 
new format of signature to reflect the different range of risks associated with the 
new manifestation of signature. Consider the example of Charles Goodman, the solicitor who used a rubber stamp to sign a letter that accompanied his bill of 
costs.32 Although the control of the rubber stamp was not the subject of judicial 
comment, Evershed MR noted at 554, that Mr Goodman ‘… kept the stamp locked 
up in his own room so as to be available only for his own use’. Although neither 
Mr Goodman’s actions nor the comment by Evershed MR make an explicit point about taking reasonable care of the rubber stamp, nevertheless the implication 
that the rubber stamp should be kept safe is obvious. It is clear that Mr Goodman took reasonable care to ensure only he had access to the rubber stamp, and the observation by Evershed MR implied that this made the use of the rubber 
stamp acceptable as a method of authenticating documents. If Evershed MR had considered the matter further, he might have reached the conclusion that there is a reasonable expectation in circumstances where a person decides to use a rubber stamp as a form of signature, that they can be expected, as a rule of law, to provide for the security of the use of the signature, and to take appropriate steps 
to guard against its use by unauthorized persons.
16.49 Williams J discussed this point in the case of Robb v. The Pennsylvania 
Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities,33 discussed below. The matter 
of the security of a rubber stamp was also mentioned briefly in British Estate 
Investment Society Ltd v. Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes)34 where an Additional 
Commissioner regularly used a rubber stamp to sign significant volumes of 
documents. In his judgment, Danckwerts J mentioned the measures taken in 
the office to provide for the safety and unauthorized use of the rubber stamp.35 
31 Guide to Enactment, paragraph 143.32 Goodman v. J Eban Limited [1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 1 All ER 763; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.33 40 W.N.C. 129, 3 Pa.Super. 254, 1897 WL 3989 (Pa.Super. 1897) affirmed by186 Pa. 456, 40 
A. 969, for dissenting opinion, see 186 Pa. 456, 41 A. 49.34 (1954 – 1958) 37 Tax Cas 79; [1956] TR 397; 35 ATC 413; 50 R & IT 33.35 (1954 – 1958) 37 Tax Cas 79 at 87.
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Once again, there is no explicit mention of the need for a signing party to provide 
for the security of the rubber stamp and to protect it against misuse. However, the action of the signing party in providing for the security of the rubber stamp suggests that, even without a rule of law requiring them to take steps to secure the rubber stamp, they took such precautions because the nature of the instrument thus created permits others to use a recognized means of identifying 
and authenticating a document. If this train of thought is accepted, a number of points can be made in support of the requirements required by the UNCITRAL 
Model Laws and the contractual obligations that certification authorities seek to impose on subscribing parties and receiving parties, as follows:
(i) The evidence from Charles Goodman in Goodman v. J Eban Limited and of the Additional Commissioner in British Estate Investment 
Society Ltd v. Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes) demonstrates that when the signing party acquired a rubber stamp as a means of 
affixing their signature to a document, they took appropriate 
precautions to safeguard it from misuse and theft.
(ii) The comments by Evershed MR36 and Danckwerts J37 imply that the authorized use of the rubber stamp rested on the care with which the signing party took of the item, and because the security 
of the rubber stamp was assured, the signature affixed to the 
document by the rubber stamp was authentic and therefore valid.
(iii) In the event the recipient doubted the authenticity of the signature, they can undertake their own form of due diligence to 
verify the authenticity and validity of the signature. This point was made by Romer LJ at 564 in Goodman v. J Eban Limited where he 
pointed out that ‘If in fact his clients entertained any doubt as to the authenticity of the letter, nothing could be easier than to ask him, by 
telephone or letter, to confirm it.’ Whilst the point made by Romer LJ is an explicit instruction as to what action the recipient could take, 
the comment was not necessarily meant to form a legal rule.
16.50 Although none of the comments made by the judges in these two cases 
are sufficient to form a rule of law in relation to such matters, nevertheless they recognized that where technology is used to provide a substitute for so physical 
an act as the affixing of a manuscript signature to a document, new considerations relating to the presumptions that should apply to alternative methods of applying 
a signature must be considered.
16.51 In light of the decision of Waller J in Standard Bank London Limited v. Bank 
of Tokyo Limited,38 it appears that this train of thought may have already been 
36 Goodman v. J Eban Limited [1954] 1 QB 550 at 554.37 British Estate Investment Society Ltd v. Jackson (H M Inspector of Taxes) (1954 – 1958) 37 
Tax Cas 79 at 87.38 [1995] CLC 496; [1996] 1 CTLR T-17.
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adopted in England and Wales. In this case, the Bank of Tokyo in Kuala Lumpur arranged for three tested telexes to be sent to Standard, containing a secret 
code confirming and authenticating the authorized signatory of three letters of 
credit with a total face value of US$19.8m, and confirming that the Bank of Tokyo 
accepted all responsibilities and liabilities under those letters of credit. Evidence 
was adduced to indicate that banks not only used this system with confidence, 
but also used it to avoid arguments about authority. In this instance, the tested 
telexes were sent fraudulently.
16.52 The main thrust of the Bank of Tokyo’s case was this: because they could establish that a thief must have been working in their tested telex department, 
Standard could only rely upon the apparent authority of the tested telexes. As a result, it argued that there was a lower test to establish the lack of apparent 
authority. Waller J disagreed with this argument at 502C, because the issue was not reliance on apparent authority:
Standard rely first on a general representation by BOT that if a telex comes by tested telex that telex will be duly authorised by 
BOT (that representation on any view is authorised);second they rely on the use of the tested telex mechanism itself as representing that the telex is authorised as the previous representation stated that it would be; andthirdly they rely on the statement in the telex as being the 
authorised statement of BOT.
16.53 The Bank of Tokyo was found liable for negligent misrepresentation because the tested telexes could not have been sent without negligence on the 
bank’s part. Whether Standard had a duty to inquire into the authenticity of 
the tested telexes depended on the circumstances of each case.39 Tested telexes 
contain codes or tests, which are secret between the sender and the recipient. This allows the recipient to accept without question that the telex was sent by 
and with the authority of the sender. The tested telexes in this instance were sent through other banks, because the Bank of Tokyo in Kuala Lumpur did not have a 
means of directly authenticating telexes between itself and Standard. By sending tested telexes, banks intend the receiving bank to act on the content without 
further instructions. This means the receiving bank requires the sending bank to 
confirm the person signing the document is an authorized signatory, verify the 
signatory is authorized to sign the particular document, and provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the recipient that the sending bank authorized the sending 
of the telex.
16.54 Superficially, there is a similarity between the circumstances of this case and the public key infrastructure, where the authentication process has to go 
through so many channels. However, there is a distinction between a tested telex 
produced in a bank and the public key infrastructure. The authority of a telex 
39 [1995] CLC 496 at 501H.
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is reliant upon internal systems within the bank.40 No third party is involved in 
identifying the sender of the telex or authenticating the codes or text sent. In addition, the tested telex is sent through other banks over apparently secure 
lines of communication. Conversely, the public key infrastructure operates over 
the internet, which was designed to be open and is, therefore, insecure. The link between the identity and authentication of a user of an electronic signature is 
not as cohesive as between such trusted parties as banks. There are significantly more links, which neither party has control over, in the chain between the 
sending party and receiving party of an electronic signature. As a result, it can 
be argued that there is a distinction between what can be termed a ‘secure or 
closed communication system’ and an ‘open communications system’. Clearly the burden of proving that an electronic signature was used without authority must 
be borne by either the user or the relying party. In this instance, Waller J took the view that the sender was in full control of the environment in which the tested 
telex was sent, and decided that the burden should fall on the sender.
16.55 In the context of an open insecure network, however, different criteria 
might, based upon the protection of the consumer, be applied by the courts. Private individuals are encouraged to use inherently insecure personal computers for digital signatures at the request of parties that intend to rely on such signatures, 
such as governments and commercial entities. It will be interesting to know if the government carries out the duties of a verifying party each time a subject 
communicates with a department electronically.
The recipient’s procedural and due diligence burden
16.56 Whether it is for the user, when using an electronic signature, to bear such 
a burden, is debatable. If it is accepted that the recipient is required to establish 
whether they could rely on the certificate in all the circumstances, they may be required to provide any or all of the evidence discussed above in relation to 
verifying the integrity of a certificate, depending on the nature of the challenge. Providing the recipient has carried out all the relevant checks required, it is possible to argue that it has discharged what can be described as a procedural 
and due diligence burden and has become a verifying party.
The sending party: the burden of proof of security and 
integrity
16.57 Once the recipient, if required so to do, has satisfied a judge that it has discharged the procedural and due diligence burden, the user will need to address the issue of the security and integrity of their computer or system, amongst other 
topics of relevance in the circumstances. This can be described as the burden 
40 A message using an authentication code sent through the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication) system has the legal effect of binding the sender bank according to its contents: Industrial & Commercial Bank Ltd v. Banco Ambrosiano 
Veneto SpA [2003] 1 SLR 221.
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of proof of security and integrity, which comprises both a persuasive burden 
(or burden of proof on the pleadings) and the evidential burden of adducing 
evidence. In discussing this aspect, it is useful to compare identical problems that have exercised the minds of people in the past, and what mechanisms were 
put in place to provide for the integrity of the method of proving intent.
16.58 In the case of the impression of a seal, the use of a seal became so common by the 14th century that consideration had to be given to provide for additional 
evidence, other than the impression of a seal affixed to the document, that the 
seal impression was not a forgery or added without authority. The sovereign might have a number of seals for different purposes: a signet for the secretary; a privy seal, which was in between the secretary and the Chancellor; the great seal, 
controlled by the Chancellor to authenticate the most formal of acts, and a finger 
ring, later called a privy signet, for the personal affairs of the monarch.41 Care was taken to destroy seal matrices in a public ceremony, as occurred when Edward III ascended the throne and had the great seal used by his father and grandfather 
broken into tiny pieces in his presence.42 However, the physical object of the 
impression of a seal can be undermined, just as any other form of authentication. For instance, the seal itself might be forged, or the seal of a dead person used, as in the case of Hannibal when he forged letters in the name of the dead Roman 
consul Marcellus after removing the signet ring from his body.43 For instance, it 
was an offence to forge the royal seal. By the Statute of Edward III, counterfeiting the great and privy seals were treasonable offences, and one man who forged 
the seal of Henry II was only saved from being hanged by the king’s mercy.44 At common law it was a felony and regarded as a capital offence, and there are three 
medieval cases of this nature.
16.59 A person could challenge a document where the seal was not right, or the 
right seal was attached to the wrong document. As seals became more common, 
the other issue was the degree of forgery for ordinary seals. There is evidence 
that illustrates people took their seal very seriously. In 1190, for instance, Adam, 
son of Peter de Birkin broke his seal and replaced it. He went to the length of 
repeating a grant he had previously made to the abbey of Rievaulx.45 There then developed a means of countersigning the main seal with the use of a secret seal as 
a counter-seal to one of the great seals. The great seal would be in the possession 
and under the control of the officer of state, and the secret seal in the possession of the owner, thus providing a double check to the authenticity of the document, because the second seal may be imprinted on to the great seal, providing two 
41 P.M. Barnes and L.C. Hector, A Guide to Seals in the Public Record Office (2nd edn., London: 
HMSO, 1968), p. 8; P. Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages (London: 
Hambledon and London, 2003), pp. 97–8.42 P.D.A. Harvey and A. McGuinness, A guide to British medieval seals (University of Toronto 
Press, 1996), p. 34.43 Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice, p. 6.44 Harvey and McGuinness, A guide to British medieval seals, pp. 33, 98–9.45 Barnes and Hector, A Guide to Seals in the Public Record Office, pp. 29–30.
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seal impressions on the same seal. The concerns for the security of the seal were sometimes carried to what seems like extraordinary lengths, but were probably 
routine. In 1214 the chapter seal of Salisbury cathedral was in the care of two cannons, but by 1353 it was kept in a chest with three locks, and was only used 
in the presence of all three cannons, each of whom held a key. By the Statute of Acton Burnell in 1283, debts could be registered before the mayor, who issued 
a recognisance with a special seal supplied by the crown. However, in 1285, the Statute of Merchants amended the previous statute, and ordered that the seal must be contained in two parts, the larger to be retained by the mayor, and the smaller to be retained by the clerk – indicating, in the opinion of one scholar, 
that there had probably been a scandal.46 In the late 13th century, the seal of the corporation of Winchester was placed in a box with three locks, and the keys retained by two counsellors and one ordinary person, and this box in turn was 
itself kept in a chest with two keys, held by one counsellor and one other.47
16.60 Conceptually, there is little difference between the seal matrix and a rubber stamp, and the nature of the security in place to prevent unauthorized use is 
identical. In this respect, the 1897 Pennsylvania case of Robb v. The Pennsylvania 
Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities48 is highly instructive. This case pre-dates the use of electronic signatures in any form by one hundred years, yet the difference in time does not diminish the issues, even if they were articulated 
with different concepts and language by the judges at the time. In this case, money had been paid out on two cheques signed with the facsimile signature of the bank 
depositor by means of a rubber stamp. Mr Robb did not authorize either cheque. In 1893, Mr Robb, as the president of a commercial corporation, had occasion to 
send out a large number of invitations to a banquet. To save himself the trouble of signing each invitation, he had a rubber stamp made with a facsimile of his 
signature. After retiring, he rented a private office, and with the rent came the 
services of an office boy. He employed the boy on various errands, including 
sending him to the bank to draw money on cheques. It can be inferred from the 
report that he used the rubber stamp to sign cheques. He kept the rubber stamp 
in a compartment inside a fireproof safe. He locked the compartment and put the key to the compartment in a drawer in the safe, behind some papers, and 
covered it up. He then locked the drawer, and placed the key into an unlocked 
drawer in the safe. He then locked the safe, and put the key in a little box, which 
he put in a wooden drawer or box, and this was kept on top of another safe. 
The plaintiff surmised that the office boy had watched his moves at some time 
in the past. The majority of the judges found that Mr Robb was not negligent 
in the use of the rubber stamp. The basis of their decision centred on whether he was negligent in failing to exercise care in preventing the rubber stamp from 
46 T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), p. 140, quoted in 
Harvey and McGuinness, A guide to British medieval seals, p. 111.47 Harvey and McGuinness, A guide to British medieval seals, pp. 58–62, 98–9.48 40 W.N.C. 129, 3 Pa.Super. 254, 1897 WL 3989 (Pa.Super. 1897) affirmed by 186 Pa. 456, 
40 A. 969, for dissenting opinion, see 186 Pa. 456, 41 A. 49.
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falling into the wrong hands. Rice PJ rejected the proposition that Mr Robb was bound to keep the stamp in a place that prevented any person from obtaining 
it without authority. However, no attempt was made by the majority judges to explain how the bank was in a position to challenge the signature, given that the signature was identical each time the rubber stamp was used, with the exception that the impression will vary in quality depending on the amount of ink used 
and the pressure applied to the stamp as the signature is affixed to the cheque. 
The majority held that the bank was liable for the cheques. Williams J wrote a dissenting judgment that raises the modern issues, using different language, but 
germane nevertheless. His entire opinion is printed in the law report on page 49. The major part of his opinion, with which Sterrett CJ concurred, raises important issues that are relevant to digital signatures in particular:It is conceded that Mr Robb caused the stamp to be made with which 
this check was executed. He says he only intended to use it for a particular purpose, but it is perfectly apparent that he intended his signature produced by this stamp should be recognized as his by his friends and acquaintances who should receive it, as it certainly 
would be. The signatures made by it as they are presented to us in the paper books, when placed by the side of admittedly genuine 
signatures, are indistinguishable from them. Now, this stamp 
belonged to him, was made under his direction, and for his use. 
It was intended for the rapid production of his signature. It was 
in his possession. He was bound to take care of it as safely as of 
his own signature made by himself with his own hand. He was 
bound to do this at his peril. There is no question of reasonable or 
sufficient care in this case. As with the signed check, so with this 
stamp signature. When he put it in his safe, and left the key where it was possible for any one to get it, and so gain admission to the safe, he exposed himself to the loss that might follow, and that loss 
is his. He seeks in this action to put his own proper loss upon the 
bank that paid the checks, by alleging that the checks were forged. 
But they were not forged. The signature was his. He prepared it. All 
that can be said is that he did not affix it to the checks. But he had 
prepared it so that any one could affix it to a check or any other 
paper, and when so affixed it was absolutely impossible to tell that 
it had not been done by him. There would be some justification for his claim upon the bank if he had advised the banker that he had prepared such a signature that might by a possibility be clandestinely gotten from his possession, and given him an impression made by it, and pointed out, if he could have done so, how it might be distinguished from his signature as made by a pen; 
but he did nothing of the kind. If the bank is not protected by his signature made by means of his own private stamp, if it is bound at its peril to know and discriminate between his signature made 
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with his pen and that made with his private stamp, then he has, by the use of the stamp, very greatly increased the responsibility and peril of the bank without so much as giving it notice or affording the slightest intimation of the necessity for additional vigilance in 
scrutinizing checks purporting to bear his signature. Upon every rule of commercial law, and upon every consideration of equity and good conscience, the judgment entered in the court below in this case should be reversed, and judgment should be entered here 
in favour of the defendant.
16.61 It was for the bank, relying on the signature, to prove it was genuine. The image of the signature was genuine, but Mr Robb had neither applied it, nor 
authorized the signature to be applied to the cheque. In this respect, it was a forgery, and in the words of Wills J in The Staple of England v. The Governor and 
Company of the Bank of England:49A forgery can give no title, and those that rely upon it must be able to shew some extraneous ground – such as that of estoppel – why 
they should be entitled to act upon it.
16.62 In The Staple of England, the bank were held liable for failing to make proper enquiries as to title where the company gave the safe keeping of the 
Company seal to their clerk (a solicitor), and the clerk, without authority, affixed the seal to a power of attorney that enabled him to sell funds of the Company 
for his own benefit. The seal and the rubber stamp have the same problem: the 
need to prevent unauthorized use. Although the use of rubber stamps was not new at the time of this case, nevertheless Mr Robb failed to notify the bank that 
he was using a mechanical reproduction of his manuscript signature. Arguably, if the bank had been made aware of this practice, as suggested by Williams J, it might have refused to honour such cheques, or if it accepted them, the bank 
might have taken additional care to ensure with each cheque that he had affixed 
the signature with the intention of signing it.
16.63 There is a difference of degree between securing a physical object such as a rubber stamp and a digital signature, but in the event of a dispute, it follows 
that it is the holder of the certificate and private key who is in the best position to 
prove either that the security in place was adequate, such that the certificate and 
private key could not be used improperly. The user will possibly be in physical 
control of the following (this list is not exhaustive):The hardware and the software of the computer or system upon 
which the private key sits.The security in place in relation to the computer or system, the use of the system by employees and the control of any tokens used to 
store the private key.
49 (1888) 21 QBD 160 at 166.
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The ability of the user to revoke their private key promptly after 
finding out that their system or private key was compromised.
16.64 If the user wishes to argue their security was so poor that an unauthorized third party could have gained access to the system to send an electronic communication with an electronic signature attached without authority, the user will undoubtedly be admitting breach of contract with the vendor from whom 
they obtained the certifying certificate. They are also probably admitting they 
were negligent. This is the central conundrum any user of a digital signature 
faces. The flexible nature of the need to implement suitable precautions relating to securing a seal was recognized by Wills J, and in a prescient comment, he indicated in The Staple of England at 168, that:The precautions which appear to be natural in one century may appear pedantic and unnecessary in another … there can be no 
inflexible and unvarying rule of law as to that which is essentially a mixed question of fact and law…
The persuasive and evidential burden of demonstrating 
weaknesses in the infrastructure
16.65 Once a communication leaves the user’s computer or system, they 
relinquish control of the document or message. If the user can demonstrate the effectiveness of the security and integrity of their computer or system, the next link is the network over which the communication passes and the public key infrastructure that supports such items as digital signatures, although these 
considerations also apply to ATMs and online banking systems, for instance. Evidence might be required from a number of organizations in the chain 
(discussed in more detail below), including the registration authority and the effectiveness of the registration procedure, the methods of management the 
certification authority uses to control its infrastructure, and the effectiveness or otherwise of any third party supplier whose product or service is included in the 
chain.
16.66 If the recipient can demonstrate the due diligence they carried out was reasonable in the circumstances, and the user can demonstrate, to the required standard, the security and integrity of their computer or system, the question then becomes: which party to the proceedings has the persuasive and evidential 
burden of demonstrating any weaknesses in the infrastructure. The burden of proof will inevitably be on the party that asserts the problem lies with third 
parties in the chain. It seems that all the recipient needs to do is to demonstrate 
procedural and due diligence. Thereafter, it is for the sender to either demonstrate lack of security, or that the fault occurred as the result of failure by third parties 
in the chain, unlike the burden in proving a manuscript signature.
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Burden of proof – the Jitsuin
16.67 Since the eighth century, a similar system of authentication to that of the electronic signature has existed in the physical world, by which a signing party deposits an imprint of their mark with a trusted third party, and relying parties can rest assured that when the mark is used, they can rely on the authentication 
of the person by the mark. This is the Jitsuin (original seal) of Japan. Other seals 
include the Ginko-In (bank seal) for banking purposes, and Mitome-In (approval 
seal) for use in everyday circumstances, such as signing for a delivery of post. The 
seal is called an insho, and the word ‘inkan’ describes the impression of the seal. 
The purpose of a name seal is to confirm a person’s intention to enter a transaction 
and to act as a form of identification. The use of Mitome-In in Japan is so much part of everyday life that foreigners, although they are permitted in some situations to use a manuscript signature instead of a name seal, are advised to obtain such a seal 
if they are going to remain in the country for any length of time.50
16.68 Jitsuin are used instead of manuscript signatures to execute important 
documents. For instance, the Jitsuin Seal Registration Certificate is required as an attachment to the document of application for the transfer of registration in 
the real property registry at the Legal Affairs Bureau. The importance attached 
to the Jitsuin Seal Registration Certificate under Japanese Law is such that the transfer of the registration is essential for the perfection of the transfer of title of 
a real property. The Jitsuin is endowed with a legal presumption that is founded partly on the common understanding that a name seal either cannot be forged, 
or is difficult to forge, and partly on a very long history of use.
Registering a Jitsuin
16.69 Jitsuin are required to conform to specific criteria:
(i) The name on the seal must conform to the registered name; the 
seal must have a border surrounding the name (and the border 
must not be missing or chipped); machine-made, mass-produced seals are not acceptable; the seal must be made of a material that cannot be altered easily, and the diameter must be greater than 
8mm square but smaller than 25mm square.
(ii) Only the owner of a seal or a representative can apply to register 
a Jitsuin, and the applicant has to be over the age of 15 years.
(iii) A Jitsuin must be registered at the offices of the local 
government, whether village, town or city.
16.70 Upon applying for a registered seal (Jitsuin) and Seal Registration Certificate 
(inkan toroku shomeisho) some local offices will send the applicant a letter of 
50 For a further explanation, see G.P. McAlinn (ed.), Japanese Business Law (Leiden: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2007), pp. 202–4.
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verification for the purpose of identification. Alternatively, the usual range of 
documents will be required to be produced when the applicant attends the office. 
The registration takes place when the applicant attends the office with their seal, 
during which their identity is checked. Where a representative registers the seal, 
they will be required to provide a Letter of Attorney or a Letter of Advice Giving Right of Representation, which must be signed and sealed by the owner of the 
seal. After registering the seal, the applicant is given a Seal Registration Card (inkan 
torokusho, a plastic card) rather than a Seal Registration Certificate.
The Seal Registration Certificate
16.71 The Seal Registration Certificate includes the following information: an impression of the registered seal; the name of the seal holder; the date of birth 
of the seal holder; the gender of the seal holder; the address of the seal holder. The registration of the Jitsuin is tied to a particular geographical locality, so if the seal holder moves to another part of Japan or leaves Japan for good, the seal registration becomes null and void, and a new registration process must be 
undertaken at the new location. Where a Jitsuin is lost, the process is to attend 
the office that issued the Seal Registration Certificate and initiate the procedure 
to delete the registration. There is no procedure to notify relying parties that the 
Jitsuin has been stolen or lost.
The legal presumption of the Seal Registration Certificate
16.72 A Seal Registration Certificate proves the seal holder has adopted the 
impression of the seal that is recorded in the Certificate. The Civil Procedure Law provides for a legal presumption relating to the authenticity of a private 
document, as follows: ‘A private document shall be presumed to be authentically 
executed if it bears the signature or seal of the principal or his representative’.51 
It appears that this presumption is rebuttable. This discussion is restricted to 
private documents, and does not include government documents.52 For this presumption to operate, the party bearing the burden of proof is required to 
prove that the registered owner of the seal intended to affix an impression of 
their seal on the document. This intention may itself be presumed if the relying party proves that the seal impressed on the document and the impression of the 
adopted seal held by the owner is the same. However, the relying party must also 
prove that the signing party has in fact adopted the seal. This fact is proved by 
using the Seal Registration Certificate, because the Seal Registration Certificate bears the adopted seal and the name of the signing party, thus it is easy for 
the relying party to prove that the signing party adopted the seal.53 Once it is 
51 Civil Procedure Law (Law No 109 of 1998) Article 228(4).52 Civil Procedure Law (Law No 109 of 1998) Article 228 and 228(2) and (3).53 This chain of presumption is reinforced by the provisions of Civil Procedure Law (Law No 
109 of 1998) Article 229, which states: ‘The authenticity of execution of documents may 
also be proved by a comparison of specimen of handwriting or seal impression’.
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established that the signing party intended to affix an impression of their seal by operation of this presumption, the presumption under the Civil Procedure Law takes effect, and the document in question is presumed to be authentically 
executed.
16.73 This explanation demonstrates there are two levels of presumption, a 
process known as the ‘Two Phase Presumption’. It involves the following steps.If the impression of the seal and the adopted seal held by the signing party are the same, then it is presumed that:
The signing party intended to affix the seal impression, which in turn creates the presumption that:The document bearing the seal impression was 
authentically executed.
16.74 It is to be noted that there is no statutory requirement of due diligence in 
order to utilize this presumption.
Rebutting the presumption
16.75 The owner of the seal can rebut these presumptions. However, it is 
difficult to effectively prove that the document was not authentically executed, 
which is tantamount to trying to prove a negative. Of recent, this presumption has been found to pose problems in an age when it is very easy to forge name 
seals with the availability of advanced technology. This problem reached national importance following a series of thefts from deposit accounts held in banks using 
forged or stolen seals. The problem is partly explained by Matsushita Shuli:54
Door-picking artist quietly breaks and enters victim’s house and 
nicks bank account passbook. The passbook, especially old ones, 
usually carries the seal image on the first page. The joker scans 
54 Obtaining information about this problem in the English language is difficult. A budget 
committee at Congress was arranged to discuss ‘The problem of seal impression’ on 27 
February 2003, by Mr Toshimasa Yamada of the Democratic Party and Mr Hideo Usui 
of the Liberal Democratic Party, but links to this item no longer appear to be live. The 
Japanese Bankers Association (http://www.zenginkyo.or.jp/en/) does not have any 
documents in English about this issue, but by typing in the words ‘deposits stolen seal’, a 
number of documents that refer to the problem of theft will be discovered. Slightly more 
information was possible to obtain from the article by Matsushita Shuli (from which 
the quote is taken), ‘A futile effort to prop up hopeless Hanko system?’ CNET Asia, 14 
August 2006, but the article no longer appears to be available online; but see M. Negishi, 
‘Security concerns jeopardize future of age-old tradition of “hanko” seals’, The Japan 
Times, undated, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2004/01/14/business/
security-concerns-jeopardize-future-of-age-old-tradition-of-hanko-seals/#.V0xESulvf8t. 
The most recent news item is ‘UPDATE 1-Molex probing unauthorized loans at Japan 
unit’, 9 April 2010 2:36pm EDT, Reuters, online at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSSGE6380JJ20100409; ‘Huge Local Fraud Case, ebiz in Japan’, 20 April 2010, Japan.Inc, 
online at http://www.japaninc.com/tt562_huge-local-fraud-case.
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this image and prints it on the withdrawal slip with color printer. The bank teller accepts this slip and passbook as authentic, and 
victim’s account will be emptied. Sometimes, the scanned digital 
image goes to hanko carving machine, too.
The real cause of trouble: It’s the stamped image of one’s hanko 
that is stored in the databases of government offices, banks and 
other public institutions. Not the particulars of physical hanko 
itself! And any image can be flawlessly reproduced in this era of 
digital processing. QED.
16.76 The Jitsuin and the Seal Registration Certificate have been a very effective method of providing for the authenticity and intention of a person when entering 
into a legally binding agreement. A trusted third party undertakes to certify the 
nexus between the applicant and the Jitsuin. The presumption worked well in a 
society where the accurate copying of name seals was difficult for the would-be 
thief.55 However, with the advent of modern means of duplication, a tension has begun to be manifest between the assurance that an individual can prove their identity and thereby authenticate a document with the use of a Seal Registration 
Certificate in combination with a Jitsuin, and the failure to require the relying party to take steps to authenticate the identity of the person who claims the name 
seal is their adopted Jitsuin. The Seal Registration Certificate proves the seal 
holder has adopted the impression of the seal that is recorded in the Certificate. In modern Japan, the failure to balance the presumption that accompanies the use of a Jitsuin, with an accompanying duty to take steps to require the person 
using the name seal to provide the certificate of authenticity, has meant ordinary 
consumers suffer the loss. This is an example where advances in technology have caused problems in a system of authentication that has worked well over an 
extended period of time in Japanese history. Whilst a change to the law will not follow immediately, when a change does occur, a cultural shift will also have to take place, in which the relying party will have to take reasonable steps to verify 
the signing party.
Burden of proof – standards
16.77 Technical specifications, known as standards, are a voluntary means of 
providing for interoperability between equipment and processes. It does not follow that the same standards will be implemented for the same product, and when a vendor implements a standard, it may not be implemented consistently 
with other vendors.56 It is conceivable that, in the event of a dispute, the party 
55 N. Kawawa, ‘The Japanese law on unauthorized on-line credit card and banking transactions: are current legal principles with respect to unauthorized transactions adequate to protect consumers against information technology crimes in contemporary 
society?’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013), pp. 71–80 for a 
general overview of the position in Japan.56 For an example relating to qualified electronic signatures in Poland where companies 
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bearing the burden of proof may have recourse to apply their mind to the relevant standards and to determine whether the standards were complied with, 
and if not, why not. In this respect, consideration will have to be given to whether 
any relevant standards were tested and certified by an approved certification laboratory in accordance with the Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation.
Burden of proof – summary
16.78 In the context of electronic signatures, and digital signatures in particular, 
there is a clear lesson to be understood. In the physical world where the signature-
creation device is difficult to replicate accurately, a tri-part method of providing 
assurance can be very effective. The owner of the Japanese seal provides evidence 
of their identity to satisfy a nominated authority sufficiently for the authority to 
create a certificate to link the seal to the owner. The authority retains the evidence of the link, and the relying party can rest assured that the person with the seal, if 
authenticated with a certificate, is who they say they are. The flaw in this model, in an age when a name seal is easy to duplicate, is to fail to impose a duty on the 
relying party to undertake sufficient due diligence to satisfy themselves that the 
holder of the seal is the person whose name seal is registered.
16.79 The use of a rubber stamp as a form of signature has similar properties to 
the name seal, but without the properties of the Jitsuin. In the cases of Goodman v. 
J Eban Limited57 and British Estate Investment Society Ltd v. Jackson (H M Inspector 
of Taxes)58 the respective recipients of the stamped documents did not question the authenticity of the stamped signature, but sought to challenge the format of 
the signature. The underlying assumptions about the security of a rubber stamp were not fully articulated; that is, the owner of such a stamp is expected to keep 
it secure and prevent any unauthorized use. If the recipient was in any doubt as to the authenticity of the document signed with a rubber stamp, they could 
always take steps to verify the integrity of the document. While observations about the security were made in passing by the judges and did not lay down a rule of law, nevertheless they represent underlying assumptions about the risks to be attached to the use of a means of providing authentication to a document, which may not always be under the control of the owner, at least in cases where the means in question are adopted for the convenience and advantage of the user, 
rather than the recipient.
16.80 The risks for the participants when using electronic signatures is, to a certain extent, similar to that of the Jitsuin and rubber stamp, depending on 
chose different signature formats from the standards available, which in turn prevented 
any possible intra-country interoperability for years, see P. Krawczyk, ‘When the EU 
qualified electronic signature becomes an information services preventer’, Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), pp. 7–18.57 [1954] 1 QB 550; [1954] 1 All ER 763; [1954] 2 WLR 581, CA.58 (1954–1958) 37 Tax Cas 79; [1956] TR 397; 35 ATC 413; 50 R & IT 33.
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the type of electronic signature used. In the context of the digital signature, 
the trusted third party allocates the risks and responsibilities. In general, a subscribing party or receiving party that relies on such technology is either fully aware of the limitations associated with the use of a digital signature, or they have no concept of the issues, and they use a digital signature in ignorance of the 
risks they may face if their reliance were to be tested. Statute provides that where 
a trusted third party with a contractual relationship with its customer (a bank) debits the account of a customer with the payment of a cheque the customer did not sign, the bank has no authority to take the money and therefore must credit 
the account with the amount charged.59 The allocation of risk with the Jitsuin is 
under threat because of the ease by which a name seal can be forged.
16.81 It was judges during the 19th century who created the protection for those 
customers that affixed their manuscript signature to a cheque. All the politicians 
did was to codify the rule developed by judges.60 While it will be important to take into account the suggestion made by Romer LJ in Goodman v. J Eban Limited61 where he suggested the recipient of a document stamped with a rubber stamp can take action to authenticate the document, the action and effort required to 
check that the writer of a letter intended to affix their signature by means of a rubber stamp is far less than the magnitude of the task facing a recipient of, in 
particular, a digital signature. The terms and content of the certification practice 
policies of the certification authorities demonstrate the complexity of the task 
faced by a recipient if they are expected to verify a digital signature.
Presumptions
16.82 The aim of a presumption is to reduce the need prove every item of evidence adduced in court, or to reduce the need for evidence in relation to some 
issues. Some presumptions are considered irrebuttable. Where an irrebuttable presumption operates, once a party has proved a fact or had one fact admitted, another fact will be presumed, and the other party cannot call evidence to the 
contrary. With a rebuttable presumption, after the proof of admission of the presumption is admitted into evidence, the court can presume another fact as a 
result. However, the other party then has the persuasive or evidential burden to 
disprove the presumed fact. One presumption that applies to computers is the 
59 Bills of Exchange Act 1882 s24; Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 
97/5/EC (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 319, 5.12.2007, p. 1–36, implemented by The 
Payment Services Regulations 2009 (SI 209/2009) as amended by The Payment Services 
(Amendment) Regulations 2009 (SI 2475/2009).60 N. Bohm, I. Brown and B. Gladman, ‘Electronic commerce: who carries the risk of fraud?’, 
Journal of Information, Law and Technology, 3 (2000), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_3/bohm, paragraph 2.61 [1954] 1 QB 550 at 564.
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presumption that a machine is presumed to be in working order. In the context of digital evidence, however, it is pertinent to be aware of the imperfections inherent in the way computers function, and how digital evidence is prone to 
alteration. Evidence derived from a computer must be admissible, authentic, 
accurate and complete in the same way as any other form of evidence. However, computers are also very volatile, in that a document, record or log can be altered 
very easily without leaving an obvious trace. Bearing in mind that much of the evidence accumulated about the use of an electronic signature will be by way of software code between a series of computers, all of which will be connected to the internet, the problems of relying on evidence generated by computers 
increase.62
62 See Mason, Electronic Evidence, ch. 5 for a detailed consideration of this presumption.
S. Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law (London: Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2016), 
chapter 17, ‘Data protection’, pp. 387–97.
17Data protection
17.1 Electronic signatures come in various forms, and to illustrate a simple but disturbing way in which documents are used, one can look to the activities of 
some local councils in England. When a person applies for planning permission, they are required to submit a planning application, and their manuscript 
signature is affixed to the document. The documents that accompany a planning 
application are open to the public to view. However, some local authorities scan the applications and publish the application into pdf format before uploading the entire document on to a website, thus exposing a number of manuscript 
signatures to being viewed by the entire world. This action enables would-be thieves to obtain a perfect specimen of a manuscript signature that could be used 
for nefarious purposes in the future. This is just one of the problems that affect 
electronic signatures and the application of the principles of data protection. This state of affairs in England illustrates that rules put into place to provide for 
openness in pre-digital times are not always appropriate in the digital age. In this instance, the application of a rule requiring openness at a time when paper was paramount has been uncritically transposed into the digital age without thought 
to the wider repercussions.
The legal framework
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
17.2 In the international context, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development developed a set of guidelines, part of which included the need 
to consider the issues relating to the protection of personal data.1 Principle 5, 
‘Protection of privacy and personal data’, sets out the expectation:The fundamental rights of individuals to privacy, including secrecy of communications and protection of personal data, should be respected in national cryptography policies and in the 
implementation and use of cryptographic methods.
17.3 In discussing the issues relating to privacy, the guidelines expressly 
note the difference between cryptographic keys used for confidentiality and 
those used for authentication. Any user that intends to use a private key for the 
1 Cryptography Guidelines: Recommendation of the Council (OECD, 27 March 1997. See also OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(OECD, 2013) and Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce 
(OECD, 1999).
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purposes of authentication must be made aware of the difference, and undertake to ensure only the relevant algorithms are used for the purpose of generating a 
private key. Failure so to do may enable malicious individuals to use the private key not only to impersonate an individual, but also to send incriminating material 
electronically that can be associated with the innocent holder of the private key.2
Guidelines
PKI Assessment Guidelines
17.4 The PKI Assessment Guidelines3 consider some of the issues. In particular, the authors assume correctly that many end users, both consumers and businesses, will not be knowledgeable about the technology that underpins 
public key cryptography. Additionally, it is also thought that it cannot be presumed that:4
… all or even most certificate owners and users regularly read and understand the complex and often lengthy legal documents that usually govern the contractual relationships amongst the various 
parties in a PKI.
17.5 Thus the guidelines emphasise the need of assessors take particular 
note of the method by which a certification authority or registration authority incorporates the use of information practices into the contract with a subscribing party, and how personal data is to be used where a recipient decides 
to become a verifying party. It is suggested that participants within the public 
key infrastructure (certification authorities, registration authorities and the 
repository) should take reasonable steps to make subscribing parties aware of 
the links within the infrastructure and how their personal data is used.5
CARAT Guidelines
17.6 The National Automated Clearing House Association developed a set 
of guidelines for constructing policies for the use of public key certificates, 
consideration of which was given to the issue of confidentiality.6 The guidance 
2 Guidelines for Cryptography Policy (OECD, 1997). See also OECD Ministerial Conference, 
‘A borderless world: realising the potential of global electronic commerce’, Action plan for 
electronic commerce, 7–9 October 1998, Ottawa, Canada (SG/EC(98)9/REV5).
3 PKI Assessment Guidelines (v1.0 10 May 2003) (Information Security Committee, Electronic Commerce Division, Section of Science and Technology Information Security 
Committee American Bar Association) C.5.
4 PKI Assessment Guidelines C.5.
5 C.5.1.1.
6 ‘Guidelines for constructing policies governing the use of identity-based public key 
certificates’ (National Automated Clearing House Association, The Internet Council, 
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offered is that a certificate policy should provide that information in certificates 
is not confidential. The guide distinguishes between the types of privacy that should be considered in relation to electronic transactions:Data privacy, which refers to the privacy and accuracy of the data 
that a subscribing party knows is being collected.Transactional privacy, which refers to the privacy and accuracy of transactional data the subscribing party may not be aware of that 
is being collected. It does not follow that transactional data will be 
collected as it is generated. The point is, that where such data is collected, the subscribing party has the same right to privacy even 
where they are not aware that the data is being collected.7
17.7 The advice offered is to follow the OECD guidelines, as well as follow the 
laws in a prevailing jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction, which is not discussed 
in this text, was also an issue discussed by the PKI Assessment Guidelines.
Australia
17.8 In Australia, the Officer of the Federal Privacy Commissioner prepared a document in 2002 entitled Privacy and Public Key Infrastructure: Guidelines for 
Agencies using PKI to communicate or transact with individuals.8 The document 
sets out the risks, both actual and potential. The first is whether the amount 
of information gathered is relevant to the level of certificate being issued 
or requested at the registration stage, contained in Public Key Certificates, 
(which are also normally publicly available, in that it is conceivable that the 
transactions carried out by an individual may be tracked), and included in Public 
Key Directories and Certificate Revocation Lists, which in turn may enable the directories to be scanned for information and downloaded with a view of using 
the data in ways that interferes with the privacy of individuals. On page 19 the 
following comment is offered: ‘The issue to consider, from a privacy perspective, 
is whether PKI applications require the publication of a public key directory. If publication is considered necessary then a privacy protective option is to allow 
individual clients to opt out of having their public keys listed in the directory. This is similar to the way telephone subscribers may opt out of having their 
phone number published in the phone directory’. Another issue concerns logs 
Certification Authority Rating and Trust (CARAT) Task Force, 14 January 2000) available 
online from http://civics.typepad.com/files/carat_final_011400-1-1.pdf.
7 Part E paragraph 2.8, 2.
8 An electronic version is available at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/OAPC-2001.
pdf; V. Liu, ‘Release of Guidelines by the Privacy Commissioner for Agencies using PKI: 
implications for Agencies, government contractors and private sector organisations’, 
Computers and Law: Journal for the Australian and New Zealand Societies for Computers 
and the Law, 47 (2002), pp. 24–31, online at http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/
ANZCompuLawJl/2002/9.pdf.
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and ephemeral data which are stored by servers hosting public key directories, 
Certificate Revocation Lists and other PKI transactions and maintained by CAs 
and agencies: such logs will normally retain details of when a certificate was 
viewed and what online transactions the individual entered into. It is a legitimate expectation that a relevant organization may maintain records of such activities; 
nevertheless, the logs could be used to monitor transactions and compile profiles 
of individuals using such services.
17.9 The Federal Privacy Commissioner offers nine guidelines, each of which 
includes a commentary. They are:
Guideline 1 – Agency Client Choice on the Use of PKI ApplicationsAgencies should allow their clients to choose whether to use PKI for a particular transaction and to offer them alternative means 
of service delivery. The alternative need not always be an online 
alternative. In providing this choice agencies should advise their clients of the privacy risks and advantages associated with their 
use of PKI and alternative methods for that transaction.
Guideline 2 – Awareness and EducationAgencies and their contracted PKI service providers should co-operate closely to ensure that their clients are fully informed of the proper use of PKI and of the risks and responsibilities associated with the use of PKI, including the secure management of private 
keys.
Guideline 3 – Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs)Agencies should undertake a Privacy Impact Assessment before 
implementing a new PKI system or significantly revising or 
extending an existing PKI system.
Guideline 4 – Evidence of IdentityWhen developing PKI applications or contracting with PKI services providers, agencies should ensure that only minimum Evidence of Identity that is necessary for, or directly related, to the process is 
collected.In addition, where a client wishes to obtain more than one 
certificate then the client should be given a range of options including:
consenting to use a Gatekeeper certificate of equal or higher 
value to apply for a new certificate;consenting to the re-use of Evidence of Identity documentation previously provided by the client;or providing documentation on registration for an 
additional certificate.
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Guideline 5 – Aggregation of Personal InformationIn the course of PKI transactions with clients, agencies and their contracted PKI service providers should ensure that no detailed history of client transactions is created or used by the agency or contracted PKI service provider, except to the extent that this is 
required for system maintenance or evidentiary purposes.Agencies and contracted PKI service providers, should not use PKI transactions to collect personal information that is not necessary, 
or directly related to, the PKI business transaction.
Guideline 6 – Single or Multiple Certificates
Agencies should allow clients to use more than one certificate, 
where these are fit for the purpose of the relevant application. 
Agencies should also recognise certificates they have not issued 
where these certificates are fit for the purpose of the relevant 
application.
Guideline 7 – Subscriber Generation of Keys
Where an agency issues certificates or contracts for their issue, the agency should allow its clients the option of generating their 
own keys, provided that the agency is satisfied that subscriber key 
generation can be implemented securely.
Guideline 8 – Public Key DirectoriesAgency clients should be allowed to opt out of including their public 
keys in a public key directory (PKD) where the PKD is published.
Guideline 9 – Pseudonymity and AnonymityAgencies should provide their clients with anonymous and pseudonymous options for transacting with them, to the extent that this is not inconsistent with the objectives and operation of 
the relevant online application.
European Union
17.10 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party adopted a Working 
document on biometrics.9 A biodynamic version of a manuscript signature was determined to come within the provisions of the relevant data protection 
Directive, because the use of the data implied the processing of personal data. It was determined that it the data came within the provisions of the relevant 
Directive on data protection. A further document entitled Opinion 3/2012 on 
developments in biometric technologies was published on 27 April 2012.10 The 
9 12168/02/EN WP 80.10 00720/12/EN WP193.
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Opinion expressed the view that technologies using biodynamic data should be 
subject to appropriate security, and duly outlined the principles. Reference was made to biodynamic versions of a manuscript signature on page 27, and the data protection risks associated with the use of such methods of applying a signature were set out:Accuracy: People may not always sign in the same manner, so they could face problems during the enrolment process as well as when 
verifying their identity.Impact: Biometrics based on behavioural characteristics such a signature may not be unique over time and can be changed by the 
data subject. Changes of signature can also have a physiological 
origin and can preclude a successful verification resulting in the need of alternative procedures in order to verify the identity of the 
individuals.
Anti-spoofing: While the graphical image of a traditional signature can be easily replicated and forged by a trained human, photocopy or with computer graphics software, a dynamic signature is more 
secure because the verification process checks also dynamic characteristics which are complex and unique to the handwriting 
style of a person.
Practical issues11
Generating the private key
17.11 The most secure private key is that which is generated within the total 
control of the person who intends to use it. Thus a key pair can be generated from a personal computer, but the exposure to attack depends not on where they were generated, but on where the keys are stored, and personal computers are 
very weak from this point of view, especially when connected to a network. If a trusted third party generated the key pair for a person, then the user would have 
to be assured that the private key would be only be available to them. In addition, further assurances would have to be made by the key generator respecting the security process, because it is very easy for a person to use the private key to 
impersonate the legitimate owner to the detriment of the actual owner.
11 The author is indebted to the early work of G. Greenleaf and R. Clarke, ‘Privacy implications 
of digital signatures’, joint address, IBC Conference on Digital Signatures, Sydney, 12 
March 1997, available online at http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/DigSig.html, whose 
structure is followed in this section; see also M.H.M. Schellekens, Electronic Signatures: 
Authentication Technology from a Legal Perspective (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2004), 
ch. 5.
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Storage of the private key
17.12 Where an individual decides to take advantage of the ability to have and use a digital signature, the next issue they must consider is how the private key 
is stored, backed up and how the copies are stored. Any breach of security will increase the risks associated with the private key being used by a malicious person or organization to the detriment of the owner of the private key, should the security of the private key be so poor as to make it relatively easy to obtain 
for illicit purposes.
Revocation of private keys
17.13 The act of revoking a private key will require the person with the private 
key to identify themselves to the certification authority. The authentication of the user will invariably be intrusive, but necessary if the key is to be revoked 
effectively and in a timely manner.
Data required for the certificate
17.14 Clearly either the certification authority or registration authority will 
require the intended subscriber to provide them with sufficient personal data 
to identify themselves to obtain and use a digital signature. Either or both organizations will be required to deal with the data in a manner appropriate to 
the jurisdiction within which the subscribing party is situated.
Case law
Biodynamic versions of a manuscript signature
17.15 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada dealt with an application of the use of biodynamic versions of a manuscript signature in 
PIPEDA Case Finding #71.12 In separate complaints, two recipients of parcels objected to the practice of a courier company that demanded they sign for the parcel by providing an electronic signature upon delivery, and then posted the 
signatures on the company website without consent. The facts are summarised in the report:
When asked to sign electronically for receipt of a parcel, the first complainant expressed his preference for signing a paper receipt, but was told that unless he provided an electronic signature 
he would not receive his parcel. The complainant provided his electronic signature under protest and took possession of his 
parcel. He later made email inquiries of the company to determine 
12 2002 CanLII 42333 (P.C.C.).
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whether electronic signatures were indeed mandatory under company policy or whether allowances were made for persons 
who preferred to sign paper. Replies indicated only that obtaining 
electronic signatures was company policy.After agreeing to provide a signature electronically to indicate receipt of a delivery by the company in question, the second complainant discovered that this electronic signature had been placed in the tracking section of the company website, along with his name and address and the delivery status of the parcel in 
question. When he asked that his electronic signature be removed, 
a company representative told him it was not possible.
17.16 The investigation by the office of the Commissioner revealed the following:The company stores signatures obtained from parcel recipients in 
its tracking system, which is accessible at the company’s website, and uses them in providing an online tracking service for its 
customers.
By keying in the appropriate parcel identification number (PIN), a website user gains access to information about the corresponding 
shipment – specifically, name and address of the intended recipient, delivery status of the parcel and, once delivery is completed, the 
recipient’s electronic signature.It is sometimes possible, by varying a digit of the PIN within a reasonable range, to gain access to names, addresses, and electronic signatures pertaining to other shipments – that is, the 
personal information of others.There was no evidence that the company had in any way informed the complainants of its intention to use their electronic signature on its website for online tracking purposes or sought consent for 
such use.At the time of the complaints, it was not company policy to remove signatures from the online tracking system at the request of 
individuals.
17.17 The Commissioner’s office determined that it had jurisdiction under the provisions of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA). The Act applies to any federal work, undertaking or business, and the Commissioner had jurisdiction because inter-provincial courier companies are 
federal works, undertakings or businesses as defined in the Act. The relevant 
Principles were: Principle 4.3 of Schedule 1, that states that the knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal information, except where inappropriate; Principle 4.3.3, that states that an organization must not, as a condition of the supply of a product or service, require an individual to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
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information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified and legitimate 
purposes, and section 5(3) that states that an organization may collect, use, or disclose personal information only for purposes that a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances.
17.18 On the matter of use, the Commissioner determined that the company had neither informed nor sought the consent of people in respect of any use it intended to make of their electronic signatures beyond the immediate purpose 
of indicating receipt. There was no evidence that the company had ever obtained consent to place electronic signatures on its website and using them for the 
purpose of providing a tracking service to its customers.
17.19 The Commissioner found the company had been in contravention of 
Principle 4.3 and section 5(3), because a reasonable person would not have considered such use appropriate in any circumstances, especially given the 
demonstrated potential for unauthorized disclosure of the signatures. In 
addition, the company was in breach of Principle 4.3.3, because the ostensible and immediate purpose for the collection had been to indicate receipt of a parcel, 
but that purpose could have been fulfilled by other means, such as a signature 
on paper. For this reason, it cannot be said that an electronic signature was a 
requirement for the fulfilment of the purpose. As a result, it was determined that 
the electronic signatures had not been required to fulfil explicitly specified and 
legitimate purposes and that the company had therefore not been justified in 
demanding them as a condition of service.
A name typed in an email
17.20 The question of whether a name typed in an email can be considered to 
be confidential will depend on the circumstances. The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada considered, given the facts of Order MO-3140, Appeal MA14-303,13 that an electronic signature typed in an email was 
confidential. In this instance, a person filed a request by email about the conduct 
of a councillor. The councillor in turn requested to see a copy of the email. It was 
granted. The individual who sent the email to the region appealed the decision 
to provide the Councillor making the request with a copy of the email. The adjudicator ordered the provision of the disclosure of the information that was 
not personal, and ordered that the electronic signature be not given.
13 2014 CanLII 79320 (ONIPC).
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Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions 
Regulations 2016 (European 
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Greececivil procedure, 276name in email address, 220, 267
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Index 409
instruments are in order, 216subjective test proposed, 274lead pencil, 23, 25 fn 95, 88, 91–2leaseautopen, 66email, 225–6facsimile, 87initials, 29, 30 fn 126name acts to authenticate, 48, 263–4name in body of, 262name in email address, 281pencil, 90, 92rubber stamp, 88seal, 41in the third person, 32typed that did not bind, 68 fn 273legal fees arrangement, signed with name in email address, 279legal presumptionaim of, 385Electronic Communications Act 2000, 176as to Jitsuin, 380rebuttal as to Jitsuin, 382
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of certification authority, comparison, 137of trust service providers, 160
certifying certificates, reliability, 361incurring of, 341
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DigiNotar B. V., 345–6
VeriSign, 345–7public key infrastructureassumptions, 343digital signature, 341participants in, 340of recipient, comparison, 142risks of digital signature, examples, 342, 347scanned manuscript signature, 339scope of legislation as to, comparison, 137of sender, comparison, 138typed name, 340types of loss, 343UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, conduct of relying party, 367
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Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), as to name in email address, 255–6Limitation Act 1980, telex, 80lithographed name, as signature, 52Lithuaniafacsimile, 88name typed in electronic document, 230PIN, 215loan of money, signed by name typed in electronic document, 227loss, types of with digital signature, 343Malaysiaapproach to electronic signature legislation, 116, 144duty of subscribing party, 134
licensing of certification authorities, 133recipient, assumption of risk, 144malicious software, risks, 86, 158, 170, 305 fns 16 and 19, 310, 315, 324, 360, 362manuscript signature
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fingerprints, 307secret code, 306
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Saint Lucia, approach to electronic signature legislation, 115
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definition of, 104identifying, 102link to signature, 103–4presumption, 369signatureabsence of, 27, 93, 242, 33assisted signature, 23authentication, 1
authenticated signature fiction, 69–71
authorityagency 26, 30 fn 126, 32, 44, 45, 47 fn 199, 51 fn 218, 62 fn 216, 66, 67, 70, 76, 77, 78, 80, 207, 215 fn 2, 231, 234–5, 270, 271delegation, 184generally, 14, 25 fn 93, 41, 50 fn 215, 53, 63 fn 263, 64, 66, 68, 73, 74, 75, 76 fn 307, 79, 81, 82 fn 323, 104, 156, 184lawyer as agent, 224chirograph, 15–16creation devices, technical requirements for security of, 148, 149
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definition of statutory, 6UNCITRAL, 7and physical carrier, 7, 182, 183scanned manuscript signature, 
Germany, not writing, 288Scotland, 7whether digital format amounts to, 6writing material, 90
Zambia, default form of electronic signature, legislative, 126
Zimbabwe, description of signature, confusion, 199
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